

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THE

HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION

FROM THE

FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

TO a 2126

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

BY F. GUIZOT,

THE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE,

AUTHOR OF "HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF 1640."

TRANSLATED BY WILLIAM HAZLITT.

VOLUME I.

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PREFACE

TO THE

THIRD AMERICAN EDITION.

The adoption of this work as a text-book by numerous institutions, and the demand for a third edition within so short a period, indicate the favorable estimation in which it is held in this country.

In complying with the request of the publishers to superintend the present edition, the editor has seen fit to add a few notes, which, if of no value to the accomplished historical scholar, may perhaps be of some use to the younger student. He takes this occasion to offer a few observations on the study of history, and on the use which he conceives may be made of works like the present.

The study of history is a necessary part of a thorough education. Aside from its more immediate practical advantages a full and familiar knowledge of history is requisite to the most liberal cultivation of the mind. Accordingly, the study of history has always had a place in the course of instruction pursued in our higher institutions.

Precisely here, however, lies a serious difficulty. History is not, like many of the other studies prescribed in such a course, a science whose leading principles can be systematically exhibited within a moderate compass, and of which a complete elementary knowledge can be imparted within a limited time. There is, properly speaking, no short road to a competent knowledge of history. For any valuable purpose

there is really no such thing as an *elementary* study of history. It is not worth while to study it at all, unless it be thoroughly studied. A thorough knowledge of it cannot, however, be imparted in the lecture room; it must be acquired by the student himself in the solitary labor of the closet. The most accomplished instructer can do nothing more than to assist him in pursuing his investigations for himself. He must study special histories. He must carefully examine the best sources,—if possible, the original sources. He must make himself familiar with the details—at least of all the most important portions—of the history of the world. This is the work of years.

It is obvious, therefore, that a thorough knowledge of history can never be acquired in the time allowed for its study in the usual course of public instruction. The same thing may perhaps be said to hold true of other studies. To a certain extent it does. Still, in regard to most of the other studies, more can be done within the allotted time towards acquiring a competent knowledge of them, than can be done in regard to history. A good foundation may be laid; a successful beginning may be made. In respect to history it is far more difficult.

In what way, therefore, to occupy the time allotted to history to the best advantage, is a perplexing problem.

To devote the whole period to the study of some compend of *universal history*, containing a summary or abridgment of all the special histories of the world, is a very common method. Yet such works, from the nature of the case, can be out little more to the young student than a barren mass of dates, names, and dead facts. We might as well expect to gain a correct and lively impression of the form, features, and expression of a living man from the contemplation of the human skeleton, as to acquire a true knowledge of history from such abridgments alone. "Abridgments," as Professor Smyth well remarks, "have their use, but to read them as a

more summary method of acquiring historical knowledge, is not their use, nor can be. When the detail is tolerably known, the summary can then be understood, but not before. Summaries may always serve most usefully to revive the knowledge which has been before acquired, may throw it into proper shapes and proportions, and leave it in this state upon the memory, to supply the materials of subsequent reflection. But general histories, if they are read first, and before the particular history is known, are a sort of chain, of which the links seem not connected; contain representations and statements, which cannot be understood, and therefore cannot be remembered; and exhibit to the mind a succession of objects and images, each of which appears and retires too rapidly to be surveyed; and, when the whole vision has passed by, as soon it does, a trace of it is scarcely found to remain. Were I to look from an eminence over a country which I had never before seen, I should discover only the principal objects; the villa, the stream, the lawn, or the wood. But if the landscape before me had been the scene of my childhood, or lately of my residence, every object would bring along with it all its attendant associations, and the picture that was presented to the eye would be the least part of the impression that was received by the mind. Such is the difference between reading general histories before, or after, the particular histories to which they refer."

I must not, indeed, omit to observe," continues the same writer, "that there are some parts of history so obscure and of so little importance, that general accounts of them are all that can either be expected or acquired. Abridgments and general histories must here be used. Not that much can be thus received, but that much is not wanted, and that what little is necessary may be thus obtained.

" must also confess that general histories may in like manner be resorted to, for the purpose of acquiring a general notion of the great leading features of any particular history;

they may be to the student what maps are to the traveller, and give an idea of the nature of the country, and of the magnitude and situation of the towns through which he is to pass; they may teach him what he is to expect, and at what points he is to be the most diligent in his inquiries.

"Viewed in this light, general histories may be considered as of great importance, and that even *before* the perusal of the particular histories to which they refer; but they must never be resorted to except in the instances, and for the purposes just mentioned;—they must not be read as substitutes for more minute and regular histories, nor as short methods of quiring knowledge."*

While, therefore, the time devoted to history in our usual course of public instruction may not be altogether lost, even if wholly employed in the study of some general compendium there is yet great danger that its fruit will be merely the mechanical acquisition of a mass of dead facts, soon forgotten.

The zealous teacher will naturally feel a strong desire to lead his pupils to a more intimate acquaintance with the living spirit of history, the true meaning and significance of its mere facts. In this view resort is often had to such works as this of Guizot and others, which treat of what is called the *philosophy* of history. But in such works a knowledge of the facts which are made the basis of generalization and reflection, is almost wholly presumed; while the young student, from ignorance of the details of history, or a too slight acquaintance with them, may not be in a condition to understand, much less to judge for himself of the force and justness of, the general views presented to him,—at all events, is exposed to the danger of getting the habit of too easily taking upon trust, of acquiescence without insight. Against all these dangers the faithful teacher must do his best to protect the student. The most proper time to study such works is un

* Smyth's Lectures on Modern History, vol. I. p. 6.—Am. ed.

doubtedly when a thorough historical knowledge of the facts upon which they rest is acquired. Some one such work may however, under the guidance of a competent teacher, be read with benefit by the young student. Even if there be some things which he cannot adequately appreciate till he shall have gained a more minute knowledge of the historical details; even if there be some things which for the present he must leave unsettled or take upon trust,—he will still gain the advantage of having his attention directed to the great problems which history presents for solution; he will form an idea of what is meant by the most general spirit of history; he will have learned that the mere external events of history are worthy of record only as significant of the moral spirit of humanity; and he will be guided in his future study of the facts and details of special histories by a more determinate aim, and a more enlightened interest.

At the same time it is extremely desirable that the student should in the course of his elementary education be led to *accomplish thoroughly some portion*, however small, of the great task of the historical scholar; that some epoch, or portion of an epoch, some interesting and important event, at least, forming a sort of historical whole, should be selected and minutely studied, till he is thoroughly familiar with all its details, and perfectly comprehends the connexion, meaning, and consequences, of all the facts. This should be done for the purpose of teaching him how to investigate and compare, combine and reflect for himself.

In the impossibility, then, of communicating a thorough knowledge of history during the usual course of public instruction thus much, it is conceived, should be attempted—to add to the study of some judicious compend of universal history, that of some good specimen of philosophical generalization of historical facts, and the thorough investigation of some small portion of special history

The present work by M. Guizot may be recommended as

an excellent specimen of the sort of books which may aid the student in forming the habit of reflecting upon the facts of history, and in awakening and directing an intelligent interest in the study of those facts Its generalizations, it is true, are often extremely rapid, and presume a vast amount of historical knowledge ; but with the guidance of a competent teacher, the diligent student may supply for himself the needful information ; while the clearness and liveliness of the style render it an attractive work, and the general justness of its thought, the moderation and candor of its spirit, make it for the most part a safe and salutary work.

In the occasional notes added to this edition—and which are referred to by numerals—the editor has had no regular plan of elucidating the work. He has sometimes made a critical or qualifying remark simply because it could be done in a short space, and at other times has omitted to say any thing, because he would otherwise have been led into too extended a disquisition. So, likewise, in some places he has given historical or chronological statements of facts where he thought he could do so to any good purpose within a moderate compass, and in other places, which might seem equally or more to require similar illustration, he has added nothing, because he could not save the student the trouble of looking elsewhere without increasing too much the size of the volume. In short, they are what they are—here and there a note ; and the editor would fain hope that they will not detract from the value of the work in the view of any readers, and that to some they may be of use. C S H.

University of New-York.
June, 1842

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GENERAL

HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION

IN MODERN EUROPE,

FROM THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

LECTURE I.

CIVILIZATION IN GENERAL.

Being called upon to give a course of lectures, and having considered what subject would be most agreeable and convenient to fill up the short space allowed us from now to the close of the year, it has occurred to me that a general sketch of the History of Modern Europe, considered more especially with regard to the progress of civilization—that a general survey of the history of European civilization, of its origin, its progress, its end, its character, would be the most profitable subject upon which I could engage your attention.

I say European civilization, because there is evidently so striking a uniformity (*unité*) in the civilization of the different states of Europe, as fully to warrant this appellation. Civilization has flowed to them all from sources so much alike—it is so connected in them all, notwithstanding the great differences of time, of place, and circumstances, by the same principles, and it so tends in them all to bring about the same results, that no one will doubt the fact of there being a civilization essentially European.

At the same time it must be observed that this civilization cannot be found in—its history cannot be collected from, the history of any single state of Europe. However similar in its general appearance throughout the whole, its variety is not

less remarkable, nor has it ever yet developed itself completely in any particular country. Its characteristic features are widely spread, and we shall be obliged to seek, as occasion may require, in England, in France, in Germany, in Spain, for the elements of its history.

The situation in which we are placed, as Frenchmen, affords us a great advantage for entering upon the study of European civilization; for, without intending to flatter the country to which I am bound by so many ties, I cannot but regard France as the centre, as the focus, of the civilization of Europe. It would be going too far to say that she has always been, upon every occasion, in advance of other nations. Italy, at various epochs, has outstripped her in the arts; England, as regards political institutions, is by far before her; and, perhaps, at certain moments, we may find other nations of Europe superior to her in various particulars: but it must still be allowed, that whenever France has set forward in the career of civilization, she has sprung forth with new vigor, and has soon come up with, or passed by, all her rivals.

Not only is this the case, but those ideas, those institutions which promote civilization, but whose birth must be referred to other countries, have, before they could become general, or produce fruit,—before they could be transplanted to other lands, or benefit the common stock of European civilization, been obliged to undergo in France a new preparation: it is from France, as from a second country more rich and fertile, that they have started forth to make the conquest of Europe. There is not a single great idea, not a single great principle of civilization, which, in order to become universally spread, has not first passed through France.

There is, indeed, in the genius of the French, something of a sociableness, of a sympathy,—something which spreads itself with more facility and energy, than in the genius of any other people: it may be in the language, or the particular turn of mind of the French nation; it may be in their manners, or that their ideas, being more popular, present themselves more clearly to the masses, penetrate among them with greater ease; but, in a word, clearness, sociability, sympathy, are the particular characteristics of France, of its civilization; and these qualities render it eminently qualified to march at the head of European civilization.

In studying, then, the history of this great fact, it is neither an arbitrary choice, nor convention, that leads us to make

France the central point from which we shall study it; but it is because we feel that in so doing, we in a manner place ourselves in the very heart of civilization itself—in the heart of the very fact which we desire to investigate.

I say *fact*, and I say it advisedly: civilization is just as much a fact as any other—it is a fact which like any other may be studied, described, and have its history recounted.

It has been the custom for some time past, and very properly, to talk of the necessity of confining history to facts; nothing can be more just; but it would be almost absurd to suppose that there are no facts but such as are material and visible: there are moral, hidden facts, which are no less real than battles, wars, and the public acts of government. Besides these individual facts, each of which has its proper name, there are others of a general nature, without a name, of which it is impossible to say that they happened in such a year, or on such a day, and which it is impossible to confine within any precise limits, but which are yet just as much facts as the battles and public acts of which we have spoken.

That very portion, indeed, which we are accustomed to hear called the philosophy of history—which consists in showing the relation of events with each other—the chain which connects them—the *causes* and *effects* of events—this is history just as much as the description of battles, and all the other exterior events which it recounts. Facts of this kind are undoubtedly more difficult to unravel; the historian is more liable to deceive himself respecting them; it requires more skill to place them distinctly before the reader; but this difficulty does not alter their nature; they still continue not a whit the less, for all this, to form an essential part of history.

Civilization is just one of these kind of facts; it is so general in its nature that it can scarcely be seized; so complicated that it can scarcely be unravelled; so hidden as scarcely to be discernible. The difficulty of describing it, of recounting its history, is apparent and acknowledged; but its existence, its worthiness to be described and to be recounted, is not less certain and manifest. Then, respecting civilization, what a number of problems remain to be solved! It may be asked, it is even now disputed, whether civilization be a good or an evil? One party decries it as teeming with mischief to man, while another lauds it as the means by which he will attain

his highest dignity and excellence.[1] Again, it is asked whether this *fact* is universal—whether there is a general civilization of the whole human race—a course for humanity to run—a destiny for it to accomplish; whether nations have not transmitted from age to age something to their successors which is never lost, but which grows and continues as a common stock, and will thus be carried on to the end of all things. For my part, I feel assured that human nature has such a destiny; that a general civilization pervades the human race; that at every epoch it augments; and that there, consequently,

---

[1] This dispute turns upon the greater or less extension given to the term.

Civilization may be taken to signify merely the multiplication of artificial wants, and of the means and refinements of physical enjoyment.

It may also be taken to imply both a state of physical well being and a state of superior intellectual and moral culture.

It is only in the former sense that it can be alleged that civilization is an evil.

Civilization is properly a relative term. It refers to a certain state of mankind as distinguished from barbarism.

Man is formed for society. Isolated and solitary, his reason would remain perfectly undeveloped. Against the total defeat of his destination for rational development God has provided by the domestic relations. Yet without a further extension of the social ties, man would still remain comparatively rude and uncultivated—never emerging from barbarism. In proportion as the social relations are extended, regulated and perfected, man is softened, ameliorated, cultivated. To this improvement various social conditions combine; but as the political organization of society—the STATE—is that which first gives security and permanence to all the others, it holds the most important place. Hence it is from the political organization of society, from the establishment of the STATE, (in Latin *civitas*,) that the word civilization is taken.

Civilization, therefore, in its most general idea, is an improved condition of man resulting from the establishment of social order in place of the individual independence and lawlessness of the savage or barbarous life. It may exist in various degrees: it is susceptible of continual progress: and hence the history of civilization is the history of the progress of the human race towards realizing the idea of humanity, through the extension and perfection of the social relations, and as affected, advanced or retarded, by the character of the various political and civil institutions which have existed.

is a universal history of civilization to be written. Nor have I any hesitation in asserting that this history is the most noble, the most interesting of any, and that it comprehends every other.

Is it not indeed clear that civilization is the great fact in which all others merge; in which they all end, in which they are all condensed, in which all others find their importance? Take all the facts of which the history of a nation is composed, all the facts which we are accustomed to consider as the elements of its existence—take its institutions, its commerce, its industry, its wars, the various details of its government; and if you would form some idea of them as a whole, if you would see their various bearings on each other, if you would appreciate their value, if you would pass a judgment upon them, what is it you desire to know? Why, what they have done to forward the progress of civilization—what part they have acted in this great drama,—what influence they have exercised in aiding its advance. It is not only by this that we form a general opinion of these facts, but it is by this standard that we try them, that we estimate their true value. These are, as it were, the rivers of whom we ask how much water they have carried to the ocean. Civilization is, as it were, the grand emporium of a people, in which all its wealth —all the elements of its life—all the powers of its existence are stored up. It is so true that we judge of minor facts accordingly as they affect this greater one, that even some which are naturally detested and hated, which prove a heavy calamity to the nation upon which they fall—say, for instance, despotism, anarchy, and so forth,—even these are partly forgiven, their evil nature is partly overlooked, if they have aided in any considerable degree the march of civilization. Wherever the progress of this principle is visible, together with the facts which have urged it forward, we are tempted to forget the price it has cost—we overlook the dearness of the purchase.

Again, there are certain facts which, properly speaking, can not be called social—individual facts which rather concern the human intellect than public life: such are religious doctrines, philosophical opinions, literature, the sciences and arts. All these seem to offer themselves to individual man for his improvement, instruction, or amusement; and to be directed rather to his intellectual melioration and pleasure, than to his social condition. Yet still, how often do these facts come be-

fore us—how often are we compelled to consider them as influencing civilization! In all times, in all countries, it has been the boast of religion, that it has civilized the people among whom it has dwelt. Literature, the arts, and sciences, have put in their claim for a share of this glory; and mankind has been ready to laud and honor them whenever it has felt that this praise was fairly their due. In the same manner, facts the most important—facts of themselves, and independently of their exterior consequences, the most sublime in their nature, have increased in importance, have reached a higher degree of sublimity, by their connexion with civilization. Such is the worth of this great principle, that it gives a value to all it touches. Not only so, but there are even cases, in which the facts of which we have spoken, in which philosophy, literature, the sciences, and the arts, are especially judged, and condemned or applauded, according to their influence upon civilization.

Before, however, we proceed to the history of this fact, so important, so extensive, so precious, and which seems, as it were, to imbody the entire life of nations, let us consider it for a moment in itself, and endeavor to discover what it really is.

I shall be careful here not to fall into pure philosophy; I shall not lay down a certain rational principle, and then, by deduction, show the nature of civilization as a consequence there would be too many chances of error in pursuing this method. Still, without this, we shall be able to find a fact to establish and to describe.

For a long time past, and in many countries, the word civilization has been in use; ideas more or less clear, and of wider or more contracted signification, have been attached to it; still it has been constantly employed and generally understood. Now, it is the popular, common signification of this word that we must investigate. In the usual, general acceptation of terms, there will nearly always be found more truth than in the seemingly more precise and rigorous definitions of science. It is common sense which gives to words their popular signification, and common sense is the genius of humanity. The popular signification of a word is formed by degrees, and while the facts it represents are themselves present. As often as a fact comes before us which seems to answer to

he signification of a known term, this term is naturally applied to it, its signification gradually extending and enlarging itself, so that at last the various facts and ideas which, from the nature of things, ought to be brought together and imbodied in this term, will be found collected and imbodied in it When, on the contrary, the signification of a word is determined by science, it is usually done by one or a very few individuals, who, at the time, are under the influence of some particular fact which has taken possession of their imagination. Thus it comes to pass that scientific definitions are, in general, much narrower, and, on that very account, much less correct, than the popular significations given to words. So, in the investigation of the meaning of the word *civilization* as a fact—by seeking out all the ideas it comprises, according to the common sense of mankind, we shall arrive much nearer to the knowledge of the fact itself, by than attempting to give our own scientific definition of it, though this might at first appear more clear and precise.

I shall commence this investigation by placing before you a series of hypotheses. I shall describe society in various conditions, and shall then ask if the state in which I so describe it is, in the general opinion of mankind, the state of a people advancing in civilization—if it answers to the signification which mankind generally attaches to this word.

First, imagine a people whose outward circumstances are easy and agreeable; few taxes, few hardships; justice is fairly administered; in a word, physical existence, taken altogether, is satisfactorily and happily regulated. But with all this the moral and intellectual energies of this people are studiously kept in a state of torpor and inertness. It can hardly be called oppression; its tendency is not of that character—it is rather compression. We are not without examples of this state of society. There have been a great number of little aristocratic republics, in which the people have been thus treated like so many flocks of sheep, carefully tended, physically happy, but without the least intellectual and moral activity. Is this civilization? Do we recognise here a people in a state of moral and social advancement?

Let us take another hypothesis. Let us imagine a people whose outward circumstances are less favorable and agreeable; still, however, supportable As a set-off, its intellectual

and moral cravings have not here been entirely neglected. A certain range has been allowed them—some few pure and elevated sentiments have been here distributed; religious and moral notions have reached a certain degree of improvement; but the greatest care has been taken to stifle every principle of liberty. The moral and intellectual wants of this people are provided for in the way that, among some nations, the physical wants have been provided for; a certain portion of truth is doled out to each, but no one is permitted to help himself—to seek for truth on his own account. Immobility is the character of its moral life; and to this condition are fallen most of the populations of Asia, in which theocratic government restrains the advance of man: such, for example, is the state of the Hindoos. I again put the same question as before—Is this a people among whom civilization is going on?

I will change entirely the nature of the hypothesis: suppose a people among whom there reigns a very large stretch of personal liberty, but among whom also disorder and inequality almost everywhere abound. The weak are oppressed, afflicted, destroyed; violence is the ruling character of the social condition. Every one knows that such has been the state of Europe. Is this a civilized state? It may without doubt contain germs of civilization which may progressively shoot up; but the actual state of things which prevails in this society is not, we may rest assured, what the common sense of mankind would call civilization.

I pass on to a fourth and last hypothesis. Every individual here enjoys the widest extent of liberty; inequality is rare, or, at least, of a very slight character. Every one does as he likes, and scarcely differs in power from his neighbor. But then here scarcely such a thing is known as a general interest; here exist but few public ideas; hardly any public feeling; but little society: in short, the life and faculties of individuals are put forth and spent in an isolated state, with but little regard to society, and with scarcely a sentiment of its influence. Men here exercise no influence upon one another; they leave no traces of their existence. Generation after generation pass away, leaving society just as they found it. Such is the condition of the various tribes of savages; liberty and equality dwell among them, but no touch of civilization.

I could easily multiply these hypotheses; but I presume that I have gone far enough to show what is the popular and natural signification of the word civilization.

It is evident that none of the states which I have just described will correspond with the common notion of mankind respecting this term. It seems to me that the first idea comprised in the word *civilization* (and this may be gathered from the various examples which I have placed before you) is the notion of progress, of development. It calls up within us the notion of a people advancing, of a people in a course of improvement and melioration.

Now what is this progress? What is this development? In this is the great difficulty. The etymology of the word seems sufficiently obvious—it points at once to the improvement of civil life. The first notion which strikes us in pronouncing it is the progress of society; the melioration of the social state; the carrying to higher perfection the relations between man and man. It awakens within us at once the notion of an increase of national prosperity, of a greater activity and better organization of the social relations. On one hand there is a manifest increase in the power and well-being of society at large; and on the other a more equitable distribution of this power and this well-being among the individuals of which society is composed.

But the word civilization has a more extensive signification than this, which seems to confine it to the mere outward, physical organization of society. Now, if this were all, the human race would be little better than the inhabitants of an ant-hill or bee-hive; a society in which nothing was sought for beyond order and well-being—in which the highest, the sole aim, would be the production of the means of life, and their equitable distribution.

But our nature at once rejects this definition as too narrow. It tells us that man is formed for a higher destiny than this. That this is not the full development of his character—that civilization comprehends something more extensive, something more complex, something superior to the perfection of social relations, of social power and well-being.

That this is so, we have not merely the evidence of our nature, and that derived from the signification which the common sense of mankind has attached to the word; but we have likewise the evidence of facts.

No one, for example, will deny that there are communities in which the social state of man is better—in which the means of life are better supplied, are more rapidly produced, are better distributed, than in others, which yet will be pronounced

by the unanimous voice of mankind to be superior in point of civilization.

Take Rome, for example, in the splendid days of the republic, at the close of the second Punic war; the moment of her greatest virtues, when she was rapidly advancing to the empire of the world—when her social condition was evidently improving. Take Rome again under Augustus, at the commencement of her decline, when, to say the least, the progressive movement of society halted, when bad principles seemed ready to prevail: but is there any person who would not say that Rome was more civilized under Augustus than in the days of Fabricius or Cincinnatus?

Let us look further: let us look at France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In a merely social point of view, as respects the quantity and the distribution of well-being among individuals, France, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was decidedly inferior to several of the other states of Europe; to Holland and England in particular Social activity, in these countries, was greater, increased more rapidly, and distributed its fruits more equitably among individuals. Yet consult the general opinion of mankind, and it will tell you that France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the most civilized country of Europe. Europe has not hesitated to acknowledge this fact, and evidence of its truth will be found in all the great works of European literature.

It appears evident, then, that all that we understand by this term is not comprised in the simple idea of social well-being and happiness; and, if we look a little deeper, we discover that, besides the progress and melioration of social life, another development is comprised in our notion of civilization: namely, the development of individual life, the development of the human mind and its faculties—the development of man himself.

It is this development which so strikingly manifested itself in France and Rome at these epochs; it is this expansion of human intelligence which gave to them so great a degree of superiority in civilization. In these countries the godlike principle which distinguishes man from the brute exhibited itself with peculiar grandeur and power; and compensated in the eyes of the world for the defects of their social system These communities had still many social conquests to make, but they had already glorified themselves by the intellectual

and moral victories they had achieved. Many of the conveniences of life were here wanting; from a considerable portion of the community were still withheld their natural rights and political privileges: but see the number of illustrious individuals who lived and earned the applause and approbation of their fellow-men. Here, too, literature, science, and art, attained extraordinary perfection, and shone in more splendor than perhaps they had ever done before. Now, wherever this takes place, wherever man sees these glorious idols of his worship displayed in their full lustre,—wherever he sees this fund of rational and refined enjoyment for the godlike part of his nature called into existence, there he recognises and adores civilization.

Two elements, then, seem to be comprised in the great fact which we call civilization;—two circumstances are necessary to its existence—it lives upon two conditions—it reveals itself by two symptoms: the progress of society, the progress of individuals; the melioration of the social system, and the expansion of the mind and faculties of man. Wherever the exterior condition of man becomes enlarged, quickened, and improved; wherever the intellectual nature of man distinguishes itself by its energy, brilliancy, and its grandeur; wherever these two signs concur, and they often do so, notwithstanding the gravest imperfections in the social system, there man proclaims and applauds civilization.

Such, if I mistake not, would be the notion mankind in general would form of civilization, from a simple and rational inquiry into the meaning of the term. This view of it is confirmed by History. If we ask of her what has been the character of every great crisis favorable to civilization, if we examine those great events which all acknowledge to have carried it forward, we shall always find one or other of the two elements which I have just described. They have all been epochs of individual or social improvement; events which have either wrought a change in individual man, in his opinions, his manners; or in his exterior condition, his situation as regards his relations with his fellow-men. Christianity, for example: I allude not merely to the first moment of its appearance, but to the first centuries of its existence—Christianity was in no way addressed to the social condition of man; it distinctly disclaimed all interference with it. It commanded the slave to obey his master. It attacked none of the great evils, none of the gross acts of injustice, by which

the social system of that day was disfigured: yet who but will acknowledge that Christianity has been one of the greatest promoters of civilization? And wherefore? Because it has changed the interior condition of man, his opinions, his sentiments: because it has regenerated his moral, his intellectual character.

We have seen a crisis of an opposite nature; a crisis affecting not the intellectual, but the outward condition of man, which has changed and regenerated society. This also we may rest assured is a decisive crisis of civilization. If we search history through, we shall everywhere find the same result; we shall meet with no important event, which had a direct influence in the advancement of civilization, which has not exercised it in one of the two ways I have just mentioned.

Having thus, as I hope, given you a clear notion of the two elements of which civilization is composed, let us now see whether one of them alone would be sufficient to constitute it: whether either the development of the social condition, or the development of the individual man taken separately, deserves to be regarded as civilization? or whether these two events are so intimately connected, that, if they are not produced simultaneously, they are nevertheless *so intimately connected*, that, sooner or later, one uniformly produces the other?

There are three ways, as it seems to me, in which we may proceed in deciding this question. *First:* we may investigate the nature itself of the two elements of civilization, and see whether by that they are strictly and necessarily bound together. *Secondly:* we may examine historically whether, in fact, they have manifested themselves separately, or whether one has always produced the other. *Thirdly:* we may consult common sense, *i. e.*, the general opinion of mankind. Let us first address ourselves to the general opinion of mankind—to common sense.

When any great change takes place in the state of a country—when any great development of social prosperity is accomplished within it—any revolution or reform in the powers and privileges of society, this new event naturally has its adversaries. It is necessarily contested and opposed. Now

what are the objections which the adversaries of such revolutions bring against them?

They assert that this progress of the social condition is attended with no advantage; that it does not improve in a corresponding degree the moral state—the intellectual powers of man; that it is a false, deceitful progress, which proves detrimental to his moral character, to the true interests of his better nature. On the other hand, this attack is repulsed with much force by the friends of the movement. They maintain that the progress of society necessarily leads to the progress of intelligence and morality; that, in proportion as the social life is better regulated, individual life becomes more refined and virtuous. Thus the question rests in abeyance between the opposers and partisans of the change.

But reverse this hypothesis; suppose the moral development in progress. What do the men who labor for it generally hope for?—What, at the origin of societies, have the founders of religion, the sages, poets, and philosophers, who have labored to regulate and refine the manners of mankind, promised themselves? What but the melioration of the social condition: the more equitable distribution of the blessings of life? What, now, let me ask, should be inferred from this dispute and from those hopes and promises? It may, I think, be fairly inferred that it is the spontaneous, intuitive conviction of mankind, that the two elements of civilization—the social and moral development—are intimately connected; that, at the approach of one, man looks for the other. It is to this natural conviction, we appeal when, to second or combat either one or the other of the two elements, we deny or attest its union with the other. We know that if men were persuaded that the melioration of the social condition would operate against the expansion of the intellect, they would almost oppose and cry out against the advancement of society. On the other hand, when we speak to mankind of improving society by improving its individual members, we find them willing to believe us, and to adopt the principle. Hence we may affirm that it is the intuitive belief of man, that these two elements of civilization are intimately connected, and that they reciprocally produce one another.

If we now examine the history of the world we shall have the same result. We shall find that every expansion of human intelligence has proved of advantage to society: and that

all the great advances in the social condition have turned to the profit of humanity. One or other of these facts may predominate, may shine forth with greater splendor for a season, and impress upon the movement its own particular character. At times, it may not be till after the lapse of a long interval, after a thousand transformations, a thousand obstacles, that the second shows itself, and comes, as it were, to complete the civilization which the first had begun; but when we look closely we easily recognise the link by which they are connected. The movements of Providence are not restricted to narrow bounds: it is not anxious to deduce to-day the consequence of the premises it laid down yesterday. It may defer this for ages, till the fulness of time shall come. Its logic will not be less conclusive for reasoning slowly. Providence moves through time, as the gods of Homer through space—it makes a step, and ages have rolled away! How long a time, how many circumstances intervened, before the regeneration of the moral powers of man, by Christianity, exercised its great, its legitimate influence upon his social condition? Yet who can doubt or mistake its power?

If we pass from history to the nature itself of the two facts which constitute civilization, we are infallibly led to the same result. We have all experienced this. If a man makes a mental advance, some mental discovery, if he acquires some new idea, or some new faculty, what is the desire that takes possession of him at the very moment he makes it? It is the desire to promulgate his sentiment to the exterior world—to publish and realize his thought. When a man acquires a new truth—when his being in his own eyes has made an advance, has acquired a new gift, immediately there becomes joined to this acquirement the notion of a mission. He feels obliged, impelled, as it were, by a secret interest, to extend, to carry out of himself the change, the melioration which has been accomplished within him. To what, but this, do we owe the exertions of great reformers? The exertions of those great benefactors of the human race, who have changed the face of the world, after having first been changed themselves, have been stimulated and governed by no other impulse than this.

So much for the change which takes place in the intellectual man. Let us now consider him in a social state. A revolution is made in the condition of society. Rights and

property are more equitably distributed among individuals. this is as much as to say, the appearance of the world is purer—is more beautiful. The state of things, both as respects governments, and as respects men in their relations with each other, is improved. And can there be a question whether the sight of this goodly spectacle, whether the melioration of this external condition of man, will have a corresponding influence upon his moral, his individual character—upon humanity? Such a doubt would belie all that is said of the authority of example and of the power of habit, which is founded upon nothing but the conviction that exterior facts and circumstances, if good, reasonable, well-regulated, are followed, sooner or later, more or less completely, by intellectual results of the same nature, of the same beauty: that a world better governed, better regulated, a world in which justice more fully prevails, renders man himself more just. That the intellectual man then is instructed and improved by the superior condition of society, and his social condition, his external well-being, meliorated and refined by increase of intelligence in individuals: that the two elements of civilization are strictly connected: that ages, that obstacles of all kinds, may interpose between them—that it is possible they may undergo a thousand transformations before they meet together; but that sooner or later this union will take place is certain; for it is a law of their nature that they should do so—the great facts of history bear witness that such is really the case—the instinctive belief of man proclaims the same truth.

Thus, though I have not by a great deal advanced all that might be said upon this subject, I trust I have given a tolerably correct and adequate notion, in the foregoing cursory account, of what civilization is, of what are its offices, and what its importance. I might here quit the subject; but I cannot part with it, without placing before you another question, which here naturally presents itself—a question not purely historical, but rather, I will not say hypothetical, but conjectural; a question which we can see here but in part; but which, however, is not less real, but presses itself upon our notice at every turn of thought.

Of the two developments, of which we have just now spoken, and which together constitute civilization,—of the

development of society on one part, and of the expansion of human intelligence on the other—which is the end? which are the means? Is it for the improvement of the social condition, for the melioration of his existence upon the earth, that man fully developes himself, his mind, his faculties, his sentiments, his ideas, his whole being? Or is the melioration of the social condition, the progress of society,—is indeed society itself merely the theatre, the occasion, the motive and excitement for the development of the individual? In a word, is society formed for the individual, or the individual for society? Upon the reply to this question depends our knowledge of whether the destiny of man is purely social, whether society exhausts and absorbs the entire man, or whether he bears within him something foreign, something superior to his existence in this world?

One of the greatest philosophers and most distinguished men of the present age, whose words become indelibly engraved upon whatever spot they fall, has resolved this question; he has resolved it, at least, according to his own conviction. The following are his words: "Human societies are born, live, and die, upon the earth; there they accomplish their destinies. But they contain not the whole man. After his engagement to society there still remains in him the more noble part of his nature; those high faculties by which he elevates himself to God, to a future life, and to the unknown blessings of an invisible world. We, individuals, each with a separate and distinct existence, with an identical person, we, truly beings endowed with immortality, we have a higher destiny than that of states."*

I shall add nothing on this subject; it is not my province to handle it: it is enough for me to have placed it before you. It haunts us again at the close of the history of civilization.—Where the history of civilization ends, when there is no more to be said of the present life, man invincibly demands if all is over—if that be the end of all things? This, then, is the last problem, and the grandest, to which the history of civilization can lead us. It is sufficient that I have marked its place, and its sublime character.[2]

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* Opinion De Royer Collard, sur le projet de loi rélatif au sacrilége, pp. 7 et 1[illegible].

[2] Man can be comprehended only as a free moral being, that is, as a rational being: but as a rational being it is impossible to com-

From the foregoing remarks, it becomes evident that the history of civilization may be considered from two different points of view—may be drawn from two different sources. The historian may take up his abode during the time prescribed, say a series of centuries, in the human soul, or with some particular nation. He may study, describe, relate, all the circumstances, all the transformations, all the revolutions, which may have taken place in the intellectual man; and when he had done this he would have a history of the civilization among the people, or during the period which he had chosen. He might proceed differently: instead of entering into the interior of man, he might take his stand in the external world. He might take his station in the midst of the great theatre of life; instead of describing the change of ideas, of the sentiments of the individual being, he might describe his exterior

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prehend his existence, if it be limited to the present world. In the very nature of human reason and of the relations of the human race to it, lies the idea of the destination of the race for a supermundane and eternal sphere. Reason is the germ of a development which is not and cannot be reached here below. To doubt that it is destined for development, and that there is a corresponding sphere, is contradictory: it is to doubt whether the fruit, unfolding from the blossom, is destined by its constitution to ripen.

Herein, while the delusion of certain philosophical theories respecting *Human Perfectibility* is made apparent, may be seen nevertheless the correct idea of man's earthly life. It is that of a continual progress, a reaching towards that perfection, the notion and desire of which lies in the nature of his reason.

Humanity in all its social efforts has always been governed by the idea of a perfection never yet attained. All human history may in one view be regarded as a series of attempts to realize this idea.

As individual man can attain the ideal perfection of his nature only as a rational being, by the harmony of all his powers with his reason; so it is equally clear that humanity can realize the idea of social perfection only as a rational society, by the union and brotherhood of the human family, and the harmony of all individuals with the Divine reason. How far it may be in the intentions of Divine Providence that the human race shall realize this perfection, it may be impossible to determine. Certain it is, that it can never be brought about by any mere political institutions, by checks and counterchecks of interest, by any balance of international powers. Only Christianity can effect this universal brotherhood of nations, and bind the human family together in a rational that is, a free moral society.

circumstances, the events, the revolutions of his social condition. These two portions, these two histories of civilization, are strictly connected with each other; they are the counterpart, the reflected image of one another. They may, however, be separated. Perhaps it is necessary, at least in the beginning, in order to be exposed in detail and with clearness, that they should be. For my part I have no intention, upon the present occasion, to enter upon the history of civilization in the human mind: the history of the exterior events of the visible and social world is that to which I shall call your attention. It would give me pleasure to be able to display before you the phenomenon of civilization in the way I understand it, in all its bearings, in its widest extent—to place before you all the vast questions to which it gives rise. But, for the present, I must restrain my wishes; I must confine myself to a narrower field: it is only the history of the social state that I shall attempt to narrate.

My first object will be to seek out the elements of European civilization at the time of its birth, at the fall of the Roman empire—to examine carefully society such as it was in the midst of these famous ruins. I shall endeavor to pick out these elements, and to place them before you, side by side; I shall endeavor to put them in motion, and to follow them in their progress through the fifteen centuries which have rolled away since that epoch.

We shall not, I think, proceed far in this study, without being convinced that civilization is still in its infancy. How distant is the human mind from the perfection to which it may attain—from the perfection for which it was created! How incapable are we of grasping the whole future destiny of man! Let any one even descend into his own mind—let him picture there the highest point of perfection to which man, to which society may attain, that he can conceive, that he can hope;—let him then contrast this picture with the present state of the world, and he will feel assured that society and civilization are still in their childhood: that however great the distance they have advanced, that which they have before them is incomparably, is infinitely greater. This, however, should not lessen the pleasure with which we contemplate our present condition. When you have run over with me the great epochs of civilization during the last fifteen centuries, you will see, up to our time, how painful, how stormy, has been the condition of man; how hard has been his lot, not only outwardly

as regards society, but internally, as regards the intellectual man. For fifteen centuries the human mind has suffered as much as the human race. You will see that it is only lately that the human mind, perhaps for the first time, has arrived, imperfect though its condition still be, to a state where some peace, some harmony, some freedom is found. The same holds with regard to society—its immense progress is evident —the condition of man, compared with what it has been, is easy and just. In thinking of our ancestors we may almost apply to ourselves the verses of Lucretius :—

> "Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis,
> E terrâ magnum alterius spectare laborem."

Without any great degree of pride we may, as Sthenelas is made to do in Homer, Ημεις τοι πατερων μεγ' αμεινονες ευχομεθ' ειναι, 'Return thanks to God that we are infinitely better than our fathers."

We must, however, take care not to deliver ourselves up too fully to a notion of our happiness and our improved condition It may lead us into two serious evils, pride and inactivity ;— it may give us an overweening confidence in the power and success of the human mind, of its present attainments ; and, at the same time, dispose us to apathy, enervated by the agreeableness of our condition. I know not if this strikes you as it does me, but in my judgment we continually oscillate between an inclination to complain without sufficient cause, and to be too easily satisfied. We have an extreme susceptibility of mind, an inordinate craving, an ambition in our thoughts, in our desires, and in the movements of our imagination ; yet when we come to practical life—when trouble, when sacrifices, when efforts are required for the attainment of our object, we sink into lassitude and inactivity. We are discouraged almost as easily as we had been excited. Let us not, however, suffer ourselves to be invaded by either of these vices. Let us estimate fairly what our abilities, our knowledge, our power enable us to do lawfully ; and let us aim at nothing that we cannot lawfully, justly, prudently—with a proper respect to the great principles upon which our social system, our civilization is based—attain. The age of barbarian Europe, with its brute force, its violence, its lies and deceit,—the habitual practice under which Europe groaned during four or five centuries are passed away for ever, and has given place to a bet

ter order of things. We trust that the time now approaches when man's condition shall be progressively improved by the force of reason and truth, when the brute part of nature shall be crushed, that the godlike spirit may unfold. In the mean time let us be cautious that no vague desires, that no extravagant theories, the time for which may not yet be come, carry us beyond the bounds of prudence, or beget in us a discontent with our present state. To us much has been given, of us much will be required. Posterity will demand a strict account of our conduct—the public, the government, *all* is now open to discussion, to examination. Let us then attach ourselves firmly to the principles of our civilization, to justice, to the laws, to liberty: and never forget, that, if we have the right to demand that all things shall be laid open before us, and judged by us, we likewise are before the world, who will examine us, and judge us according to our works.

LECTURE II.*

OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION IN PARTICULAR: ITS DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS—ITS SUPERIORITY—ITS ELEMENTS.

In the preceding Lecture, I endeavored to give an explanation of civilization in general. Without referring to any civilization in particular, or to circumstances of time and place I essayed to place it before you in a point of view purely philosophical. I purpose now to enter upon the History of the Civilization of Europe; but before doing so, before going into its proper history, I must make you acquainted with the peculiar character of this civilization—with its distinguishing features, so that you may be able to recognise and distinguish European civilization from every other.

When we look at the civilizations which have preceded that of modern Europe, whether in Asia or elsewhere, including even those of Greece and Rome, it is impossible not to be struck with the unity of character which reigns among them. Each appears as though it had emanated from a single fact, from a single idea. One might almost assert that society was under the influence of one single principle, which universally prevailed and determined the character of its institutions, its manners, its opinions—in a word, all its developments.

In Egypt, for example, it was the theocratic principle that took possession of society, and showed itself in its manners, in its monuments, and in all that has come down to us of Egyptian civilization. In India the same phenomenon occurs—it is still a repetition of the almost exclusively prevailing

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* This lecture, in the original, is introduced by a few words, in which the author offers to explain privately any points of his discourse, not well understood, to such as shall apply; also to state that he is obliged frequently to make assertions without being able, from the short time allotted to him, to give the proofs they seem to require.

influence of theocracy. In other regions a different organization may be observed—perhaps the domination of a conquering caste: and where such is the case, the principle of force takes entire possession of society, imposing upon it its laws and its character. In another place, perhaps, we discover society under the entire influence of the democratic principle; such was the case in the commercial republics which covered the coasts of Asia Minor and Syria—in Ionia and Phœnicia. In a word, whenever we contemplate the civilizations of the ancients, we find them all impressed with one ever-prevailing character of unity, visible in their institutions, their ideas, and manners—one sole, or at least one very preponderating influence, seems to govern and determine all things.

I do not mean to aver that this overpowering influence of one single principle, of one single form, prevailed without any exception in the civilization of those states. If we go back to their earliest history, we shall find that the various powers which dwelt in the bosom of these societies frequently struggled for mastery. Thus among the Egyptians, the Etruscans, even among the Greeks and others, we may observe the warrior caste struggling against that of the priests. In other places we find the spirit of clanship struggling against the spirit of free association, the spirit of aristocracy against popular rights. These struggles, however, mostly took place in periods beyond the reach of history, and no evidence of them is left beyond a vague tradition.

Sometimes, indeed, these early struggles broke out afresh at a later period in the history of the nations; but in almost every case they were quickly terminated by the victory of one of the powers which sought to prevail, and which then took sole possession of society. The war always ended by the domination of some special principle, which, if not exclusive, at least greatly preponderated. The co-existence and strife of various principles among these nations were no more than a passing, an accidental circumstance.

From this cause a remarkable unity characterizes most of the civilizations of antiquity, the results of which, however, were very different. In one nation, as in Greece, the unity of the social principle led to a development of wonderful rapidity; no other people ever ran so brilliant a career in so short a time. But Greece had hardly become glorious, before she appeared worn out: her decline, if not quite so rapid as

ner rise, was strangely sudden. It seems as if the principle which called Greek civilization into life was exhausted. No other came to invigorate it, or supply its place.

In other states, say, for example, in India and Egypt, where again only one principle of civilization prevailed, the result was different. Society here became stationary; simplicity produced monotony; the country was not destroyed; society continued to exist; but there was no progression; it remained torpid and inactive.

To this same cause must be attributed that character of tyranny which prevailed, under various names, and the most opposite forms, in all the civilizations of antiquity. Society belonged to one *exclusive* power, which could bear with no other. Every principle of a different tendency was proscribed. The governing principle would nowhere suffer by its side the manifestation and influence of a rival principle.

This character of simplicity, of unity, in their civilization, is equally impressed upon their literature and intellectual productions. Who that has run over the monuments of Hindoo literature lately introduced into Europe, but has seen that they are all struck from the same die? They all seem the result of one same fact; the expression of one same idea. Religious and moral treatises, historical traditions, dramatic poetry, epics, all bear the same physiognomy. The same character of unity and monotony shines out in these works of mind and fancy, as we discover in their life and institutions. Even in Greece, notwithstanding the immense stores of knowledge and intellect which it poured forth, a wonderful unity still prevailed in all relating to literature and the arts.

How different to all this is the case as respects the civilization of modern Europe! Take ever so rapid a glance at this, and it strikes you at once as diversified, confused, and stormy. All the principles of social organization are found existing together within it; powers temporal, powers spiritual, the theocratic, monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements, all classes of society, all the social situations, are jumbled together, and visible within it; as well as infinite gradations of liberty, of wealth, and of influence. These various powers, too, are found here in a state of continual struggle among themselves, without any one having sufficient force to

master the others, and take sole possession of society. Among the ancients, at every great epoch, all communities seem cast in the same mould : it was now pure monarchy, now theocracy or democracy, that became the reigning principle, each in its turn reigning absolutely. But modern Europe contains examples of all these systems, of all the attempts at social organization ; pure and mixed monarchies, theocracies, republics more or less aristocratic, all live in common, side by side, at one and the same time ; yet, notwithstanding their diversity, they all bear a certain resemblance to each other, a kind of family likeness which it is impossible to mistake, and which shows them to be essentially European

In the moral character, in the notions and sentiments of Europe, we find the same variety, the same struggle. Theocratical opinions, monarchical opinions, aristocratic opinions democratic opinions, cross and jostle, struggle, become interwoven, limit, and modify each other. Open the boldest treatises of the middle age : in none of them is an opinion carried to its final consequences. The advocates of absolute power flinch, almost unconsciously, from the results to which their doctrine would carry them. We see that the ideas and influences around them frighten them from pushing it to its uttermost point. Democracy felt the same control. That imperturbable boldness, so striking in ancient civilizations, nowhere found a place in the European system. In sentiments we discover the same contrasts, the same variety ; an indomitable taste for independence dwelling by the side of the greatest aptness for submission ; a singular fidelity between man and man, and at the same time an imperious desire in each to do his own will, to shake off all restraint, to live alone, without troubling himself with the rest of the world. Minds were as much diversified as society.

The same characteristic is observable in literature. It cannot be denied that in what relates to the form and beauty of art, modern Europe is very inferior to antiquity ; but if we look at her literature as regards depth of feeling and ideas, it will be found more powerful and rich. The human mind has been employed upon a greater number of objects, its labors have been more diversified, it has gone to a greater depth Its imperfection in form is owing to this very cause. The more plenteous and rich the materials, the greater is the dif

ficulty of forcing them into a pure and simple form. That which gives beauty to a composition, that which in works of art we call form, is the clearness, the simplicity, the symbolical unity of the work. With the prodigious diversity of ideas and sentiments which belong to European civilization, the difficulty to attain this grand and chaste simplicity has been increased.

In every part, then, we find this character of variety to prevail in modern civilization. It has undoubtedly brought with it this inconvenience, that when we consider separately any particular development of the human mind in literature, in the arts, in any of the ways in which human intelligence may go forward, we shall generally find it inferior to the corresponding development in the civilization of antiquity; but, as a set-off to this, when we regard it as a whole, European civilization appears incomparably more rich and diversified: if each particular fruit has not attained the same perfection, it has ripened an infinitely greater variety. Again, European civilization has now endured fifteen centuries, and in all that time it has been in a state of progression. It may be true that it has not advanced so rapidly as the Greek; but, catching new impulses at every step, it is still advancing. An unbounded career is open before it; and from day to day it presses forward to the race with increasing rapidity, because increased freedom attends upon all its movements. While in other civilizations the exclusive domination, or at least the excessive preponderance of a single principle, of a single form, led to tyranny, in modern Europe the diversity of the elements of social order, the incapability of any one to exclude the rest, gave birth to the liberty which now prevails. The inability of the various principles to exterminate one another compelled each to endure the others, made it necessary for them to live in common, for them to enter into a sort of mutual understanding. Each consented to have only that part of civilization which fell to its share. Thus, while everywhere else the predominance of one principle has produced tyranny, the variety of elements of European civilization, and the constant warfare in which they have been engaged, have given birth in Europe to that liberty which we prize so dearly.

It is this which gives to European civilization its real, its immense superiority—it is this which forms its essential, its

distinctive character. And if, carrying our views still further we penetrate beyond the surface into the very nature of things we shall find that this superiority is legitimate—that it is acknowledged by reason as well as proclaimed by facts. Quitting for a moment European civilization, and taking a glance at the world in general, at the common course of earthly things, what is the character we find it to bear? What do we here perceive? Why just that very same diversity, that very same variety of elements, that very same struggle which is so strikingly evinced in European civilization. It is plain enough that no single principle, no particular organization, no simple idea, no special power has ever been permitted to obtain possession of the world, to mould it into a durable form, and to drive from it every opposing tendency, so as to reign itself supreme. Various powers, principles, and systems here intermingle, modify one another, and struggle incessantly—now subduing, now subdued—never wholly conquered, never conquering. Such is apparently the general state of the world, while diversity of forms, of ideas, of principles, their struggles and their energies, all tend towards a certain unity, certain ideal, which, though perhaps it may never be attained, mankind is constantly approaching by dint of liberty and labor. Hence European civilization is the reflected image of the world—like the course of earthly things, it is neither narrowly circumscribed, exclusive, nor stationary. For the first time, civilization appears to have divested itself of its special character: its development presents itself for the first time under as diversified, as abundant, as laborious an aspect as the great theatre of the universe itself.

European civilization has, if I may be allowed the expression, at last penetrated into the ways of eternal truth—into the scheme of Providence;—it moves in the ways which God has prescribed. This is the rational principle of its superiority.

Let it not, I beseech you, be forgotten—bear in mind, as we proceed with these lectures, that it is in this diversity of elements, and their constant struggle, that the essential character of our civilization consists. At present I can do no more than assert this; its proof will be found in the facts I shall bring before you. Still I think you will acknowledge it to be a confirmation of this assertion, if I can show you that the causes, and the elements of the character which I have just

attributed to it, can be traced to the very cradle of our civilization. If, I say, at the very moment of her birth, at the very hour in which the Roman empire fell, I can show you, in the state of the world, the circumstances which, from the beginning, have concurred to give to European civilization that agitated and diversified, but at the same time prolific character which distinguishes it, I think I shall have a strong claim upon your assent to its truth. In order to accomplish this, I shall begin by investigating the condition of Europe at the fall of the Roman empire, so that we may discover in its institutions, in its opinions, its ideas, its sentiments, what were the elements which the ancient world bequeathed to the modern. And upon these elements you will see strongly impressed the character which I have just described.

It is necessary that we should first see what the Roman empire was, and how it was formed.

Rome in its origin was a mere municipality, a corporation. The Roman government was nothing more than an assemblage of institutions suitable to a population enclosed within the walls of a city; that is to say, they were *municipal* institutions;—this was their distinctive character.

This was not peculiar to Rome. If we look, in this period, at the part of Italy which surrounded Rome, we find nothing but cities. What were then called nations were nothing more than confederations of cities. The Latin nation was a confederation of Latin cities. The Etrurians, the Samnites, the Sabines, the nations of Magna Græcia, were all composed in the same way.

At this time there were no country places, no villages; at least the country was nothing like what it is in the present day. It was cultivated, no doubt, but it was not peopled. The proprietors of lands and of country estates dwelt in cities; they left these occasionally to visit their rural property, where they usually kept a certain number of slaves; but that which we now call the country, that scattered population, sometimes in lone houses, sometimes in hamlets and villages, and which everywhere dots our land with agricultural dwellings, was altogether unknown in ancient Italy.

And what was the case when Rome extended her bounds-

ries? If we follow her history, we shall find that she conquered or founded a host of cities. It was with cities she fought, it was with cities she treated, it was into cities she sent colonies. In short, the history of the conquest of the world by Rome is the history of the conquest and foundation of a vast number of cities. It is true that in the East the extension of the Roman dominion bore somewhat of a different character: the population was not distributed there in the same way as in the western world; it was under a social system, partaking more of the patriarchal form, and was consequently much less concentrated in cities. But, as we have only to do with the population of Europe, I shall not dwell upon what relates to that of the East.

Confining ourselves, then, to the West, we shall find the fact to be such as I have described it. In the Gauls, in Spain, we meet with nothing but cities. At any distance from these, the country consisted of marshes and forests. Examine the character of the monuments left us of ancient Rome—the old Roman roads. We find great roads extending from city to city; but the thousands of little by-paths, which now intersect every part of the country, were then unknown. Neither do we find any traces of that immense number of lesser objects—of churches, castles, country-seats, and villages, which were spread all over the country during the middle ages. Rome has left no traces of this kind; her only bequest consists of vast monuments impressed with a municipal character, destined for a numerous population, crowded into a single spot. In whatever point of view you consider the Roman world, you meet with this almost exclusive preponderance of cities, and an absence of country populations and dwellings. This municipal character of the Roman world evidently rendered the unity, the social tie of a great state, extremely difficult to establish and maintain.

A municipal corporation like Rome might be able to conquer the world, but it was a much more difficult task to govern it, to mould it into one compact body. Thus, when the work seemed done, when all the West, and a great part of the East, had submitted to the Roman yoke, we find an immense host of cities, of little states formed for separate existence and independence, breaking their chains, escaping on every

side. This was one of the causes which made the establishment of the empire necessary; which called for a more concentrated form of government, one better able to hold together elements which had so few points of cohesion. The empire endeavored to unite and to bind together this extensive and scattered society; and to a certain point it succeeded. Between the reigns of Augustus and Dioclesian, during the very time that her admirable civil legislation was being carried to perfection, that vast and despotic administration was established, which, spreading over the empire a sort of chain-work of functionaries subordinately arranged, firmly knit together the people and the imperial court, serving at the same time to convey to society the will of the government, and to bring to the government the tribute and obedience of society.[3]

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[3] Dioclesian, A. D. 284, must be regarded as the first who attempted to substitute a regularly organized system of oriental monarchy, with its imposing ceremonial, and its long gradation of dignities, proceeding from the throne as the centre of all authority and the source of all dignity, in place of the former military despotism, supported only upon, and therefore always at the mercy of, the pretorian guards.

This system was still further perfected by Constantine the Great, A. D. 324, who introduced several important changes into the constitution of the empire.

He divided the empire into four great prefectures; the East, Illyricum; Italy; and Gaul.

The four pretorian prefects created by Dioclesian were retained by Constantine; but with a very material change in their powers. He deprived them of all military command, and made them merely civil governors in the four prefectures.

He consolidated still more his monarchical system by an organization of ecclesiastical dignities corresponding with the gradations of the civil administration.

This system continued substantially unchanged at the division of the empire, A. D. 395, and was perpetuated after that period.

Each of the empires was divided into two prefectures, and the prefectures into diocesses, in the following manner:

	Prefectures.	*Diocesses.*
Eastern Empire.	I. The East.	1. The East. 2. Egypt. 3. Asia Minor. 4. Pontus. 5. Thrace.
	II. Illyricum.	1. Macedonia (all Greece). 2. Dacia (within the Danube

This system, besides rallying the forces, and holding together the elements, of the Roman world, introduced with wonderful celerity into society a taste for despotism, for central power. It is truly astonishing to see how rapidly this incoherent assemblage of little republics, this association of municipal corporations, sunk into an humble and obedient respect for the sacred name of emperor. The necessity for

	Prefectures.	*Diocesses.*
Western Empire.	I. Italy.	1. Italy. 2. Illyria (Pannonia, etc.). 3. Africa.
	II. Gaul.	1. Spain 2. The Gauls. 3. Britain.

Each of these diocesses was divided into provinces, of which in both empires there were one hundred and seventeen; and the provinces into cities.

Imperial Administration.

Household.—The *court* officers were: the Grand Chamberlain, two Captains of the Guard; Master of the Offices; Quæstor or Chancellor; Keeper of the Privy Purse (*comes rerum privatarum*), whose functions are to be distinguished from those of the Minister of the public treasury.

Provincial administration.—In each prefecture a *Prefectus pretorio*, at the head of the civil administration. In each diocess a Vicar of the prefect. In each province a President. The cities were governed by Duumvirs and a Defensor.

Military organization.—After the Guards and Household troops, ranked the legions and the auxiliaries. These were commanded in each prefecture by a Major General of the Militia; a commander of the cavalry, a commander of the infantry; military dukes and counts, legionary prefects, etc.

Judiciary.—Cases of special importance reserved for the emperor were decided by the quæstor; ordinary matters by various magistrates, according to their relative magnitude. An appeal lay from the defensor to the duumvirs, from the duumvirs to the president, from the president to the vicar, from the vicar to the prefectus pretorio.

Finances.—The revenues were passed, by the collectors of cities, into the hands of the provincial receivers, and thence, through a higher grade of treasurers, to the minister of the public treasury. —*Vid. Des Michels, Hist. du Moyen Age.*

establishing some tie between all these parts of the Roman world must have been very apparent and powerful, otherwise we can hardly conceive how the spirit of despotism could so easily have made its way into the minds and almost into the affections of the people.

It was with this spirit, with this administrative organization, and with the military system connected with it, that the Roman empire struggled against the dissolution which was working within it, and against the barbarians who attacked it from without. But, though it struggled long, the day at length arrived when all the skill and power of despotism, when all the pliancy of servitude, was insufficient to prolong its fate. In the fourth century, all the ties which had held this immense body together seem to have been loosened or snapped; the barbarians broke in on every side; the provinces no longer resisted, no longer troubled themselves with the general destiny. At this crisis an extraordinary idea entered the minds of one or two of the emperors: they wished to try whether the hope of general liberty, whether a confederation, a system something like what we now call the representative system, would not better defend the Roman empire than the despotic administration which already existed. There is a mandate of Honorius and the younger Theodosius, addressed, in the year 418, to the prefect of Gaul, the object of which was to establish a sort of representative government in the south of Gaul, and by its aid still to preserve the unity of empire.

Rescript of the Emperors Honorius and Theodosius the Younger, addressed, in the year 418, to the Prefect of the Gauls, residing at Arles.

"Honorius and Theodosius, Augusti, to Agricoli, Prefect of the Gauls.

"In consequence of the very salutary representation which your Magnificence has made to us, as well as upon other information obviously advantageous to the republic, we decree, in order that they may have the force of a perpetual law, that the following regulations should be made, and that obedience should be paid to them by the inhabitants of our seven provinces,* and which are such as they themselves should wish for and require. Seeing that from

* Vienne, the two Aquitaines, Novempopulana, the two Narbonnes and the province of the Maritime Alps.

motives, both of public and private utility, responsible persons of special deputies should be sent, not only by each province, but by each city, to your Magnificence, not only to render up accounts, but also to treat of such matters as concern the interest of landed proprietors, we have judged that it would be both convenient and highly advantageous to have annually, at a fixed period, and to date from the present year, an assembly for the inhabitants of the seven provinces held in the Metropolis, that is to say, in the city of Arles. By this institution our desire is to provide both for public and private interests. First, by the union of the most influential inhabitants in the presence of their illustrious Prefect, (unless he should be absent from causes affecting public order,) and by their deliberations, upon every subject brought before them, the best possible advice will be obtained. Nothing which shall have been treated of and determined upon, after a mature discussion, shall be kept from the knowledge of the rest of the provinces; and such as have not assisted at the assembly shall be bound to follow the same rules of justice and equity. Furthermore, by ordaining that an assembly should be held every year in the city of Constantine,* we believe that we are doing not only what will be advantageous to the public welfare, but what will also multiply its social relations. Indeed, this city is so favorably situated, foreigners resort to it in such large numbers, and it possesses so extensive a commerce, that all the varied productions and manufactures of the rest of the world are to be seen within it. All that the opulent East, the perfumed Arabia, the delicate Assyria, the fertile Africa, the beautiful Spain, and the courageous Gaul, produce worthy of note, abound here in such profusion, that all things admired as magnificent in the different parts of the world seem the productions of its own climate. Further, the union of the Rhone and the Tuscan sea so facilitate intercourse, that the countries which the former traverses, and the latter waters in its winding course, are made almost neighbors. Thus, as the whole earth yields up its most esteemed productions for the service of this city, as the particular commodities of each country are transported to it by land, by sea, by rivers, by ships, by rafts, by wagons, how can our Gaul fail of seeing the great benefit we confer upon it by convoking a public assembly to be held in this city, upon which, by a special gift, as it were, of Divine Providence, has been showered all the enjoyments of life, and all the facilities for commerce?

"The illustrious Prefect Petronius† did, some time ago, with a praiseworthy and enlightened view, ordain that this custom should be observed; but as its practice was interrupted by the troubles of the times and the reign of usurpers, we have resolved to put it

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* Constantine the Great was singularly partial to Arles; it was he who made it the seat of the prefecture of the Gauls: he desired also that it should bear his name; but custom was more powerful than his will.

† Petronius was Prefect of the Gauls between 402 and 408

again in force, by the prudent exercise of our authority. Thus, then, dear and well-beloved cousin Agricoli, your Magnificence, conforming to our present ordinance and the custom established by your predecessors, will cause the following regulations to be observed in the provinces:—

"It will be necessary to make known unto all persons honored with public functions or proprietors of domains, and to all the judges of provinces, that they must attend in council every year in the city of Arles, between the Ides of August and September, the days of convocation and of session to be fixed at pleasure.

"Novempopulana and the second Aquitaine, being the most distant provinces, shall have the power, according to custom, to send, if their judges should be detained by indispensable duties, deputies in their stead.

"Such persons as neglect to attend at the place appointed, and within the prescribed period, shall pay a fine: viz., judges, five pounds of gold; members of the curiæ and other dignitaries, three pounds.*

"By this measure we conceive we are granting great advantages and favor to the inhabitants of our provinces. We have also the certainty of adding to the welfare of the city of Arles, to the fidelity of which, according to our father and countryman, we owe so much.†

"Given the 15th of the calends of May; received at Arles the 10th of the calends of June."

Notwithstanding this call, the provinces and cities refused the proffered boon; nobody would name deputies, none would go to Arles. This centralization, this unity, was opposed to the primitive nature of this society. The spirit of locality, and of municipality, everywhere reappeared; the impossibility of reconstructing a general society, of building up the whole into one general state, became evident. The cities, confining themselves to the affairs of their own corporations, shut themselves up within their own walls, and the empire fell, because none would belong to the empire; because citizens wished but to belong to their city. Thus the Roman empire, at its fall, was resolved into the elements of which it had been composed, and the preponderance of municipal rule and government was again everywhere visible. The

* The municipal corps of the Roman cities were called CURIÆ, and the members of these bodies, who were very numerous, CURIALES.

† Constantine the Second, husband of Placidia, whom Honorius had taken for his colleague in 421

Roman world had been formed of cities, and to cities again it returned.[4]

This municipal system was the bequest of the ancient Roman civilization to modern Europe. It had no doubt become feeble, irregular, and very inferior to what it had been at an earlier period; but it was the only living principle, the only one that retained any form, the only one that survived the general destruction of the Roman world.

When I say the *only* one, I mistake. There was another phenomenon, another idea, which likewise outlived it. I mean the remembrance of the empire, and the title of the emperor,—the idea of imperial majesty, and of absolute power attached to the name of emperor. It must be observed, then, that the two elements which passed from the Roman civilization into ours were, *first*, the system of municipal corporations, its habits, its regulations, its principle of liberty—a general civil legislation, common to all; *secondly*, the idea of absolute power;—the principle of order and the principle of servitude.

Meanwhile, within the very heart of Roman society, there had grown up another society of a very different nature, founded upon different principles, animated by different sentiments, and which has brought into European civilization elements of a widely different character: I speak of the *Christian church*. I say the Christian church, and not Christianity, between which a broad distinction is to be made. At the end of the fourth century, and the beginning of the fifth, Christianity was no longer a simple belief, it was an institution—it had formed itself into a corporate body. It had its

[4] That the municipal spirit should have been stronger than any more general sentiment binding the citizens to the empire, was natural, not only because their interests were more immediately concerned in the municipal administration, but because the people had some voice and influence in the government of the cities, while they had none in the general government. Though the municipal magistrates, the *duumvirs* and *defensors*, were a part of that vast chain of administrative functionaries proceeding from the imperial throne, and linked to it, yet they were chosen from the municipal senate (decurions) and nominated by the people.

government, a body of priests; a settled ecclesiastical polity for the regulation of their different functions; revenues; independent means of influence. It had the rallying points suitable to a great society, in its provincial, national, and general councils, in which were wont to be debated in common the affairs of society. In a word, the Christian religion, at this epoch, was no longer merely a religion, it was a church.

Had it not been a church, it is hard to say what would have been its fate in the general convulsion which attended the overthrow of the Roman empire. Looking only to worldly means, putting out of the question the aids and superintending power of Divine Providence, and considering only the natural effects of natural causes, it would be difficult to say how Christianity, if it had continued what it was at first, a mere belief, an individual conviction, could have withstood the shock occasioned by the dissolution of the Roman empire and the invasion of the barbarians. At a later period, when it had even become an institution, an established church, it fell in Asia and the North of Africa, upon an invasion of a like kind —that of the Mohammedans; and circumstances seem to point out that it was still more likely such would have been its fate at the fall of the Roman empire. At this time there existed none of those means by which in the present day moral influences become established or rejected without the aid of institutions; none of those means by which an abstract truth now makes way, gains an authority over mankind, governs their actions, and directs their movements. Nothing of this kind existed in the fourth century; nothing which could give to simple ideas, to personal opinions, so much weight and power. Hence I think it may be assumed, that only a society firmly established, under a powerful government and rules of discipline, could hope to bear up amid such disasters—could hope to weather so violent a storm. I think, then, humanly speaking, that it is not too much to aver, that in the fourth and fifth centuries it was the Christian church that saved Christianity; that it was the Christian church, with its institutions, its magistrates, its authority—the Christian church, which struggled so vigorously to prevent the interior dissolution of the empire, which struggled against the barbarian, and which, in fact, overcame the barbarian;—it was this church, I say, that became the great connecting link—the principle of civilization between the Roman and the barbarian world. It is *the state*

of the church, then, rather than religion strictly understood,—rather than that pure and simple faith of the Gospel which all true believers must regard as its highest triumph,—that we must look at in the fifth century, in order to discover what influence Christianity had from this time upon modern civilization, and what are the elements it has introduced into it.

Let us see what at this epoch the Christian church really was.

If we look, still in an entirely worldly point of view—if we look at the changes which Christianity underwent from its first rise to the fifth century—if we examine it, (still, I repeat, not in a religious, but solely in a political sense,) we shall find that it passed through three essentially different states.

In its infancy, in its very babyhood, Christian society presents itself before us as a simple association of men possessing the same faith and opinions, the same sentiments and feelings. The first Christians met to enjoy together their common emotions, their common religious convictions. At this time we find no settled form of doctrine, no settled rules of discipline, no body of magistrates.

Still, it is perfectly obvious, that no society, however young, however feebly held together, or whatever its nature, can exist without some moral power which animates and guides it; and thus, in the various Christian congregations, there were men who preached, who taught, who *morally governed* the congregation. Still there was no settled magistrate, no discipline; a simple association of believers in a common faith, with common sentiments and feelings, was the first condition of Christian society.

But the moment this society began to advance, and almost at its birth, for we find traces of them in its earliest documents there gradually became moulded a form of doctrine, rules of discipline, a body of magistrates: of magistrates called πρεσβύτεροι, or *elders*, who afterwards became priests; of ἐπίσκοποι, inspectors or overseers, who became bishops; and of διάκονοι, or deacons, whose office was the care of the poor and the distribution of alms.

it is almost impossible to determine the precise functions of these magistrates; the line of demarcation was probably very vague and wavering; yet here was the embryo of institutions. Still, however, there was one prevailing character in this second epoch: it was that the power, the authority the preponderating influence, still remained in the hands of the general body of believers. It was they who decided in the election of magistrates, as well as in the adoption of rules of discipline and doctrine. No separation had as yet taken place between the Christian government and the Christian people; neither as yet existed apart from, or independently of, the other, and it was still the great body of Christian believers who exercised the principal influence in the society.[5]

In the third period all this was entirely changed. The clergy were separated from the people, and now formed a distinct body, with its own wealth, its own jurisdiction, its own constitution; in a word, it had its own government, and formed a complete society of itself,—a society, too, provided with all the means of existence, independently of the society to which it applied itself, and over which it extended its influence. This was the third state of the Christian church,

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[5] It is fair to say that this and the preceding paragraphs touch upon several disputed points. Contrary to the assertions here made, it has by many been always strongly maintained that from the outset not only were there Christians, but there was a Church; not only "a simple association of believers," but an organized body; and that the constitution, government, and main rules of discipline of the church were distinctly and even divinely settled; and that the determination of none of these things was ever left to the popular voice or will of "the great body of Christian believers."

At the same time it is admitted by those who hold this view, that from and after the time of Constantine, the original constitution of the church, without being destroyed, was overlaid by a vast body of human additions, particularly by the hierarchy, or long gradation of ecclesiastical dignities and powers rising upward from the primitive bishop to the patriarch, and that by these and other results of the alliance of Christianity with the empire, the simplicity of the church was corrupted, its purity endangered, and the primitive relations of the clergy and people injuriously affected.

In this view, therefore, the general correctness of the author's remarks in regard to the state of the church in what he terms the "third period" will be admitted, even by those who may question the justness of his preceding statements.

and in this state it existed at the opening of the fifth century. The government was not yet completely separated from the people; for no such government as yet existed, and less so in religious matters than in any other; but, as respects the relation between the clergy and Christians in general it was the clergy who governed, and governed almost without control.

But, besides the influence which the clergy derived from their spiritual functions, they possessed considerable power over society, from their having become chief magistrates in the city corporations. We have already seen, that, strictly speaking, nothing had descended from the Roman empire, except its municipal system. Now it had fallen out that by the vexations of despotism, and the ruin of the cities, the curiales, or officers of the corporations, had sunk into insignificance and inanity; while the bishops and the great body of the clergy, full of vigor and zeal, were naturally prepared to guide and watch over them. It is not fair to accuse the clergy of usurpation in this matter, for it fell out according to the common course of events: the clergy alone possessed moral strength and activity, and the clergy everywhere succeeded to power—such is the common law of the universe.

The change which had taken place in this respect shows itself in every part of the legislation of the Roman Emperors at this period. In opening the Theodosian and Justinian codes, we find innumerable enactments, which place the management of the municipal affairs in the hands of the clergy and bishops. I shall cite a few.

Cod. Just., L. I., tit. iv., *De Episcopali audientia*, § 26.—With regard to the yearly affairs of the cities, (whether as respects the ordinary city revenues, the funds arising from the city estates, from legacies or particular gifts, or from any other source; whether as respects the management of the public works, of the magazines of provisions, of the aqueducts; of the maintenance of the public baths the city gates, of the building of walls or towers, the repairing of bridges and roads, or of any lawsuit in which the city may be engaged on account of public or private interests,) we ordain as follows:—The right reverend bishop, and three men of good report, from among the chiefs of the city, shall assemble together; every year they shall examine the works done; they shall take care that those who conduct, or have conducted them, measure them correctly, give a true account of them, and cause it to be seen that they have fulfilled their contracts whether in the care of the public monu

ments, in the moneys expended in provisions and the public baths, of all that is expended for the repairs of the roads, aqueducts, and all other matters.

Ibid., § 30.—With respect to the guardianship of youth, of the first and second age, and of all those to whom the law gives *curators*, if their fortune is not more than 5000 *aurei*, we ordain that the nomination of the president of the province should not be waited for, on account of the great expense it would occasion, especially if the president should not reside in the city in which it becomes necessary to provide for the guardianship. The nomination of the curators or tutors shall, in this case, be made by the magistrate of the city . . . . in concert with the right reverend bishop and other persons invested with public authority, if more than one should reside in the city.

Ibid., L. I., tit. v., *De Defensoribus*, § 8.—We desire the defenders of cities, well instructed in the holy mysteries of the orthodox faith, should be chosen and instituted into their office by the reverend bishops, the clerks, notables, proprietors, and the curiales. With regard to their installation, it must be committed to the glorious power of the prefects of the prætorium, in order that their authority should have all the stability and weight which the letters of admission granted by his Magnificence are likely to give.

I could cite numerous other laws to the same effect, and in all of them you would see this one fact very strikingly prevail: namely, that between the Roman municipal system, and that of the free cities of the middle ages, there intervened an *ecclesiastical* municipal system; the preponderance of the clergy in the management of the affairs of the city corporations succeeded to that of the ancient Roman municipal magistrates, and paved the way for the organization of our modern free communities.

It will at once be seen what an amazing accession of power the Christian church gained by these means, not only in its own peculiar circle, by its increased influence on the body of Christians, but also by the part which it took in temporal matters. And it is from this period we should date its powerful co-operation in the advance of modern civilization, and the extensive influence it has had upon its character. Let us briefly run over the advantages which it introduced into it.

And, first, it was of immense advantage to European civilization that a moral influence, a moral power—a power resting entirely upon moral convictions, upon moral opinions and sentiments—should have established itself in society, just at this period, when it seemed upon the point of being crushed

by the overwhelming physical force which had taken possession of it. Had not the Christian church at this time existed, the whole world must have fallen a prey to mere brute force. The Christian church alone possessed a moral power, it maintained and promulgated the idea of a precept, of a law superior to all human authority; it proclaimed that great truth which forms the only foundation of our hope for humanity: namely, that there exists a law above all human law, which, by whatever name it may be called, whether reason, the law of God, or what not, is, in all times and in all places, the same law under different names.

Finally, the church commenced an undertaking of great importance to society—I mean the separation of temporal and spiritual authority. This separation is the only true source of liberty of conscience; it was based upon no other principle than that which serves as the groundwork for the strictest and most extensive liberty of conscience. The separation of temporal and spiritual power rests solely upon the idea that physical, that brute force, has no right or authority over the mind, over convictions, over truth. It flows from the distinction established between the world of thought and the world of action, between our inward and intellectual nature and the outward world around us. So that, however paradoxical it may seem, that very principle of liberty of conscience for which Europe has so long struggled, so much suffered, which has only so lately prevailed, and that, in many instances, against the will of the clergy,—that very principle was acted upon under the name of a separation of the temporal and spiritual power, in the infancy of European civilization. It was, moreover, the Christian church itself, driven to assert it by the circumstances in which it was placed, as a means of defence against barbarism, that introduced and maintained it

The establishment, then, of a moral influence, the maintenance of this divine law, and the separation of temporal and spiritual power, may be enumerated as the great benefits which the Christian church extended to European society in the fifth century.

Unfortunately, all its influences, even at this period, were not equally beneficial. Already, even before the close of the fifth century, we discover some of those vicious principles which have had so baneful an effect on the advancement of

our civilization. There already prevailed in the bosom of the church a desire to separate the governing and the governed The attempt was thus early made to render the governmen. entirely independent of the people under its authority — to take possession of their mind and life, without the conviction of their reason or the consent of their will. The church, more over, endeavored with all her might to establish the principle of theocracy, to usurp temporal authority, to obtain universal dominion. And when she failed in this, when she found she could not obtain absolute power for herself, she did what was almost as bad: to obtain a share of it, she leagued herself with temporal rulers, and enforced, with all her might, their claim to absolute power at the expense of the liberty of the subject.

Such then, I think, were the principal elements of civilization which Europe derived, in the fifth century, from the Church and from the Roman empire. Such was the state of the Roman world when the barbarians came to make it their prey; and we have now only to study the barbarians themselves, in order to be acquainted with the elements which were united and mixed together in the cradle of our civilization.

It must be here understood that we have nothing to do with the history of the barbarians. It is enough for our purpose to know, that with the exception of a few Slavonian tribes, such as the Alans, they were all of the same German origin: and that they were all in pretty nearly the same state of civilization. It is true that some little difference might exist in this respect, accordingly as these nations had more or less intercourse with the Roman world; and there is no doubt but the Goths had made a greater progress, and had become more refined than the Franks; but in a general point of view, and with regard to the matter before us, these little differences are of no consequence whatever.

A general notion of the state of society among the barbarians, such, at least, as will enable us to judge of what they have contributed towards modern civilization, is all that we require. This information, small as it may appear, it is now almost impossible to obtain. Respecting the municipal system of the Romans and the state of the Church we may form

a tolerably accurate idea. Their influence has lasted to the present times; we have vestiges of them in many of our institutions, and possess a thousand means of becoming acquainted with them; but the manners and social state of the barbarians have completely perished, and we are driven to conjecture what they were, either from a very few ancient historical remains, or by an effort of the imagination.

There is one sentiment one in particular, which it is necessary to understand before we can form a true picture of a barbarian; it is the pleasure of personal independence—the pleasure of enjoying, in full force and liberty, all his powers in the various ups and downs of fortune; the fondness for activity without labor; for a life of enterprise and adventure. Such was the prevailing character and disposition of the barbarians; such were the moral wants which put these immense masses of men into motion. It is extremely difficult for us, in the regulated society in which we move, to form anything like a correct idea of this feeling, and of the influence which it exercised upon the rude barbarians of the fourth and fifth centuries. There is, however, a history of the Norman conquest of England, written by M. Thierry, in which the character and disposition of the barbarian are depicted with much life and vigor. In this admirable work, the motives, the inclinations and impulses that stir men into action in a state of life bordering on the savage, have been felt and described in a truly masterly manner. There is nowhere else to be found so correct a likeness of what a barbarian was, or of his course of life. Something of the same kind, but, in my opinion, much inferior, is found in the novels of Mr. Cooper, in which he depicts the manners of the savages of America. In these scenes, in the sentiments and social relations which these savages hold in the midst of their forests, there is unquestionably something which, to a certain point, calls up before us the manners of the ancient Germans. No doubt these pictures are a little imaginative, a little poetical; the worst features in the life and manners of the barbarians are not given in all their naked coarseness. I allude not merely to the evils which these manners forced into the social condition, but to the inward individual condition of the barbarian himself. There is in this passionate desire for personal independence something of a grosser, more material character than we should suppose from the work of M. Thierry; a degree of

brutality, of headstrong passion, of apathy, which we do not discover in his details. Still, notwithstanding this alloy of brutal and stupid selfishness, there is, if we look more profoundly into the matter, something of a noble and moral character, in this taste for independence, which seems to derive its power from our moral nature. It is the pleasure of feeling one's self a man; the sentiment of personality; of human spontaneity in its unrestricted development.

It was the rude barbarians of Germany who introduced this sentiment of personal independence, this love of individual liberty, into European civilization; it was unknown among the Romans, it was unknown in the Christian Church, it was unknown in nearly all the civilizations of antiquity. The liberty which we meet with in ancient civilizations is political liberty; it is the liberty of the citizen. It was not about his personal liberty that man troubled himself, it was about his liberty as a citizen. He formed part of an association, and to this alone he was devoted. The case was the same in the Christian Church. Among its members a devoted attachment to the Christian body, a devotedness to its laws, and an earnest zeal for the extension of its empire, were everywhere conspicuous; the spirit of Christianity wrought a change in the moral character of man, opposed to this principle of independence; for under its influence his mind struggled to extinguish its own liberty, and to deliver itself up entirely to the dictates of his faith. But the feeling of personal independence, a fondness for genuine liberty displaying itself without regard to consequences, and with scarcely any other aim than its own satisfaction—this feeling, I repeat, was unknown to the Romans and to the Christians. We are indebted for it to the barbarians, who introduced it into European civilization, in which, from its first rise, it has played so considerable a part, and has produced such lasting and beneficial results, that it must be regarded as one of its fundamental principles, and could not be passed without notice.

There is another, a second element of civilization, which we likewise inherit from the barbarians alone: I mean military patronage, the tie which became formed between individuals, between warriors, and which, without destroying the liberty of any, without even destroying in the commencement the equality up to a certain point which existed between them, laid the foundation of a graduated subordination, and was the

origin of that aristocratical organization which, at a later period, grew into the feudal system. The germ of this connexion was the attachment of man to man; the fidelity which united individuals, without apparent necessity, without any obligation arising from the general principles of society. In none of the ancient republics do you see any example of individuals particularly and freely attached to other individuals. They were all attached to the city. Among the barbarians this tie was formed between man and man; first by the relationship of companion and chief, when they came in bands to overrun Europe; and at a later period, by the relationship of sovereign and vassal. This second principle, which has had so vast an influence in the civilization of modern Europe—this devotedness of man to man—came to us entirely from our German ancestors; it formed part of their social system, and was adopted into ours.

Let me now ask if I was not fully justified in stating, as I did at the outset, that modern civilization, even in its infancy, was diversified, agitated, and confused? Is it not true that we find at the fall of the Roman empire nearly all the elements which are met with in the progressive career of our civilization? We have found at this epoch three societies all different; first, municipal society, the last remains of the Roman empire; secondly, Christian society; and lastly, barbarian society. We find these societies very differently organized; founded upon principles totally opposite; inspiring men with sentiments altogether different. We find the love of the most absolute independence by the side of the most devoted submission; military patronage by the side of ecclesiastical domination; spiritual power and temporal power everywhere together; the canons of the church, the learned legislation of the Romans, the almost unwritten customs of the barbarians; everywhere a mixture or rather co-existence of nations, of languages, of social situations, of manners, of ideas, of impressions, the most diversified. These, I think, afford a sufficient proof of the truth of the general character which I have endeavored to picture of our civilization.

There is no denying that we owe to this confusion, this diversity, this tossing and jostling of elements, the slow progress of Europe, the storms by which she has been buffeted, the miseries to which oftimes she has been a prey. But

however dear these have cost us, we must not regard them with unmingled regret. In nations, as well as in individuals the good fortune to have all the faculties called into action, so as to ensure a full and free development of the various powers both of mind and body, is an advantage not too dearly paid for by the labor and pain with which it is attended. What we might call the hard fortune of European civilization—the trouble, the toil it has undergone—the violence it has suffered in its course—have been of infinitely more service to the progress of humanity than that tranquil, smooth simplicity, in which other civilizations have run their course. I shall now halt. In the rude sketch which I have drawn, I trust you will recognise the general features of the world such as it appeared upon the fall of the Roman empire, as well as the various elements which conspired and mingled together to give birth to European civilization. Henceforward these will move and act under our notice. We shall next put these in motion, and see how they work together. In the next lecture I shall endeavor to show what they became and what they performed in the epoch which is called the Barbarous Period; that is to say, the period during which the chaos of invasion continued.[6]

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[6] The remarkable crisis, when the Romans and the barbarians were contending for the empire of the world, should be well comprehended by the student. Gibbon will furnish the history: Cæsar and Tacitus are the original sources for a knowledge of the German character. It was a struggle between civilization and barbarism: the latter triumphed; the Dark Ages were the result.

Frequent border wars had been maintained with the Germans on the Rhine from the time of Julius Cæsar, when the conquest of Gaul had extended the bounds of the empire to that river.

But after the time of Caracalla, 212, the conflict became incessant: new tribes of Germans began to appear and press upon the frontier, making continual predatory irruptions into the Roman territory, but effecting no permanent establishment.

At length, in 376, the Huns, entering Europe from northern Asia, subdued or drove before them the Sclavonian and Gothic tribes, precipitated the Visigoths across the Danube within the limits of the Roman Empire.

Then began the struggle for the empire. Wave followed wave in the great migration of nations—a movement which continued to roll tumultuously over Europe for more than three centuries after the downfall of the Western Empire.

The various tribes of barbarians whose names appear in the history of this period belonged to three distinct races:

1. The *Scythian*—comprising the Huns, the Alani, Avari, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Turks, and Tartars.

2. The *Sclavonian*—to which belonged the Bosnians, the Servians, Croatians, etc.: the Wendi, Poles, Bohemians, Moravians Pomeranians, Wiltsians, Lusatians, etc.; the Livonians and Lithuanians.

3. The *German*—including the Alemanni, a confederation of tribes of which the Suevi were the chief; the Bavarians, Marcomanni, Quadi, Hermunduri, Heruli; the Gepidæ, the Goths the Franes, the Frisons; the Vandals, Burgundians, Rugii, Lombards; the Angli, and Saxons.

The *final extinction* of the Roman Empire of the West is dated in 476, when the imperial throne was subverted by Odoacer, leader of the mixed multitude of barbarian auxiliaries. But it should be remembered that previous to this event Rome had been twice taken and sacked, first by Alaric and the Visigoths in 410, next by Genseric and the Vandals in 455; and that *four* barbarian kingdoms had been established within the limits of the empire: the kingdom of the Burgundians in 413; of the Suevi in 419; of the Visigoths in 419; of Carthage by the Vandals in 439.

In 493 the power of Odoacer was destroyed, and the Ostro-Gothic kingdom of Italy established by Theodoric the Great.

Thus, before the end of the fifth century, the Vandals were masters of Africa; the Suevi, of a part of Spain; the Visigoths of the rest, together with a large part of Gaul; the Burgundians of that part of Gaul lying on the Rhone and Saône; the Ostro-Goths of nearly all Italy; while the Franes under Clovis had begun (481—496) the career of conquest, which in the next and following centuries resulted in the overthrow of those kingdoms, the establishment of the Frankish dominion, and the formation for a time of a new centre of gravity for Europe under Charlemagne.

LECTURE III.

OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY—CO-EXISTENCE OF ALL THE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE FIFTH CENTURY—ATTEMPTS TO REORGANIZE SOCIETY.

In my last lecture, I brought you to what may be called the porch to the history of modern civilization. I briefly placed before you the primary elements of European civilization, as found when, at the dissolution of the Roman empire, it was yet in its cradle. I endeavored to give you a preliminary sketch of their diversity, their continual struggles with each other, and to show you that no one of them succeeded in obtaining the mastery in our social system; at least such a mastery as would imply the complete subjugation or expulsion of the others. We have seen that these circumstances form the distinguishing character of European civilization. We will today begin the history of its childhood in what is commonly called the dark or middle age, the age of barbarism.

It is impossible for us not to be struck, at the first glance at this period, with a fact which seems quite contradictory to the statement we have just made. No sooner do we seek for information respecting the opinions that have been formed relative to the ancient condition of modern Europe, than we find that the various elements of our civilization, that is to say, monarchy, theocracy, aristocracy, and democracy, each would have us believe that originally, European society belonged to it alone, and that it has only lost the power it then possessed by the usurpation of the other elements. Examine all that has been written, all that has been said on this subject, and you will find that every author who has attempted to build up a system which should represent or explain our origin, has asserted the exclusive predominance of one or other of these elements of European civilization.

First, there is the school of civilians, attached to the feudal system, among whom we may mention Boulainvilliers as

the most celebrated, who boldly asserts, that, at the downfall of the Roman empire, it was the conquering nation, forming afterwards the nobility, who alone possessed authority, or right, or power. Society, it is said, was their domain, of which kings and people have since despoiled them; and hence, the aristocratic organization is affirmed to have been in Europe the primitive and genuine form.

Next to this school we may place the advocates of monarchy, the Abbé Dubois, for example, who maintains, on the other side, that it was to royalty that European society belonged. According to him, the German kings succeeded to all the rights of the Roman emperors; they were even invited in by the ancient nations, among others by the Gauls and Saxons; they alone possessed legitimate authority, and all the conquests of the aristocracy were only so many encroachments upon the power of the monarchs.

The liberals, republicans, or democrats, whichever you may choose to call them, form a third school. Consult the Abbé de Mably. According to this school, the government by which society was ruled in the fifth century, was composed of free institutions; of assemblies of freemen, of the nation properly so called. Kings and nobles enriched themselves by the spoils of this primitive Liberty; it has fallen under their repeated attacks, but it reigned before them.

Another power, however, claimed the right of governing society, and upon much higher grounds than any of these. Monarchical, aristocratic, and popular pretensions were all of a worldly nature: the Church of Rome founded her pretensions upon her sacred mission and divine right. By her labors, Europe, she said, had attained the blessings of civilization and truth, and to her alone belonged the right to govern it.

Here then is a difficulty which meets us at the very outset. We have stated our belief that no one of the elements of European civilization obtained an exclusive mastery over it, in the whole course of its history, that they lived in a constant state of proximity, of amalgamation, of strife, and of compromise; yet here, at our very first step, we are met by the directly opposite opinion, that one or other of these elements, even in the very infancy of civilization, even in the very heart of barbarian Europe, took entire possession of society. And it is not in one country alone, it is in every nation of Europe

that the various principles of our civilization, under forms a little varied, at epochs a little apart, have displayed these irreconcilable pretensions. The historic schools which I have enumerated are met with everywhere.

This fact is important, not in itself, but because it reveals some other facts which make a great figure in our history. By this simultaneous advancement of claims the most opposed to the exclusive possession of power, in the first stage of modern Europe, two important facts are revealed: first, the principle, the idea of political legitimacy; an idea which has played a considerable part in the progress of European civilization. The second is the particular, the true character of the state of barbarian Europe during that period, which now more expressly demands attention.

It is my task, then, to explain these two facts; and to show you how they may be fairly deduced from the early struggle of the pretensions which I have just called to your notice.

Now what do these various elements of our civilization,—what do theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy aim at, when they each endeavor to make out that it alone was the first which held possession of European society? Is it any thing beyond the desire of each to establish its sole claim to legitimacy? For what is political legitimacy? Evidently nothing more than a right founded upon antiquity, upon duration, which is obvious from the simple fact, that priority of time is pleaded as the source of right, as proof of legitimate power. But, observe again, this claim is not peculiar to one system, to one element of our civilization, but is made alike by all. The political writers of the Continent have been in the habit, for some time past, of regarding legitimacy as belonging, exclusively, to the monarchical system. This is an error; legitimacy may be found in all the systems. It has already been shown that, of the various elements of our civilization, each wished to appropriate it to itself. But advance a few steps further into the history of Europe, and you will see social forms of government, the most opposed in principles, alike in possession of this legitimacy. The Italian and Swiss aristocracies and democracies, the little republic of San Marino, as well as the most powerful monarchies, have considered themselves legitimate, and have been acknowledged

as such, all founding their claim to this title upon the antiquity of their institutions; upon the historical priority and duration of their particular system of government.

If we leave modern Europe, and turn our attention to other times and to other countries, we shall everywhere find this same notion prevail respecting political legitimacy. It everywhere attaches itself to some portion of government; to some institution; to some form, or to some maxim. There is no country, no time, in which you may not discover some portion of the social system, some public authority, that has assumed, and been acknowledged to possess, this character of legitimacy, arising from antiquity, prescription, and duration

Let us for a moment see what this legitimacy is? of what it is composed? what it requires? and how it found its way into European civilization?

You will find that all power—I say all, without distinction—owes its existence in the first place partly to force. I do not say that force alone has been, in all cases, the foundation of power, or that this, without any other title, could in every case have been established by force alone. Other claims undoubtedly are requisite. Certain powers become established in consequence of certain social expediencies, of certain relations with the state of society, with its customs or opinions. But it is impossible to close our eyes to the fact, that violence has sullied the birth of all the authorities in the world, whatever may have been their nature or their form.

This origin, however, no one will acknowledge. All authorities, whatever their nature, disclaim it. None of them will allow themselves to be considered as the offspring of force. Governments are warned by an invincible instinct that force is no title—that might is not right—and that, while they rest upon no other foundation than violence, they are entirely destitute of right. Hence, if we go back to some distant period, in which the various systems, the various powers, are found struggling one against the other, we shall hear them each exclaiming, "I existed before you; my claim is the oldest; my claim rests upon other grounds than force; society belonged to me before this state of violence, before this strife in which you now find me. I was legitimate; I have been opposed, and my rights have been torn from me."

This fact alone proves that the idea of violence is not the foundation of political legitimacy,—that it rests upon some

other basis. This disavowal of violence made by every system, proclaims, as plainly as facts can speak, that there is another legitimacy, the true foundation of all the others, the legitimacy of reason, of justice, of right. It is to this origin that they seek to link themselves. As they feel scandalized at the very idea of being the offspring of force, they pretend to be invested, by virtue of their antiquity, with a different title. The first characteristic, then, of political legitimacy, is to disclaim violence as the source of authority, and to associate it with a moral notion, a moral force—with the notion of justice, of right, of reason. This is the primary element from which the principle of political legitimacy has sprung forth. It has issued from it, aided by time, aided by prescription. Let us see how.

Violence presides at the birth of governments, at the birth of societies; but time rolls on. He changes the works of violence. He corrects them. He corrects them, simply because society endures, and because it is composed of men. Man bears within himself certain notions of order, of justice, of reason, with a certain desire to bring them into play—he wishes to see them predominate in the sphere in which he moves. For this he labors unceasingly; and if the social system in which he lives, continues, his labor is not in vain. Man naturally brings reason, morality, and legitimacy into the world in which he lives.

Independently of the labor of man, by a special law of Providence which it is impossible to mistake, a law analogous to that which rules the material world, there is a certain degree of order, of intelligence, of justice, indispensable to the duration of human society. From the simple fact of its duration we may argue, that a society is not completely irrational, savage, or iniquitous; that it is not altogether destitute of intelligence, truth, and justice, for without these, society cannot hold together. Again, as society develops itself, it becomes stronger, more powerful; if the social system is continually augmented by the increase of individuals who accept and approve its regulations, it is because the action of time gradually introduces into it more right, more intelligence, more justice; it it is because a gradual approximation is made in its affairs to the principles of true legitimacy.

Thus forces itself into the world, and from the world into the mind of man, the notion of political legitimacy. Its foun-

dation in the first place, at least to a certain extent, is moral legitimacy—is justice, intelligence, and truth; it next obtains the sanction of time, which gives reason to believe that affairs are conducted by reason, that the true legitimacy has been introduced. At the epoch which we are about to study, you will find violence and fraud hovering over the cradle of monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and even over the church itself; you will see this violence and fraud everywhere gradually abated; and justice and truth taking their place in civilization. It is this introduction of justice and truth into our social system, that has nourished and gradually matured political legitimacy; and it is thus that it has taken firm root in modern civilization.

All those then who have attempted at various times to set up this idea of legitimacy as the foundation of absolute power, have wrested it from its true origin. It has nothing to do with absolute power. It is under the name of justice and righteousness that it has made its way into the world and found footing. Neither is it exclusive. It belongs to no party in particular; it springs up in all systems where truth and justice prevail. Political legitimacy is as much attached to liberty as to power; to the rights of individuals as to the forms under which are exercised the public functions. As we go on we shall find it, as I said before, in systems the most opposed; in the feudal system; in the free cities of Flanders and Germany; in the republics of Italy, as well as in monarchy. It is a quality which appertains to all the divers elements of our civilization, and which it is necessary should be well understood before entering upon its history.

The second fact revealed to us by that simultaneous advancement of claims, of which I spoke at the beginning of this lecture, is the true character of what is called the period of barbarism. Each of the elements of European civilization pretends, that at this epoch Europe belonged to it alone; hence we may conclude that it really belonged to no one of them. When any particular kind of government prevails in the world, there is no difficulty in recognising it. When we come to the tenth century, we acknowledge, without hesitation, the preponderance of feudalism. At the seventeenth we have no hesitation in asserting, that the monarchical principle prevails. If we turn our eyes to the free communities of Flanders, to the republics of Italy, we confess at once the

predominance of democracy. Whenever, indeed, any one principle really bears sway in society, it cannot be mistaken.

The dispute, then, that has arisen among the various systems which hold a part in European civilization, respecting which bore chief sway at its origin, proves that they all existed there together, without any one of them having prevailed so generally as to give to society its form or its name.

This is, indeed, the character of the dark age: it was a chaos of all the elements; the childhood of all the systems; a universal jumble, in which even strife itself was neither permanent nor systematic. By an examination of the social system of this period under its various forms, I could show you that in no part of them is there to be found anything like a general principle, anything like stability. I shall, however, confine myself to two essential particulars—the state of persons, the state of institutions. This will be sufficient to give a general picture of society.

We find at this time four classes of persons: 1st. Freemen, that is to say, men who, depending upon no superior, upon no patron, held their property and life in full liberty, without being fettered by any obligation towards another individual. 2d. The *Leudes*, *Fidèles*, *Antrustions*, &c., who were connected at first by the relationship of companion and chief, and afterwards by that of vassal and lord, towards another individual to whom they owed fealty and service, in consequence of a grant of lands, or some other gifts. 3d. Freedmen. 4th. Slaves.

But were these various classes fixed? Were men once placed in a certain rank bound to it? Were the relations, in which the different classes stood towards each other, regular or permanent? Not at all. Freemen were continually changing their condition, and becoming vassals to nobles, in consideration of some gift which these might have to bestow; while others were falling into the class of slaves or serfs. Vassals were continually struggling to shake off the yoke of patronage, to regain their independence, to return to the class of freemen. Every part of society was in motion. There was a continual passing and repassing from one class to the other. No man continued long in the same rank; no rank continued long the same

Property was in much the same state. I need scarcely tell you, that possessions were distinguished into *allodial*, or entirely free, and *beneficiary*, or such as were held by tenure, with certain obligations to be discharged towards a superior. Some writers attempt to trace out a regular and established system with respect to the latter class of proprietors, and lay it down as a rule that benefices were at first bestowed for a determinate number of years; that they were afterwards granted for life; and finally, at a later period, became hereditary. The attempt is vain. Lands were held in all these various ways at the same time, and in the same places. Benefices for a term of years, benefices for life, hereditary benefices, are found in the same period; even the same lands, within a few years, passed through these different states. There was nothing more settled, nothing more general, in the state of lands than in the state of persons. Everything shows the difficulties of the transition from the wandering life to the settled life; from the simple personal relations which existed among the barbarians as invading migratory hordes, to the mixed relations of persons and property. During this transition all was confused, local, and disordered.

In institutions we observe the same unfixedness, the same chaos. We find here three different systems at once before us:—1st. Monarchy; 2d. Aristocracy, or the proprietorship of men and lands, as lord and vassal; and, 3dly. Free institutions, or assemblies of free men deliberating in common. No one of these systems entirely prevailed. Free institutions existed; but the men who should have formed part of these assemblies seldom troubled themselves to attend them. Baronial jurisdiction was not more regularly exercised. Monarchy, the most simple institution, the most easy to determine, here had no fixed character; at one time it was elective, at another hereditary—here the son succeeded to his father, there the election was confined to a family; in another place it was open to all, purely elective, and the choice fell on a distant relation, or perhaps a stranger. In none of these systems can we discover anything fixed; all the institutions, as well as the social conditions, dwelt together, continually confounded, continually changing.

The same unsettledness existed with regard to states, they were created, suppressed, united, and divided; no governments no frontiers no nations; a general jumble of situations

principles, events, races, languages such was barbarian Europe.

Let us now fix the limits of this extraordinary period. Its origin is strongly defined; it began with the fall of the Roman empire. But where did it close? To settle this question, we must find out the cause of this state of society; we must see what were the causes of barbarism.

I think I can point out two:—one material, arising from exterior circumstances, from the course of events; the other, moral, arising from the mind, from the intellects of man.

The material, or outward cause, was the continuance of invasion; for it must not be supposed that the invasions of the barbarian hordes stopped all at once, in the fifth century. Do not believe that because the Roman empire was fallen, and kingdoms of barbarians founded upon its ruins, that the movement of nations was over. There are plenty of facts to prove that this was not the case, and that this movement lasted a long time after the destruction of the empire.

If we look to the Franks, or French, we shall find even the first race of kings continually carrying on wars beyond the Rhine. We see Clotaire, Dagobert, making expedition after expedition into Germany, and engaged in a constant struggle with the Thuringians, the Danes, and the Saxons who occupied the right bank of that river. And why was this but because these nations wished to cross the Rhine and get a share in the spoils of the empire? How came it to pass that the Franks, established in Gaul, and principally the Eastern, or Austrasian Franks, much about the same time, threw themselves in such large bodies upon Switzerland, and invaded Italy by crossing the Alps? It was because they were pushed forward by new populations from the north-east. These invasions were not mere pillaging inroads, they were not expeditions undertaken for the purpose of plunder, they were the result of necessity. The people, disturbed in their own settlements, pressed forward to better their fortune and find new abodes elsewhere. A new German nation entered upon the arena, and founded the powerful kingdom of the Lombards in Italy. In Gaul, or France, the Merovinginian dynasty gave way to the Carlovingian; a change which is now gen-

erally acknowledged to have been, properly speaking, a new irruption of Franks into Gaul—a movement of nations, which substituted the Eastern Franks for the Western. Under the second race of kings, we find Charlemagne playing the same part against the Saxons, which the Merovinginian princes played against the Thuringians: he carried on an unceasing war against the nations beyond the Rhine, who were precipitated upon the west by the Wiltzians, the Swabians, the Bohemians, and the various tribes of Slavonians, who trod on the heels of the German race. Throughout the north-east emigrations were going on and changing the face of affairs.

In the south, a movement of the same nature took place. While the German and Slavonian tribes pressed along the Rhine and Danube, the Saracens began to ravage and conquer the various coasts of the Mediterranean.

The invasion of the Saracens, however, had a character peculiarly its own. In them the spirit of conquest was united with the spirit of proselytism; the sword was drawn as well for the promulgation of a faith as the acquisition of territory. There is a vast difference between their invasion and that of the Germans. In the Christian world spiritual force and temporal force were quite distinct. The zeal for the propagation of a faith and the lust of conquest are not inmates of the same bosom. The Germans, after their conversion, preserved the same manners, the same sentiments, the same tastes, as before; they were still guided by passions and interests of a worldly nature. They had become Christians, but not missionaries. The Saracens, on the contrary, were both conquerors and missionaries. The power of the Koran and of the sword was in the same hands. And it was this peculiarity which, I think, gave to Mohammedan civilization the wretched character which it bears. It was in this union of the temporal and spiritual powers, and the confusion which it created between moral authority and physical force, that that tyranny was born which seems inherent in their civilization. This I believe to be the principal cause of that stationary state into which it has everywhere fallen. This effect, however, did not show itself upon the first rise of Mohammedanism; the union, on the contrary, of military ardor and religious zeal, gave to the Saracen invasion a prodigious power. Its ideas and moral passions had at once a brilliancy and splendor altogether wanting in the Germanic invasions; it displayed it-

self with more energy and enthusiasm, and had a correspondent effect upon the minds and passions of men.

Such was the situation of Europe from the fifth to the ninth century. Pressed on the south by the Mohammedans, and on the north by the Germans and Slavonians, it could not be otherwise than that the reaction of this double invasion should keep the interior of Europe in a state of continual ferment Populations were incessantly displaced, crowded one upon another; there was no regularity, nothing permanent or fixed. Some differences undoubtedly prevailed between the various nations. The chaos was more general in Germany than in the other parts of Europe Here was the focus of movement France was more agitated than Italy. But nowhere could society become settled and regulated; barbarism everywhere continued, and from the same cause that introduced it.[7]

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[7] The following chronological indications may assist in recalling a more distinct view of the invasions, conquests, and revolutions of this stormy period.

507. Clovis (of the *Merovingian* dynasty, and true founder of the Frankish empire) adds to his former acquisitions the conquest of the Visigothic kingdom. Dies, 511. Kingdom divided between his four sons, but ultimately united under one of them, Clotaire I., 568.
530. Thuringia conquered and annexed to the Frankish dominions.
535. Conquest of Burgundy by the Franks.
554. Ostro-Gothic kingdom destroyed by Narses—Italy becomes a province of the Eastern Empire.
560. Gepidæ destroyed by the Lombards and Avars.
568. Kingdom of the Lombards established in Upper Italy.—Southern Italy continues an exarchate of the Eastern Empire.
628. Dagobert I. (son of Clotaire II.) king of the Franks. Invasion of the Slavonians (Wendi). Mayors of the Palace control the royal authority.
687. Pepin Heristal, mayor of the palace.
711. The Saracens appear in Europe—conquer Spain—cross the Pyrenees—checked on the Aude, 712—invade France, beaten by Eudes duke of Aquitaine, 721—driven beyond the Aude, 725.
715. Charles Martel mayor of the palace.
726 Leo (Iconoclastes), Emperor of the East, issues an edict against image-worship—the people of Rome and Naples revolt—exarch of Ravenna murdered by the people, and the city yielded to the Lombards. A sort of republic under the authority of the Pope established at Rome; including the territory from Viterba to Terracina, and from Narni to Ostia. Commencement of the temporal power of the Popes. The Pope

Thus much for the material cause depending upon the course of events; let us now look to the moral cause, founded on the intellectual condition of man, which, it must be acknowledged, was not less powerful.

For, certainly, after all is said and done, whatever may be the course of external affairs, it is man himself who makes our world. It is according to the ideas, the sentiments, the moral and intellectual dispositions of man himself, that the

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and the republic of Venice (founded 697) unite to drive the Lombards from Ravenna.

732. Saracens invade France—defeated by Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours.

752-757. Pepin the Short, mayor of the palace—deposes Childeric, the last of the Merovingian kings—recognised king by the Pope—founds the *Carlovingian* dynasty.

Exarchate of Ravenna destroyed by the Lombards—the Pope and the Romans refuse submission—invite the aid of Pepin, who invades Italy and forces the Lombards to give up the exarchate of Ravenna and the Pentapolis, which he bestows upon the Pope. Commencement of the relations between the Popes and the German princes.

768. *Charlemagne* king—conquers Aquitania, 769; overthrows the Lombard kingdom of Italy, 774; first war against the Saxons; drives them beyond the Weser, 772–774; defeats them again, 777; war against Spain, 778; second war against the Saxons, 778–785; subdues all on the south of the Elbe, compels them to receive baptism. The Lombards (of Beneventum), the Greeks, and Avari, league against him—defeated. Avari subdued and Christianized, 791–799.

800. Charlemagne restores the Roman Empire of the West; receives the imperial crown from the Pope; Saxons on the Elbe subdued and dispersed, 812. [The subjugation of the Saxons had cost Charlemagne thirty years war.] War with the Wiltzians and other Slavonian tribes. Maritime incursions of the Northmen on the ocean coast, and of the Saracens on the Mediterranean.

814. Death of Charlemagne. This event was followed by the dismemberment of his empire, and the formation of the three great states of Germany, France, and Italy; also of three secondary kingdoms, Castile, Arragon, and Navarre.

The death of Charlemagne and the breaking up of his vast system likewise opened the barriers of the empire to the incursions of the Saracens, the Northmen, the Slavonians, and the Hungarians: it was not until the close of the tenth century that the barbarian invasions can be said to have definitely ceased.

world is regulated, and marches onward. It is upon the intellectual state of man that the visible form of society depends.

Now let us consider for a moment what is required to enable men to form themselves into a society somewhat durable, somewhat regular? It is evidently necessary, in the first place, that they should have a certain number of ideas sufficiently enlarged to settle upon the terms by which this society should be formed; to apply themselves to its wants, to its relations In the second place, it is necessary that these ideas should be common to the greater part of the members of the society; and finally, that they should put some constraint upon their own inclinations and actions.

It is clear that where men possess no ideas extending beyond their own existence, where their intellectual horizon is bounded in self, if they are still delivered up to their own passions, and their own wills,—if they have not among them a certain number of notions and sentiments common to them all, round which they may all rally, it is clear that they cannot form a society: without this each individual will be a principle of agitation and dissolution in the social system of which he forms a part.

Wherever individualism reigns nearly absolute, wherever man considers but himself, wherever his ideas extend not beyond himself, wherever he only yields obedience to his own passions, there society—that is to say, society in any degree extended or permanent—becomes almost impossible. Now this was just the moral state of the conquerors of Europe at the epoch which engages our attention. I remarked, in the last lecture, that we owe to the Germans the powerful sentiment of personal liberty, of human individualism. Now, in a state of extreme rudeness and ignorance, this sentiment is mere selfishness, in all its brutality, with all its unsociability. Such was its character from the fifth to the eighth century, among the Germans. They cared for nothing beyond their own interest, for nothing beyond the gratification of their own passions, their own inclinations; how, then, could they accommodate themselves, in any tolerable degree, to the social condition? The attempt was made to bring them into it; they endeavored of themselves to enter into it; but an act of improvidence, a burst of passion, a lack of intelligence, soon threw them back to their old position. At every instant we see attempts made to form man into a social state, and at

every instant we see them overthrown by the failings of man, by the absence of the moral conditions necessary to its existence.

Such were the two causes which kept our forefathers in a state of barbarism; so long as these continued, so long barbarism endured. Let us see if we can discover when and from what causes it at last ceased.

Europe labored to emerge from this state. It is contrary to the nature of man, even when sunk into it by his own fault, to wish to remain in it. However rude, however ignorant, however selfish, however headstrong, there is yet in him a still small voice, an instinct, which tells him he was made for something better;—that he has another and higher destiny. In the midst of confusion and disorder, he is haunted and tormented by a taste for order and improvement. The claims of justice, of prudence, of development, disturb him, even under the yoke of the most brutish egotism. He feels himself impelled to improve the material world, society, and himself; he labors to do this, without attempting to account to himself for the want which urges him to the task. The barbarians aspired to civilization, while they were yet incapable of it—nay, more—while they even detested it whenever its laws restrained their selfish desires.

There still remained, too, a considerable number of wrecks and fragments of Roman civilization. The name of the empire, the remembrance of that great and glorious society still dwelt in the memory of many, and especially among the senators of cities, bishops, priests, and all those who could trace their origin to the Roman world.

Among the barbarians themselves, or their barbarian ancestors, many had witnessed the greatness of the Roman empire: they had served in its armies; they had conquered it. The image, the name of Roman civilization dazzled them; they felt a desire to imitate it; to bring it back again, to preserve some portion of it. This was another cause which ought to have forced them out of the state of barbarism, which I have described.

A third cause, and one which readily presents itself to every one was the Christian Church. The Christian Church

was a regularly constituted society; having its maxims, its rules, its discipline, together with an ardent desire to extend its influence, to conquer its conquerors. Among the Christians of this period, in the Catholic clergy, there were men of profound and varied learning; men who had thought deeply, who were versed in ethics and politics; who had formed definite opinions and vigorous notions, upon all subjects; who felt a praiseworthy zeal to propagate information, and to advance the cause of learning. No society ever made greater efforts than the Christian Church did from the fifth to the tenth century, to influence the world around it, and to assimilate it to itself. When its history shall become the particular object of our examination, we shall more clearly see what it attempted—it attacked, in a manner, barbarism at every point, in order to civilize it and rule over it.

Finally, a fourth cause of the progress of civilization, a cause which it is impossible strictly to appreciate, but which is not therefore the less real, was the appearance of great men. To say why a great man appears on the stage at a certain epoch, or what of his own individual development he imparts to the world at large, is beyond our power; it is the secret of Providence; but the fact is still certain. There are men to whom the spectacle of society, in a state of anarchy or immobility, is revolting and almost unbearable; it occasions them an intellectual shudder, as a thing that should not be; they feel an unconquerable desire to change it; to restore order; to introduce something general, regular and permanent, into the world which is placed before them. Tremendous power! often tyrannical, committing a thousand iniquities, a thousand errors, for human weakness accompanies it. Glorious and salutary power! nevertheless, for it gives to humanity, and by the hand of man, a new and powerful impulse.

These various causes, these various powers working together, led to several attempts, between the fifth and ninth centuries, to draw European society from the barbarous state into which it had fallen.

The first of these was the compilation of the barbarian laws; an attempt which, though it effected but little, we cannot pass over, because it was made by the barbarians themselves. Between the sixth and eighth centuries, the laws of nearly all the barbarous nations (which, however, were nothing

more than the rude customs by which they had been regulated, before their invasion of the Roman empire) were reduced to writing. Of these there are enumerated the codes of the Burgundians, the Salii, and Ripuarian Franks, the Visigoths, the Lombards, the Saxons, the Frisons, the Bavarians, the Germans, and some others. This was evidently a commencement of civilization—an attempt to bring society under the authority of general and fixed principles. Much, however, could not be expected from it. It published the laws of a society which no longer existed; the laws of the social system of the barbarians before their establishment in the Roman territory—before they had changed their wandering life for a settled one; before the nomad warriors became lost in the landed proprietors. It is true, that here and there may be found an article respecting the lands conquered by the barbarians, or respecting their relations with the ancient inhabitants of the country; some few bold attempts were made to regulate the new circumstances in which they were placed. But the far greater part of these laws were taken up with their ancient life, their ancient condition in Germany; were totally inapplicable to the new state of society, and had but a small share in its advancement.

In Italy and the south of Gaul, another attempt of a different character was made about this time. In these places Roman society had not been so completely rooted out as elsewhere; in the cities, especially, there still remained something of order and civil life; and in these civilization seemed to make a stand. If we look, for example, at the kingdom of the Ostrogoths in Italy under Theodoric we shall see, even under the dominion of a barbarous nation and king, the municipal form taking breath, as it were, and exercising a considerable influence upon the general tide of events. Here Roman manners had modified the Gothic, and brought them in a great degree to assume a likeness to their own. The same thing took place in the south of Gaul. At the opening of the sixth century, Alaric, a Visigothic king of Toulouse, caused a collection of the Roman laws to be made, and published under the name of *Breviarum Aniani*, a code for his Roman subjects.[8]

[8] Some knowledge of these codes is necessary. Laws are the best index of the state of a people: but the barbarian codes are

In Spain, a different power, that of the church, endeavored to restore the work of civilization. Instead of the ancient German assemblies of warriors, the assembly that had most influence in Spain was the Council of Toledo; and in this council the bishops bore sway, although it was attended by the higher order of the laity. Open the laws of the Visigoths, and you will discover that it is not a code compiled by barbarians, but bears convincing marks of having been drawn up by the philosophers of the age—by the clergy. It abounds in general views, in theories, and in theories, indeed, altogether foreign to barbarian manners. Thus, for example, we know that the legislation of the barbarians was a personal legislation; that is to say, the same law only applied to one particular race of men. The Romans were judged by the old Roman laws, the Franks were judged by the Salian or Ripuarian code; in short, each people had its separate laws, though united under the same government, and dwelling together in the same territory. This is what is called personal legislation, in contradistinction to real legislation, which is founded upon territory. Now this is exactly the case with the legislation of the Visigoths; it is not personal, but territorial. All the inhabitants of Spain, Romans, Visigoths, or what not, were compelled to yield obedience to one law. Read a little further, and you will meet with still more striking traces of philosophy. Among the barbarians a fixed price was put upon

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particularly interesting as the first result of the contact of barbarism with civilization. In fact, the collecting and reducing to writing of these rude customs must be considered partly as an imitation of the Romans by their conquerors.

Of the *Capitularies* some knowledge should likewise be obtained. These were proclamations or laws published by different kings from Clovis to Hugh Capet. Taken in connexion with the codes, they indicate the character of the people, and the changes in the state of society.

The original sources of information are the work of Lindenbrogius for the codes, of Baluze for the capitularies. The general reader will find something on the subject in Gibbon and in Montesquieu; but Butler's *Horæ Juridicæ* is the best book—concise, yet complete in the view it gives.

Among the peculiarities by which most of these laws are distinguished from modern legislation, the most striking is perhaps the fact that all offences were punished with *fines*. This is significant of the barbarian sentiment of individuality, of personal independence. The barbarian will not suffer his life or liberty to be affected by his actions.

man, according to his rank in society—the life of the barbarian, the Roman, the freeman, and vassal, were not valued at the same amount—there was a graduated scale of prices. But the principle that all men's lives are of equal worth in the eyes of the law, was established by the code of the Visigoths. The same superiority is observable in their judicial proceedings:—instead of the ordeal, the oath of compurgators, or trial by battle, you will find the proofs established by witnesses, and a rational examination made of the fact, such as might take place in a civilized society. In short, the code of the Visigoths bore throughout evident marks of learning, system, and polity. In it we trace the hand of the same clergy that acted in the Council of Toledo, and which exercised so large and beneficial an influence upon the government of the country.[9]

In Spain then, up to the time of the great invasion of the Saracens, it was the hierarchy which made the greatest efforts to advance civilization.

In France, the attempt was made by another power. It was the work of great men, and above all of Charlemagne. Examine his reign under its different aspects; and you will see that the darling object of his life was to civilize the nations he governed. Let us regard him first as a warrior. He was always in the field; from the south to the north-east, from the Ebro to the Elbe and Weser. Perhaps you imagine that these expeditions were the effect of choice, and sprung from a pure love of conquest? No such thing. I will not assert that he pursued any very regular system, or that there was much diplomacy or strategy in his plans; but what he did sprang from necessity, and a desire to repress barbarism. From the beginning to the end of his reign he was occupied in staying the progress of a double invasion—that of the Mohammedans in the south, and that of the Germanic and Slavonic tribes in the north. This is what gave the reign of Charlemagne its military cast. I have already said that his expeditions against the Saxons were undertaken for the same purpose. If we pass on from his wars to his government, we shall find the case much the same: his leading object was to introduce order and unity in every part of his extensive dominions. I

[9] Des Michels represents the code of the Visigoths, as sanctioned by the Council of Toledo in 688, to have been only a revision and amendment of the code of Alaric, published in 506.

have not said *kingdom* or *state*, because these words are too precise in their signification, and call up ideas which bear but little relation to the society of which Charlemagne stood at the head. Thus much, however, seems certain, that when he found himself master of this vast territory, it mortified and grieved him to see all within it so precarious and unsettled—to see anarchy and brutality everywhere prevailing,—and it was the first wish of his heart to better this wretched condition of society. He endeavored to do this at first by his *missi regii*, whom he sent into every part of his dominions to find out and correct abuses; to amend the mal-administration of justice, and to render him an account of all that was wrong; and afterwards by the general assemblies or parliaments as they have been called of the Champ de Mars, which he held more regularly than any of his predecessors. These assemblies he made nearly every considerable person in his dominions to attend. They were not assemblies formed for the preservation of the liberty of the subject, there was nothing in them bearing any likeness to the deliberations of our own days. But Charlemagne found them a means by which he could become well informed of facts and circumstances, and by which he could introduce some regulation, some unity, into the restless and disorganized populations he had to govern.

In whatever point of view, indeed, we regard the reign of Charlemagne, we always find its leading characteristic to be a desire to overcome barbarism, and to advance civilization. We see this conspicuously in his foundation of schools, in his collecting of libraries, in his gathering about him the learned of all countries; in the favor he showed towards the influence of the church, for everything, in a word, which seemed likely to operate beneficially upon society in general, or the individual man.

An attempt of the same nature was made very soon afterwards in England, by ALFRED THE GREAT.

These are some of the means which were in operation, from the fifth to the ninth century, in various parts of Europe, which seemed likely to put an end to barbarism.

None of them succeeded. Charlemagne was unable to establish his great empire, and the system of government by which he wished to rule it. The church succeeded no better

in its attempt in Spain to found a system of theocracy. And though in Italy and the south of France, Roman civilization made several attempts to raise its head, it was not till a later period, till towards the end of the tenth century, that it in reality acquired any vigor. Up to this time, every effort to put an end to barbarism failed: they supposed men more advanced than they in reality were. They all desired, under various forms, to establish a society more extensive, or better regulated, than the spirit of the age was prepared for. The attempts, however, were not lost to mankind. At the commencement of the tenth century, there was no longer any visible appearance of the great empire of Charlemagne, nor of the glorious councils of Toledo, but barbarism was drawing nigh its end. Two great results were obtained:

1. The movement of the invading hordes had been stopped both in the north and in the south. Upon the dismemberment of the empire of Charlemagne, the states, which became formed upon the right bank of the Rhine, opposed an effectual barrier to the tribes which advanced from the west. The Danes and Normans are an incontestable proof of this. Up to this time, if we except the Saxon attacks upon England, the invasions of the German tribes by sea had not been very considerable: but in the course of the ninth century they became constant and general. And this happened, because invasions by land had become exceedingly difficult; society had acquired, on this side, frontiers more fixed and secure; and that portion of the wandering nations, which could not be pressed back, were at least turned from their ancient course, and compelled to proceed by sea. Great as undoubtedly was the misery occasioned to the west of Europe by the incursions of these pirates and marauders, they still were much less hurtful than the invasions by land, and disturbed much less generally the newly-forming society. In the south, the case was much the same. The Arabs had settled in Spain: and the struggle between them and the Christians still continued; but this occasioned no new emigration of nations. Bands of Saracens still, from time to time, infested the coasts of the Mediterranean, but the great career of Islamism was arrested.

2. In the interior of Europe we begin at this time to see the wandering life decline; populations became fixed; estates

and landed possessions became settled; the relations between man and man no longer varied from day to day under the influence of force or chance. The interior and moral condition of man himself began to undergo a change; his ideas, his sentiments, began, like his life, to assume a more fixed character. He began to feel an attachment to the place in which he dwelt; to the connexions and associations which he here formed; to those domains which he now calculated upon leaving to his children; to that dwelling which hereafter became his castle; to that miserable assemblage of serfs and slaves, which was one day to become a village. Little societies everywhere began to be formed; little states to be cut out according to the measure, if I may so say, of the capacities and prudence of men. There, societies gradually became connected by a tie, the origin of which is to be found in the manners of the German barbarians: the tie of a confederation which would not destroy individual freedom. On one side we find every considerable proprietor settling himself in his domains, surrounded only by his family and retainers; on the other, a certain graduated subordination of services and rights existing among all these military proprietors scattered over the land. Here we have the feudal system oozing at last out of the bosom of barbarism. Of the various elements of our civilizations, it was natural enough that the Germanic element should first prevail. It was already in possession of power; it had conquered Europe: from it European civilization was to receive its first form—its first social organization.

The character of this form—the character of feudalism, and the influence it has exercised upon European civilization—will be the object of my next lecture; while in the very bosom of this system, in its meridian, we shall, at every step, meet with the other elements of our own social system, monarchy, the church, and the communities or free cities. We shall feel pre-assured that these were not destined to fall under this feudal form, to which they adapted themselves while struggling against it; and that we may look forward to the hour when victory will declare itself for them in their turn.

LECTURE IV

THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.

I HAVE thus far endeavored to give you a view of the state of Europe upon the fall of the Roman empire; of its state in the first period of modern history—in the period of barbarism. We have seen that at the end of the period, towards the beginning of the tenth century, the first principle, the first system, which took possession of European society, was the feudal system—that out of the very bosom of barbarism sprung feudalism. The investigation of this system will be the subject of the present lecture.

I need scarcely remind you that it is not the history of events, properly so called, that we propose to consider. I shall not here recount the destinies of the feudal system. The subject which engages our attention is the history of civilization; it is that general, hidden fact, which we have to seek for, out of all the exterior facts in which its existence is contained.

Thus the events, the social crisises, the various states through which society has passed, will in no way interest us, except so far as they are connected with the growth of civilization; we have only to learn from them how they have retarded or forwarded this great work; what they have given it, and what they have withheld from it. It is only in this point of view that we shall consider the feudal system.

In the first of these lectures we settled what civilization was; we endeavored to discover its elements; we saw that it consisted, on one side, in the development of man himself, of the individual, of humanity; on the other, of his outward or social condition. When then we come to any event, to any system, to any general condition of society, we have this twofold question to put to it: What has it done for or against the development of man—for or against the development of society? It will, however, be at once seen that, in the inves

tigation we have undertaken, it will be impossible for us not to come in contact with some of the grandest questions in moral philosophy. When we would, for example, know in what an event, a system, has contributed to the progress of man and of society, it is necessary that we should know what is the *true* development of society and of man; and be enabled to detect those developments which are deceitful, illegitimate,—which pervert instead of meliorate,—which cause them to retrograde instead of to advance. We shall not attempt to elude this task. By so doing we should mutilate and weaken our ideas, as well as the facts themselves. Besides, the present state of the world, the spirit of the age, compels us at once frankly to welcome this inevitable alliance of philosophy and history.

This indeed forms a striking, perhaps the essential, characteristic of the present times. We are now compelled to consider—science and reality—theory and practice—right and fact—and to make them move side by side. Down to the present time these two powers have lived apart. The world has been accustomed to see theory and practice following two different routes, unknown to each other, or at least never meeting. When doctrines, when general ideas, have wished to intermeddle in affairs, to influence the world, it has only been able to effect this under the appearance and by the aid of fanaticism. Up to the present time the government of human societies, the direction of their affairs, have been divided between two sorts of influences; on one side theorists, men who would rule all according to abstract notions—enthusiasts; on the other, men ignorant of all rational principle,—experimentalists, whose only guide is expediency. This state of things is now over. The world will no longer agitate for the sake of some abstract principle, some fanciful theory—some Utopian government which can only exist in the imagination of an enthusiast; nor will it put up with practical abuses and oppressions, however favored by prescription and expediency, where they are opposed to the just principles and the legitimate end of government. To ensure respect, to obtain confidence, governing powers must now unite theory and practice; they must know and acknowledge the influence of both. They must regard as well principles as facts; must respect both truth and necessity—must shun, on one hand, the blind pride of the fanatic theorist, and, on the other, the no less

blind pride of the libertine practician. To this better state of things we have been brought by the progress of the human mind and the progress of society. On one side the human mind is so elevated and enlarged that it is able to view at once, as a whole, the subject or fact which comes under its notice, with all the various circumstances and principles which affect it—these it calculates and combines—it so opposes, mixes, and arranges them—that while the everlasting principle is placed boldly and prominently forward so as not to be mistaken, care is taken that it shall not be endangered, that its progress shall not be retarded by a negligent or rash estimate of the circumstances which oppose it. On the other side, social systems are so improved as no longer to shrink from the light of truth; so improved, that facts may be brought to the test of science—practice may be placed by the side of theory, and, notwithstanding its many imperfections, the comparison will excite in us neither discouragement nor disgust.

I shall give way, then, freely to this natural tendency—to this spirit of the age, by passing continually from the investigation of circumstances to the investigation of ideas—from an exposition of facts to the consideration of doctrines. Perhaps there is, in the present disposition of the public, another reason in favor of this method. For some time past there has existed among us a decided taste, a sort of predilection for facts, for looking at things in a practical point of view. We have been so much a prey to the despotism of abstract ideas of theories,—they have, in some respects, cost us so dear, that we now regard them with a degree of distrust. We like better to refer to facts, to particular circumstances, and to judge and act accordingly. Let us not complain of this. It is a new advance—it is a grand step in knowledge, and towards the empire of truth; provided, however, we do not suffer ourselves to be carried too far by this disposition—provided that we do not forget that truth alone has a right to reign in the world; that facts have no merit but in proportion as they bear its stamp, and assimilate themselves more and more to its image; that all true grandeur proceeds from mind; that all expansion belongs to it. The civilization of France possesses this peculiar character: it has never been wanting in intellectual grandeur. It has always been rich in ideas. The power of mind has been great in French society—greater, perhaps, than anywhere else. It must not lose this happy privilege—it must not fall into that lower, that somewhat ma-

erial condition which prevails in other societies. Intelligence, theories, must still maintain in France the same rank which they have hitherto occupied.

I shall not then attempt to shun these general and philosophical questions: I will not go out of my way to seek them, but when circumstances bring them naturally before me, I shall attack them without hesitation or embarrassment. This will be the case more than once in considering the feudal system as connected with the history of European civilization

A great proof that in the tenth century the feudal system was necessary, and the only social system practicable, is the universality of its adoption. Wherever barbarism ceased, feudalism became general. This at first struck men as the triumph of chaos. All unity, all general civilization seemed gone; society on all sides seemed dismembered; a multitude of petty, obscure, isolated, incoherent societies arose. This appeared, to those who lived and saw it, universal anarchy—the dissolution of all things. Consult the poets and historians of the day: they all believed that the end of the world was at hand. Yet this was, in truth, a new and real social system which was forming: feudal society was so necessary, so inevitable, so altogether the only consequence that could flow from the previous state of things, that all entered into it, all adopted its form. Even elements the most foreign to this system, the church, the free communities, royalty, all were constrained to accommodate themselves to it. Churches became sovereigns and vassals; cities became lords and vassals; royalty was hidden under the feudal suzerain. All things were given in fief, not only estates, but rights and privileges: the right to cut wood in the forests, the privilege of fishing. The churches gave their surplice-fees in fief: the revenues of baptism—the fees for churching women. In the same manner, too, that all the great elements of society were drawn within the feudal enclosure, so even the smallest portions, the most trifling circumstances of common life, became subject to feudalism.

In observing the feudal system thus taking possession of every part of society, one might be apt, at first, to believe that the essential, vital principle of feudalism everywhere prevailed. This would be a grand mistake. Although they pu

on the feudal form, yet the institutions, the elements of society which were not analogous to the feudal system, did not lose their nature, the principles by which they were distinguished The feudal church, for example, never ceased for a moment to be animated and governed at bottom by the principles of theocracy, and she never for a moment relaxed her endeavors to gain for this the predominancy. Now she leagued with royalty, now with the pope, and now with the people, to destroy this system, whose livery, for the time, she was compelled to put on. It was the same with royalty and the free cities: in one the principle of monarchy, in the others the principle of democracy, continued fundamentally to prevail: and, notwithstanding their feudal appearance, these various elements of European society constantly labored to deliver themselves from a form so foreign to their nature, and to put on that which corresponded with their true and vital principle.

Though perfectly satisfied, therefore, of the universality of the feudal *form*, we must take care not to conclude on that account, that the feudal *principle* was equally universal. We must be no less cautious not to take our ideas of feudalism indifferently from every object which bears its physiognomy. In order to know and understand this system thoroughly—to unravel and judge of its effects upon modern civilization—we must seek it where the form and spirit dwell together; we must study it in the hierarchy of the laic possessors of fiefs in the association of the conquerors of the European territory. This was the true residence of the feudal system, and into this we will now endeavor to penetrate.

I said a few words, just now, on the importance of questions of a moral nature; and on the danger and inconvenience of passing them by without proper attention. A matter of a totally opposite character arises here, and demands our consideration, it is one which has been, in general, too much neglected. I allude to the physical condition of society; to the changes which take place in the life and manners of a people in consequence of some new event, some revolution, some new state into which it may be thrown. These changes have not always been sufficiently attended to. The modification which these great crisises in the history of the world have wrought in the material existence of mankind—in the physical conditions of the relations of men to one another—

have not been investigated with so much advantage as they might have been. These modifications have more influence upon the general body of society than is imagined. Every one knows how much has been said upon the influence of climate, and of the importance which Montesquieu attached to it. Now if we regard only the direct influence of climate upon man, perhaps it has not been so extensive as is generally supposed; it is, to say the least, vague and difficult to appreciate: but the indirect influence of climate, that, for example, which arises from the circumstance that in a hot country man lives in the open air, while in a cold one he lives shut up in his habitation—that he lives here upon one kind of food, and there upon another, are facts of extreme importance; inasmuch as a simple change in physical life may have a powerful effect upon the course of civilization. Every great revolution leads to modifications of this nature in the social system, and consequently claims our consideration.

The establishment of the feudal system wrought a change of this kind, which had a powerful and striking influence upon European civilization. It changed the distribution of the population. Hitherto the lords of the territory, the conquering population, had lived united in masses more or less numerous, either settled in cities, or moving about the country in bands, but by the operation of the feudal system these men were brought to live isolated, each in his own dwelling, at long distances apart. You will instantly perceive the influence which this change must have exercised upon the character and progress of civilization. The social preponderance—the government of society, passed at once from cities to the country; the baronial courts of the great landed proprietors took the place of the great national assemblies—the public body was lost in the thousand little sovereignties into which every kingdom was split. This was the first consequence—a consequence purely physical, of the triumph of the feudal system. The more closely we examine this circumstance, the more clearly and forcibly will its effects present themselves to our notice.

Let us now examine this society in itself, and trace out its influence upon the progress of civilization. We will take feudalism, in the first place, in its most simple state, in its primitive fundamental form. We will visit a possessor of a

fief in his lonely domain, we will see the course of life which he leads there, and the little society by which he is surrounded.

Having fixed upon an elevated solitary spot, strong by nature, and which he takes care to render secure, the lordly proprietor of the domain builds his castle. Here he settles himself, with his wife and children, and perhaps some few freemen, who, not having obtained fiefs, not having themselves become proprietors, have attached themselves to his fortunes, and continued to live with him and form a part of his household. These are the inhabitants of the interior of the castle. At the foot of the hill on which this castle stands we find huddled together a little population of peasants, of serfs, who cultivate the lands of the possessor of the fief. In the midst of this group of cottages religion soon planted a church and a priest. A priest, in these early days of feudalism, was generally the chaplain of the baron, and the curate of the village, two offices which by and by became separated, and the village had its pastor dwelling by the side of his church.

Such is the first form, the elementary principle, of feudal society. We will now examine this simple form, in order to put to it the twofold question we have to ask of every fact, namely, what it has done towards the progress—first, of man, himself; secondly, of society?

It is with peculiar propriety that we put this twofold question to the little society I have just described, and that we should attach importance to its answers, forasmuch as this society is the type, the faithful picture, of feudal society in the aggregate; the baron, the people of his domain, and the priest, compose, whether upon a large or smaller scale, the feudal system when separated from monarchy and cities, two distinct and foreign elements.

The first circumstance which strikes us in looking at this little community is the great importance with which the possessor of the fief must have been regarded, not only by himself, but by all around him. A feeling of personal consequence, of individual liberty, was a prevailing feature in the character of the barbarians. The feeling here, however, was of a different nature; it was no longer simply the liberty of

ne man, of the warrior, it was the importance of the proprietor, of the head of the family, of the master. His situation, with regard to all around him, would naturally beget in him an idea of superiority—a superiority of a peculiar nature, and very different from that we meet with in other systems of civilization. Look, for example, at the Roman patrician, who was placed in one of the highest aristocratic situations of the ancient world. Like the feudal lord, he was head of the family, superior, master; and besides this, he was a religious magistrate, high priest over his household. But mark the difference: his importance as a religious magistrate is derived from without. It is not an importance strictly personal, attached to the individual: he receives it from on high; he is the delegate of divinity, the interpreter of religious faith. The Roman patrician, moreover, was the member of a corporation which lived united in the same place—a member of the senate—again, an importance which he derived from without from his corporation. The greatness of these ancient aristocrats, associated to a religious and political character, belonged to the situation, to the corporation in general, rather than to the individual. That of the proprietor of a fief belonged to himself alone; he held nothing of any one; all his rights, all his power, centred in himself. He is no religious magistrate; he forms no part of a senate; it is in the individual, in his own person, that all his importance resides—all that he is, he is of himself, in his own name alone. What a vast influence must a situation like this have exercised over him who enjoyed it! What haughtiness, what pride, must it have engendered! Above him, no superior of whom he was but the representative and interpreter; near him no equals; no general and powerful law to restrain him—no exterior force to control him; his will suffered no check but from the limits of his power, and the presence of danger. Such seems to me the moral effect that would naturally be produced upon the character or disposition of man, by the situation in which he was placed under the feudal system.

I shall proceed to a second consequence equally important, though too little noticed; I mean the peculiar character of the feudal family

Let us consider for a moment the various family systems

Let us look, in the first place, at the patriarchal family, of which so beautiful a picture is given us in the Bible, and in numerous Oriental treatises. We find it composed of a great number of individuals—it was a tribe. The chief, the patriarch, in this case, lives in common with his children, with his neighbors, with the various generations assembled around him—all his relations or his servants. He not only lives with them, he has the same interests, the same occupations, he leads the same life. This was the situation of Abraham, and of the patriarchs; and is still that of the Bedouin Arabs, who, from generation to generation, continue to follow the same patriarchal mode of life.

Let us look next at the *clan*—another family system, which now scarcely exists, except in Scotland and Ireland, but through which probably the greater part of the European world has passed. This is no longer the patriarchal family. A great difference is found here between the chief and the rest of the community; he leads not the same life; the greater part are employed in husbandry, and in supplying his wants, while the chief himself lives in idleness or war. Still they all descend from the same stock; they all bear the same name; and their common parentage, their ancient traditions, the same remembrances, and the same associations, create a moral tie, a sort of equality, between all the members of the clan.

These are the two principal forms of family society as represented by history. Does either of them, let me ask you, resemble the feudal family? Certainly not. At the first glance, there may, indeed, seem some similarity between the feudal family and the clan; but the difference is marked and striking. The population which surrounds the possessor of the fief is quite foreign to him; it bears not his name. They are unconnected by relationship, or by any historical or moral tie. The same holds with respect to the patriarchal family. The feudal proprietor neither leads the same life, nor follows the same occupations as those who live around him; he is engaged in arms, or lives in idleness: the others are laborers. The feudal family is not numerous—it forms no tribe—it is confined to a single family properly so called; to the wife and children, who live separated from the rest of the people in the interior of the castle. The peasantry and serfs form

no part of it: they are of another origin, and immeasurably beneath it. Five or six individuals, at a vast height above them, and at the same time foreigners, make up the feudal family. Is it not evident that the peculiarity of its situation must have given to this family a peculiar character? Confined, concentrated, called upon continually to defend itself; mistrusting, or at least shutting itself up from the rest of the world, even from its servants, in-door life, domestic manners must naturally have acquired a great preponderance. We cannot keep out of sight, that the grosser passions of the chief, the constantly passing his time in warfare or hunting, opposed a considerable obstacle to the formation of a strictly domestic society. But its progress, though slow, was certain. The chief, however violent and brutal his out-door exercises, must habitually return into the bosom of his family. He there finds his wife and children, and scarcely any but them; they alone are his constant companions; they alone divide his sorrows and soften his joys; they alone are interested in all that concerns him. It could not but happen in such circumstances, that domestic life must have acquired a vast influence; nor is there any lack of proofs that it did so. Was it not in the bosom of the feudal family that the importance of women, that the value of the wife and mother, at last made itself known? In none of the ancient communities, not merely speaking of those in which the spirit of family never existed, but in those in which it existed most powerfully—say, for example, in the patriarchal system—in none of these did women ever attain to anything like the place which they acquired in Europe under the feudal system. It is to the progress, to the preponderance of domestic manners in the feudal halls and castles, that they owe this change, this improvement in their condition. The cause of this has been sought for in the peculiar manners of the ancient Germans; in a national respect which they are said to have borne, in the midst of their forests, to the female sex. Upon a single phrase of Tacitus, Germanic patriotism has founded a high degree of superiority —of primitive and ineffable purity of manners—in the relations between the two sexes among the Germans. Pure chimeras! Phrases like this of Tacitus—sentiments and customs analogous to those of the Germans of old, are found in the narratives of a host of writers, who have seen, or inquired into, the manners of savage and barbarous tribes. There is nothing primitive, nothing peculiar to a certain race

in this matter. It was in the effects of a very decided social situation—it was in the increase and preponderance of domestic manners, that the importance of the female sex in Europe had its rise, and the preponderance of domestic manners in Europe very early became an essential characteristic in the feudal system.

A second circumstance, a fresh proof of the influence of domestic life, forms a striking feature in the picture of a feudal family. I mean the principle of inheritance—the spirit of perpetuity which so strongly predominates in its character. This spirit of inheritance is a natural off-shoot of the spirit of family, but it nowhere took such deep root as in the feudal system, where it was nourished by the nature of the property with which the family was, as it were, incorporated. The fief differed from other possessions in this, that it constantly required a chief, or owner, who could defend it, manage it, discharge the obligations by which it was held, and thus maintain its rank in the general association of the great proprietors of the kingdom. There thus became a kind of identification of the possessor of the fief with the fief itself, and with all its future possessors.

This circumstance powerfully tended to strengthen and knit together the ties of family, already so strong by the nature of the feudal system itself.

Quitting the baronial dwelling, let us now descend to the little population that surrounds it. Everything here wears a different aspect. The disposition of man is so kindly and good, that it is almost impossible for a number of individuals to be placed for any length of time in a social situation without giving birth to a certain moral tie between them: sentiments of protection, of benevolence, of affection, spring up naturally. Thus it happened in the feudal system. There can be no doubt, but that after a certain time, kind and friendly feelings would grow up between the feudal lord and his serfs. This, however, took place in spite of their relative situation, and by no means through its influence. Considered in itself, this situation was radically vicious. There was nothing morally common between the holder of the fief and his serfs. They formed part of his estate; they were his property; and under this word property are comprised, not

only all the rights which we delegate to the public magistrate to exercise in the name of the state, but likewise all those which we possess over private property: the right of making laws, of levying taxes, of inflicting punishment, as well as that of disposing of them—or selling them. There existed not, in fact, between the lord of the domain and its cultivators, so far as we consider the latter as men, either rights, guarantee, or society.

From this I believe has arisen that almost universal, invincible hatred which country people have at all times borne to the feudal system, to every remnant of it—to its very name. We are not without examples of men having submitted to the heavy yoke of despotism, of their having become accustomed to it, nay more, of their having freely accepted it. Religious despotism, monarchical despotism, have more than once obtained the sanction, almost the love, of the population which they governed. But feudal despotism has always been repulsed, always hateful. It tyrannized over the destinies of men, without ruling in their hearts. Perhaps this may be partly accounted for by the fact, that, in religious and monarchical despotism, authority is always exercised by virtue of some belief or opinion common to both ruler and subjects; he is the representative, the minister, of another power superior to all human powers. He speaks or acts in the name of Divinity or of a common feeling, and not in the name of man himself, of man alone. Feudal despotism differed from this; it was the authority of man over man; the domination of the personal, capricious will of an individual. This perhaps is the only tyranny to which man, much to his honor, never will submit. Wherever in a ruler, or master, he sees but the individual man,—the moment that the authority which presses upon him is no more than an individual, a human will, one like his own, he feels mortified and indignant, and struggles against the yoke which he is compelled to bear. Such was the true, the distinctive character of the feudal power, and such was the origin of the hatred which it has never ceased to inspire.

The religious element which was associated with the feudal power was but little calculated to alleviate its yoke. I do not see how the influence of the priest could be very great in the society which I have just described, or that he could have much success in legitimizing the connexion between the enslaved people and the lordly proprietor. The church has ex

ercised a very powerful influence in the civilization of Europe but then it has been by proceeding in a general manner—by changing the general dispositions of mankind. When we enter intimately into the little feudal society, properly so called, we find the influence of the priest between the baron and his serfs to have been very slight. It most frequently happened that he was as rude and nearly as much under control as the serf himself; and therefore not very well fitted, either by his position or talents, to enter into a contest with the lordly baron. We must, to be sure, naturally suppose, that, called upon as he was by his office to administer and to keep alive among these poor people the great moral truths of Christianity, he became endeared and useful to them in this respect; he consoled and instructed them; but I believe he had but little power to soften their hard condition.

Having examined the feudal system in its rudest, its simplest form; having placed before you the principal consequences which flowed from it, as respects the possessor of the fief himself, as respects his family, and as respects the population gathered about him; let us now quit this narrow precinct. The population of the fief was not the only one in the land: there were other societies more or less like his own of which he was a member—with which he was connected. What, then, let us ask, was the influence which this general society to which he belonged might be expected to exercise upon civilization?

One short observation before we reply: both the possessor of the fief and the priest, it is true, formed part of a general society; in the distance they had numerous and frequent connexions; not so the cultivators—the serfs. Every time that, in speaking of the population of the country at this period, we make use of some general term, which seems to convey the idea of one single and same society—such for example as the word people—we speak without truth. For this population there was no general society—its existence was purely local. Beyond the estate in which they dwelt, the serfs had no relations whatever,—no connexion either with persons, things, or government. For them there existed no common destiny, no common country—they formed not a nation. When we speak of the feudal association as a whole it is only the great proprietors that are alluded to.

Let us now see what the relations of the little feudal society were with the general society to which it held, and what consequences these relations may be expected to have led to in the progress of civilization.

We all know what the ties were which bound together the possessors of fiefs; what conditions were attached to their possessions; what were the obligations of service on one part, and of protection on the other. I shall not enter into a detail of these obligations; it is enough for the present purpose that you have a general idea of them. This system, however, seemed naturally to pour into the mind of every possessor of a fief a certain number of ideas and moral sentiments—ideas of duty, sentiments of affection. That the principles of fidelity, devotedness, loyalty, became developed, and maintained by the relations in which the possessors of fiefs stood towards one another, is evident. The fact speaks for itself.

The attempt was made to change these obligations, these duties, these sentiments, and so on, into laws and institutions. It is well known that feudalism wished legally to settle what services the possessor of a fief owed to his sovereign; what services he had a right to expect from him in return; in what cases the vassal might be called upon to furnish military or pecuniary aid to his lord; in what way the lord might obtain the services of his vassals, in those affairs, in which they were not bound to yield them by the mere possession of their fiefs. The attempt was made to place all these rights under the protection of institutions founded to ensure their respect. Thus the baronial jurisdictions were erected to administer justice between the possessors of fiefs, upon complaints duly laid before their common suzerain. Thus every baron of any consideration collected his vassals in parliament, to debate in common the affairs which required their consent or concurrence. There was, in short, a combination of political, judicial, and military means, which show the attempt to organize the feudal system—to convert the relations between the possessors of fiefs into laws and institutions.

But these laws, these institutions, had no stability—no guarantee.

If it should be asked what is a political guarantee, I am compelled to look back to its fundamental character, and to state that this is the constant existence, in the bosom of society, of a will, of an authority disposed and in a condition to impose

a law upon the wills and powers of private individuals—to enforce their obedience to the common rule, to make them respect the general law.

There are only two systems of political guarantees possible: there must be either a will, a particular power, so superior to the others that none of them can resist it, but are obliged to yield to its authority whenever it is interposed; or, on the other, a public will, the result of the concurrence—of the development of the wills of individuals, and which likewise is in a condition, when once it has expressed itself, to make itself obeyed and respected by all.

These are the only two systems of political guarantees possible; the despotism of one alone, or of a body; or free government. If we examine the various systems, we shall find that they may all be brought under one of these two.

Well, neither of these existed, or could exist, under the feudal system.

Without doubt the possessors of fiefs were not all equal among themselves. There were some much more powerful than others; and very many sufficiently powerful to oppress the weaker. But there was none, from the king, the first of proprietors, downward, who was in a condition to impose law upon all the others; in a condition to make himself obeyed. Call to mind that none of the permanent means of power and influence at this time existed—no standing army—no regular taxes—no fixed tribunals. The social authorities—the institutions, had, in a manner, to be new formed every time they were wanted. A tribunal had to be formed for every trial—an army to be formed for every war—a revenue to be formed every time that money was needed. All was occasional—accidental—special; there was no central, permanent, independent means of government. It is evident that in such a system no individual had the power to enforce his will upon others; to compel all to respect and obey the general law.

On the other hand, resistance was easy, in proportion as repression was difficult. Shut up in his castle, with but a small number of enemies to cope with, and aware that other vassals in a like situation were ready to join and assist him, the possessor of a fief found but little difficulty in defending himself.

It must then, I think, be confessed, that the first system of political guarantees—namely, that which would make all responsible to the strongest—has been shown to be impossible under the feudal system.

The other system—that of free government, of a public power, a public authority—was just as impracticable. The reason is simple enough. When we speak now of a public power, of what we call the rights of sovereignty—that is, the right of making laws, of imposing taxes, of inflicting punishment, we know, we bear in mind, that these rights belong to nobody; that no one has, on his own account, the right to punish others, or to impose any burden or law upon them. These are rights which belong only to the great body of society, which are exercised only in its name; they are emanations from the people, and held in trust for their benefit. Thus it happens that when an individual is brought before an authority invested with these rights, the sentiment that predominates in his mind, though perhaps he himself may be unconscious of it, is, that he is in the presence of a public legitimate authority, invested with the power to command him, an authority which, beforehand, he has tacitly acknowledged. This was by no means the case under the feudal system. The possessor of a fief, within his domain, was invested with all the rights and privileges of sovereignty; he inherited them with the territory; they were a matter of private property. What are now called public rights were then private rights; what are now called public authorities were then private authorities. When the possessor of a fief, after having exercised sovereign power in his own name, as proprietor over all the population which lived around him, attended an assembly, attended a parliament held by his sovereign—a parliament not in general very numerous, and composed of men of the same grade, or nearly so, as himself—he did not carry with him any notion of a public authority. This idea was in direct contradiction to all about him—to all his notions, to all that he had done within his own domains. All he saw in these assemblies were men invested with the same rights as himself, in the same situation as himself, acting as he had done by virtue of their own personal title. Nothing led or compelled him to see or acknowledge in the very highest portion of the government, or in the institutions which we call public, that character of superiority or generality which seems to us bound up

with the no.ion of political power. Hence. if he was dissatis fied with its decision, he refused to concur in it, and perhaps called in force to resist it.

Force, indeed, was the true and usual guarantee of righ under the feudal system, if force can be called a guarantee. Every law continually had recourse to force to make itself respected or acknowledged. No institution succeeded under it. This was so perfectly felt that institutions were scarcely ever applied to. If the agency of the baronial courts or par liaments of vassals had been of any importance, we should find them more generally employed than. from history, they appear to have been. Their rarity proves their insignificance.

This is not astonishing. There is another reason for is more profound and decisive than any I have yet adduced.

Of all the systems of government and political guarantee it may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that the most difficult to establish and render effectual is the federative system; a system which consists in leaving in each place or province, in every separate society, all that portion of government which can abide there, and in taking from it only so much of it as is indispensable to a general society, in order to carry it to the centre of this larger society, and there to imbody it under the form of a central government. This federative system, theoretically the most simple, is found in practice the most complex; for in order to reconcile the degree of independence, of local liberty, which is permitted to remain, with the degree of general order, of general submission, which in certain cases it supposes and exacts, evidently requires a very advanced state of civilization—requires, indeed, that the will of man, that individual liberty, should concur in the establishment and maintenance of the system much more than in any other, because it possesses less than any other the means of coercion.

The federative system, then, is one which evidently requires the greatest maturity of reason, of morality, of civilization in the society to which it is applied. Yet we find that this was the kind of government which the feudal system attempted to establish: for feudalism, as a whole, was truly a confederation. It rested upon the same principles, for example, as those on which is based, in the present day, the federative system of the United States of America. It affected to leave in the hands of each great proprietor all that portion of the government, of sovereignty, which could be exercised there

and to carry to the suzerain, or to the general assembly of barons, the least possible portion of power, and only this in cases of absolute necessity. You will easily conceive the impossibility of establishing a system like this in a world of ignorance, of brute passions, or, in a word, where the moral condition of man was so imperfect as under the feudal system. The very nature of such a government was in opposition to the notions, the habits and manners of the very men to whom it was to be applied. How then can we be astonished at the bad success of this attempt at organization?

We have now considered the feudal system, first, in its most simple element, in its fundamental principle; and then in its collective form, as a whole: we have examined it under these two points of view, in order to see what it did and what it might have been expected to do; what has been its influence on the progress of civilization. These investigations, I think, bring us to this twofold conclusion:—

1st. Feudalism seems to have exercised a great, and, upon the whole, a salutary influence upon the intellectual development of individuals. It gave birth to elevated ideas and feelings in the mind, to moral wants, to grand developments of character and passion.

2dly. With regard to society, it was incapable of establishing either legal order or political guarantee. In the wretched state to which society had been reduced by barbarism, in which it was incapable of a more regular or enlarged form, the feudal system seemed indispensable as a step towards reassociation; still this system, in itself radically vicious, could neither regulate nor enlarge society. The only political right which the feudal system was capable of exercising in European society, was the right of resistance: I will not say legal resistance, for there can be no question of legal resistance in a society so little advanced. The progress of society consists pre-eminently in substituting, on one hand, public authority for private will; and, on the other, legal resistance for individual resistance. This is the great end, the chief perfection, of social order; a large field is left to personal liberty, but when personal liberty offends, when it becomes necessary to call it to account, our only appeal is to public reason; public reason is placed in the judge's chair to pass sentence on the charge which is preferred against individual liberty

Such is the system of legal order and of legal resistance You will easily perceive, that there was nothing bearing any resemblance to this in the feudal system. The right of resistance, which was maintained and practised in this system was the right of personal resistance; a terrible and anti-social right, inasmuch as its only appeal is to brute force—to war—which is the destruction of society itself; a right, however, which ought never to be entirely erased from the mind of man, because by its abolition he puts on the fetters of servitude. The notion of the right of resistance had been banished from the Roman community, by the general disgrace and infamy into which it had fallen, and it could not be regenerated from its ruins. It could not, in my opinion, have sprung more naturally from the principles of Christian society. It is to the feudal system that we are indebted for its re-introduction among us. The glory of civilization is to render this principle for ever inactive and useless; the glory of the feudal system is its having constantly professed and defended it

Such, if I am not widely mistaken, is the result of our investigation of the feudal community, considered in itself, in its general principles, and independently of its historical progress. If we now turn to facts, to history, we shall find it to have fallen out, just as might have been expected, that the feudal system accomplished its task; that its destiny has been conformable to its nature. Events may be adduced in proof of all the conjectures, of all the inductions, which I have drawn from the nature and essential character of this system.

Take a glance, for example, at the general history of feudalism, from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, and say, is it not impossible to deny that it exercised a vast and salutary influence upon the progress of individual man—upon the development of his sentiments, his disposition, and his ideas? Where can we open the history of this period, without discovering a crowd of noble sentiments, of splendid achievements, of beautiful developments of humanity, evidently generated in the bosom of feudal life. Chivalry, which in reality bears scarcely the least resemblance to feudalism, was nevertheless its offspring. It was feudalism which gave birth to that romantic thirst and fondness for all that is noble, generous, and faithful—for that sentiment of honor, which still raises its voice in favor of the system by which it was nursed

But turn to another side. Here we see that the first sparks of European imagination, that the first attempts of poetry, of literature, that the first intellectual gratifications which Europe tasted in emerging from barbarism, sprung up under the protection, under the wings, of feudalism. It was in the baronial hall that they were born, and cherished, and protected. It is to the feudal times that we trace back the earliest literary monuments of England, France, and Germany, the earliest intellectual enjoyments of modern Europe.

As a set-off to this, if we question history respecting the influence of feudalism upon the social system, its reply is, though still in accordance with our conjectures, that the feudal system has everywhere opposed not only the establishment of general order, but at the same time the extension of general liberty. Under whatever point of view we consider the progress of society, the feudal system always appears as an obstacle in its way. Hence, from the earliest existence of feudalism, the two powers which have been the prime movers in the progress of order and liberty—monarchical power on the one hand, and popular power on the other—that is to say, the king and the people—have both attacked it, and struggled against it continually. What few attempts were made at different periods to regulate it, to impart to it somewhat of a legal, a general character—as was done in England, by William the Conqueror and his sons; in France, by St. Louis; and by several of the German Emperors—all these endeavors, all these attempts failed. The very nature itself of feudality is opposed to order and legality. In the last century, some writers of talent attempted to dress out feudalism as a social system; they endeavored to make it appear a legitimate, well-ordered, progressive state of society, and represented it as a golden age. Ask them, however, where it existed: summon them to assign it a locality, and a time, and they will be found wanting. It is a Utopia without date, a drama, for which we find, in the past, neither theatre nor actors. The cause of this error is noways difficult to discover; and it accounts as well for the error of the opposite class, who cannot pronounce the name of feudalism without coupling to it an absolute anathema. Both these parties have looked at it, as the two knights did at the statue of Janus, only on one side. They have not considered the two different points of view from which feudalism may be surveyed

They do not distinguish, on one hand, its influence upon the progress of the individual man, upon his feelings, his faculties, his disposition and passions; nor, on the other, its influence upon the social condition. One party could not imagine that a social system in which were to be found so many noble sentiments, so many virtues, in which were seen sprouting forth the earliest buds of literature and science; in which manners became not only more refined, but attained a certain elevation and grandeur; in such a system they could not imagine that the evil was so great or so fatal as it was made to appear. The other party, seeing but the misery which feudalism inflicted on the great body of the people—the obstacles which it opposed to the establishment of order and liberty—would not believe that it could produce noble characters, great virtues, or any improvement whatsoever. Both these parties have misunderstood the twofold principle of civilization: they have not been aware that it consists of two movements, one of which for a time may advance independently of the other; although after a lapse of centuries, and perhaps a long series of events, they must at last reciprocally recall and bring forward each other.

To conclude, feudalism, in its character and influence, was just what its nature would lead us to expect. Individualism, the energy of personal existence, was the prevailing principle among the vanquishers of the Roman world; and the development of the individual man, of his mind, and faculties, might above all be expected to result from the social system, founded by them and for them. That which man himself carries into a social system, his intellectual moral disposition at the time he enters it, has a powerful influence upon the situation in which he establishes himself—upon all around him. This situation in its turn reacts upon his dispositions, strengthens and improves them. The individual prevailed in German society; and the influence of the feudal system, the offspring of German society, displayed itself in the improvement and advance of the individual. We shall find the same fact to recur in the other elements of our civilization: they all hold faithful to their original principle; they have advanced and pushed the world in that same road by which they first entered. The subject of the next lecture—the history of the Church, and its influence upon European civilization, from the fifth to the twelfth cen-

tury—will furnish us with a new and striking example of this fact.[10]

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[10] To appreciate the views taken in the foregoing lecture, a knowledge of the peculiar institutions and customs of the Feudal System, and of the historical facts connected with its rise and progress, is requisite. The lecture might, within the same space, have been more full and instructive in these respects, with advantage to the disquisitions here presented. The needful information must be supplied by the lecturer, or the student must seek it for himself. The second chapter of Hallam's Middle Ages will perhaps best furnish within a brief compass all that is necessary.

The Feudal System, as a completely organized institution, cannot be said to have extended much beyond the limits of the empire founded by Charlemagne, which it will be remembered included France, Germany, Italy, and part of Spain. In France and Germany its working is best displayed.

The germs of the system existed, without doubt, long before the time of Charlemagne; but its full development is dated from the tenth century. Previous to this time, an important step in the progress of the system had been taken by the conversion of *benefices* (or lands granted by the kngs to their vassals upon condition of military service) into *hereditary* fiefs. But the event which completely established the Feudal System, subverting in the sequel the royal authority, and destroying the Carlovingian dynasty, was the act of Charles the Bold, who, in 879, made the governments of the counties hereditary. These provinces thus became great fiefs, the dukes and counts rendering homage indeed to the crown, but as to the rest exercising independent authority, and controlling all the lesser feudatories within their former jurisdiction.

It must be borne in mind that the Feudal System was both cause and effect of the wretched state of society during the times when it prevailed; whatever has been said of its benefits must be taken with great qualifications, and at all events applies almost wholly to the feudal proprietors; the lower classes, the mass of the people, were subject to every species of lawless oppression. By the year 1300, the system was substantially overthrown, although a great many of the odious and oppressive exactions which it entailed upon the peasantry, the cultivators of the soil, were perpetuated down to the French Revolution. The causes of its decline were the growth of the royal power, the increase of commerce—the rise of the free cities—and the formation of a middle class.

LECTURE V.

THE CHURCH.

Having investigated the nature and influence of the feudal system, I shall take the Christian Church, from the fifth to the twelfth century, as the subject of the present lecture. I say the *Christian Church*, because, as I have observed once before, it is not about Christianity itself, Christianity as a religious system, that I shall occupy your attention, but the church as an ecclesiastical society—the Christian hierarchy. This society was almost completely organized before the close of the fifth century. Not that it has not undergone many and important changes since that period, but from this time the church, considered as a corporation, as the government of the Christian world, may be said to have attained a complete and independent existence.

A single glance will be sufficient to convince us, that there existed, in the fifth century, an immense difference between the state of the church and that of the other elements of European civilization. You will remember that I have pointed out, as primary elements of our civilization, the municipal system, the feudal system, monarchy, and the church. The municipal system, in the fifth century, was no more than a fragment of the Roman empire, a shadow without life, or definite form. The feudal system was still a chaos. Monarchy existed only in name. All the *civil* elements of modern society were either in their decline or infancy. The church alone possessed youth and vigor; she alone possessed at the same time a definite form, with activity and strength; she alone possessed at once movement and order, energy and system, that is to say, the two greatest means of influence. Is it not, let me ask you, by mental vigor, by intellectual movement on one side, and by order and discipline on the other, that all institutions acquire their power and influence over society? The church, moreover awakened attention to, and agitated all the great

questions which interest man; she busied herself with all the great problems of his nature, with all he had to hope or fear for futurity. Hence her influence upon modern civilization has been so powerful—more powerful, perhaps, than its most violent adversaries, or its most zealous defenders, have supposed. They, eager to advance or abuse her, have only regarded the church in a contentious point of view; and with that contracted spirit which controversy engenders, how could they do her justice, or grasp the full scope of her sway?

To us, the church, in the fifth century, appears as an organized and independent society, interposed between the masters of the world, the sovereigns, the possessors of temporal power, and the people, serving as a connecting link between them, and exercising its influence over all.

To know and completely understand its agency, then, we must consider it from three different points of view: we must consider it first in itself—we must see what it really was, what was its internal constitution, what the principles which there bore sway, what its nature. We must next consider it in its relations with temporal rulers—kings, lords, and others; and, finally, in its relations with the people. And when by this threefold investigation we have formed a complete picture of the church, of its principles, its situation, and the influence which it exercised, we will verify this picture by history; we will see whether facts, whether what we properly call events, from the fifth to the twelfth century, agree with the conclusions which our threefold examination of the church, of its own nature, of its relations with the masters of the world, and with the people, had previously led us to come to respecting it.

Let us first consider the church in itself, its internal condition, its own nature.

The first, and perhaps the most important fact that demands our attention here, is its existence; the existence of a government of religion, of a priesthood, of an ecclesiastical corporation.

In the opinion of many enlightened persons, the very notion of a religious corporation, of a priesthood, of a government of religion, is absurd. They believe that a religion, whose object is the establishment of a clerical body, of a priesthood

egally constituted in short, of a government of religion, must exercise, upon the whole, an influence more dangerous than useful. In their opinion religion is a matter purely individual betwixt man and God; and that whenever religion loses this character, whenever an exterior authority interferes between the individual and the object of his religious belief, that is between him and God, religion is corrupted, and society in danger.

It will not do to pass by this question without taking a deeper view of it. In order to know what has been the influence of the Christian Church, we must know what ought to be, from the nature of the institution itself, the influence of a church, the influence of a priesthood. To judge of this influence we must inquire more especially whether religion is, in fact, purely individual; whether it excites and gives birth to nothing beyond this intimate relation between each individual and God; or whether it does not, in fact, necessarily become a source of new relations between man and man, and so necessarily lead to the formation of a religious society, and from that to a government of this society.

If we reduce religion to what is properly called religious feeling—to that feeling which, though very real, is somewhat vague, somewhat uncertain in its object, and which we can scarcely characterize but by naming it—to that feeling which addresses itself at one time to exterior nature, at another to the inmost recesses of the soul; to-day to the imagination, to-morrow to the mysteries of the future; which wanders everywhere, and settles nowhere; which, in a word, exhausts both the world of matter and of fancy in search of a resting-place, and yet finds none—if we reduce religion to this feeling; then, it would seem, it may remain purely individual Such a feeling may give rise to a passing association; it may, it will indeed, find a pleasure in sympathy; it will feed upon it, it will be strengthened by it; but its fluctuating and doubtful character will prevent its becoming the principle of permanent and extensive association; will prevent it from accommodating itself to any system of precepts, of discipline, of forms; will prevent it, in a word, from giving birth to a society, to a religious government.

But either I have strangely deceived myself, or this religious feeling does not comprehend the whole religious nature of man. Religion, in my opinion, is quite another thing, and infinitely more comprehensive than this.

Joined to the destinies and nature of man, there are a number of problems whose solution we cannot work out in the present life; these, though connected with an order of things strange and foreign to the world around us, and apparently beyond the reach of human faculties, do not the less invincibly torment the soul of man, part of whose nature it seems to be anxiously to desire and struggle for the clearing up of the mystery in which they are involved. The solution of these problems,—the creeds and dogmas which contain it, or at least are supposed to contain it—such is the first object, the first source, of religion.

Another road brings us to the same point. To those among us who have made some progress in the study of moral philosophy, it is now, I presume, become sufficiently evident, that morality may exist independently of religious ideas; that the distinction between moral good and moral evil, the obligation to avoid evil and to cleave to that which is good, are laws as much acknowledged by man, in his proper nature, as the laws of logic; and which spring as much from a principle within him, as in his actual life they find their application. But granting these truths to be proved, yielding up to morality its independence, a question naturally arises in the human mind: whence cometh morality, whither doth it lead? This obligation to do good, which exists of itself, is it a fact standing by itself, without author, without aim? Doth it not conceal, or rather doth it not reveal to man, an origin, a destiny, reaching beyond this world? By this question, which rises spontaneously and inevitably, morality, in its turn, leads man to the porch of religion, and opens to him a sphere from which he has not borrowed it.

Thus on one side the problems of our nature, on the other the necessity of seeking a sanction, an origin, an aim, for morality, open to us fruitful and certain sources of religion. Thus it presents itself before us under many other aspects besides that of a simple feeling such as I have described. It presents itself as an assemblage:

First, of doctrines called into existence by the problems which man finds in himself.

Secondly, of precepts which correspond with these doctrines, and give to natural morality a signification and sanction

Thirdly, and lastly, of promises which address themselves to the hopes of humanity respecting futurity.

This is truly what constitutes religion. This is really what it is at bottom, and not a mere form of sensibility, a sally of the imagination, a species of poetry.

Religion thus brought back to its true element, to its essence, no longer appears as an affair purely individual, but as a powerful and fruitful principle of association. Would you regard it as a system of opinions, of dogmas? The answer is, truth belongs to no one; it is universal, absolute; all men are prone to seek it, to profess it in common. Would you rest upon the precepts which are associated with the doctrines? The reply is, law obligatory upon one is obligatory upon all—man is bound to promulgate it, to bring all under its authority. It is the same with respect to the promises which religion makes as the rewards of obedience to its faith and its precepts; it is necessary they should be spread, and that these fruits of religion should be offered to all. From the essential elements of religion then is seen to spring up a religious society; and it springs from them so infallibly, that the word which expresses the social feeling with the greatest energy, which expresses our invincible desire to propagate ideas, to extend society, is proselytism—a term particularly applied to religious creeds, to which it seems almost exclusively consecrated.

A religious society once formed,—when a certain number of men are joined together by the same religious opinions and belief, yield obedience to the same law of religious precepts, and are inspired with the same religious hopes, they need a government. No society can exist a week, no, not even an hour, without a government. At the very instant in which a society is formed, by the very act of its formation it calls forth a government, which proclaims the common truth that holds them together, which promulgates and maintains the precepts that this truth may be expected to bring forth. That a religious society, like all others, requires a controlling power, a government, is implied in the very fact that a society exists.

And not only is a government necessary, but it naturally arises of itself. I cannot spare much time to show how governments rise and become established in society in gene-

ral. I shall only remark, that when matters are left to take their natural course, when no exterior force is applied to drive them from their usual route, power will fall into the hands of the most capable, of the most worthy, into the hands of those who will lead society on its way. Are there thoughts of a military expedition? the bravest will have the command. Is society anxious about some discovery, some learned enterprise? the most skilful will be sought for. The same will take place in all other matters. Let but the common order of things be observed, let the natural inequality of men freely display itself, and each will find the station that he is best fitted to fill. So as regards religion, men will be found no more equal in talents, in abilities, and in power, than they are in other matters: this man has a more striking method than others in proclaiming the doctrines of religion and making converts; another has more power in enforcing religious precepts; a third may excel in exciting religious hopes and emotions, and keeping the soul in a devout and holy frame. The same inequality of faculties and of influence, which gives rise to power in civil society, will be found to exist in religious society. Missionaries, like generals, go forth to conquer. So that while, on the one hand, religious government naturally flows from the nature of religious society, it as naturally develops itself, on the other, by the simple effect of human faculties, and their unequal distribution.

Thus the moment that religion takes possession of a man a religious society begins to be formed; and the moment this religious society appears it gives birth to a government.

A grave objection, however, here presents itself: in this case there is nothing to command, nothing to impose; no kind of force can here be legitimate. There is no place for government, because here the most perfect liberty ought to prevail.

Be it so. But is it not forming a gross and degrading idea of government to suppose that it resides *only*, to suppose that it resides *chiefly*, in the force which it exercises to make itself obeyed, in its coercive element?

Let us quit religion for a moment, and turn to civil governments. Trace with me, I beseech you, the simple march of circumstances. Society exists. Something is to be done, no matter what, in its name and for its interest; a law has to be

executed some measure to be adopted, a judgment to be pronounced. Now, certainly, there is a proper method of supplying these social wants; there is a proper law to make, a proper measure to adopt, a proper judgment to pronounce. Whatever may be the matter in hand, whatever may be the interest in question, there is, upon every occasion, a truth which must be discovered, and which ought to decide the matter, and govern the conduct to be adopted.

The first business of government is to seek this truth, is to discover what is just, reasonable, and suitable to society. When this is found, it is proclaimed: the next business is to introduce it to the public mind; to get it approved by the men upon whom it is to act; to persuade them that it is reasonable. In all this is there anything coercive? Not at all. Suppose now that the truth which ought to decide upon the affair, no matter what; suppose, I say, that the truth being found and proclaimed, all understandings should be at once convinced; all wills at once determined; that all should acknowledge that the government was right, and obey it spontaneously. There is nothing yet of compulsion, no occasion for the employment of force. Does it follow then that a government does not exist? Is there nothing of government in all this? To be sure there is, and it has accomplished its task. Compulsion appears not till the resistance of individuals calls for it—till the idea, the decision which authority has adopted, fails to obtain the approbation or the voluntary submission of all. Then government employs force to make itself obeyed. This is a necessary *consequence* of human imperfection; an imperfection which resides as well in power as in society. There is no way of entirely avoiding this; civil governments will always be obliged to have recourse, to a certain degree, to compulsion. Still it is evident they are not made up of compulsion, because, whenever they can, they are glad to do without it, to the great blessing of all; and their highest point of perfection is to be able to discard it, and to trust to means purely moral, to their influence upon the understanding: so that, in proportion as government can dispense with compulsion and force, the more faithful it is to its true nature, and the better it fulfils the purpose for which it is sent. This is not to shrink, this is not to give way, as people commonly cry out; it is merely acting in a different manner, in a manner much more general and powerful. Those governments which employ the most compulsion perform much less than those

which scarcely ever have recourse to it. Government, by addressing itself to the understanding, by engaging the free-will of its subjects, by acting by means purely intellectual, instead of contracting, expands and elevates itself; it is then that it accomplishes most, and attains to the grandest objects. On the contrary, it is when government is obliged to be constantly employing its physical arm that it becomes weak and restrained—that it does little, and does that little badly.

The essence of government then by no means resides in compulsion, in the exercise of brute force; it consists more especially of a system of means and powers, conceived for the purpose of discovering upon all occasions what is best to be done; for the purpose of discovering the truth which by right ought to govern society, for the purpose of persuading all men to acknowledge this truth, to adopt and respect it willingly and freely. Thus I think I have shown that the necessity for, and the existence of a government, are very conceivable, even though there should be no room for compulsion, even though it should be absolutely forbidden.

This is exactly the case in the government of religious society. There is no doubt but compulsion is here strictly forbidden; there can be no doubt, as its only territory is the conscience of man, but that every species of force must be illegal, whatever may be the end designed. But government does not exist the less on this account. It still has to perform all the duties which we have just now enumerated. It is incumbent upon it to seek out the religious doctrines which resolve the problems of human destiny; or, if a general system of faith beforehand exists, in which these problems are already resolved, it will be its duty to discover and set forth its consequences in each particular case. It will be its duty to promulgate and maintain the precepts which correspond to its doctrines. It will be its duty to preach them, to teach them, and, if society wanders from them, to bring it back again to the right path. No compulsion; but the investigation, the preaching, the teaching of religious truths; the administering to religious wants; admonishing; censuring; this is the task which religious government has to perform. Suppress all force and coercion as much as you desire, still you will see all the essential questions connected with the organization of a government present themselves before you, and demand a

solution The question, for example, whether a body of religious magistrates is necessary, or whether it is possible to trust to the religious inspiration of individuals? This question, which is a subject of debate between most religious societies and that of the Quakers, will always exist, it must always remain a matter of discussion. Again, granting a body of religious magistrates to be necessary, the question arises whether a system of equality is to be preferred, or an hierarchal constitution—a graduated series of powers? This question will not cease because you take from the ecclesiastical magistrates, whatever they may be, all means of compulsion Instead then of dissolving religious society in order to have the right to destroy religious government, it must be acknowledged that religious society forms itself naturally, that religious government flows no less naturally from religious society, and that the problem to be solved is on what conditions this government ought to exist, on what it is based, what are its principles, what the conditions of its legitimacy? This is the investigation which the existence of religious government as of all others, compels us to undertake.

The conditions of legitimacy are the same in the government of a religious society as in all others. They may be reduced to two: the first is, that authority should be placed and constantly remain, as effectually at least as the imperfection of all human affairs will permit, in the hands of the best, the most capable; so that the legitimate superiority, which lies scattered in various parts of society, may be thereby drawn out, collected, and delegated to discover the social law —to exercise its authority. The second is, that the authority thus legitimately constituted should respect the legitimate liberties of those over whom it is called to govern. A good system for the formation and organization of authority, a good system of securities for liberty, are the two conditions in which the goodness of government in general resides, whether civil or religious. And it is by this standard that all governments should be judged.

Instead, then, of reproaching the Church, the government of the Christian world, with its existence, let us examine how it was constituted, and see whether its principles correspond with the two essential conditions of all good government.

Let us examine the Church in this twofold point of view.

In the first place, with regard to the formation and transmission of authority in the Church, there is a word, which has often been made use of, which I wish to get rid of altogether I mean the word *caste*. This word has been too frequently applied to the Christian clergy, but its application to that body is both improper and unjust. The idea of hereditary right is inherent to the idea of caste. In every part of the world, in every country in which the system of *caste* has prevailed—in Egypt, in India—from the earliest time to the present day—you will find that castes have been everywhere essentially hereditary: they are, in fact, the transmission of the same rank and condition, of the same power, from father to son. Now where there is no inheritance there is no caste, but a corporation. The *esprit de corps*, or that certain degree of love and interest which every individual of an order feels towards it as a whole, as well as towards all its members, has its inconveniences, but differs very essentially from the spirit of caste. The celibacy of the clergy of itself renders the application of this term to the Christian Church altogether improper.

The important consequences of this distinction cannot have escaped you. To the system of castes, to the circumstance of inheritance, certain peculiar privileges are necessarily attached; the very definition of caste implies this. Where the same functions, the same powers become hereditary in the same families, it is evident that they possess peculiar privileges, which none can acquire independently of birth. This is indeed exactly what has taken place wherever the religious government has fallen into the hands of a caste; it has become a matter of privilege; all were shut out from it but those who belonged to the families of the caste. Now nothing like this is to be found in the Christian Church. Not only is the Church entirely free from this fault, but she has constantly maintained the principle, that all men, whatever their origin are equally privileged to enter her ranks, to fill her highest offices, to enjoy her proudest dignities. The ecclesiastical career, particularly from the fifth to the twelfth century, was open to all. The church was recruited from all ranks of society, from the lower as well as the higher, indeed, most frequently from the lower. When all around her fell under the tyranny of privilege, she alone maintained the principle of equality of competition and emulation; she alone called the

superior of all classes to the possession of power. This is the first great consequence which naturally flowed from the fact that the Church was a corporation and not a caste.

I will show you a second. It is the inherent nature of all castes to possess a degree of immobility. This assertion requires no proof. Turn over the pages of history, and you will find that wherever the tyranny of castes has predominated, society, whether religious or political, has universally become sluggish and torpid. A dread of improvement was certainly introduced at a certain epoch, and up to a certain point, into the Christian Church. But whatever regret this may cost us, it cannot be said that this feeling ever generally prevailed. It cannot be said that the Christian Church ever remained inactive and stationary. For a long course of centuries she was always in motion; at one time pushed forward by her opponents without, at others driven on by an inward impulse—by the want of reform, or of interior development. The church, indeed, taken as a whole, has been constantly changing—constantly advancing—her history is diversified and progressive. Can it be doubted that she was indebted for this to the admission of all classes to the priestly offices, to the continual filling up of her ranks, upon a principle of equality, by which a stream of young and vigorous blood was ever flowing into her veins, keeping her unceasingly active and stirring, and defending her from the reproach of apathy and immobility which might otherwise have triumphed over her?

But how did the Church, in admitting all classes to power satisfy herself that they had the right to be so admitted? How did she discover and proceed in taking from the bosom of society, the legitimate superiorities who should have a share in her government? In the church two principles were in full vigor: *first*, the election of the inferior by the superior, which, in fact, was nothing more than choice or nomination; *secondly*, the election of the superior by the subordinates, or election properly so called, and such as we conceive to be election in the present day.

The ordination of priests, for example, the power of raising a man to the priestly office, rested solely with the superior. He alone made choice of the candidate for holy orders. The case was the same in the collation to certain ecclesiastical benefices, such as those attached to feudal grants, and some others; it was the superior whether king, pope, or lord, who

nominated to the benefice. In other cases the true principle of election prevailed. The bishops had been, for a long time, and were still, often, in the period under consideration, elected by the inferior clergy; even the people sometimes took part in them. In monasteries the abbot was elected by the monks At Rome, the pope was elected by the college of cardinals; and, at an earlier date, even all the Roman clergy had a voice in his election. You may here clearly observe, then, the two principles, the choice of the inferior by the superior, and the election of the superior by the subordinates; which were admitted and acted upon in the Church, particularly at the period which now engages our attention. It was by one of these two means that men were appointed to the various offices in the Church, or obtained any portion of ecclesiastical authority.

These two principles were not only in operation at the same time, but being altogether opposite in their nature, a constant struggle prevailed between them. After a strife for centuries, after many vicissitudes, the nomination of the inferior by the superior gained the day in the Christian Church. Yet, from the fifth to the twelfth century, the opposite principle, the election of the superior by the subordinates, continued generally to prevail.

We must not be astonished at the co-existence of these two opposite principles. If we look at society in general, at the common course of affairs, at the manner in which authority is there transmitted, we shall find that this transmission is sometimes effected by one of these modes, and sometimes the other. The Church did not invent them, she found them in the providential government of human things, and borrowed hem from it. There is somewhat of truth, of utility, in both. Their combination would often prove the best mode of discovering legitimate power. It is a great misfortune, in my opinion, that only one of them, the choice of the inferior by the superior, should have been victorious in the Church. The second, however, was never entirely banished, but under various names, with more or less success, has re-appeared in every epoch, with at least sufficient force to protest against, and interrupt, prescription.[11]

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11 The distinction between the power of conferring the authority to exercise the spiritual functions of an ecclesiastical office, and the right of designating the person upon whom the authority shall

The Christian Church, at the period of which we are speaking, derived an immense force from its respect for equality and the various kinds of legitimate superiority. It was the most popular society of the time—the most accessible; it alone opened its arms to all the talents, to all the ambitiously noble of our race. To this, above all, it owed its greatness, at least certainly much more than to its riches, and the illegitimate means which it but too often employed.

With regard to the second condition of a good government, namely, a respect for liberty, that of the Church leaves much to be desired.

Two bad principles here met together. One avowed, forming part and parcel, as it were, of the doctrines of the Church; the other, in no way a legitimate consequence of her doctrines, was introduced into her bosom by human weakness.

The first was a denial of the rights of individual reason—the claim of transmitting points of faith from the highest authority, downwards, throughout the whole religious body, without allowing to any one the right of examining them for himself. But it was more easy to lay this down as a principle than to carry it out in practice; and the reason is obvious, for a conviction cannot enter into the human mind unless the human mind first opens the door to it; it cannot enter by force. In whatever way it may present itself, whatever name it may invoke, reason looks to it, and if it forces an entrance, it is because reason is satisfied. Thus individual reason has always continued to exist, and under whatever name it may

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be conferred for any particular place, should be borne in mind. The former, by the established constitution of the Church and by universal practice, always belonged exclusively to the bishops: they alone ordained the inferior clergy; they alone consecrated the bishops. In regard to the latter the practice varied: sometimes, he person designated was elected by the clergy and people, which was the primitive mode, sometimes by the clergy; sometimes by the temporal sovereign. But in no case did the people or the prince imagine themselves competent to consecrate, to confer upon the person they had selected for bishop, the spiritual powers pertaining to the functions of the see or benefice. This was always referred to the bishops, with whom it rested to confer or withhold those powers, without which the designation by people or prince was of no effect. This remark, of course, applies only to the sacred or spiritual orders; the authority of priors, abbots, etc was derived from their election.

have been disguised, has always considered and reflected upon the ideas which have been attempted to be forced upon it. Still, however, it must be admitted but as too true, that reason often becomes impaired; that she loses her power, becomes mutilated and contracted—that she may be brought not only to make a sorry use of her faculties, but to make a more limited use of them than she ought to do. So far indeed the bad principle which crept into the Church took effect, but with regard to the practical and complete operation of this principle, it never took place—it was impossible it ever should.

The second vicious principle was the right of compulsion assumed by the Romish church; a right, however, contrary to the very nature and spirit of religious society, to the origin of the Church itself, and to its primitive maxims. A right, too, disputed by some of the most illustrious fathers of the Church—by St. Ambrose, St. Hilary, St. Martin—but which, nevertheless, prevailed and became an important feature in its history. The right it assumed of forcing belief, if these two words can stand together, or of punishing faith physically, of persecuting heresy, that is to say, a contempt for the legitimate liberty of human thought, was an error which found its way into the Romish church before the beginning of the fifth century, and has in the end cost her very dear.

If then we consider the state of the Church with regard to the liberty of its members, we must confess that its principles in this respect were less legitimate, less salutary, than those which presided at the rise and formation of ecclesiastical power. It must not, however, be supposed, that a bad principle radically vitiates an institution; nor even that it does it all the mischief of which it is pregnant. Nothing tortures history more than logic. No sooner does the human mind seize upon an idea, than it draws from it all its possible consequences; makes it produce, in imagination, all that it would in reality be capable of producing, and then figures it down in history with all the extravagant additions which itself has conjured up. This, however, is nothing like the truth. Events are not so prompt in their consequences, as the human mind in its deductions. There is in all things a mixture of good and evil, so profound, so inseparable, that, in whatever part you penetrate, if even you descend to the lowest elements of society, or into the soul itself, you will there find these two principles dwelling together, developing themselves side by side perpetually struggling and quarrelling with each other.

but neither of them ever obtaining a complete victory, or absolutely destroying its fellow. Human nature never reaches to the extreme either of good or evil. It passes, without ceasing, from one to the other; it recovers itself at the moment when it seems lost for ever. It slips and loses ground at the moment when it seems to have assumed the firmest position.

We again discover here that character of discordance, of diversity, of strife, to which I formerly called your attention, as the fundamental character of European civilization. Besides this, there is another general fact which characterizes the government of the Church, which we must not pass over without notice. In the present day, when the idea of government presents itself to our mind, we know, of whatever kind it may be, that it will scarcely pretend to any authority beyond the outward actions of men, beyond the civil relations between man and man. Governments do not profess to carry their rule further than this. With regard to human thought, to the human conscience, to the intellectual powers of man; with regard to individual opinions, to private morals,—with these they do not interfere: this would be to invade the domain of liberty.

The Christian Church did, and was bent upon doing, exactly the contrary. What she undertook to govern was the human thought, human liberty, private morals, individual opinions. She did not draw up a code like ours, which took account only of those crimes that are at the same time offensive to morals and dangerous to society, punishing them only when, and because, they bore this twofold character; but prepared a catalogue of all those actions, criminal more particularly in a moral point of view, and punished them all under the name of sins. Her aim was their entire suppression. In a word, the government of the Church did not, like our modern governments, direct her attention to the outward man, or to the purely civil relations of men among themselves; she addressed herself to the inward man, to the thought, to the conscience; in fact, to that which of all things is most hidden and secure, most free, and which spurns the least restraint. The Church, then, by the very nature of its undertaking, combined with the nature of some of the principles upon which its government was founded, stood in great peril of falling into tyranny; of an illegitimate employment of force. In the mean time, this force was encountered by a resistance

within the Church itself, which it could never overcome. Human thought and liberty, however fettered, however confined for room and space in which to exercise their faculties oppose with so much energy every attempt to enslave them, that their reaction makes even despotism itself to yield, and give up something every moment. This took place in the very bosom of the Christian Church. We have seen heresy proscribed—the right of free inquiry condemned; a contempt shown for individual reason, the principle of the imperative transmission of doctrines by human authority established. And yet where can we find a society in which individual reason more boldly developed itself than in the Church? What are sects and heresies, if not the fruit of individual opinions? These sects, these heresies, all these oppositions which arose in the Christian Church, are the most decisive proof of the life and moral activity which reigned within her: a life stormy, painful, sown with perils, with errors and crimes—yet splendid and mighty, and which has given place to the noblest developments of intelligence and mind. But leaving the opposition, and looking to the ecclesiastical government itself—how does the case stand here? You will find it constituted, you will find it acting, in a manner quite opposite to what you would expect from some of its principles. It denies the right of inquiry, it wishes to deprive individual reason of its liberty; yet it appeals to reason incessantly; practical liberty actually predominates in its affairs. What are its institutions, its means of action? Provincial councils, national councils, general councils; a perpetual correspondence, a perpetual publication of letters, of admonitions, of writings. No government ever went so far in discussions and open deliberations. One might fancy one's self in the midst of the philosophical schools of Greece. But it was not here a mere discussion, it was not a simple search after truth that here occupied the attention; it was questions of authority, of measures to be taken, of decrees to be drawn up, in short, the business of a government. Such indeed was the energy of intellectual life in the bosom of this government, that it became its predominant, universal character; to this all others gave way; and that which shone forth from all its parts, was the exercise of reason and liberty.[12]

[12] There are several things in the foregoing paragraphs not quite accurately put.

I am far, notwithstanding all this, from believing that the vicious principles, which I have endeavored to explain, and

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The assumption of the right, or the exercise of the power to coerce faith, to punish physically for religious opinions, cannot indeed be too strongly condemned. It was a monstrous tyranny exercised by the Church at this period. The right of *separating* from its society such as rejected the fundamental articles of its constitution, is entirely a different thing—being a right inherent in every association, not to advert here to any grounds on which the *obligation* to do so was thought to rest.

Again; in regard to the authority of the Church and the "rights of individual reason"—here undoubtedly, in the corrupt ages of the Church, monstrous abuses grew up; yet these abuses should be distinguished from the primitive principle, from the perversion of which they sprang—the principle which required *implicit* faith in all matters divinely revealed.—It is incorrect, too, to represent the Church, even at its most corrupt period, as maintaining "the principle of the imperative transmission of doctrines by *human authority* established." The absolute subjection of all Church authority, as well as of the individual members of the Church, to the authority of the Divine Word, was always held.

Nor, again, does the Church deserve the praise given to it in the text of acting in its councils in opposition to its principles. In the councils, the Church no doubt exercised to a certain extent the right inherent in all ordinary associations of legislating for itself. In all matters relating to rites, ceremonies, and doctrines, not considered to be definitively settled by Divine appointment, these councils exercised the power of determining by their own authority. In all such matters there was scope for "discussion, deliberation," and arbitrary preference. But when the question was concerning any fundamental *article of faith*, the statement that "one might fancy one's self in the midst of the philosophical schools of Greece," is anything but true. They never dreamed of settling any such question by excogitation, speculation, reasoning. The appeal was to the sacred Scriptures as the ultimate and absolute authority. It was a matter of interpretation. If the sacred writings were not clear and decisive in themselves of the point in question, the next and only inquiry was, what could be historically ascertained to have been the interpretation sanctioned by the universal consent of the Church from the Apostolic age downwards, —and that was held to be decisive. Such was always the *theory* of the Church as to the authority of its councils: it was never imagined that the ascertained consent of the Church universal from the primitive age, in regard to a question of interpretation bearing on an article of faith, could be set aside, by any discussion or vote, by any speculation or reasoning.

Thus, from not distinguishing things quite distinct, the author's censure on the one hand, and his praise on the other, may convey an erroneous impression.

which, in my opinion, existed in the Christian Church, existed there without producing any effect. In the period now under review, they already bore very bitter fruits; at a later period they bore others still more bitter; still they did not produce all the evils which might have been expected, they did not choke the good which sprang up in the same soil. Such was the Church considered in itself, in its interior, in its own nature.

Let us now consider it in its relations with sovereigns, with the holders of temporal authority. This is the second point of view in which I have promised to consider it.

When at the fall of the western empire, when, instead of the ancient Roman government, under which the Church had been born, under which she had grown up, with which she had common habits and old connexions, she found herself surrounded by barbarian kings, by barbarian chieftains, wandering from place to place, or shut up in their castles, with whom she had nothing in common, between whom and her there was as yet no tie—neither traditions, nor creeds, nor feelings; her danger appeared great, and her fears were equally so.

One only idea became predominant in the Church; it was to take possession of these new-comers—to convert them. The relations of the Church with the barbarians had, at first, scarcely any other aim.[13]

To gain these barbarians, the most effective means seemed to be to dazzle their senses and work upon their imagination. Thus it came to pass that the number, pomp, and variety of

[13] Some of the barbarians had embraced Christianity before their invasion of the Roman Empire. Among these were the Goths, converted in the fourth century by their bishops Theophilus and Ulphilas; the Heruli, the Suevi, the Vandals, and perhaps the Lombards. They were converted by Arian missionaries, and embraced that form of Christianity. In the sixth and seventh centuries the Suevi, Visigoths, and Lombards adopted the orthodox faith: the Heruli, Vandals, and Ostro-Goths adhered to Arianism. The remarks of the text can therefore be applied literally only to the Burgundians, Francs, etc., by whom the first conquerors of the empire were swept away. Still, the Church had much to do even in bringing under her full influence the first barbarians.

religious ceremonies were at this epoch wonderfully increased. The ancient chronicles particularly show, that it was principally in this way that the Church worked upon the barbarians. She converted them by grand spectacles.

But even when they had become settled and converted, even after the growth of some common ties between them, the danger of the Church was not over. The brutality, the unthinking, the unreflecting character of the barbarians were so great, that the new faith, the new feelings with which they had been inspired, exercised but a very slight empire over them. When every part of society fell a prey to violence, the Church could scarcely hope altogether to escape. To save herself she announced a principle, which had already been set up, though but very vaguely, under the empire; the separation of spiritual and temporal power, and their mutual independence. It was by the aid of this principle that the Church dwelt freely by the side of the barbarians; she maintained that force had no authority over religious belief, hopes, or promises, and that the spiritual and temporal worlds are completely distinct.

You cannot fail to see at once the beneficial consequences which have resulted from this principle. Independently of the temporary service it was of to the Church, it has had the inestimable effect of founding in justice the separation of the two authorities, of preventing one from controlling the other. In addition to this, the Church, by asserting the independence of the intellectual world, in its collective form, prepared the independence of the intellectual world in individuals—the independence of thought. The Church declared that the system of religious belief could not be brought under the yoke of force, and each individual has been led to hold the same language for himself. The principle of free inquiry, the liberty of individual thought, is exactly the same as that of the independence of the spiritual authority in general, with regard to temporal power.

The desire for liberty, unfortunately, is but a step from the desire for power. The Church soon passed from one to the other. When she had established her independence, it was in accordance with the natural course of ambition that she should attempt to raise her spiritual authority above temporal authority. We must not, however, suppose that this claim

had any other origin than the weaknesses of humanity, some of these are very profound, and it is of importance that they should be known.

When liberty prevails in the intellectual world, when the thoughts and consciences of men are not enthralled by a power which calls in question their right of deliberating, of deciding, and employs its authority against them; when there is no visible constituted spiritual government laying claim to the right of dictating opinions; in such circumstances, the idea of the domination of the spiritual order over the temporal could scarcely spring up. Such is very nearly the present state of the world. But when there exists, as there did in the tenth century, a government of the spiritual order; when the human thought and conscience are subject to certain laws, to certain institutions, to certain authorities, which have arrogated to themselves the right to govern, to constrain them; in short, when spiritual authority is established, when it has effectively taken possession, in the name of right and power, of the human reason and conscience, it is natural that it should go on to assume a domination over the temporal order; that it should argue: "What! have I a right, have I an authority over that which is most elevated, most independent in man—over his thoughts, over his interior will, over his conscience; and have I not a right over his exterior, his temporal and material interests? Am I the interpreter of divine justice and truth, and yet not able to regulate the affairs of this world according to justice and truth?"

The force of this reasoning shows that the spiritual order had a natural tendency to encroach on the temporal. This tendency was increased by the fact, that the spiritual order, at this time, comprised all the intelligence of the age, every possible development of the human mind. There was but one science, *theology*; but one spiritual order, the theological: all the other sciences, rhetoric, arithmetic, and even music, centred in theology.

The spiritual power, finding itself thus in possession of all the intelligence of the age, at the head of all intellectual activity, was naturally enough led to arrogate to itself the general government of the world.

A second cause, which very much favored its views, was

the dreadful state of the temporal order, the violence and iniquity which prevailed in all temporal governments.

For some centuries past men might speak, with a degree of confidence, of temporal power; but temporal power, at the epoch of which we are speaking, was mere brutal force, a system of rapine and violence. The Church, however imperfect might be her notions of morality and justice, was infinitely superior to a temporal government such as this; and the cry of the people continually urged her to take its place.

When a pope or bishop proclaimed that a sovereign had lost his rights, that his subjects were released from their oath of fidelity, this interference, though undoubtedly liable to the greatest abuses, was often, in the particular case to which it was directed, just and salutary. It generally holds, indeed, that where liberty is wanting, religion, in a great measure supplies its place. In the tenth century, the oppressed nations were not in a state to protect themselves, to defend their rights against civil violence—religion, in the name of Heaven, placed itself between them. This is one of the causes which most contributed to the success of the usurpations of the Church.

There is a third cause, which, in my opinion, has not been sufficiently noticed. This is the manifold character and situation of the leaders of the Church; the variety of aspects under which they appeared in society. On one side they were prelates, members of the ecclesiastical order, a portion of the spiritual power, and as such independent: on the other, they were vassals, and by this title formed one of the links of civil feudalism. But this was not all: besides being vassals, they were also subjects. Something similar to the ancient relations in which the bishops and clergy had stood towards the Roman emperors now existed between the clergy and the barbarian sovereigns. A series of causes, which it would be tedious to detail, had brought the bishops to look upon the barbarian kings, to a certain degree, as the successors of the Roman emperors, and to attribute to them the same rights. The heads of the clergy then had a threefold character: first, they were ecclesiastics, and as such held to the performance of certain duties; secondly, they were feudal vassals, with the rights and obligations of such; thirdly, they were mere subjects, and as such bound to render obedience to an absolute sovereign. Observe the necessary consequence

of this. The temporal sovereigns, no whit less covetous, no whit less ambitious than the bishops, frequently made use of their temporal power, as superiors or sovereigns, to attack the independence of the Church, to usurp the right of collating to benefices, of nominating to bishopricks, and so on. On the other side, the bishops often sheltered themselves under their spiritual independence to refuse the performance of their obligations as vassals and subjects; so that on both sides there was an inevitable tendency to trespass on the rights of the other: on the side of the sovereigns, to destroy spiritual independence; on the side of the heads of the Church, to make their spiritual independence the means of universal dominion.

This result showed itself sufficiently plain in events well known to you all; in the quarrel respecting investitures; in the struggle between the Holy See and the Empire. The threefold character of the heads of the Church, and the difficulty of preventing them from trespassing on one another, was the real cause of the uncertainty and strife of all its pretensions.

Finally, the Church had a third connexion with the sovereigns, and it was to her the most disastrous and fatal. She laid claim to the right of coercion, to the right of restraining and punishing heresy. But she had no means by which to do this; she had no physical force at her disposal: when she had condemned the heretic, she was without the power to carry her sentence into execution. What was the consequence? She called to her aid the secular arm; she had to borrow the power of the civil authority as the means of compulsion. To what a wretched shift was she thus driven by the adoption of the wicked and detestable principles of coercion and persecution!

I must stop here. There is not sufficient time for us to finish our investigation of the Church. We have still to consider its relation with the people, the principles which prevailed in its intercourse with them, and what consequences resulted from its bearing upon civilization in general. I shall afterwards endeavor to confirm by history, by facts, by what befell the Church from the fifth to the twelfth century, the inductions which we have drawn from the nature of her institutions and principles.

LECTURE VI

THE CHURCH.

In the present lecture we shall conclude our inquiries respecting the state of the Church. In the last, I stated that I should place it before you in three principal points of view: first, in itself—in its interior constitution and nature, as a distinct and independent society: secondly, in its relations with sovereigns, with temporal power; thirdly, in its relations with the people. Having then been able to accomplish no more than the first two parts of my task, it remains for me today to place before you the church in its relations with the people. I shall endeavor, after I have done this, to sum up this threefold examination, and to give a general judgment respecting the influence of the church from the fifth to the twelfth century; finally, I shall close this part of my subject by verifying my statements by an appeal to facts, by an examination of the history of the Church during this period.

You will easily understand that, in speaking of the relations of the Church with the people, I shall be obliged to confine myself to very general views. It is impossible that I should enter into a detail of the practices of the Church, or recount the daily intercourse of the clergy with their charge. It is the prevailing principles, and the great effects of the system and conduct of the Church towards the body of Christians, that I shall endeavor to bring before you.

A striking feature, and, I am bound to say, a radical vice in the relations of the Church with the people, was the separation of the governors and the governed, which left the governed without any influence upon their government, which established the independence of the clergy with respect to the general body of Christians.

It would seem as if this evil was called forth by the state of man and society, for it was introduced into the Christian

Church at a very early period. The separation of the clergy and the people was not altogether perfected at the time of which we are speaking; there were certain occasions—the election of bishops, for example—upon which the people, at least sometimes, took part in church government. This interference, however, became weaker and weaker, as well as more rare; even in the second century it had begun rapidly and visibly to decline. Indeed, the tendency of the Church to detach itself from the rest of society, the establishment of the independence of the clergy, forms, to a great extent, the history of the Church from its very cradle.

It is impossible to disguise the fact, that from this circumstance sprang the greater number of abuses, which, from this period, cost the Church so dear; as well as many others which entered into her system in after-times. We must not, however, impute all its faults to this principle, nor must we regard this tendency to isolation as peculiar to the Christian clergy. There is in the very nature of religious society a powerful inclination to elevate the governors above the governed; to regard them as something distinct, something divine. This is the effect of the mission with which they are charged; of the character in which they appear before the people. This effect, however, is more hurtful in a religious society than in any other. For with what do they pretend to interfere? With the reason and conscience and future destiny of man: that is to say, with that which is the closest locked up; with that which is most strictly individual, with that which is most free. We can imagine how, up to a certain point, a man, whatever ill may result from it, may give up the direction of his temporal affairs to an outward authority. We can conceive a notion of that philosopher who, when one told him that his house was on fire, said, "Go and tell my wife; I never meddle with household affairs." But when our conscience, our thoughts, our intellectual existence are at stake—to give up the government of one's self, to deliver over one's very soul to the authority of a stranger, is, indeed, a moral suicide: is, indeed, a thousand times worse than bodily servitude—than to become a mere appurtenance of the soil.

Such, nevertheless, was the evil, which without ever, as I shall presently show, completely prevailing, invaded more and more the Christian Church in its relations with the people. We have already seen, that even in the bosom of the Church itself, the lower orders of the clergy had no guarantee for their

liberty; it was much worse, out of the Church, for the laity Among churchmen there was at least discussion, deliberation, the display of individual faculties; the struggle, itself, supplied in some measure the place of liberty. There was nothing, however, like this between the clergy and the people. The laity had no further share in the government of the Church than as simple lookers-on. Thus we see quickly shoot up and thrive, the idea that theology, that religious questions and affairs, were the privileged territory of the clergy; that the clergy alone had the right, not only to decide upon all matters respecting it, but likewise that they alone had the right to study it, and that the laity ought not to intermeddle with it. At the period of which we are now speaking, this theory had fully established its authority and it has required ages, and revolutions full of terror, to overcome it; to restore to the public the right of debating religious questions, and inquiring into their truths.

In principle, then, as well as in fact, the legal separation of the clergy and the laity was nearly completed before the twelfth century.

It must not, however, be understood, that the Christian world had no influence upon its government during this period. Of legal interference it was destitute, but not of influence. It is, indeed, almost impossible that such should be the case under any kind of government, and more particularly so of one founded upon the common opinions and belief of the governing and governed. For, wherever this community of ideas springs up and expands, wherever the same intellectual movement carries onward for government and the people, there necessarily becomes formed between them a tie, which no vice in their organization can ever altogether break. To make you clearly understand what I mean, I will give you an example, familiar to us all, taken from the political world At no period in the history of France had the French nation less power of a legal nature, I mean by way of institutions, of interfering in the government, than in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during the reigns of Louis XIV. and XV. All the direct and official means by which the people could exercise any authority had been cut off and suppressed. Yet there cannot be a doubt but that the public, the country, exercised, at this time, more influence upon the government than at any other, more, for example, than when the states-gen-

eral had been frequently convoked; than when the parliaments intermeddled to a considerable extent in politics, than when the people had a much greater legal participation in the government.

It must have been observed by all that there exists a power which no law can comprise or suppress, and which, in times of need, goes even further than institutions. Call it the spirit of the age, public intelligence, opinion, or what you will, you cannot doubt its existence. In France, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this public opinion was more powerful than at any other epoch; and, though it was deprived of the legal means of acting upon the government, yet it acted indirectly, by the force of ideas common to the governing and the governed, by the absolute necessity under which the governing found themselves of attending to the opinions of the governed. What took place in the Church from the fifth to the twelfth century was very similar to this. The body of the Christian world, it is true, had no legal means of expressing its desires; but there was a great advancement of mind in religious matters: this movement bore along clergy and laity together, and in this way the people acted upon the Church.

It is of the greatest importance that these indirect influences should be kept in view in the study of history. They are much more efficacious and often more salutary, than we take them to be. It is very natural that men should wish their influence to be prompt and apparent; that they should covet the credit of promoting success, of establishing power, of procuring triumph. But this is not always either possible or useful. There are times and situations when the indirect, unperceived influence is more beneficial, more practicable. Let me borrow another illustration from politics. We know that the English parliament more than once, and particularly in 1641, demanded, as many other popular assemblies have done in such cases, the power to nominate the ministers and great officers of the crown. The immense direct force which by this means it would exercise upon the government was regarded as a precious guarantee. But how has it turned out? Why, in the few cases in which it has been permitted to possess this power, the result has been always unfavorable. The choice has been badly concerted; affairs badly conducted But what is the case in the present day? Is it not the influence of the two houses of parliament which determines

the choice of ministers, and the nomination to all the great offices of state? And, though this influence be indirect and general, it is found to work better than the direct interference of parliament which has always terminated badly.

There is one reason why this should be so, which I must beg leave to lay before you, at the expense of a few minutes of your time. The direct action upon government supposes those to whom it is confided possessed of superior talents—of superior information, understanding, and prudence. As they go to the object at once, and *per saltem* as it were, they must be sure not to miss their mark. Indirect influences, on the contrary, pursuing a tortuous course—only arriving at their object through numerous difficulties—become rectified and adapted to their end by the very obstacles they have to encounter. Before they can succeed, they must undergo discussion, be combated and controlled; their triumph is slow, conditional, and partial. It is on this account that where society is not sufficiently advanced to make it prudent to place immediate power in the hands of the people, these indirect influences, though often insufficient, are nevertheless to be preferred. It was by such that the Christian world acted upon its government;—acted, I must allow, very inadequately—by far too little; but still it is something that it acted at all.

There was another thing which strengthened the tie between the clergy and laity. This was the dispersion of the clergy into every part of the social system. In almost all other cases, where a church has been formed independent of the people whom it governed, the body of priests has been composed of men in nearly the same condition of life. I do not mean that the inequalities of rank were not sufficiently great among them, but that the power was lodged in the hands of colleges of priests living in common, and governing the people submitted to their laws from the innermost recess of some sacred temple. The organization of the Christian Church was widely different. From the thatched cottage of the husbandman—from the miserable hut of the serf at the foot of the feudal chateau to the palace of the monarch—there was everywhere a clergyman. This diversity in the situation of the Christian priesthood, their participation in all the varied fortunes of humanity—of common life—was a great bond of union between the laity and clergy; a bond which has been wanting in most other hierarchies invested

with power. Besides this, the bishops, the heads of the Christian clergy, were, as we have seen, mixed up with the feudal system: they were, at the same time, members of the civil and of the ecclesiastical governments. This naturally led to similarity of feeling, of interests, of habits, and of manners, in the clergy and laity. There has been a good deal said, and with reason, of military bishops, of priests who led secular lives; but we may be assured that this evil, however great, was not so hurtful as the system which kept priests for ever locked up in a temple, altogether separated from common life. Bishops who took a share in the cares, and, up to a certain point, in the disorders of civil life, were of more use in society than those who were altogether strangers to the people to their wants, their affairs, and their manners. In our system there has been, in this respect, a similarity of fortune, of condition, which, if it have not altogether corrected, has, at least, softened the evil which the separation of the governing and governed must in all cases prove.

Now, having pointed out this separation, having endeavored to determine its extent, let us see how the Christian Church governed—let us see in what way it acted upon the people under its authority.

What did it do, on one hand, for the development of man, for the intellectual progress of the individual?

What did it do, on the other, for the melioration of the social system?

With regard to individual development, I fear the Church, at this epoch, gave herself but little trouble about it. She endeavored to soften the rugged manners of the great, and to render them more kind and just in their conduct towards the weak. She endeavored to inculcate a life of morality among the poor, and to inspire them with higher sentiments and hopes than the lot in which they were cast would give rise to. I believe not, however, that for individual man—for the drawing forth or advancement of his capacities—that the Church did much, especially for the laity, during this period. What she did in this way was confined to the bosom of her

own society. For the development of the clergy, for the instruction of the priesthood, she was anxiously alive: to promote this she had her schools her colleges, and all other institutions which the deplorable state of society would permit. These schools and colleges, it is true, were all theological, and destined for the education of the clergy alone; and though, from the intimacy between the civil and religious orders, they could not but have some influence upon the rest of the world, it was very slow and indirect. It cannot, indeed, be denied but the Church, too, necessarily excited and kept alive a general activity of mind, by the career which she opened to all those whom she judged worthy to enlist into her ranks, but beyond this she did little for the intellectual improvement of the laity.

For the melioration of the social state her labors were greater and more efficacious.

She combated with much perseverance and pertinacity the great vices of the social condition, particularly slavery. It has been frequently asserted that the abolition of slavery in the modern world must be altogether carried to the credit of Christianity. I believe this is going too far: slavery subsisted for a long time in the bosom of Christian society without much notice being taken of it—without any great outcry against it. To effect its abolition required the co-operation of several causes—a great development of new ideas, of new principles of civilization. It cannot, however, be denied that the Church employed its influence to restrain it; the clergy in general, and especially several popes, enforced the manumission of their slaves as a duty incumbent upon laymen, and loudly inveighed against the scandal of keeping Christians in bondage. Again, the greater part of the forms by which slaves were set free, at various epochs, are founded upon religious motives. It is under the impression of some religious feeling—the hopes of the future, the equality of all Christian men, and so on—that the freedom of the slave is granted. These, it must be confessed, are rather convincing proofs of the influence of the Church, and of her desire for the abolition of this evil of evils this iniquity of iniquities!

The church did not labor less worthily for the improvement

of civil and criminal legislation. We know to what a terrible extent, notwithstanding some few principles of liberty, this was absurd and wretched; we have read of the irrational and superstitious proofs to which the barbarians occasionally had recourse—their trial by battle, their ordeals, their oaths of compurgation—as the only means by which they could discover the truth. To replace these by more rational and legitimate proceedings, the Church earnestly labored, and labored not in vain. I have already spoken of the striking difference between the laws of the Visigoths, mostly promulgated by the councils of Toledo, and the codes of the barbarians. It is impossible to compare them without at once admitting the immense superiority of the notions of the Church in matters of jurisprudence, justice, and legislation—in all relating to the discovery of truth, and a knowledge of human nature. It must certainly be admitted that the greater part of these notions were borrowed from Roman legislation; but it is not less certain that they would have perished if the Church had not preserved and defended them—if she had not labored to spread them abroad. If the question, for example, is respecting the employment of oaths, open the laws of the Visigoths, and see with what prudence it controls their use:—

Let the judge, in order to come at the truth, first interrogate the witnesses, then examine the papers, and not allow of oaths too easily. The investigation of truth and justice demands, that the documents on both sides should be carefully examined, and that the necessity of the oath, suspended over the head of both parties, should only come unexpectedly. Let the oath only be adopted in causes in which the judge shall be able to discover no written documents, no proof, nor guide to the truth.

In criminal matters, the punishment is proportioned to the offence, according to tolerably correct notions of philosophy, morals, and justice; the efforts of an enlightened legislator struggling against the violence and caprice of barbarian manners. The title of *cæde et morte hominum* gives us a very favorable example of this, when compared with the corresponding laws of the other nations. Among the latter, it is the damage alone which seems to constitute the crime; and the punishment is sought for in the pecuniary reparation which is made in compounding for it; but in the code of the Visigoths the crime is traced to its true and moral principle—the intention of the perpetrator. Various shades of guilt—involuntary

homicide, chance-medley homicide, justifiable homicide, unpremeditated homicide, and wilful murder—are distinguished and defined nearly as accurately as in our modern codes; the punishments likewise varying, so as to make a fair approximation to justice. The legislator, indeed, carried the principle of justice still further. He endeavored, if not to abolish, at least to lessen, that difference of legal value, which the other barbarian laws put upon the life of man. The only distinction here made was between the freeman and the slave. With regard to the freeman, the punishment did not vary either according to the perpetrator, or according to the rank of the slain, but only according to the moral guilt of the murderer. With regard to slaves, not daring entirely to deprive masters of the right of life and death, he at least endeavored to restrain it and destroy its brutal character by subjecting it to an open and regular procedure.

The law itself is worthy of attention and I therefore shall give it at length :—

"If no one who is culpable, or the accomplice in a crime, ought to go unpunished, how much more reasonable is it that those should be restrained who commit homicide maliciously, or from a slight cause! Thus, as masters in their pride often put their slaves to death without any cause, it is proper to extirpate altogether this license, and to decree that the present law shall be for ever binding upon all. No master or mistress shall have power to put to death any of their slaves, male or female, or any of their dependants, without public judgment. If any slave, or other servant, commits a crime which renders them subject to capital punishment, his master or his accuser shall immediately give information to the judge, or count, or duke, of the place in which the crime has been perpetrated. After the matter has been tried, if the crime is proved, let the criminal receive, either by the judge or by his own master, the sentence of death which he has merited; in such manner, however, that if the judge desires not to put the accused to death, he must draw up against him in writing, a capital sentence, and then it will remain with his master to kill him or grant him his life. But when, indeed, a slave, by a fatal audacity, in resisting his master, shall strike, or attempt to strike him with his arm, with a stone, or by any other means; and the master, in defending himself, kills the slave in his anger, the master shall in nowise be liable to the punishment of homicide. But it will be necessary to prove that the fact has so happened; and that by the testimony or oath of the slaves, male or female, who witnessed it, and also by the oath of the person himself who committed the deed. Whosoever from pure malice shall kill a slave himself, or employ another

o do so, without his having been publicly tried, shall be considered infamous, shall be declared incapable of giving evidence, shall be banished for life, and his property be given to his nearest heirs."—(*For. Jud.* L. VI. tit. V., l. 12.)

There is another circumstance connected with the institutions of the Church, which has not, in general, been so much noticed as it deserves. I allude to its penitentiary system, which is the more interesting in the present day, because, so far as the principles and applications of moral law are concerned, it is almost completely in unison with the notions of modern philosophy. If we look closely into the nature of the punishments inflicted by the Church at public penance, which was its principal mode of punishing, we shall find that their object was, above all other things, to excite repentance in the soul of the guilty; in that of the lookers on, the moral terror of example. But there is another idea which mixes itself up with this—the idea of expiation. I know not, generally speaking, whether it be possible to separate the idea of punishment from that of expiation; and whether there be not in all punishment, independently of the desire to awaken the guilty to repentance, and to deter those from vice who might be under temptation, a secret and imperious desire to expiate the wrong committed. Putting this question, however, aside, it is sufficiently evident that repentance and example were the objects proposed by the Church in every part of its system of penance. And is not the attainment of these very objects the end of every truly philosophical legislation? Is it not for the sake of these very principles that the most enlightened lawyers have clamored for a reform in the penal legislation of Europe? Open their books—those of Jeremy Bentham for example—and you will be astonished at the numerous resemblances which you will everywhere find between their plans of punishment and those adopted by the Church. We may be quite sure that they have not borrowed them from her; and the Church could scarcely foresee that her example would one day be quoted in support of the system of philosophers not very remarkable for their devotion.

Finally, she endeavored by every means in her power to suppress the frequent recourse which at this period was had to violence and the continual wars to which society was so prone. It is well known what the truce of God was, as well

as a number of other similar measures by which the Church hoped to prevent the employment of physical force, and to introduce into the social system more order and gentleness. The facts under this head are so well known, that I shall not go into any detail concerning them [14]

Having now run over the principal points to which I wished to draw attention respecting the relations of the Church to the people; having now considered it under the three aspects, which I proposed to do, we know it within and without; in its interior constitution, and in its twofold relations with society. It remains for us to deduce from what we have learned by way of inference, by way of conjecture, its general influence upon European civilization. This is almost done to our hands. The simple recital of the facts of the predominant principles of the Church, both reveals and explains its influence: the results have in a manner been brought before us with the causes. If, however, we endeavor to sum them up, we shall be led, I think, to two general conclusions.

The first is, that the Church has exercised a vast and important influence upon the moral and intellectual order of Europe; upon the notions, sentiments, and manners of society. This fact is evident; the intellectual and moral progress of Europe has been essentially theological. Look at its history from the fifth to the sixteenth century, and you will find throughout that theology has possessed and directed the human mind; every idea is impressed with theology; every

[14] The "Truce of God" was a regulation prohibiting all private warfare or duels on the holydays, from Thursday evening to Sunday evening in each week, also during the season of Advent and Lent, and on the "octaves," or eighth day, of the great festivals. This rule was first introduced in Aquitaine in 1017; then in France and Burgundy; subsequently into Germany, England, and the Netherlands. During the eleventh century it was enjoined by special decrees of numerous councils of the Church. Whoever engaged in private quarrels on the prohibited days was excommunicated. The Church endeavored by this regulation to restrict and mitigate evils which it could not entirely repress. The Truce of God was also made binding in regard to certain places, as churches, convents, hospitals; also certain persons, as clergymen, and in general all unarmed and defenceless persons.

question that has been started, whether philosophical, politi cal, or historical, has been considered in a religious point of view. So powerful, indeed, has been the authority of the Church in matters of intellect, that even the mathematical and physical sciences have been obliged to submit to its doctrines. The spirit of theology has been as it were the blood which has circulated in the veins of the European world down to the time of Bacon and Descartes. Bacon in England, and Descartes in France, were the first who carried the human mind out of the pale of theology.

We shall find the same fact hold if we travel through the regions of literature: the habits, the sentiments, the language of theology there show themselves at every step.

This influence, taken altogether, has been salutary. It not only kept up and ministered to the intellectual movement in Europe, but the system of doctrines and precepts, by whose authority it stamped its impress upon that movement, was incalculably superior to any which the ancient world had known.

The influence of the Church, moreover, has given to the development of the human mind, in our modern world, an extent and variety which it never possessed elsewhere. In the East, intelligence was altogether religious: among the Greeks, it was almost exclusively human: there human culture—humanity, properly so called, its nature and destiny—actually disappeared; here it was man alone, his passions, his feelings, his present interests, which occupied the field. In our world the spirit of religion mixes itself with all but excludes nothing. Human feelings, human interests, occupy a considerable space in every branch of our literature; yet the religious character of man, that portion of his being which connects him with another world, appears at every turn in them all. Could modern intelligence assume a visible shape we should recognise at once, in its mixed character, the finger of man and the finger of God. Thus the two great sources of human development, humanity and religion, have been open at the same time and flowed in plenteous streams. Notwithstanding all the evil, all the abuses, which may have crept into the Church—notwithstanding all the acts of tyranny of which she has been guilty, we must still acknowledge her influence upon the progress and culture of the human intellect to have been beneficial; that she has assisted in its development rather than its compression, in its extension rather than its confinement

The case is widely different when we look at the Church in a political point of view. By softening the rugged manners and sentiments of the people; by raising her voice against a great number of practical barbarisms, and doing what she could to expel them, there is no doubt but the Church largely contributed to the melioration of the social condition; but with regard to politics, properly so called, with regard to all that concerns the relations between the governing and the governed—between power and liberty—I cannot conceal my opinion, that its influence has been baneful. In this respect the Church has always shown herself as the interpreter and defender of two systems, equally vicious, that is, of theocracy, and of the imperial tyranny of the Roman empire—that is to say, of despotism, both religious and civil. Examine all its institutions, all its laws; peruse its canons, look at its procedure, and you will everywhere find the maxims of theocracy or the empire to predominate. In her weakness, the Church sheltered herself under the absolute power of the Roman Emperors; in her strength she laid claim to it herself, under the name of spiritual power. We must not here confine ourselves to a few particular facts. The Church has often, no doubt, set up and defended the rights of the people against the bad government of their rulers; often, indeed, has she approved and excited insurrection; often too has she maintained the rights and interests of the people in the presence of their sovereigns. But when the question of political securities came into debate between power and liberty; when any step was taken to establish a system of permanent institutions, which might effectually protect liberty from the invasions of power in general; the Church always ranged herself on the side of despotism.

This should not astonish us, neither should we be too ready to attribute it to any particular failing in the clergy, or to any particular vice in the Church. There is a more profound and powerful cause.

What is the object of religion? of *any* religion, true or false? It is to govern the human passions, the human will. All religion is a restraint, an authority, a government. It comes in the name of a divine law, to subdue, to mortify human nature. It is then to human liberty that it directly opposes itself. It is human liberty that resists it, and that it wishes to overcome. This is the grand object of religion, its mission, its hope.

But while it is with human liberty that all religions have to contend, while they aspire to reform the will of man, they have no means by which they can act upon him—they have no moral power over him, but through his own will, his liberty. When they make use of exterior means, when they resort to force, to seduction—in short, make use of means opposed to the free consent of man, they treat him as we treat water, wind, or any power entirely physical: they fail in their object; they attain not their end; they do not reach, they cannot govern the will. Before religions can really accomplish their task, it is necessary that they should be accepted by the free-will of man: it is necessary that man should submit, but it must be willingly and freely, and that he still preserves his liberty in the midst of this submission. It is in his that resides the double problem which religions are called upon to resolve.

They have too often mistaken their object. They have regarded liberty as an obstacle, and not as a means; they have forgotten the nature of the power to which they address themselves, and have conducted themselves towards the human soul as they would towards a material force. It is this error that has led them to range themselves on the side of power, on the side of despotism, against human liberty; regarding it as an adversary, they have endeavored to subjugate rather than to protect it. Had religions but fairly considered their means of operation, had they not suffered themselves to be drawn away by a natural but deceitful bias, they would have seen that liberty is a condition, without which man cannot be morally governed; that religion neither has nor ought to have any means of influence not strictly moral: they would have respected the will of man in their attempt to govern it. They have too often forgotten this, and the issue has been that religious power and liberty have suffered together.

I will not push further this investigation of the general consequences that have followed the influence of the Church upon European civilization. I have summed them up in this double result,—a great and salutary influence upon its moral and intellectual condition; an influence rather hurtful than beneficial to its political condition. We have now to try our assertions by facts, to verify by history what we have as yet only deduced from the nature and situation of ecclesiastical society. Let us now see what was the destiny of the Chris-

tian Church from the fifth to the twelfth century, and whether the principles which I have laid down, the results which I have endeavored to draw from them, have really been such as I have represented them.

Let me caution you, however, against supposing that these principles, these results, appeared all at once, and as clearly as they are here set forth by me. We are apt to fall into the great and common error, in looking at the past through centuries of distance, of forgetting moral chronology; we are apt to forget—extraordinary forgetfulness! that history is essentially successive. Take the life of any man—of Oliver Cromwell, of Cardinal Richelieu, of Gustavus Adolphus. He enters upon his career; he pushes forward in life, and rises; great circumstances act upon him; he acts upon great circumstances. He arrives at the end of all things—and then it is we know him. But it is in his whole character; it is as a complete, a finished piece; such in a manner as he is turned out, after a long labor, from the workshop of Providence. Now at his outset he was not what he thus became; he was not completed—not finished at any single moment of his life; he was formed successively. Men are formed morally in the same way as they are physically. They change every day. Their existence is constantly undergoing some modification. The Cromwell of 1650 was not the Cromwell of 1640. It is true, there is always a large stock of individuality; the same man still holds on; but how many ideas, how many sentiments, how many inclinations have changed in him! What a number of things he has lost and acquired! Thus, at whatever moment of his life we may look at a man, he is never such as we see him when his course is finished.

This, nevertheless, is an error into which a great number of historians have fallen. When they have acquired a complete idea of a man, have settled his character, they see him in this same character throughout his whole career. With them, it is the same Cromwell who enters parliament in 1628, and who dies in the palace of White-Hall thirty years afterwards. Just such mistakes as these we are very apt to fall into with regard to institutions and general influences. I caution you against them. I have laid down in their complete form, as a whole, the principles of the Church, and the consequences which may be deduced from them. Be assured, however, that historically this picture is not true. All it represents has taken place disjointedly, successively; has been

scattered here and there over space and time. Expect not to find, in the recital of events, a similar completeness or whole, the same prompt and systematic concatenation. One principle will be visible here, another there; all will be incomplete, unequal, dispersed; we must come to modern times, to the end of its career, before we can view it as a whole.

I shall now lay before you the various states through which the Church passed from the fifth to the twelfth century. We may not find, perhaps, the complete demonstration of the statements which I have made, but we shall see enough, I apprehend, to convince us that they are founded in truth.

The first state in which we see the Church in the fifth century, is as the Church imperial—the Church of the Roman Empire. Just at the time the Empire fell, the Church believed she had attained the summit of her hopes: after a long struggle, she had completely vanquished paganism. Gratian, the last emperor who assumed the pagan dignity of sovereign pontiff, died at the close of the fourth century. The Church believed herself equally victorious in her struggle against heretics, particularly against Arianism, the principal heresy of the time. Theodosius, at the end of the fourth century, put them down by his imperial edicts; and had the double merit of subduing the Arian heresy and abolishing the worship of idols throughout the Roman world. The Church, then, was in possession of the government, and had obtained the victory over her two greatest enemies. It was at this moment that the Roman Empire failed her, and she stood in the presence of new pagans, of new heretics—in the presence of the barbarians—of Goths, of Vandals, of Burgundians and Franks.[15] The fall was immense. You may easily imagine that an affectionate attachment for the Empire was for a long time preserved in the Romish Church. Hence we see her cherish so fondly all that was left of it—municipal government and absolute power. Hence, when she had suc

[15] These barbarians, it will be remembered, followed the Arian heresy, both those who embraced Christianity before the invasion of the Empire, and those who did so after that event. The Burgundians, converted by Arian missionaries in 433, adopted the Catholic faith about 517. The Franks, following the example of Clovis, embraced the orthodox faith in 497.

seeded in converting the barbarians, she endeavored to re-establish the Empire; she called upon the barbarian kings, she conjured them to become Roman emperors, to assume the privilege of Roman emperors; to enter into the same relations with the Church which had existed between her and the Roman Empire. This was the great object for which the bishops of the fifth and sixth centuries labored. Such was the general state of the Church.

The attempt could not succeed—it was impossible to make a Roman Empire, to mould a Roman society out of barbarians. Like the civil world, the Church herself sunk into barbarism. This was her second state. Comparing the writings of the monkish ecclesiastical chroniclers of the eighth century with those of the preceding six, the difference is immense. All remains of Roman civilization had disappeared, even its very language—all became buried in complete barbarism. On one side the rude barbarians, entering into the Church, became bishops and priests; on the other, the bishops, adopting the barbarian life, became, without quitting their bishoprieks, chiefs of bands of marauders, and wandered over the country, pillaging and destroying like so many companies of Clovis. Gregory of Tours gives an account of several bishops who thus passed their lives, and among others Salone and Sagittarius.

Two important facts took place while the Church continued in this state of barbarism.

The first was the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers. Nothing could be more natural than the birth of this principle at this epoch. The Church would have restored the absolute power of the Roman Empire that she might partake of it, but she could not; she therefore sought her safety in independence. It became necessary that she should be able in all parts to defend herself by her own power; for she was threatened in every quarter. Every bishop, every priest, saw the rude chiefs in their neighborhood interfering in the affairs of the Church, that they might procure a slice of its wealth, its territory, its power; and no other means of defence seemed left but to say, "The spiritual order is completely separated from the temporal; you have no right to interfere with it." This principle became, at every point of attack, the defensive armor of the Church against barbarism.

A second important fact which took place at this same pe

riod, was the establishment of the monastic orders in the west. It was at the commencement of the sixth century that St. Benedict published the rules of his order for the use of the monks of the west, then few in number, but who from this time prodigiously increased. The monks at this epoch did not yet belong to the clerical body, but were still regarded as a part of the laity. Priests and even bishops were sometimes chosen from among them; but it was not till the close of the fifth and beginning of the sixth century that monks in general were considered as belonging to the clergy, properly so called. Priests and bishops now entered the cloister, thinking by so doing they advanced a step in their religious life, and increased the sanctity of their office. The monastic life thus all at once became exceedingly popular throughout Europe. The monks had a greater power over the imagination of the barbarians than the secular clergy. The simple bishop and priest had in some measure lost their hold upon the minds of barbarians, who were accustomed to see them every day; to maltreat, perhaps to pillage them. It was a more important matter to attack a monastery, a body of holy men congregated in a holy place. Monasteries, therefore, became during this barbarous period an asylum for the Church, as the Church was for the laity. Pious men here took refuge, as others in the East had done before in the Thebias, in order to escape the worldly life and corruption of Constantinople.[16]

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[16] St Anthony, born in the year 251, is said to have laid the foundation of the monastic orders about 305, by giving rules to the Christian recluses who had withdrawn to the deserts of Thebias in Upper Egypt. His discipline was carried by some of his disciples into Syria. Subsequently St. Basil (born 326) founded a convent in Pontus. The first community of monks in Gaul was established by St. Martin of Tours, who about 375 built the famous convent of Marmoutiers. He had previously founded one at Milan in Italy.

The discipline of the Egyptian monks was introduced at the beginning of the fifth century into Provence, by St. Honoratius and St. Cassian; the former of whom established a monastery at Lerins, the latter at Marseilles.

There were, however, no regular monastic vows or public profession till the sixth century. They were then introduced by St. Benedict, first in a monastery founded by him at Monte Casino near Naples, in 529. The strict rules established by him were adopted into all the European convents. By their vows the monks were obliged to poverty, chastity, and obedience: their rules of discipline required them to devote their time to study, and to labour with their hands.

These, then, are the two most important facts in the history of the Church, during the period of barbarism. First, the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers; and, secondly, the introduction and establishment of the monastic orders in the West.

Towards the end of this period of barbarism, a fresh attempt was made to raise up a new Roman empire—I allude to the attempt of Charlemagne. The Church and the civil sovereign again contracted a close alliance. The holy see was full of docility while this lasted, and greatly increased its power. The attempt, however, again failed. The empire of Charlemagne was broken up; but the advantages which the see of Rome derived from his alliance were great and permanent. The popes henceforward were decidedly the chiefs of the Christian world.

Upon the death of Charlemagne, another period of unsettledness and confusion followed. The Church, together with civil society, again fell into a chaos; again with civil society she arose, and with it entered into the frame of the feudal system. This was the third state of the Church. The dissolution of the empire formed by Charlemagne, was followed by nearly the same results in the Church as in civil life; all unity disappeared, all became local, partial, and individual. Now began a struggle, in the situation of the clergy, such as had scarcely ever before been seen: it was the struggle of the feelings and interest of the possessor of the fief, with the feelings and interest of the priest. The chiefs of the clergy were placed in this double situation; the spirit of the priest and of the temporal baron struggled within them for mastery. The ecclesiastical spirit naturally became weakened and di

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During the dark period from the sixth century to the ninth, the monks rendered great services to the cause of religion, letters, and civilization. By their industrious hands waste forests and barren lands were converted into rich and productive gardens; in the convents were preserved all the remains of ancient learning; there missionaries were educated.

Reverence for these institutions, and gratitude for the benefits they conferred, led to gifts and endowments on the part of the pious laity, until at length the monasteries became as notorious for riches luxury, and corruption, as they were at first for simplicity devotion, and industry.

vided by this process—it was no longer so powerful, so universal. Individual interest began to prevail. A taste for independence, the habits of the feudal life, loosened the ties of the hierarchy. In this state of things, the Church made an attempt within its own bosom to correct the effects of this general break-up. It endeavored in several parts of its empire, by means of federation, by common assemblies and deliberations, to organize national Churches. It is during this period, during the sway of the feudal system, that we meet with the greatest number of councils, convocations, and ecclesiastical assemblies, as well provincial as national. In France especially, this endeavor at unity appeared to be followed up with much spirit. Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims, may be considered as the representative of this idea. He labored incessantly to organize the French Church; he sought out and employed every means of correspondence and union which he thought likely to introduce into the Feudal Church a little more unity. We find him on one side maintaing the independence of the Church with respect to temporal power, on the other its independence with respect to the Roman see; it was he who, learning that the pope wished to come to France, and threatened to excommunicate the bishops, said, *Si excommunicaturus venerit, excommunicatus abibit.*

But the attempt thus to organize a feudal Church succeeded no better than the attempt to re-establish the imperial one. There were no means of re-producing any degree of unity among its members; it tended more and more towards dissolution. Each bishop, each prelate, each abbot, isolated himself more and more in his diocess or monastery. Abuses and disorders increased from the same cause. At no time was the crime of simony carried to a greater extent—at no time were ecclesiastical benefices disposed of in a more arbitrary manner—never were the morals of the clergy more loose and disorderly.

Both the people and the better portion of the clergy were greatly scandalized at this sad state of things; and a desire for reform in the Church soon began to show itself—a desire to find some authority round which it might rally its better principles, and which might impose some wholesome restraints on the others. Several bishops—Claude of Turin, Agobard of Lyons, &c.—in their respective diocesses attempted this, but in vain; they were not in a condition to accomplish so

vast a work In the whole Church there was only one power that could succeed in this, and that was the Roman See; nor was that power slow in assuming the position which it wished to attain. In the course of the eleventh century, the Church entered upon its fourth state—that of a theocracy supported by monastic institutions.

The person who raised the Holy See to this power, so far as it can be considered the work of an individual, was Gregory VII.[17]

It has been the custom to represent this great pontiff as an enemy to all improvement, as opposed to intellectual development, to the progress of society; as a man whose desire was to keep the world stationary or retrograding. Nothing is farther from the truth. Gregory, like Charlemagne and Peter the Great, was a reformer of the despotic school. The part he played in the Church was very similar to that which Charlemagne and Peter the Great, the one in France and the other in Russia, played among the laity. He wished to reform the Church first, and next civil society by the Church. He wished to introduce into the world more morality, more justice, more order and regularity; he wished to do all this through the Holy See, and to turn all to his own profit.

While Gregory was endeavoring to bring the civil world into subjection to the Church, and the Church to the See of Rome—not, as I have said before, to keep it stationary, or make it retrograde, but with a view to its reform and improvement—an attempt of the same nature, a similar movement, was made within the solitary enclosures of the monasteries. The want of order, of discipline, and of a stricter morality,

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[17] Gregory VII. (Hildebrand) succeeded Alexander II. in the Papal chair 1073. He virtually governed the Church during the time of his predecessor, and was indeed the real author of the decree of Nicholas II., 1059, by which the power of nominating and confirming the pope was taken from the German emperors and vested in the cardinals. His whole life was devoted to aggrandizing the power of the Holy See. His talents were great, and his energy indomitable. He died 1085. For the rise and progress of the Papal power, see Hallam's Middle Ages, Chap. VII., and Ranke's History of the Popes.

The Papal power was at its height from the time of Innocent III., 1194, to that of Boniface VIII., 1294, after which it sensibly declined

was severely felt and cried out for with a zeal that would not be said nay. About this time Robert De Molême established his severe rule at Citeaux; about the same time flourished St. Norbert, and the reform of the canons, the reform of Cluny and, at last, the great reform of St. Bernard. A general fermentation reigned within the monasteries: the old monks did not like this; in defending themselves, they called these reforms an attack upon their liberty; pleaded the necessity of conforming to the manners of the times, that it was impossible to return to the discipline of the primitive Church, and treated all these reformers as madmen, as enthusiasts, as tyrants. Dip into the history of Normandy, by Ordericus Vitalius, and you will meet with these complaints at almost every page.

All this seemed greatly in favor of the Church, of its unity, and of its power. While, however, the popes of Rome sought to usurp the government of the world, while the monasteries enforced a better code of morals and a severer form of discipline, a few mighty, though solitary individuals protested in favor of human reason, and asserted its claim to be heard, its right to be consulted, in the formation of man's opinions. The greater part of these philosophers forbore to attack commonly received opinions—I mean religious creeds; all they claimed for reason was the right to be heard—all they declared was, that she had the right to try these truths by her own tests, and that it was not enough that they should be merely affirmed by authority. John Erigena, or John Scotus, as he is more frequently called, Roscelin, Abelard, and others, became the noble interpreters of individual reason, when it now began to claim its lawful inheritance. It was the teaching and writings of these giants of their days that first put in motion that desire for intellectual liberty, which kept pace with the reform of Gregory VII., and St. Bernard. If we examine the general character of this movement of mind, we shall find that it sought not a change of opinion, that it did not array itself against the received system of faith; but that it simply advocated the right of reason to work for itself—in short, the right of free inquiry.

The scholars of Abelard, as he himself tells us, in his *Introduction to Theology*, requested him to give them "some philosophical arguments, such as were fit to satisfy their minds; begged that he would instruct them, not merely to repeat what he taught them, but to understand it; for no one can

believe that which he does not comprehend, and it is absurd to set out to preach to others concerning things which neither those who teach nor those who learn can understand. What other end can the study of philosophy have, if not to lead us to a knowledge of God, to which all studies should be subordinate? For what purpose is the reading of profane authors and of books which treat of worldly affairs, permitted to believers, if not to enable them to understand the truths of the Holy Scriptures, and to give them the abilities necessary to defend them? It is above all things desirable for this purpose, that we should strengthen one another with all the powers of reason; so that in questions so difficult and complicated as those which form the object of Christian faith, you may be able to hinder the subtilties of its enemies from too easily corrupting its purity."

The importance of this first attempt after liberty, or this re birth of the spirit of free inquiry, was not long in making itself felt. Though busied with its own reform, the Church soon took the alarm, and at once declared war against these new reformers, whose methods gave it more reason to fear than their doctrines. This clamor of human reason was the grand circumstance which burst forth at the close of the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth centuries, just at the time when the Church was establishing its theocratic and monastic form. At this epoch, a serious struggle for the first time broke out between the clergy and the advocates of free inquiry. The quarrels of Abelard and St. Bernard, the councils of Soissons and Sens, at which Abelard was condemned, were nothing more than the expression of this fact, which holds so important a place in the history of modern civilization. It was the principal occurrence which affected the Church in the twelfth century; the point at which we will, for the present, take leave of it.

But at this same instant another power was put in motion, which, though altogether of a different character, was perhaps one of the most interesting and important in the progress of society during the middle ages—I mean the institution of free cities and boroughs; or what is called the enfranchisement of the commons. How strange is the inconsistency of grossness and ignorance! If it had been told to these early citizens who vindicated their liberties with such enthusiasm, that there were certain men who cried out for the rights of human reason, the right of free inquiry, men who

the Church regarded as heretics, they would have stoned or burned them on the spot. Abelard and his friends more than once ran the risk of suffering this kind of martyrdom. On the other hand, these same philosophers, who were so bold in their demands for the privileges of reason, spoke of the enfranchisement of the commons as an abominable revolution calculated to destroy civil society. Between the movement of philosophy and the movement of the commons—between political liberty and the liberty of the human mind—a war seemed to be declared; and it has required ages to reconcile these two powers, and to make them understand that their interests are the same. In the twelfth century they had nothing in common, as we shall more fully see in the next lecture, which will be devoted to the formation of free cities and municipal corporations

LECTURE VII

RISE OF FREE CITIES.

We have already, in our previous lectures, brought down the history of the two first great elements of modern civilization, the feudal system and the Church, to the twelfth century. The third of these fundamental elements—that of the commons, or free corporate cities—will form the subject of the present, and I propose to limit it to the same period as that occupied by the other two.

It is necessary, however, that I should notice, on entering upon this subject, a difference which exists between corporate cities and the feudal system and the Church. The two latter although they increased in influence, and were subject to many changes, yet show themselves as completed, as having put on a definite form, between the fifth and the twelfth centuries—we see their rise, growth, and maturity. Not so the free cities. It is not till towards the close of this period —till the eleventh and twelfth centuries—that corporate cities make any figure in history. Not that I mean to assert that their previous history does not merit attention; not that there are not evident traces of their existence before this period; all I would observe is, that they did not, previously to the eleventh century, perform any important part in the great drama of the world, as connected with modern civilization Again, with regard to the feudal system and the Church; we have seen them, between the fifth century and the twelfth, act with power upon the social system; we have seen the effects they produced; by regarding them as two great principles, we have arrived, by way of induction, by way of conjecture, at certain results which we have verified by referring to facts themselves. This, however, we cannot do with regard to corporations. We only see these in their childhood I can scarcely go further to-day than inquire into their causes,

their origin ; and the few observations I shall make respecting their effects—respecting the influence of corporate cities upon modern civilization, will be rather a foretelling of what afterwards came to pass, than a recounting of what actually took place. I cannot, at this period, call in the testimony of known and contemporary events, because it was not till between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries that corporations attained any degree of perfection and influence, that these institutions bore any fruit, and that we can verify our assertions by history. I mention this difference of situation, in order to forewarn you of that which you may find incomplete and premature in the sketch I am about to give you.

Let us suppose that in the year 1789, at the commencement of the terrible regeneration of France, a burgess of the twelfth century had risen from his grave, and made his appearance among us, and some one had put into his hands (for we will suppose he could read) one of those spirit-stirring pamphlets which caused so much excitement, for instance, that of M. Sieyes, *What is the third estate?* (" *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?*") If, in looking at this, he had met the following passage, which forms the basis of the pamphlet :—" The third estate is the French nation without the nobility and clergy :" what, let me ask, would be the impression such a sentence would make on this burgess's mind? Is it probable that he would understand it? No: he would not be able to comprehend the meaning of the words, " the French nation," because they remind him of no facts or circumstances with which he would be acquainted, but represent a state of things to the existence of which he is an entire stranger ; but if he did understand the phrase, and had a clear apprehension that the absolute sovereignty was lodged in the third estate, it is beyond a question that he would characterize such a proposition as almost absurd and impious, so utterly at variance would it be with his feelings and his ideas of things—so contradictory to the experience and observation of his whole life.

If we now suppose the astonished burgess to be introduced into any one of the free cities of France which had existed in his time—say Rheims, or Beauvais, or Laon, or Noyon —we shall see him still more astonished and puzzled : he enters the town, he sees no towers, ramparts, militia, or any other kind of defence ; everything exposed, everything an easy spoil to the first depredator, the town ready to fall into the hands of the first assailant. The burgess is alarmed at the

insecurity of this free city, which he finds in so defenceless and unprotected a condition. He then proceeds into the heart of the town; he inquires how things are going on, what is the nature of its government, and the character of its inhabitants. He learns that there is an authority not resident within its walls, which imposes whatever taxes it pleases to levy upon them without their consent; which requires them to keep up a militia, and to serve in the army without their inclination being consulted. They talk to him about the magistrates, about the mayor and aldermen, and he is obliged to hear that the burgesses have nothing to do with their nomination. He learns that the municipal government is not conducted by the burgesses, but that a servant of the king, a steward living at a distance, has the sole management of their affairs. In addition to this, he is informed that they are prohibited from assembling together to take into consideration matters immediately concerning themselves, that the church bells have ceased to announce public meetings for such purposes. The burgess of the twelfth century is struck dumb with confusion —a moment since he was amazed at the greatness, the importance, the vast superiority which the "tiers état" so vauntingly arrogated to itself; but now, upon examination, he finds them deprived of all civic rights, and in a state of thraldom and degradation far more intolerable than he had ever before witnessed. He passes suddenly from one extreme to the other, from the spectacle of a corporation exercising sovereign power to a corporation without any power at all: how is it possible that he should understand this, or be able to reconcile it? his head must be turned, and his faculties lost in wonder and confusion.

Now, let us burgesses of the nineteenth century imagine, in our turn, that we are transported back into the twelfth. A twofold appearance, but exactly reversed, presents itself to us in a precisely similar manner. If we regard the affairs of the public in general—the state, the government, the country, the nation at large, we shall neither see nor hear anything of burgesses; they were mere ciphers—of no importance or consideration whatever. Not only so, but if we would know in what estimation they held themselves as a body, what weight, what influence they attached to themselves with respect to their relations towards the government of France as a nation we shall receive a reply to our inquiry in language ex

pressive of deep humility and timidity; while we shall find their masters, the lords, from whom they subsequent y wrested their franchises, treating them, at least as far as words go with a pride and scorn truly amazing; yet these indignities do not appear, in the slightest degree, to provoke or astonish their submissive vassals.

But let us enter one of these free cities, and see what is going on within it. Here things take quite another turn: we find ourselves in a fortified town, defended by armed burgesses. These burgesses fix their own taxes, elect their own magistrates, have their own courts of judicature, their own public assemblies for deliberating upon public measures, from which none are excluded. They make war at their own expense, even against their suzerain—maintain their own militia. In short, they govern themselves, they are sovereigns.

Here we have a similar contrast to that which made France, of the eighteenth century, so perplexing to the burgess of the twelfth; the scenes only are changed. In the present day the burgesses, in a national point of view, are everything—municipalities nothing; formerly corporations were everything, while the burgesses, as respects the nation, were nothing. From this it will appear evident that many things, many extraordinary events, and even many revolutions, must have happened between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries, in order to bring about so great a change as that which has taken place in the social condition of this class of society. But however vast this change, there can be no doubt but that the commons, the third estate of 1789, politically speaking, are the descendants, the heirs of the free towns of the twelfth century. And the present haughty, ambitious French nation, which aspires so high, which proclaims so pomposuly its sovereignty, and pretends not only to have regenerated and to govern itself, but to regenerate and rule the whole world, is indisputably descended from those very free towns which revolted in the twelfth century—with great spirit and courage it must be allowed, but with no nobler object than that of escaping to some remote corner of the land from the vexatious tyranny of a few nobles.

It would be in vain to expect that the condition of the free towns in the twelfth century will reveal the causes of a metamorphosis such as this, which resulted from a series of events

hat took place between the twelfth and eighteenth centuries It is in these events that we shall discover the causes of this change as we go on. Nevertheless, the origin of the "*tiers état*" has played a striking part in its history; and though we may not be able therein to trace out the whole secret of its destiny, we shall, at least, there meet with the seeds of it; that which it was at first, again occurs in that which it is become, and this to a much greater extent than might be presumed from appearances. A sketch, however imperfect, of the state of the free cities in the twelfth century, will, I think, convince you of this fact.

In order to understand the condition of the free cities at that time properly, it is necessary to consider them in two points of view. There are two great questions to be determined: *first*, that of the enfranchisement of the commons, or cities—that is to say, how this revolution was brought about, what were its causes, what alteration it effected in the condition of the burgesses, what in that of society in general, and in that of all the other orders of the state. The second question relates to the government of the free cities, the internal condition of the enfranchised towns, with reference to the burgesses residing within them, the principles, forms and customs that prevailed among them.

From these two sources—namely, the change introduced into the social position of the burgesses, on the one hand, and from the internal government, by their municipal economy, on the other, has flowed all their influence upon modern civilization. All the circumstances that can be traced to their influence, may be referred to one of those two causes. As soon, then, as we thoroughly understand, and can satisfactorily account for, the enfranchisement of the free cities on the one hand, and the formation of their government on the other, we shall be in possession of the two keys to their history. In conclusion, I shall say a few words on the great diversity of conditions in the free cities of Europe. The facts which I am about to lay before you are not to be applied indiscriminately to all the free cities of the twelfth century—to those of Italy, Spain, England, and France alike; many of them undoubtedly were nearly the same in them all, but the points of difference are great and important. I shall point them out to your notice as I proceed. We shall meet with

them again at a more advanced stage of our civilization, and can then examine them more closely.

In acquainting ourselves with the history of the enfranchisement of the free towns, we must remember what was the state of those towns between the fifth and eleventh centuries —from the fall of the Roman empire to the time when municipal revolution commenced. Here, I repeat, the differences are striking: the condition of the towns varied amazingly in the different countries of Europe; still there are some facts which may be regarded as nearly common to them all, and it is to these that I shall confine my observations. When I have gone through these, I shall say a few words more particularly respecting the free towns of France, and especially those of the north, beyond the Rhône and the Loire; these will form prominent figures in the sketch I am about to make.

After the fall of the Roman empire, between the fifth and tenth centuries, the towns were neither in a state of servitude nor freedom. We here again run the same risk of error in the employment of words, that I spoke to you of in a previous lecture in describing the character of men and events. When a society has lasted a considerable time, and its language also, its words acquire a complete, a determinate, a precise, a sort of legal official signification. Time has introduced into the signification of every term a thousand ideas, which are awakened within us every time we hear it pronounced, but which, as they do not all bear the same date, are not all suitable at the same time. The terms "*servitude* and *freedom*," for example, recall to our minds ideas far more precise and definite than the facts of the eighth, ninth, or tenth centuries to which they relate. If we say that the towns in the eighth century were in a state of freedom, we say by far too much: we attach now to the word "*freedom*" a signification which does not represent the fact of the eighth century. We shall fall into the same error, if we say that the towns were in a state of servitude; for this term implies a state of things very different from the circumstances of the municipal towns of those days. I say again, then, that the towns were neither in a state of freedom nor servitude: they suffered all the evils to which weakness is liable: they were a prey to the continual depredations, rapacity, and violence of the strong: yet, notwithstanding these horrid disorders, their impoverished and

diminishing population, the towns had, and still maintained, a certain degree of importance: in most of them there was a clergyman, a bishop who exercised great authority, who possessed great influence over the people, served as a tie between them and their conquerors, thus maintaining the city in a sort of independence, by throwing over it the protecting shield of religion. Besides this, there were still left in the towns some valuable fragments of Roman institutions. We are indebted to the careful researches of MM. de Savigny, Hullmann, Mdlle. de Lézardière, &c., for having furnished us with many circumstances of this nature. We hear often, at this period, of the convocation of the senate, of the curiæ, of public assemblies, of municipal magistrates. Matters of police, wills, donations, and a multitude of civil transactions, were concluded in the *curiæ* by the magistrates, in the same way that they had previously been done under the Roman municipal government.

These remains of urban activity and freedom were gradually disappearing, it is true, from day to day. Barbarism and disorder, evils always increasing, accelerated depopulation. The establishment of the lords of the country in the provinces, and the rising preponderance of agricultural life, became another cause of the decline of the cities. The bishops themselves, after they had incorporated themselves into the feudal frame, attached much less importance to their municipal life. Finally, upon the triumph of the feudal system, the towns, without falling into the slavery of the agriculturists, were entirely subjected to the control of a lord, were included in some fief, and lost, by this title, somewhat of the independence which still remained to them, and which, indeed, they had continued to possess, even in the most barbarous times—even in the first centuries of invasion. So that from the fifth century up to the time of the complete organization of the feudal system, the state of the towns was continually getting worse.

When once, however, the feudal system was fairly established, when every man had taken his place, and became fixed as it were to the soil, when the wandering life had entirely ceased, the towns again assumed some importance—a new activity began to display itself within them. This is not surprising. Human activity, as we all know, is like the fer-

ility of the soil,—when the disturbing process is over, it reappears and makes all to grow and blossom; wherever there appears the least glimmering of peace and order the hopes of man are excited, and with his hopes his industry. This is what took place in the cities. No sooner was society a little settled under the feudal system, than the proprietors of fiefs began to feel new wants, and to acquire a certain degree of taste for improvement and melioration; this gave rise to some little commerce and industry in the towns of their domains; wealth and population increased within them,—slowly for certain, but still they increased. Among other circumstances which aided in bringing this about, there is one which, in my opinion, has not been sufficiently noticed,—I mean the asylum, the protection which the churches afforded to fugitives. Before the free towns were constituted, before they were in a condition by their power, their fortifications, to offer an asylum to the desolate population of the country, when there was no place of safety for them but the church, this circumstance alone was sufficient to draw into the cities many unfortunate persons and fugitives. These sought refuge either in the church itself or within its precincts; it was not merely the lower orders, such as serfs, villains, and so on, that sought this protection, but frequently men of considerable rank and wealth, who might chance to be proscribed. The chronicles of the times are full of examples of this kind. We find men lately powerful, upon being attacked by some more powerful neighbor, or by the king himself, abandoning their dwellings, and carrying away all the property they could rake together, entering into some city, and placing themselves under the protection of a church: they became citizens. Refugees of this sort had, in my opinion, a considerable influence upon the progress of the cities; they introduced into them, besides their wealth, elements of a population superior to the great mass of their inhabitants. We know, moreover, that when once an assemblage somewhat considerable is formed in any place that other persons naturally flock to it; perhaps from finding it a place of greater security, or perhaps from that sociable disposition of our nature which never abandons us.[18]

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[18] Upon the establishment of the feudal system, "every town, except within the royal domains, was subject to some lord. In episcopal cities, the bishop possessed a considerable authority, and in many there was a class of resident nobility. It is probable

By the concurrence of all these causes, the cities regained a small portion of power as soon as the feudal system became somewhat settled. But the security of the citizens was not restored to an equal extent. The roving, wandering life had, it is true, in a great measure ceased, but to the conquerors, to the new proprietors of the soil, this roving life was one great means of gratifying their passions. When they desired to pillage, they made an excursion, they went afar to seek a better fortune, another domain. When they became more settled, when they considered it necessary to renounce their predatory expeditions, the same passions, the same gross desires, still remained in full force. But the weight of these now fell upon those whom they found ready at hand, upon the powerful of the world, upon the cities. Instead of going afar to pillage, they pillaged what was near. The exactions of the proprietors of fiefs upon the burgesses were redoubled at the end of the tenth century. Whenever the lord of the domain, by which a city was girt, felt a desire to increase his wealth, he gratified his avarice at the expense of the citizens. It was more particularly at this period that the citizens complained of the total want of commercial security. Merchants, on returning from their trading rounds, could not, with safety, return to their city. Every avenue was taken possession of by the lord of the domain and his vassals. The moment in which industry commenced its career, was precisely that in which security was most wanting. Nothing is more galling to an active spirit, than to be deprived of the long-anticipated pleasure of enjoying the fruits of his industry. When robbed of this, he is far more irritated and vexed than when made to suffer in a state of being fixed and monotonous, than when that which is torn from him is not the fruit of his own activity, has not excited in him all the joys of hope. There is in the progressive movement, which elevates a man of a population towards a new fortune, a spirit of resistance against

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that the proportion of freemen was always greater than in the country; some sort of retail trade, and even of manufacture, must have existed in the rudest of the middle ages, and consequently some little capital was required for their exercise. Nor was it so easy to oppress a collected body, as the scattered and dispirited cultivators of the soil. Probably, therefore, the condition of the towns was at all times by far *the more tolerable servitude*."—Hallam, Middle Ages, Chap. ii. pt. 2

iniquity and violence much more energetic than in any other situation.

Such, then, was the state of cities during the course of the tenth century. They possessed more strength, more importance, more wealth, more interests to defend. At the same time, it became more necessary than ever to defend them, for these interests, their wealth and their strength, became objects of desire to the nobles. With the means of resistance, the danger and difficulty increased also. Besides, the feudal system gave to all connected with it a perpetual example of resistance; the idea of an organized energetic government, capable of keeping society in order and regularity by its intervention, had never presented itself to the spirits of that period. On the contrary, there was a perpetual recurrence of individual will, refusing to submit to authority. Such was the conduct of the major part of the holders of fiefs towards their suzerains, of the small proprietors of land to the greater; so that at the very time when the cities were oppressed and tormented, at the moment when they had new and greater interests to sustain, they had before their eyes a continual lesson of insurrection. The feudal system rendered this service to mankind—it has constantly exhibited individual will, displaying itself in all its power and energy. The lesson prospered; in spite of their weakness, in spite of the prodigious inequality which existed between them and the great proprietors, their lords, the cities everywhere broke out into rebellion against them.

It is difficult to fix a precise date to this great event—this general insurrection of the cities. The commencement of their enfranchisement is usually placed at the beginning of the eleventh century. But in all great events, how many unknown and disastrous efforts must have been made, before the successful one! Providence, upon all occasions, in order to accomplish its designs, is prodigal of courage, virtues, sacrifices—finally, of man; and it is only after a vast number of unknown attempts apparently lost, after a host of noble hearts have fallen into despair—convinced that their cause was lost—that it triumphs. Such, no doubt, was the case in the struggle of the free cities. Doubtless in the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries there were many attempts at resistance, many efforts made for freedom:—many attempts to escape

from bondage, which not only were unsuccessful, but the remembrance of which, from their ill success, has remained without glory. Still we may rest assured that these attempts had a vast influence upon succeeding events: they kept alive and maintained the spirit of liberty—they prepared the great insurrection of the eleventh century.

I say insurrection, and I say it advisedly. The enfranchisement of the towns or communities in the eleventh century was the fruit of a real insurrection, of a real war—a war declared by the population of the cities against their lords. The first fact which we always meet with in annals of this nature, is the rising of the burgesses, who seize whatever arms they can lay their hands on;—it is the expulsion of the people of the lord, who come for the purpose of levying contributions, some extortion; it is an enterprise against the neighboring castle;—such is always the character of the war. If the insurrection fails, what does the conqueror instantly do? He orders the destruction of the fortifications erected by the citizens, not only around their city, but also around each dwelling. We see that at the very moment of confederation, after having promised to act in common, after having taken, in common, the corporation oath, the first act of each citizen was to put his own house in a state of resistance. Some towns, the names of which are now almost forgotten, the little community of Vézelai, in Nevers, for example—sustained against their lord a long and obstinate struggle. At length victory declared for the Abbot of Vézelai; upon the spot he ordered the demolition of the fortifications of the houses of the citizens; and the names of many of the heroes, whose fortified houses were then destroyed, are still preserved.

Let us enter the interior of these habitations of our ancestors; let us examine the form of their construction, and the mode of life which this reveals: all is devoted to war, every thing is impressed with its character.

The construction of the house of a citizen of the twelfth century, so far, at least, as we can now obtain an idea of it, was something of this kind: it consisted usually of three stories, one room in each: that on the ground floor served as a general eating room for the family; the first story was much elevated for the sake of security, and this is the most remarkable circumstance in the construction. The room in this story was the habitation of the master of the house and his wife. The house was, in general, flanked with an angular

tower, usually square: another symptom of war; another means of defence. The second story consisted again of a single room; its use is not known, but it probably served for the children and domestics. Above this in most houses, was a small platform, evidently intended as an observatory or watch-tower. Every feature of the building bore the appearance of war. This was the decided characteristic, the true name of the movement, which wrought out the freedom of the cities.

After a war has continued a certain time, whatever may be the belligerent parties, it naturally leads to a peace. The treaties of peace between the cities and their adversaries were so many charters. These charters of the cities were so many positive treaties of peace between the burgesses and their lords.

The insurrection was general. When I say *general*, I do not mean that there was any concerted plan, that there was any coalition between all the burgesses of a country; nothing like it took place. But the situation of all the towns being nearly the same, they all were liable to the same danger; a prey to the same disasters. Having acquired similar means of resistance and defence, they made use of those means at nearly the same time. It may be possible, also, that the force of example did something; that the success of one or two communities was contagious. Sometimes the charters appear to have been drawn up from the same model; for instance, that of Noyon served as a pattern for those of Beauvais, St. Quentin, and others; I doubt, however, whether example had so great an influence as is generally conjectured. Communication between different provinces was difficult and of rare occurrence; the intelligence conveyed and received by hearsay and general report was vague and uncertain; and there is much reason for believing that the insurrection was rather the result of a similarity of situation and of a general spontaneous movement. When I say *general*, I wish to be understood simply as saying that insurrections took place everywhere; they did not, I repeat, spring from any unanimous concerted movement: all was particular, local; each community rebelled on its own account, against its own lord, unconnected with any other place.

The vicissitudes of the struggle were great. Not only did

success change from one side to the other, but even after peace was in appearance concluded, after the charter had been solemnly sworn to by both parties, they violated and eluded its articles in all sorts of ways. Kings acted a prominent part in the alternations of these struggles. I shall speak of these more in detail when I come to royalty itself. Too much has probably been said of the effects of royal influence upon the struggles of the people for freedom. These effects have been often contested, sometimes exaggerated, and in my opinion, sometimes greatly underrated. I shall here confine myself to the assertion that royalty was often called upon to interfere in these contests, sometimes by the cities, sometimes by their lords; and that it played very different parts; acting now upon one principle, and soon after upon another; that it was ever changing its intentions, its designs, and its conduct; but that, taking it altogether, it did much, and produced a greater portion of good than of evil.

In spite of all these vicissitudes, notwithstanding the perpetual violation of charters in the twelfth century—the freedom of the cities was consummated. Europe, and particularly France, which, during a whole century, had abounded in insurrections, now abounded in charters; cities rejoiced in them with more or less security, but still they rejoiced; the event succeeded, and the right was acknowledged.

Let us now endeavor to ascertain the more immediate results of this great fact, and what changes it produced in the situation of the burgesses as regarded society.

And, at first, as regards the relations of the burgesses with the general government of the country, or with what we now call the state, it effected nothing; they took no part in this more than before; all remained local, enclosed within the limits of the fief.

One circumstance, however, renders this assertion not strictly true: a connexion now began to be formed between the cities and the king. At one time the people called upon the king for support and protection, or solicited him to guaranty the charter which had been promised or sworn to. At another the barons invoked the judicial interference of the king between them and the burgesses. At the request of one or other of the two parties, from a multitude of various causes

royalty was called upon to interfere in the quarrel, whence resulted a frequent and close connexion between the citizens and the king. In consequence of this connexion the cities became a part of the state, they began to have relations with the general government

Although all still remained local, yet a new general class of society became formed by the enfranchisement of the communs. No coalition of the burgesses of different cities had taken place; as yet they had as a class no public or general existence. But the country was covered with men engaged in similar pursuits, possessing the same views and interests the same manners and customs; between whom there could not fail to be gradually formed a certain tie, from which originated the general class of burgesses. This formation of a great social class was the necessary result of the local enfranchisement of the burgesses. It must not, however, be supposed that the class of which we are speaking was then what it has since become. Not only is its situation greatly changed, but its elements are totally different. In the twelfth century, this class was almost entirely composed of merchants or small traders, and little landed or house proprietors who had taken up their residence in the city. Three centuries afterwards there were added to this class lawyers, physicians, men of letters, and the local magistrates. The class of burgesses was formed gradually and of very different elements: history gives us no accurate account of its progress, nor of its diversity. When the body of citizens is spoken of, it is erroneously conjectured to have been, at all times, composed of the same elements. Absurd supposition! It is, perhaps, in the diversity of its composition at different periods of history that we should seek to discover the secret of its destiny; so long as it was destitute of magistrates and of men of letters, so long it remained totally unlike what it became in the sixteenth century; as regards the state, it neither possessed the same character nor the same importance. In order to form a just idea of the changes in the rank and influence of this portion of society we must take a view of the new professions, the new moral situations, of the new intellectual state which gradually arose within it. In the twelfth century, I must repeat, the body of citizens consisted only of small merchants or traders, who, after having finished their purchases and sales retired to their houses in the city or town; and of little pro

prietors of houses or lands who had there taken up their residence. Such was the European class of citizens, in its primary elements

The third great result of the enfranchisement of the cities was the struggle of classes; a struggle which constitutes the very fact of modern history, and of which it is full.

Modern Europe, indeed, is born of this struggle between the different classes of society. I have already shown that in other places this struggle has been productive of very different consequences; in Asia, for example, one particular class has completely triumphed, and the system of castes has succeeded to that of classes, and society has there fallen into a state of immobility. Nothing of this kind, thank God! has taken place in Europe. One of the classes has not conquered, has not brought the others into subjection; no class has been able to overcome, to subjugate the others; the struggle, instead of rendering society stationary, has been a principal cause of its progress; the relations of the different classes with one another; the necessity of combating and of yielding by turns; the variety of interests, passions, and excitements; the desire to conquer without the power to do so: from all this has probably sprung the most energetic, the most productive principle of development in European civilization. This struggle of the classes has been constant; enmity has grown up between them; the infinite diversity of situation, of interests, and of manners, has produced a strong moral hostility; yet they have progressively approached, assimilated, and understood each other; every country of Europe has seen arise and develop itself within it a certain public mind, a certain community of interests, of ideas, of sentiments, which have triumphed over this diversity and war. In France, for example, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the moral and social separation of classes was still very profound, yet there can be no doubt but that their fusion, even then, was far advanced; that even then there was a real French nation, not consisting of any class exclusively, but of a commixture of the whole; all animated with the same feeling, actuated by one common social principle, firmly knit together by the bond of nationality.

Thus, from the bosom of variety, enmity, and discord, has issued that national unity, now become so conspicuous in modern Europe; that nationality whose tendency is to de

velop and purify itself more and more, and every day to increase its splendor.

Such are the great, the important, the conspicuous social effects of the revolution which now occupies our attention. Let us now endeavor to show what were its moral effects, what changes it produced in the minds of the citizens themselves, what they became in consequence, and what they should morally become, in their new situation.

When we take into our consideration the connexion of the citizens with the state in general, with the government of the state, and with the interests of the country, as that connexion existed not only in the twelfth century, but also in after ages, there is one circumstance which must strike us most forcibly: I mean the extraordinary mental timidity of the citizens: their humility; the excessive modesty of their pretensions to a right of interference in the government of their country; and the little matter that, in this respect, contented them. Nothing was to be seen in them which discovered that genuine political feeling which aspires to the possession of influence, and to the power of reforming and governing; nothing attests in them either energy of mind, or loftiness of ambition; one feels ready to exclaim, Poor, prudent, simple-hearted citizens!

There are not, properly, more than two sources whence, in the political world, can flow loftiness of ambition and energy of mind. There must be either the feeling of possessing a great importance, a great power over the destiny of others, and this over a large sphere; or there must be in one's self a powerful feeling of personal independence, the assurance of one's own liberty, the consciousness of having a destiny with which no will can intermeddle beyond that in one's own bosom. To one or other of these two conditions seem to be attached energy of mind, the loftiness of ambition, the desire to act in a large sphere, and to obtain corresponding results.

Neither of these conditions is to be found in the situation of the burgesses of the middle ages. These were, as we have just seen, only important to themselves; except within the walls of their own city, their influence amounted to but little; as regarded the state, to almost nothing. Nor could they be possessed of any great feeling of personal independence: their having conquered—their having obtained a charter did but little in the way of promoting this noble senti-

ment. The burgess of a city, comparing himself with the little baron who dwelt near him, and who had just been vanquished by him, would still be sensible of his own extreme inferiority, he was ignorant of that proud sentiment of independence which animated the proprietor of a fief; the share of freedom which he possessed was not derived from himself alone, but from his association with others—from the difficult and precarious succor which they afforded. Hence that retiring disposition, that timidity of mind, that trembling shyness, that humility of speech, (though perhaps coupled with firmness of purpose,) which is so deeply stamped on the character of the burgesses, not only of the twelfth century, but even of their most remote descendants. They had no taste for great enterprises; if chance pushed them into such, they became vexed and embarrassed; any responsibility was a burden to them; they felt themselves out of their sphere, and endeavored to return into it; they treated upon easy terms. Thus, in running over the history of Europe, and especially of France, we may occasionally find municipal communities esteemed, consulted, perhaps respected, but rarely feared; they seldom impressed their adversaries with the notion that they were a great and formidable power, a power truly political. There is nothing to be astonished at in the weakness of the modern burgess; the great cause of it may be traced to his origin, in those circumstances of his enfranchisement which I have just placed before you. The loftiness of ambition, independent of social conditions, breadth and boldness of political views, the desire to be employed in public affairs, the full consciousness of the greatness of man, considered as such, and of the power that belongs to him, if he be capable of exercising it; it is these sentiments, these dispositions, which, of entirely modern growth in Europe, are the offspring of modern civilization, and of that glorious and powerful generality which characterizes it, and which will never fail to secure to the public an influence, a weight in the government of the country, that were constantly wanting, and deservedly wanting, to the burgesses our ancestors

As a set-off to this, in the contests which they had to sustain respecting their local interests—in this narrow field, they acquired and displayed a degree of energy, devotedness, perseverance, and patience, which has never been surpassed. The difficulty of the enterprise was so great, they had to

struggle against such perils, that a display of courage almos beyond example became necessary. Our notions of the burgess of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and of his life are very erroneous. The picture which Sir Walter Scott has drawn in *Quentin Durward* of the burgomaster of Liege, fat, inactive, without experience, without daring, and caring for nothing but passing his life in ease and enjoyment, is only fitted for the stage; the real burgess of that day had a coat of mail continually on his back, a pike constantly in his hand; his life was nearly as stormy, as warlike, as rigid as that of the nobles with whom he contended. It was in these every-day perils, in combating the varied dangers of practical life, hat he acquired that bold and masculine character, that determined exertion, which have become more rare in the softer activity of modern times.

None, however, of these social and moral effects of the enfranchisement of corporations became fully developed in the twelfth century; it is only in the course of the two following centuries that they showed themselves so as to be clearly discerned. It is nevertheless certain that the seeds of these effects existed in the primary situation of the commons, in the mode of their enfranchisement, and in the position which the burgesses from that time took in society; I think, therefore, that I have done right in bringing these circumstances before you to-day.

Let us now penetrate into the interior of one of those corporate cities of the twelfth century, that we may see how it was governed, that we may now see what principles and what facts prevailed in the relations of the burgesses with one another. It must be remembered, that in speaking of the municipal system bequeathed by the Roman empire to the modern world, I took occasion to say, that the Roman world was a great coalition of municipalities, which had previously been as sovereign and independent as Rome itself. Each of these cities had formerly been in the same condition as Rome a little free republic, making peace and war, and governing itself by its own will. As fast as these became incorporated into the Roman world, those rights which constitute sovereignty—the right of war and peace, of legislation, taxation, &c.—were transferred from each city to the central government at Rome. There remained then but one municipal sovereignty. Rome reigned over a vast number of munici

palities, which had nothing left beyond a civic existence. The municipal system became essentially changed : it was no longer a political government, but simply a mode of administration. This was the grand revolution which was consummated under the Roman empire. The municipal system became a mode of administration ; it was reduced to the government of local affairs, to the civic interests of the city. This is the state in which the Roman empire, at its fall, left the cities and their institutions. During the chaos of barbarism, notions and facts of all sorts became embroiled and confused ; the various attributes of sovereignty and administration were confounded. Distinctions of this nature were no longer regarded. Affairs were suffered to run on in the course dictated by necessity. The municipalities became sovereigns or administrators in the various places, as need might require Where cities rebelled, they re-assumed the sovereignty, for the sake of security, not out of respect for any political theory nor from any feeling of their dignity, but that they might have the means of contending with the nobles, whose yoke they had thrown off ; that they might take upon themselves the right to call out the militia, to tax themselves to support the war, to name their own chiefs and magistrates ; in a word, to govern themselves. The internal government of the city was their means of defence, of security. Thus, sovereignty again returned to the municipal system, which had been deprived of it by the conquests of Rome. City corporations again became sovereigns. This is the political characteristic of their enfranchisement.

I do not, however, mean to assert, that this sovereignty was complete. Some trace of an exterior sovereignty always may be found ; sometimes it was the baron who retained the right to send a magistrate into the city, with whom the municipal magistrates acted as assessors ; perhaps he had the right to collect certain revenues ; in some cases a fixed tribute was assured to him. Sometimes the exterior sovereignty of the community was in the hands of the king.

The cities themselves, in their turn, entered into the feudal system ; they had vassals, and became suzerains ; and by this title possessed that portion of sovereignty which was inherent in the suzerainty. A great confusion arose between the rights which they held from their feudal position, and those which they had acquired by their insurrection ; and by this double title they held the sovereignty.

Let us see, as far as the very scanty sources left us will allow, how the internal government of the cities, at least in the more early times, was managed. The entire body of the inhabitants formed the communal assembly: all those who had taken the communal oath—and all who dwelt within the walls were obliged to do so—were summoned, by the tolling of the bell, to the general assembly. In this were named the magistrates. The number chosen, and the power and proceedings of the magistrates, differed very considerably. After choosing the magistrates, the assemblies dissolved; and the magistrates governed almost alone, sufficiently arbitrarily, being under no further responsibility than the new elections, or, perhaps, popular outbreaks, which were, at this time, the great guarantee for good government.

You will observe that the internal organization of the municipal towns is reduced to two very simple elements, the general assembly of the inhabitants, and a government invested with almost arbitrary power, under the responsibility of insurrections,—general outbreaks. It was impossible, especially while such manners prevailed, to establish anything like a regular government, with proper guarantees of order and duration. The greater part of the population of these cities were ignorant, brutal, and savage to a degree which rendered them exceedingly difficult to govern. At the end of a very short period, there was but little more security within these communities than there had been, previously, in the relations of the burgesses within the baron. There soon, however, became formed a burgess aristocracy. The causes of this are easily understood. The notions of that day, coupled with certain social relations, led to the establishment of trading companies legally constituted. A system of privileges became introduced into the interior of the cities, and, in the end a great inequality. There soon grew up in all of them a certain number of considerable, opulent burgesses, and a population, more or less numerous, of workmen, who, notwithstanding their inferiority, had no small influence in the affairs of the community. The free cities thus became divided into an upper class of burgesses, and a population subject to all the errors, all the vices of a mob. The superior citizens thus found themselves pressed between two great difficulties: first, the arduous one of governing this inferior turbulent population and secondly, that of withstanding the continual attempts

of the ancient master of the borough, who sought to regain his former power. Such was the situation of their affairs, not only in France, but in Europe, down to the sixteenth century. This, perhaps, is the cause which prevented these communities from taking, in several countries of Europe, and especially in France, that high political station which seemed properly to belong to them. Two spirits were unceasingly at work within them: among the inferior population, a blind, licentious, furious spirit of democracy; among the superior burgesses, a spirit of timidity, of caution, and an excessive desire to accommodate all differences, whether with the king, or with its ancient proprietors, so as to preserve peace and order in the bosom of the community. Neither of these spirits could raise the cities to a high rank in the state.

All these effects did not become apparent in the twelfth century; still we may foresee them, even in the character of the insurrection, in the manner in which it broke out, in the state of the different elements of the city population.

Such, if I mistake not, are the principal characteristics, the general results, both of the enfranchisement of the cities and of their internal government. I have already premised, that these facts were not so uniform, not so universal, as I have represented them. There are great diversities in the history of the European free cities. In the south of France and in Italy, for example, the Roman municipal system prevailed, the population was not nearly so divided, so unequal, as in the north. Here, also, the municipal organization was much better; perhaps the effect of Roman traditions, perhaps of the better state of the population. In the north, it was the feudal system that prevailed in the city arrangements. Here all seemed subordinate to the struggle against the barons. The cities of the south paid much more regard to their internal constitution, to the work of melioration and progress. We see, from the beginning, that they will become free republics. The career of those of the north, above all those of France, showed itself, from the first, more rude, more incomplete, destined to less perfect, less beautiful developments. If we run over those of Germany, Spain, and England, we shall find among them many other differences. I cannot particularize them, but shall notice some of them, as we advance in the history of civilization. All things at their origin are nearly confounded in one and the same physiognomy; it is only in their

after-growth that their variety shows itself. Then begins a new development which urges forward societies towards that free and lofty unity, the glorious object of the efforts and wishes of mankind.[19]

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[19] Hallam's Middle Ages, Chap. ii. pt. 2, treating of the causes of the decline of the feudal system, contains a brief view of the origin of the free cities, the time of their incorporation in the principal countries of feudal Europe, the nature of their privileges, etc. In the opinion of this writer, corporations existed earlier in Spain than in any other country: the charter of Leon, granted by Alfonzo V. in 1020, makes mention of the common council of that city as an existing and long-established institution. The earliest charters in France — those of St. Quentin and Amiens—were granted by Louis VI. During his reign, and those of the two succeeding kings, 1108-1223, the principal towns in France acquired the privileges of incorporation. In England it is not clear that any corporate towns, except London, possessed the right of internal jurisdiction before the reign of Henry II., 1154. The charter of London was granted by Henry I., in 1100.

Most worthy of the student's attention is the history of the *free* cities of Germany and Italy, especially of the latter, as having contributed so largely to the progress of modern civilization. By the middle of the twelfth century the cities of Lombardy, with Milan at their head, had become extremely rich and powerful; they formed a confederation among themselves; maintained an obstinate struggle for more than thirty years with Frederick Barbarossa, emperor of Germany, which terminated in 1183 by the treaty of Constance, wherein the emperor renounced all legal privileges in the interior of the cities, acknowledged the right of the confederated cities to levy armies, erect fortifications, exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction by officers of their own appointment.

Among the German cities, confederations were also formed: of these the most celebrated was the *Hanseatic League*, which originated in 1239-1241, from a convention between Lubeck, Hamburg, and one or two other cities, by which they agreed to defend each other against all oppression and violence, particularly of the nobles. The number of towns united in this league rapidly increased; it included at one time *eighty-five* cities. Regular diets were held every third year at Lubeck, the chief city of the confederacy. This league was at various times confirmed by kings and princes; and, in the fourteenth century, exercised a powerful political as well as commercial influence. It was dissolved in 1630.

The privileges granted by charters to the cities in the middle ages, were in general these: the right of corporate property; a common seal; exemption from the more ignominious or oppressive tokens of feudal subjection, and the defined regulation of the rest; settled rules as to succession and private rights of property; and,

lastly, and of the greatest value, exemption from the royal jurisdiction, as well as from that of the territorial judges, and the right of being governed by magistrates of their own, either wholly, or (in some cases) partly chosen by themselves. By degrees, at a later period, the cities acquired the right of representation in the legislative bodies of the nation—in Spain as early as the middle of the twelfth century, in France, England, Germany, and Italy about a century later.

LECTURE VIII

SKETCH OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION — STATE OF EUROPE FROM THE TWELFTH TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURIES — THE CRUSADES.

I HAVE not yet laid before you the whole plan of my course. I began by pointing out its object, and I then went straight forward, without taking any comprehensive view of European civilization, and without indicating at once its starting-point, its path, and its goal,—its beginning, middle, and end. We are now, however, arrived at a period when this comprehensive view, this general outline, of the world through which we travel, becomes necessary. The times which have hitherto been the subject of our study, are explained in some measure by themselves, or by clear and immediate results. The times into which we are about to enter can neither be understood nor excite any strong interest, unless we connect them with their most indirect and remote consequences. In an inquiry of such vast extent, a time arrives when we can no longer submit to go forward with a dark and unknown path before us; when we desire to know not only whence we have come and where we are, but whither we are going. This is now the case with us. The period which we approach cannot be understood, or its importance appreciated, unless by means of the relations which connect it with modern times. Its true spirit has been revealed only by the lapse of many subsequent ages.

We are in possession of almost all the essential elements of European civilization. I say almost all, because I have not yet said anything on the subject of monarchy. The crisis which decidedly developed the monarchical principle, hardly took place before the twelfth or even the thirteenth century. It was then only that the institution of monarchy was really established, and began to occupy a definite place in modern society. It is on this account that I have not sooner entered on the subject. With this exception we possess, I repeat it

all the great elements of European society. You have seen the origin of the feudal aristocracy, the Church and the municipalities; you have observed the institutions which would naturally correspond with these facts; and not only the institutions, but the principles and ideas which those facts naturally give rise to. Thus, with reference to feudalism, you have watched the origin of modern domestic life; you have comprehended, in all its energy, the feeling of personal independence, and the place which it must have occupied in our civilization. With reference to the Church, you have observed the appearance of the purely religious form of society, its relations with civil society, the principle of theocracy, the separation between the spiritual and temporal powers, the first blows of persecution, the first cries of liberty of conscience. The infant municipalities have given you a view of a social union founded on principles quite different from those of feudalism; the diversity of the classes of society, their contests with each other, the first and strongly marked features of the manners of the modern inhabitants of towns; timidity of judgment combined with energy of soul, proneness to be excited by demagogues joined to a spirit of obedience to legal authority; all the elements, in short, which have concurred in the formation of European society have already come under your observation.

Let us now transport ourselves into the heart of modern Europe; I do not mean Europe in the present day, after the prodigious metamorphosis we have witnessed, but in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What an immense difference! I have already insisted on this difference with reference to communities; I have endeavored to show you how little resemblance there is between the burgesses of the eighteenth century and those of the twelfth. Make the same experiment on feudalism and the Church, and you will be struck with a similar metamorphosis. There was no more resemblance between the nobility of the court of Louis XV. and the feudal aristocracy, or between the Church in the days of Cardinal de Bernis and those of the Abbé Suger, than there is between the burgesses of the eighteenth century and the same class in the twelfth. Between these two periods though society had already acquired all its elements, it underwent a total transformation.

I am now desirous to trace clearly the general and essential character of this transformation.

From the fifth century, society contained all that I have already found and described as belonging to it,—kings, a lay aristocracy, a clergy, citizens, husbandmen, civil and religious authorities; the germs, in short, of every thing necessary to form a nation and a government; and yet there was no government, no nation. In all the period that has occupied our attention, there was no such thing as a people, properly so called, or a government, in the modern acceptation of the word. We have fallen in with a number of particular forces, special facts, and local institutions; but nothing general, nothing public, nothing political, nothing, in short, like real nationality

Let us, on the other hand, survey Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: we everywhere see two great objects make their appearance on the stage of the world, —the government and the people. The influence of a general power over an entire country, and the influence of the country in the power which governs it, are the materials of history; the relations between these great forces, their alliances or their contests, are the subjects of its narration. The nobility, the clergy, the citizens, all these different classes and particular powers are thrown into the back-ground, and effaced, as it were, by these two great objects, the people and its government.

This, if I am not deceived, is the essential feature which distinguishes modern Europe from the Europe of the early ages; and this was the change which was accomplished between the thirteenth and the sixteenth century.

It is, then, in the period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, into which we are about to enter, that we must endeavor to find the cause of this change. It is the distinctive character of this period, that it was employed in changing Europe from its primitive to its modern state; and hence arise its importance and historical interest. If we did not consider it under this point of view, if we did not endeavor to discover the events which arose out of this period, not only we should never be able to comprehend it, but we should soon become weary of the inquiry.

Viewed in itself and apart from its results; it is a period without character, a period in which confusion went on in-

creasing without apparent causes, a period of movement without direction, of agitation without result; a period when monarchy, nobility, clergy, citizens, all the elements of social order, seemed to turn round in the same circle, incapable alike of progression and of rest. Experiments of all kinds were made and failed; endeavors were made to establish governments and lay the foundations of public liberty; reforms in religion were even attempted; but nothing was accomplished or came to any result. If ever the human race seemed destined to be always agitated, and yet always stationary, condemned to unceasing and yet barren labors, it was from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century that this was the complexion of its condition and history.

I am acquainted only with one work in which this appearance of the period in question is faithfully described; I allude to M. de Barante's *History of the Dukes of Burgundy*. I do not speak of the fidelity of his pictures of manners and narratives of adventures, but of that general fidelity which renders the work an exact image, a true mirror of the whole period, of which it at the same time displays both the agitation and the monotony.

Considered, on the contrary, in relation to what has succeeded it, as the transition from Europe in its primitive, to Europe in its modern state, this period assumes a more distinct and animated aspect; we discover in it a unity of design, a movement in one direction, a progression; and its unity and interest are found to reside in the slow and hidden labor accomplished in the course of its duration.

The history of European civilization, then, may be thrown into three great periods: first, a period which I shall call that of origin, or formation; during which the different elements of society disengage themselves from chaos, assume an existence, and show themselves in their native forms, with the principles by which they are animated; this period lasted almost to the twelfth century. The second period is a period of experiments, attempts, groping; the different elements of society approach and enter into combination, feeling each other, as it were, but without producing anything general, regular, or durable; this state of things, to say the truth, did not terminate till the sixteenth century. Then comes the third period, or the period of development, in which human society in Europe takes a definite form follows a determinate

direction, proceeds rapidly and with a general movement, towards a clear and precise object; this is the period which began in the sixteenth century, and is now pursuing its course

Such appears, on a general view, to be the aspect of European civilization. We are now about to enter into the second of the above periods; and we have to inquire what were the great and critical events which occurred during its course, and which were the determining causes of the social transformation which was its result.

The first great event which presents itself to our view, and which opened, so to speak, the period we are speaking of, was the crusades. They began at the end of the eleventh century, and lasted during the twelfth and thirteenth. It was indeed, a great event; for, since its occurrence, it has never ceased to occupy the attention of philosophical historians, who have shown themselves aware of its influence in changing the conditions of nations, and of the necessity of study in order to comprehend the general course of its facts.

The first character of the crusades is their universality; all Europe concurred in them; they were the first European event. Before the crusades, Europe had never been moved by the same sentiment, or acted in a common cause; till then, in fact, Europe did not exist. The crusades made manifest the existence of Christian Europe. The French formed the main body of the first army of crusaders; but there were also Germans, Italians, Spaniards, and English. But look at the second and third crusades, and we find all the nations of Christendom engaged in them. The world had never before witnessed a similar combination.

But this is not all. In the same manner as the crusades were a European event, so, in each separate nation, they were a national event. In every nation, all classes of society were animated with the same impression, yielded to the same idea, and abandoned themselves to the same impulse. Kings, nobles, priests, citizens, country people, all took the same interest and the same share in the crusades. The moral unity of nations was thus made manifest; a fact as new as the unity of Europe.

When such events take place in what may be called the youth of nations; in periods when they act spontaneously, freely, without premeditation or political design, we recognise what history calls heroic events, the heroic ages of nations. The crusades were the heroic event of modern Europe; a movement at the same time individual and general; national, and yet not under political direction.

That this was really their primitive character is proved by every fact, and every document. Who were the first crusaders? Bands of people who set out under the conduct of Peter the Hermit, without preparations, guides, or leaders, followed rather than led by a few obscure knights, traversed Germany and the Greek empire, and were dispersed, or perished, in Asia Minor.

The higher class, the feudal nobility, next put themselves in motion for the crusade. Under the command of Godfrey of Bouillon, the nobles and their men departed full of ardor. When they had traversed Asia Minor, the leaders of the crusaders were seized with a fit of lukewarmness and fatigue. They became indifferent about continuing their course; they were inclined rather to look to their own interest, to make conquests and possess them. The mass of the army, however, rose up, and insisted on marching to Jerusalem, the deliverance of the holy city being the object of the crusade. It was not to gain principalities for Raymond of Toulouse, or for Bohemond, or any other leader, that the crusaders had taken arms. The popular, national, European impulse overcame all the intentions of individuals; and the leaders had not sufficient ascendency over the masses to make them yield to their personal interests.

The sovereigns, who had been strangers to the first crusade, were now drawn into the general movement as the people had been. The great crusades of the twelfth century were commanded by kings.

I now go at once to the end of the thirteenth century. A great deal was still said in Europe about crusades, and they were even preached with ardor. The popes excited the sovereigns and the people; councils were held to recommend the conquest of the holy land; but no expeditions of any importance were now undertaken for this purpose, and it was regarded with general indifference. Something had entered in

to the spirit of European society which put an end to the crusades. Some private expeditions still took place; some nobles and some bands of troops still continued to depart for Jerusalem; but the general movement was evidently arrested. Neither the necessity, however, nor its facility of continuing it, seemed to have ceased. The Moslems triumphed more and more in Asia. The Christian kingdom founded at Jerusalem had fallen into their hands. It still appeared necessary to regain it; and the means of success were greater than at the commencement of the crusades. A great number of Christians were established and still powerful in Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine. The proper means of transport, and of carrying on the war, were better known. Still, nothing could revive the spirit of the crusades. It is evident that the two great forces of society—the sovereigns on the one hand, and the people on the other—no longer desired their continuance.

It has been often said that Europe was weary of these constant inroads upon Asia. We must come to an understanding as to the meaning of the word *weariness*, frequently used on such occasions. It is exceedingly incorrect. It is not true that generations of mankind can be weary of what has not been done by themselves; that they can be wearied by the fatigues of their fathers. Weariness is personal; it cannot be transmitted like an inheritance. The people of the thirteenth century were not weary of the crusades of the twelfth; they were influenced by a different cause. A great change had taken place in opinions, sentiments, and social relations. There were no longer the same wants, or the same desires: the people no longer believed, or wished to believe, in the same things. It is by these moral or political changes, and not by weariness, that the differences in the conduct of successive generations can be explained. The pretended weariness ascribed to them is a metaphor wholly destitute of truth.

Two great causes, the one moral, the other social, impelled Europe into the crusades.

The *moral* cause, as you are aware, was the impulse of religious feeling and belief. From the end of the seventh century, Christianity maintained a constant struggle against Mohammedanism. It had overcome Mohammedanism in Europe, after having been threatened with great danger from it; and

had succeeded in confining it to Spain. Even from thence the expulsion of Mohammedanism was constantly attempted The crusades have been represented as a sort of accident, an unforeseen event, sprung from the recitals of pilgrims returned from Jerusalem, and the preaching of Peter the Hermit They were nothing of the kind. The crusades were the continuation, the height of the great struggle which had subsisted for four centuries between Christianity and Mohammedanism. The theatre of this contest had hitherto been in Europe; it was now transported into Asia. If I had attached any value to those comparisons, those parallels, into which historical facts are sometimes made willing or unwillingly to enter, I might show you Christianity running exactly the same course, and undergoing the same destiny in Asia, as Mohammedanism in Europe. Mohammedanism established itself in Spain, where it conquered, founded a kingdom and various principalities. The Christians did the same thing in Asia. They were there in regard to the Mohammedans, in the same situation as the Mohammedans in Spain with regard to the Christians. The kingdom of Jerusalem corresponds with the kingdom of Granada: but these similitudes, after all, are of little importance. The great fact was the struggle between the two religious and social systems: the crusades were its principal crisis. This is their historical character; the chain which connects them with the general course of events.

Another cause, the *social* state of Europe in the eleventh century, equally contributed to the breaking out of the crusades. I have been careful to explain why, from the fifth to the eleventh century, there was no such thing as generality in Europe; I have endeavored to show how every thing had assumed a local character; how states, existing institutions, and opinions, were confined within very narrow bounds: it was then that the feudal system prevailed. After the lapse of some time, such a narrow horizon was no longer sufficient; human thought and activity aspired to pass beyond the narrow sphere in which they were confined. The people no longer led their former wandering life, but had not lost the taste for its movement and its adventures; they threw themselves into the crusades as into a new state of existence, in which they were more at large, and enjoyed more variety; which reminded them of the freedom of former barbarism, while it opened boundless prospects of futurity

These were, in my opinion, the two determining causes of the crusades in the twelfth century. At the end of the thirteenth, neither of these causes continued to exist. Mankind and society were so greatly changed, that neither the moral nor the social incitements which had impelled Europe upon Asia were felt any longer. I do not know whether many of you have read the original historians of the crusades, or have ever thought of comparing the contemporary chroniclers of the first crusades with those of the end of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; for example, Albert de Aix, Robert the Monk, and Raynard d'Argile, who were engaged in the first crusade with William of Tyre and Jacques de Vitry. When we compare these two classes of writers, it is impossible not to be struck with the distance between them. The first are animated chroniclers, whose imagination is excited, and who relate the events of the crusade with passion: but they are narrow-minded in the extreme, without an idea beyond the little sphere in which they lived; ignorant of every science, full of prejudices, incapable of forming an opinion on what was passing around them, or the events which were the subject of their narratives. But open, on the other hand, the history of the crusades by William of Tyre, and you will be surprised to find almost a modern historian; a cultivated, enlarged, and liberal mind, great political intelligence, general views and opinions upon causes and effects. Jacques de Vitry is an example of another species of cultivation; he is a man of learning, who does not confine himself to what immediately concerns the crusades, but describes the state of manners, the geography, the religion, and natural history of the country to which his history relates. There is, in short, an immense distance between the historians of the first and of the last crusades; a distance which manifests an actual revolution in the state of the human mind.

This revolution is most conspicuous in the manner in which these two classes of writers speak of the Mohammedans. For the first chroniclers,—and consequently for the first crusaders, of whose sentiments the first chroniclers are merely the organs,—the Mohammedans are only an object of hatred; it is clear that those who speak of them do not know them, form no judgment respecting them, nor consider them under any point of view but that of the religious hostility which exists between them. No vestige of social relation is discoverable between them and the Mohammedans: they detest them, and

fight with them; and nothing more. William of Tyre, Jacques de Vitry, Bernard le Trésorier, speak of the Mussulmans quite differently. We see that, even while fighting with them, they no longer regard them as monsters; that they have entered to a certain extent into their ideas, that they have lived with them, and that certain social relations, and even a sort of sympathy, have arisen between them. William of Tyre pronounces a glowing eulogium on Noureddin and Bernard le Trésorier on Saladin. They sometimes even go the length of placing the manners and conduct of the Mussulmans in opposition to those of the Christians; they adopt the manners and sentiments of the Mussulmans in order to satirise the Christians, in the same manner as Tacitus delineated the manners of the Germans in contrast with those of Rome. You see, then, what an immense change must have taken place between these two periods, since you find in the latter, in regard to the very enemies of the Christians, the very people against whom the crusades were directed, an impartiality of judgment which would have filled the first crusaders with surprise and horror.

The principal effect, then, of the crusades was a great step towards the emancipation of the mind, a great progress towards enlarged and liberal ideas. Though begun under the name and influence of religious belief, the crusades deprived religious ideas, I shall not say of their legitimate share of influence, but of their exclusive and despotic possession of the human mind. This result, though undoubtedly unforeseen, arose from various causes. The first was evidently the novelty, extent, and variety of the scene which displayed itself to the crusaders; what generally happens to travellers happened to them. It is mere common-place to say, that travelling gives freedom to the mind; that the habit of observing different nations, different manners, and different opinions, enlarges the ideas, and disengages the judgment from old prejudices The same thing happened to those nations of travellers who have been called the crusaders; their minds were opened and raised by having seen a multitude of different things, by having become acquainted with other manners than their own. They found themselves also placed in connexion with two states of civilization, not only different from their own, but more advanced—the Greek state of society on the one hand, and the Mussulman on the other. There is no doubt that the

society of the Greeks, though enervated, perverted, and decaying, gave the crusaders the impression of something more advanced, polished, and enlightened than their own. The society of the Mussulmans presented them a scene of the same kind. It is curious to observe in the chronicles the impression made by the crusaders on the Mussulmans, who regarded them at first as the most brutal, ferocious, and stupid barbarians they had ever seen. The crusaders, on their part, were struck with the riches and elegance of manners which they observed among the Mussulmans. These first impressions were succeeded by frequent relations between the Mussulmans and Christians. These became more extensive and important than is commonly believed. Not only had the Christians of the East habitual relations with the Mussulmans, but the people of the East and the West became acquainted with, visited, and mingled with each other. It is but lately that one of those learned men who do honor to France in the eyes of Europe, M. Abel Rémusat, has discovered the relations which subsisted between the Mongol emperors and the Christian kings. Mongol ambassadors were sent to the kings of the Franks, and to St. Louis among others, in order to persuade them to enter into alliance, and to resume the crusades for the common interest of the Mongols and the Christians against the Turks. And not only were diplomatic and official relations thus established between the sovereigns, but there was much and various intercourse between the nations of the East and West. I shall quote the words of M. Abel Rémusat:* —

"Many men of religious orders, Italians, French, and Flemings, were charged with diplomatic missions to the court of the Great Khan. Mongols of distinction came to Rome, Barcelona, Valentia, Lyons, Paris, London, and Northampton; and a Franciscan of the kingdom of Naples was archbishop of Pekin. His successor was a professor of theology in the university of Paris. But how many other people followed in the train of those personages, either as slaves, or attracted by the desire of profit, or led by curiosity into regions hitherto unknown! Chance has preserved the names of some of these; the first envoy who visited the king of Hungary on the part of the Tartars was an Englishman, who had been banished from his country for certain crimes, and who, after having wandered over Asia, at last entered into the service of the Mongols. A Flemish Cordelier, in the heart of Tartary, fell in with a woman

* Memoires sur les Relations Politiques des Princes Chrétiens avec les Empereurs Mongols. Deuxième Mémoire, p. 154, 157.

of Metz called *Paquette*, who had been carried off into Hungary a Parisian goldsmith, and a young man from the neighborhood of Rouen, who had been at the taking of Belgrade. In the same country he fell in also with Russians, Hungarians, and Flemings. A singer, called *Robert*, after having travelled through Eastern Asia, returned to end his days in the cathedral of Chartres. A Tartar was a furnisher of helmets in the armies of Philip the Fair. Jean de Plancarpin fell in, near Gayeux, with a Russian gentleman whom he calls *Temer*, and who acted as an interpreter; and many merchants of Breslaw, Poland, and Austria, accompanied him in his journey into Tartary. Others returned with him through Russia; they were Genoese, Pisans, and Venetians. Two Venetians, merchants, whom chance had brought to Bokhara, followed a Mongol ambassador, sent by Houlagou to Khoubilai. They remained many years in China and Tartary, returned with letters from the Great Khan to the Pope, and afterwards went back to the Khan, taking with them the son of one of their number, the celebrated Marco Polo, and once more left the court of Khoubilai to return to Venice. Travels of this nature were not less frequent in the following century. Of this number are those of John Mandeville, an English physician; Oderic de Frioul, Pegoletti, Guillaume de Bouldeselle, and several others. It may well be supposed, that those travels of which the memory is preserved, form but a small part of those which were undertaken, and there were in those days many more people who were able to perform those long journeys than to write accounts of them. Many of those adventurers must have remained and died in the countries they went to visit. Others returned home, as obscure as before, but having their imagination full of the things they had seen, relating them to their families, with much exaggeration no doubt, but leaving behind them, among many ridiculous fables, useful recollections and traditions capable of bearing fruit. Thus, in Germany, Italy, and France, in the monasteries, among the nobility, and even down to the lowest classes of society, there were deposited many precious seeds destined to bud at a somewhat later period. All these unknown travellers, carrying the arts of their own country into distant regions, brought back other pieces of knowledge not less precious, and, without being aware of it, made exchanges more advantageous than those of commerce. By these means, not only the traffic in the silks, porcelain, and other commodities of Hindostan, became more extensive and practicable, and new paths were opened to commercial industry and enterprise; but, what was more valuable still, foreign manners, unknown nations, extraordinary productions, presented themselves in abundance to the minds of the Europeans, which, since the fall of the Roman empire, had been confined within too narrow a circle. Men began to attach some importance to the most beautiful, the most populous, and the most anciently civilized, of the four quarters of the world. They began to study the arts, the religions, the languages, of the nations by whom it was

inhabited; and there was even an intention of establishing a professorship of the Tartar language in the university of Paris. The accounts of travellers, strange and exaggerated, indeed, but soon discussed and cleared up, diffused more correct and varied notions of those distant regions. The world seemed to open, as it were, towards the East; geography made an immense stride; and ardor for discovery became the new form assumed by European spirit of adventure. The idea of another hemisphere, when our own came to be better known, no longer seemed an improbable paradox; and it was when in search of the Zipangri of Marco Polo that Christopher Columbus discovered the New World."

You see, then, what a vast and unexplored world was laid open to the view of European intelligence by the consequences of the crusades. It cannot be doubted that the impulse which led to them was one of the most powerful causes of the development and freedom of mind which arose out of that great event.

There is another circumstance which is worthy of notice Down to the time of the crusades, the court of Rome, the centre of the Church, had been very little in communication with the laity, unless through the medium of ecclesiastics; either legates sent by the court of Rome, or the whole body of the bishops and clergy. There were always some laymen in direct relation with Rome; but upon the whole, it was by means of churchmen that Rome had any communication with the people of different countries. During the crusades, on the contrary, Rome became a halting-place for a great portion of the crusaders, either in going or returning. A multitude of laymen were spectators of its policy and its manners, and were able to discover the share which personal interest had in religious disputes. There is no doubt that this newly-acquired knowledge inspired many minds with a boldness hitherto unknown.

When we consider the state of the general mind at the termination of the crusades, especially in regard to ecclesiastical matters, we cannot fail to be struck with a singular fact: religious notions underwent no change, and were not replaced by contrary or even different opinions. Thought, notwithstanding, had become more free; religious creeds were not the only subject on which the human mind exercised its faculties; without abandoning them, it began occasionally to wander from them, and to take other directions. Thus, at the

end of the thirteenth century, the moral cause which had led to the crusades, or which, at least, had been their most energetic principle, had disappeared; the moral state of Europe had undergone an essential modification

The social state of society had undergone an analogous change. Many inquiries have been made as to the influence of the crusades in this respect; it has been shown in what manner they had reduced a great number of feudal proprietors to the necessity of selling their fiefs to the kings, or to sell their privileges to the communities, in order to raise money for the crusades.

It has been shown that, in consequence of their absence, many of the nobles lost a great portion of their power. Without entering into the details of this question, we may collect into a few general facts the influence of the crusades on the social state of Europe.

They greatly diminished the number of petty fiefs, petty domains, and petty proprietors; they concentrated property and power in a smaller number of hands. It is from the time of the crusades that we may observe the formation and growth of great fiefs—the existence of feudal power on a large scale.

I have often regretted that there was not a map of France divided into fiefs, as we have a map of France divided into departments, *arrondissements*, cantons and *communes*, in which all the fiefs were marked, with their boundaries, relations with each other, and successive changes. If we could have compared, by the help of such maps, the state of France before and after the crusades, we should have seen how many small fiefs had disappeared, and to what extent the greater ones had increased. This was one of the most important results of the crusades.

Even in those cases where small proprietors preserved their fiefs, they did not live upon them in such an insulated state as formerly. The possessors of great fiefs became so many centres around which the smaller ones were gathered, and near which they came to live. During the crusades, small proprietors found it necessary to place themselves in the train of some rich and powerful chief, from whom they received assistance and support. They lived with him, shared his fortune, and passed through the same adventures that he did. When the crusaders returned home, this social spirit, this habit of living in intercourse with superiors continued to

subsist, and had its influence on the manners of the age. As we see that the great fiefs were increased after the crusades, so we see, also, that the proprietors of these fiefs held, within their castles, a much more considerable court than before, and were surrounded by a greater number of gentlemen, who preserved their little domains, but no longer kept within them.

The extension of the great fiefs, and the creation of a number of central points in society, in place of the general dispersion which previously existed, were the two principal effects of the crusades, considered with respect to their influence upon feudalism.

As to the inhabitants of the towns, a result of the same nature may easily be perceived. The crusades created great civic communities. Petty commerce and petty industry were not sufficient to give rise to communities such as the great cities of Italy and Flanders. It was commerce on a great scale—maritime commerce, and, especially, the commerce of the East and West, which gave them birth; now it was the crusades which gave to maritime commerce the greatest impulse it had yet received.

On the whole, when we survey the state of society at the end of the crusades, we find that the movement tending to dissolution and dispersion, the movement of universal localization (if I may be allowed such an expression), had ceased, and had been succeeded by a movement in the contrary direction, a movement of centralization. All things tended to mutual approximation; small things were absorbed in great ones, or gathered round them. Such was the direction then taken by the progress of society.

You now understand why, at the end of the thirteenth and in the fourteenth century, neither nations nor sovereigns wished to have any more crusades. They neither needed nor desired them; they had been thrown into them by the impulses of religious spirit, and the exclusive dominion of religious ideas; but this dominion had now lost its energy. They had also sought in the crusades a new way of life, of a less confined and more varied description; but they began to find this in Europe itself, in the progress of the social relations. It was at this time that kings began to see the road to political aggrandizement. Why go to Asia in search of kindoms, when there were kingdoms to conquer at their very doors? Philip Augustus embarked in the crusade very unwillingly; and what

could be more natural? His desire was to make himself King of France. It was the same thing with the people. The road to wealth was open to them; and they gave up adventures for industry. Adventures were replaced, for sovereigns, by political projects; for the people, by industry on a large scale. One class only of society still had a taste for adventure; that portion of the feudal nobility, who, not being in a condition to think of political aggrandizement, and not being disposed to industry, retained their former situation and manners. This class, accordingly, continued to embark in crusades, and endeavored to renew them.

Such, in my opinion, are the real effects of the crusades; on the one hand the extension of ideas and the emancipation of thought: on the other, a general enlargement of the social sphere, and the opening of a wider field for every sort of activity: they produced, at the same time, more individual freedom and more political unity. They tended to the independence of man and the centralization of society. Many inquiries have been made respecting the means of civilization which were directly imported from the East. It has been said that the largest part of the great discoveries which, in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, contributed to the progress of European civilization—such as the compass, printing, and gunpowder—were known in the East, and that the crusaders brought them into Europe. This is true to a certain extent; though some of these assertions may be disputed. But what cannot be disputed is this influence, this general effect of the crusades upon the human mind on the one hand, and the state of society on the other. They drew society out of a very narrow road, to throw it into new and infinitely broader paths; they began that transformation of the various elements of European society into governments and nations, which is the characteristic of modern civilization. The same period witnessed the development of one of those institutions which has most powerfully contributed to this great result—monarchy; the history of which, from the birth of the modern states of Europe to the thirteenth century, will form the subject of our next lecture.[20]

[20] On the subject of this lecture, see Mill's History of the Crusades. Gibbon and Robertson may also be consulted. The best works in German are Frederick Wilken's *Geschichte der Kreutzüge* and Heeren's *Versuch einer Entwickelung der Folgen der Kreutzüge für Europa*. In French, Michaud's *Histoire des Croisades*

The following chronological table may serve to put before the student's eye a connected outline of the principal facts. Eight crusades are enumerated.

First Crusade.—A. D. 1096–1100. Urban II. Pope.

A. D.

1094. Peter the Hermit returned from a pilgrimage—by direction of the Pope, preaches throughout Europe.

1095. Council of Clermont in France. (A previous council had been held at Placenza.) Attended by the Pope and an immense concourse of clergy and nobles. The crusade proclaimed—great privileges, civil and ecclesiastical, granted to all who should "assume the cross"—a year allowed to prepare. Peter the Hermit, not waiting, sets out at the head of a vast rabble of undisciplined fanatics and marauders, who perish by disease, famine, and the sword, in Asia Minor.

1096. An army of 100,000 mounted and mailed warriors, 600,000 men capable of bearing arms, and a multitude of monks, women, and children, depart from Europe and assemble on the plains of Bythinia, east of Constantinople. Principal leaders of the expedition, Godfrey of Boulougne, with his brothers Baldwin and Eustace; Robert II. duke of Normandy; Robert II. count of Flanders; Raymond of Toulouse; Hugh of Vermandois; Stephen de Blois; Bohemond, Prince of Tarento, with his nephew Tancred.

1097. Nice taken by the crusaders.

1098. Antioch and Edessa taken.

1099. Jerusalem taken—a Christian kingdom, on feudal principles, established—the crown conferred on Godfrey of Boulougne.

Interval between the First and Second Crusades.—1100–1147.

Baldwin I. succeeds his brother Godfrey as king of Jerusalem. A new army of crusaders destroyed by the Saracens in Asia Minor, and the remnant of the first army cut to pieces at Rama. St. Jean d'Acre, (Ptolemais,) Berytus, and Sidon, taken by Baldwin II., successor of Baldwin I. The Christian army unsuccessful—Edessa taken by the Turks in 1144—continued ill success of the Christians leads to a new crusade.

Second Crusade.—1147–1149. Eugene III. Pope.

Leaders of this expedition, Conrad III. emperor of Germany, and Louis VII. king of France, who set out separately on their march. Both armies destroyed in Asia Minor by famine and the sword.—The fugitives assemble at Jerusalem. Conrad, Louis, and Baldwin IV. king of Jerusalem, lay siege to Damascus—the enterprise fails through the quarrels of the princes—Conrad and Louis return to Europe.

Interval between the Second and Third Crusades.—1149–1189.

Saladin takes possession of Egypt and founds a dynasty in 1175.

Makes war upon the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem; defeats Guy of Lusignan at the battle of Tiberias; Guy taken prisoner; St. Jean d'Acre and Jerusalem taken. Conrad of Montferrat lays claim to the crown of Jerusalem, and rallies the remains of the Christian forces at Tyre.

Third Crusade.—1189–1193. Clement III. Pope.

Leaders, Frederick I., (Barbarossa,) emperor of Germany, Philip Augustus, king of France, and Richard I. of England.

Frederick departs first with an army of 100,000 men, which is entirely destroyed in Asia Minor. The emperor himself dies in Cilicia 1190. His son Frederick of Suabia afterwards killed at St. Jean d'Acre.

1190. The kings of France and England embark by sea, and pass the winter in Sicily; the armies embroiled by the artifices of Tancred, usurping king of Jerusalem, and by dissension between the kings.

1191. The armies of France and England, with the Christian princes of Syria, take St. Jean d'Acre. Philip Augustus returns to France, leaving a part of his army with Richard—who displays his bravery in some useless battles, but is unable to regain Jerusalem.

1192. Richard concludes a truce with Saladin and returns to Europe.

Third Interval.—1193–1202.

Saladin dies—his dominions divided among the princes of his family.

Fourth Crusade.—1202–1204. Innocent III. Pope.

Leaders, Baldwin IX. count of Flanders; Boniface II. marquis of Montferrat; Henry Dandolo, doge of Venice, etc. The *kings* of Europe could not be aroused to engage in this crusade, notwithstanding all the urgency of the Holy See. The chief command was conferred by the crusaders on Boniface of Montferrat. This expedition, however, never reached the Holy Land—but engaged in putting down a usurpation at Constantinople, which finally led to the taking and plundering of that city by the crusaders, and the division of the empire among the conquerors, of whom Baldwin was raised to the imperial dignity. The French empire of Constantinople was destroyed in 1261 by Michael Paleologus

Fourth Interval.—1204–1217.

Meantime the Christians in the East, though despoiled of most of their possessions, and weakened by divisions, bravely defended themselves against the sultans of Egypt. They continually invoked aid from Europe; but more powerful interests at home made the European princes regardless of their calls. Only those of more excited imaginations could be influenced. There was a crusade of children in 1212.

Fifth Crusade.—1217–1221. Honorius III. Pope.

Three kings, John de Brienne, titular king of Jerusalem, Andrew II. king of Hungary, and Hugh of Lusignan, king of Cyprus, united their forces at St. Jean d'Acre. The king of Hungary was soon recalled by troubles at home; Hugh of Lusignan died; and John de Brienne went to attack Egypt alone. He conquered Damietta, and would have obtained the restitution of Jerusalem but for the obstinacy of the Papal legate, who forbade any truce with the infidels. In 1221 the crusaders, after many reverses, submitted to an humiliating peace; and John of Brienne returning to Europe gave his daughter in marriage to Frederick II. emperor of Germany, who thereby became titular king of Jerusalem.

Fifth Interval.—1221–1228.

Nothing remarkable took place in Syria.

Sixth Crusade.—1228–1229. Gregory IX. Pope.

Leader, Frederick II. This emperor had taken the vows of the cross five years before, and though anathematized by the Pope, had failed to fulfil his engagement. At length he set out by invitation of the Sultan Maledin, who yielded Jerusalem to him by treaty without battle. Frederick was desirous to be crowned king of Jerusalem, but no bishop dared anoint an excommunicated prince. Threatened with the loss of his Italian dominions, he returned to Europe.

Sixth Interval.—1229–1248.

Anarchy throughout the East, both among the Christians and Mohammedans. Jerusalem, after being taken successively by several Saracen chiefs, fell into the hands of the Sultan of Egypt.

Seventh Crusade.—1248–1254. Innocent IV. Pope.

Leaders, St. Louis (IX.) and the French princes. The king of France engaged in this crusade in consequence of a vow made during a dangerous illness. Most of the princes of the blood and great vassals accompanied him. He turned his arms first against Egypt and took Damietta in 1250; but his army, surprised by a sudden rising of the Nile, and carried off in great numbers by pestilence, was surrounded by the Mussulmen, and Louis himself with 20,000 of his army was made prisoner. He obtained his liberty, however, by payment of a heavy ransom and the surrender of Damietta. He remained four years in Palestine, repairing the fortifications of the towns which yet remained in the hands of the Christians, (Ptolemais, Jaffa, Sidon, etc.,) and mediating between the Christian and Mohammedan princes.

Seventh Interval.—1254–1272.

The Mongols, who, under Gengis Khan, had before overrun the greatest part of Asia, now entered Syria under his son, having already destroyed the Califate of Bagdad in 1258. They were

driven from Syria by the sultan of Egypt, Bibars, by whom also Damascus, Tyre, Jaffa, and Antioch were seized.

Eighth Crusade.—1270. Clement IV. Pope.

Leaders, Louis IX.; Charles of Anjou; Edward, prince of England, afterwards Edward I. This expedition was first directed to the coast of Africa; Louis debarked before Tunis and laid siege to that city: but the army was cut down by the plague, to which Louis himself and one of his sons fell victims. Charles of Anjou his brother made peace with the Mohammedans and renounced the expedition to the Holy Land. This was the last crusade

End of the Christian power in Syria.—1270–1291.

There remained now but four places in the possession of the Christians on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean: Tripoli; Tyre; Berytus; and St. Jean d'Acre. These successively yielded to the Saracens, the last in 1291. The various orders of religious knights, sworn to the defence of the Holy Land, withdrew at first to the Island of Cyprus. In 1310, the Hospitallers established themselves at Rhodes; in 1312, the order of the Templars was abolished: in 1300, the Teutonic knights transferred the seat of their order to Courland, where they laid the foundation of a dominion which continued powerful for a long period.—See *Des Michels Hist. du Moyen Age.*

LECTURE IX

OF MONARCHY.

I ENDEAVORED, at our last meeting, to determine the essential and distinctive character of modern society as compared with the primitive state of society in Europe; and I believed I had found it in this fact, that all the elements of the social state, at first numerous and various, were reduced to two—the government on one hand, and the people on the other. Instead of finding, in the capacity of ruling forces and chief agents in history, the clergy, kings, citizens, husbandmen, and serfs, we now find in modern Europe, only two great objects which occupy the historical stage—the government and the nation.

If such is the fact to which European civilization has led, such, also, is the result to which our researches should conduct us. We must see the birth, the growth, the progressive establishment of this great result. We have entered upon the period to which we can trace its origin: it was, as you have seen, between the twelfth and the sixteenth centuries that those slow and hidden operations took place which brought society into this new form, this definite state. We have also considered the first great event which, in my opinion, evidently had a powerful effect in impelling Europe into this road; I mean the crusades.

About the same period, and almost at the very time when the crusades broke out, that institution began to increase, which has perhaps chiefly contributed to the formation of modern society, and to the fusion of all the social elements into two forces, the government and the people. This institution is monarchy.

It is evident that monarchy has played a vast part in the history of European civilization. Of this we may convince ourselves by a single glance. We see the development of

monarchy proceed, for a considerable time, at the same rate as that of society itself: they had a common progression. And not only had they a common progression, but with every step that society made towards its definitive and modern character, monarchy seemed to increase and prosper; so that when the work was consummated—when there remained, in the great states of Europe, little or no important and decisive influence but that of the government and the public—it was monarchy that became the government.

It was not only in France, where the fact is evident, that this happened, but in most of the countries of Europe. A little sooner or later, and under forms somewhat different, the history of society in England, Spain, and Germany, offers us the same result. In England, for example, it was under the Tudors that the old particular and local elements of English society were dissolved and mingled, and gave way to the system of public authorities; this, also, was the period when monarchy had the greatest influence. It was the same thing in Germany, Spain, and all the great European states.

If we leave Europe, and cast our eyes over the rest of the world, we shall be struck with an analogous fact. Everywhere we shall find monarchy holding a great place, and appearing as the most general and permanent, perhaps, of all institutions; as that which is the most difficult to preclude where it does not exist, and, where it does exist, the most difficult to extirpate. From time immemorial it has had possession of Asia. On the discovery of America, all the great states of that continent were found, with different combinations, under monarchical governments. When we penetrate into the interior of Africa, wherever we meet with nations of any extent, this is the government which prevails. And not only has monarchy penetrated everywhere, but it has accommodated itself to the most various situations, to civilization and barbarism: to the most peaceful manners, as in China, and to those in which a warlike spirit predominates. It has established itself not only in the midst of the system of *castes*, in countries whose social economy exhibits the most rigorous distinction of ranks, but also in the midst of a system of equality, in countries where society is most remote from every kind of legal and permanent classification. In some places despotic and oppressive; in others favorable to the progress of civilization and even of liberty; it is like a head that may be

placed on many different bodies, a fruit that may grow from many different buds.

In this fact we might discover many important and curious consequences. I shall take only two; the first is, that such a result cannot possibly be the offspring of mere chance, of force or usurpation only; that there must necessarily be, between the nature of monarchy considered as an institution, and the nature either of man as an individual or of human society, a strong and intimate analogy. Force, no doubt, has had its share, both in the origin and progress of the institution; but as often as you meet with a result like this, as often as you see a great event develop itself or recur during a long series of ages, and in the midst of so many different situations, never ascribe it to force. Force performs a great and daily part in human affairs; but it is not the principle which governs their movements: there is always, superior to force, and the part which it performs, a moral cause which governs the general course of events. Force, in the history of society, resembles the body in the history of man. The body assuredly holds a great place in the life of man, but is not the principle of life. Life circulates in it, but does not emanate from it. Such is also the case in human society; whatever part force may play in them, it does not govern them, or exercise a supreme control over their destinies; this is the province of reason, of the moral influences which are hidden under the accidents of force, and regulate the course of society. We may unhesitatingly declare that it was to a cause of this nature, and not to mere force, that monarchy was indebted for its success.

A second fact of almost equal importance is the flexibility of monarchy, and its faculty of modifying itself and adapting itself to a variety of different circumstances. Observe the contrast which it presents; its form reveals unity, permanence, simplicity. It does not exhibit that variety of combinations which are found in other institutions; yet it accommodates itself to the most dissimilar states of society. It becomes evident then that it is susceptible of great diversity, and capable of being attached to many different elements and principles both in man as an individual and in society.

It is because we have not considered monarchy in all its extent; because we have not, on the one hand, discovered

the principle which forms its essence and subsists under every circumstance to which it may be applied; and because, on the other hand, we have not taken into account all the variations to which it accommodates itself, and all the principles with which it can enter into alliance;—it is, I say, because we have not considered monarchy in this twofold, this enlarged point of view, that we have no thoroughly understood the part it has performed in the history of the world, and have often been mistaken as to its nature and effects.

This is the task which I should wish to undertake with you, so as to obtain a complete and precise view of the effects of this institution in modern Europe; whether they have flowed from its intrinsic principle, or from the modifications which it has undergone.

There is no doubt that the strength of monarchy, that moral power which is its true principle, does not reside in the personal will of the man who for the time happens to be king; there is no doubt that the people in accepting it as an institution, that philosophers in maintaining it as a system, have not meant to accept the empire of the will of an individual—a will essentially arbitrary, capricious, and ignorant.

Monarchy is something quite different from the will of an individual, though it presents itself under that form. It is the personification of legitimate sovereignty—of the collective will and aggregate wisdom of a people—of that will which is essentially reasonable, enlightened, just, impartial,—which knows naught of individual wills, though by the title of legitimate monarchy, earned by these conditions, it has the right to govern them. Such is the meaning of monarchy as understood by the people, and such is the motive of their adhesion to it.

Is it true that there is a legitimate sovereignty, a will which has a right to govern mankind? They certainly believe that there is; for they endeavor, have always endeavored, and cannot avoid endeavoring, to place themselves under its empire. Conceive, I shall not say a people, but the smallest community of men; conceive it in subjection to a sovereign who is such only *de facto*, to a power which has no other right but that of force, which does not govern by the title of reason and justice; human nature instantly revolts against a

sovereignty such as this. Human nature, therefore, must believe in legitimate sovereignty. It is this sovereignty alone, the sovereignty *de jure*, which man seeks for, and which alone he consents to obey. What is history but a demonstration of this universal fact? What are most of the struggles which harass the lives of nations but so many determined impulses towards this legitimate sovereignty, in order to place themselves under its empire? And it is not only the people, but philosophers, who firmly believe in its existence and incessantly seek it. What are all the systems of political philosophy but attempts to discern the legitimate sovereignty? What is the object of their investigations but to discover who has the right to govern society? Take theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; they all boast of having discovered the seat of legitimate sovereignty; they all promise to place society under the authority of its rightful master. This, I repeat, is the object of all the labor of philosophers, as well as of all the efforts of nations.

How can philosophers and nations do otherwise than believe in this legitimate sovereignty? How can they do otherwise than strive incessantly to discover it? Let us suppose the simplest case; for instance, some act to be performed, either affecting society in general, or some portion of its members, or even a single individual; it is evident that in such a case there must be some rule of action, some legitimate will to be followed and applied. Whether we enter into the most minute details of social life, or participate in its most momentous concerns, we shall always meet with a truth to be discovered, a law of reason to be applied to the realities of human affairs. It is this law which constitutes that legitimate sovereignty towards which both philosophers and nations have never ceased, and can never cease, to aspire.

But how far can legitimate sovereignty be represented, generally and permanently, by an earthly power, by a human will? Is there anything necessarily false and dangerous in such an assumption? What are we to think in particular of the personification of legitimate sovereignty under the image of royalty? On what conditions, and within what limits, is this personification admissible? These are great questions, which it is not my business now to discuss, but which I cannot avoid noticing, and on which I shall say a few words in passing

I affirm, and the plainest common sense must admit, that legitimate sovereignty, in its complete and permanent form, cannot belong to any one; and that every attribution of legitimate sovereignty to any human power whatever is radically false and dangerous. Thence arises the necessity of the limitation of every power, whatever may be its name or form; thence arises the radical illegitimacy of every sort of absolute power, whatever may be its origin, whether conquest, inheritance, or election. We may differ as to the best means of finding the legitimate sovereignty; they vary according to the diversities of place and time; but there is no place or time at which any power can legitimately be the independent possessor of this sovereignty.

This principle being laid down, it is equally certain that monarchy, under whatever system we consider it, presents itself as the personification of the legitimate sovereignty Listen to the supporters of theocracy; they will tell you that kings are the image of God upon earth, which means nothing more than that they are the personification of supreme justice, truth, and goodness. Turn to the jurists; they will tell you that the king is the living law; which means, again, that the king is the personification of the legitimate sovereignty, of that law of justice which is entitled to govern society. Interrogate monarchy itself in its pure and unmixed form; it will tell you that it is the personification of the state, of the commonwealth. In whatever combination, in whatever situation monarchy is considered, you will find that it is always held out as representing this legitimate sovereignty, this power, which alone is capable of lawfully governing society.

We need not be surprised at this. What are the characteristics of this legitimate sovereignty, and which are derived from its very nature? In the first place, it is single; since there is but one truth, one justice, so there can be but one legitimate sovereignty. It is, moreover, permanent, and always the same, for truth is unchangeable. It stands on a high vantage-ground, beyond the reach of the vicissitudes and chances of this world, with which it is only connected in the character, as it were, of a spectator and a judge. Well, then, these being the rational and natural characteristics of the legitimate sovereignty, it is monarchy which exhibits them under the most palpable form, and seems to be their most faithful image

Consult the work in which M. Benjamin Constant has so ingeniously represented monarchy, as a neutral and moderating power, raised far above the struggles and casualties of society and never interfering but in great and critical conjunctures Is not this, so to speak, the attitude of the legitimate sovereignty, in the government of human affairs? There must be something in this idea peculiarly calculated to strike the mind, for it has passed, with singular rapidity, from books into the actual conduct of affairs. A sovereign has made it, in the constitution of Brazil, the very basis of his throne. In that constitution, monarchy is represented as a moderating power, elevated above the active powers of the state, like their spectator and their judge.

Under whatever point of view you consider monarchy, when you compare it with the legitimate sovereignty, you will find a great outward resemblance between them—a resemblance with which the human mind must necessarily have been struck. Whenever the reflection or the imagination of men has especially turned towards the contemplation or study of legitimate sovereignty, and of its essential qualities, it has inclined towards monarchy. Thus in the times when religious ideas preponderated, the habitual contemplation of the nature of God impelled mankind towards the monarchical system. In the same manner, when the influence of jurists prevailed in society, the habit of studying, under the name of law, the nature of the legitimate sovereignty, was favorable to the dogma of its personification in the institution of monarchy. The attentive application of the human mind to the contemplation of the nature and qualities of the legitimate sovereignty, when there were no other causes to destroy its effect, has always given strength and consideration to monarchy, as being its image

There are, too, certain junctures, which are particularly favorable to this personification; such, for example, as when individual forces display themselves in the world with all their uncertainties; all their waywardness; when selfishness predominates in individuals, either through ignorance and brutality, or through corruption. At such times, society, distracted by the conflict of individual wills, and unable to attain, by their free concurrence, to a general will, which might hold them in subjection, feels an ardent desire for a sovereign power, to which all individuals must submit; and, as soon as any institution presents itself which bears any of the characteris

ties of legitimate sovereignty, society rallies round it with eagerness; as people, under proscription, take refuge in the sanctuary of a church. This is what has taken place in the wild and disorderly youth of nations, such as those we have passed through. Monarchy is wonderfully suited to those times of strong and fruitful anarchy, if I may so speak, in which society is striving to form and regulate itself, but is unable to do so by the free concurrence of individual wills There are other times when monarchy, though from a contrary cause, has the same merit. Why did the Roman world, so near dissolution at the end of the republic, still subsist for more than fifteen centuries, under the name of an empire, which, after all, was nothing but a lingering decay, a protracted death-struggle? Monarchy, alone, could produce such an effect; monarchy, alone, could maintain a state of society which the spirit of selfishness incessantly tended to destroy. The imperial power contended for fifteen centuries against the ruin of the Roman world.

It thus appears that there are times when monarchy, alone, can retard the dissolution, and times when it, alone, can accelerate the formation of society. And it is, in both cases because it represents, more clearly than any other form of government can do, the legitimate sovereignty, that it exercises this power over the course of events.

Under whatever point of view you consider this institution, and at whatever period you take it, you will find, therefore, that its essential character, its moral principle, its true meaning, the cause of its strength, is, its being the image, the personification, the presumed interpreter, of that single, superior, and essentially legitimate will, which alone has a right to govern society.

Let us now consider monarchy under the second point of view, that is to say, in its flexibility, the variety of parts it has performed and of effects it has produced. Let us endeavor to account for this character, and ascertain its causes.

Here we have an advantage; we can at once return to history, and to the history of our own country. By a concurrence of singular circumstances, monarchy in modern Europe has but one very character which it has ever exhibited in the history of the world. European monarchy has been, in some

sort, the result of all the possible kinds of monarchy. In running over its history, from the fifth to the twelfth century, you will see the variety of aspects under which it appears, and the extent to which we everywhere find that variety, complication, and contention, which characterize the whole course of European civilization.

In the fifth century, at the time of the great invasion of the Germans, two monarchies were in existence—the barbarian monarchy of Clovis, and the imperial monarchy of Constantine. They were very different from each other in principles and effects.

The barbarian monarchy was essentially elective. The German kings were elected, though their election did not take place in the form to which we are accustomed to attach that idea. They were military chiefs, whose power was freely accepted by a great number of their companions, by whom they were obeyed as being the bravest and most competent to rule. Election was the true source of this barbarian monarchy, its primitive and essential character.

It is true that this character, in the fifth century, was already somewhat modified, and that different elements were introduced into monarchy. Different tribes had possessed their chiefs for a certain space of time; families had arisen, more considerable and wealthier than the rest. This produced the beginning of hereditary succession; the chief being almost always chosen from these families. This was the first principle of a different nature which became associated with the leading principle of election.

Another element had already entered into the institution of barbarian monarchy—I mean the element of religion. We find among some of the barbarian tribes—the Goths, for example—the conviction that the families of their kings were descended from the families of their gods or of their deified heroes, such as Odin. This, too, was the case with Homer's monarchs, who were the issue of gods or demi-gods, and, by this title, objects of religious veneration, notwithstanding the limited extent of their power.

Such was the barbarian monarchy of the fifth century, whose primitive principle still predominated, though it had itself grown diversified and wavering.

I now take the monarchy of the Roman empire, the principle of which was totally different It was the personification of the state, the heir of the sovereignty and majesty of the Roman people. Consider the monarchy of Augustus or Tiberius: the emperor was the representative of the senate; the assemblies of the people, the whole republic.

Was not this evident from the modest language of the first emperors—of such of them, at least, as were men of sense and understood their situation? They felt that they stood in the presence of the people, who themselves had lately possessed the sovereign power, which they had abdicated in their favor; and addressed the people as their representatives and ministers. But in reality they exercised all the power of the people, and that, too, in its most exaggerated and fearful form. Such a transformation it is easy for us to comprehend; we have witnessed it ourselves; we have seen the sovereignty transferred from the people to the person of a single individual; this was the history of Napoleon. He also was a personification of the sovereignty of the people; and constantly expressed himself to that effect. "Who has been elected," he said, "like me, by eighteen millions of men? who is, like me, the representative of the people?" and when, upon his coins, we read on one side *Republique Française*, and on the other *Napoléon Empereur*, what is this but an example of the fact which I am describing, of the people having become the monarch?

Such was the fundamental character of the imperial monarchy; it preserved this character during the three first centuries of the empire; and it was, indeed, only under Diocletian that it assumed its complete and definitive form. It was then, however, on the eve of undergoing a great change; a new kind of monarchy was about to appear. During three centuries Christianity had been endeavoring to introduce into the empire the element of religion. It was under Constantine that Christianity succeeded, not in making religion the prevailing element, but in giving it a prominent part to perform. Monarchy here presents itself under a different aspect; it is not of earthly origin: the prince is not the representative of the sovereignty of the public; he is the image, the representative, the delegate of God. Power descends to him from on high while, in the imperial monarchy, power had ascended from below. These were totally different situations.

with totally different results. The rights of freedom and political securities are difficult to combine with the principle of religious monarchy; but the principle itself is high, moral, and salutary. I shall show you the idea which was formed of the prince, in the seventh century, under the system of religious monarchy. I take it from the canons of the Council of Toledo.

"The king is called *rex* because he governs with justice If he acts justly (*recté*) he has a legitimate title to the name of king; if he acts unjustly, he loses all claim to it. Our fathers, therefore, said with reason, *rex ejus eris si recta facis; si autem non facis, non eris.* The two principal virtues of a king are justice and truth, (the science of truth, reason.)

"The depositary of the royal power, no less than the whole body of the people, is bound to respect the laws. While we obey the will of heaven, we make for ourselves, as well as our subjects, wise laws, obedience to which is obligatory on ourselves and our successors, as well as upon all the population of our kingdom. * * * * * *

"God, the creator of all things, in constructing the human body, has raised the head aloft, and has willed that from it should proceed the nerves of all the members, and he has placed in the head the torches of the eyes, in order to throw light upon every dangerous object. In like manner he has established the power of intelligence, giving it the charge of governing all the members, and of prudently regulating their action. * * * * * * * * *

"It is necessary then to regulate, first of all, those things which relate to princes, to provide for their safety, and protect their life, and then those things which concern the people, in such a manner, that in properly securing the safety of kings, that of the people may be, at the same time, and so much the more effectually, secured."*

But, in the system of religious monarchy, there is almost always another element introduced besides monarchy itself A new power takes its place by its side; a power nearer to God, the source whence monarchy emanates, than monarchy itself. This is the clergy, the ecclesiastical power which interposes between God and kings, and between kings and people, in such sort, that monarchy, though the image of the Divinity, runs the hazard of falling to the rank of an instru

* Forum judicum, tit. i. l. 2; tit. i. l. 2, l. 4.

ment in the hands of the human interpreters of the Divine will. This is a new cause of diversity in the destinies and effects of the institution.

The different kinds of monarchy, then, which, in the fifth century, made their appearance on the ruins of the Roman empire, were, the barbarian monarchy, the imperial monarchy, and religious monarchy in its infancy. Their fortunes were as different as their principles.

In France, under the first race, barbarian monarchy prevailed. There were, indeed, some attempts on the part of the clergy to impress upon it the imperial or religious character; but the system of election, in the royal family, with some mixture of inheritance and of religious notions, remained predominant.

In Italy, among the Ostrogoths, the imperial monarchy overcame the barbarous customs. Theodoric considered himself as successor of the emperors. It is sufficient to read Cassiodorus to perceive that this was the character of his government.

In Spain, monarchy appeared more religious than elsewhere. As the councils of Toledo, though I shall not call them absolute, were the influencing power, the religious character predominated, if not in the government, properly so called, of the Visigothic kings, at least in the laws which the clergy suggested to them, and the language they made them speak.

In England, among the Saxons, manners remained almost wholly barbarous. The kingdoms of the heptarchy were little else than the territories of different bands, every one having its chief. Military election appears more evidently among them than anywhere else. The Anglo-Saxon monarchy is the most faithful type of the barbarian monarchy.

Thus, from the fifth to the seventh century, at the same time that all these three sorts of monarchy manifested themselves in general facts, one or other of them prevailed, according to circumstances, in the different states of Europe.

Such was the prevailing confusion at this period, that nothing of a general or permanent nature could be established: and, from vicissitude to vicissitude, we arrive at the eighth century without finding that monarchy has anywhere assumed a definitive character.

Towards the middle of the eighth century, and with the triumph of the second race of the Frank kings, events assume a more general character, and become clearer; as they were transacted on a larger scale, they can be better understood and have more evident results. The different kinds of monarchy were shortly destined to succeed and combine with one another in a very striking manner.

At the time when the Carlovingians replaced the Merovingians, we perceive a return of the barbarian monarchy. Election re-appeared; Pepin got himself elected at Soissons. When the first Carlovingians gave kingdoms to their sons, they took care that they should be acknowledged by the chief men of the states assigned to them. When they divided a kingdom, they desired that the partition should be sanctioned in the national assemblies. In short, the elective principle, under the form of popular acceptance, again assumed a certain reality. You remember that this change of dynasty was like a new inroad of the Germans into the west of Europe, and brought back some shadow of their ancient institutions and manners.

At the same time, we see the religious principle more clearly introducing itself into monarchy, and performing a part of greater importance. Pepin was acknowledged and consecrated by the pope. He felt that he stood in need of the sanction of religion; it was already become a great power, and he sought its assistance. Charlemagne adopted the same policy; and religious monarchy thus developed itself. Still, however, under Charlemagne, religion was not the prevailing character of his government; the imperial system of monarchy was that which he wished to revive. Although he allied himself closely with the clergy, he made use of them, and was not their instrument. The idea of a great state, of a great political combination,—the resurrection, in short, of the Roman empire, was the favorite day-dream of Charlemagne.

He died, and was succeeded by Louis le Debonnaire. Everybody knows the character to which the royal power was then, for a short time, reduced. The king fell into the hands of the clergy, who censured, deposed, re-instated, and governed him; a monarchy subordinate to religious authority seemed on the point of being established.

Thus, from the middle of the eighth to the middle of the ninth century, the diversity of the three kinds of monarchy

became manifested by events important, closely connected and clear.

After the death of Louis le Debonnaire, during the state of disorder into which Europe fell, the three kinds of monarchy almost equally disappeared: everything became confounded. At the end of a certain time, when the feudal system had prevailed, a fourth kind of monarchy presented itself, differing from all those which had been hitherto observed: this was feudal monarchy. It is confused in its nature, and cannot easily be defined. It has been said that the king, in the feudal system of government, was the *suzerain* over *suzerains*, the lord over lords; that he was connected by firm links, from degree to degree, with the whole frame of society; and that, in calling around him his own vassals, then the vassals of his vassals, and so on in gradation, he exercised his authority over the whole mass of the people, and showed himself to be really a king. I do not deny that this is the theory of feudal monarchy: but it is a mere theory, which has never governed facts. This pretended influence of the king by means of a hierarchical organization, these links which are supposed to have united monarchy to the whole body of feudal society, are the dreams of speculative politicians. In fact, the greatest part of the feudal chieftains at that period were completely independent of the monarchy; many of them hardly knew it even by name, and had few or no relations with it: every kind of sovereignty was local and independent. The name of king, borne by one of these feudal chiefs, does not so much express a fact as a remembrance.

Such is the state in which monarchy presents itself in the course of the tenth and eleventh centuries.

In the twelfth, at the accession of Louis le Gros, things began to change their aspect.[2] The king was more frequently spoken of; his influence penetrated into places which it had not previously reached; he assumed a more active part in society. If we inquire into this title, we recognise none of those titles of which monarchy had previously been accustomed to avail itself. It was not by inheritance from the emperors, or by the title of imperial monarchy, that this institution aggrandized itself, and assumed more consistency

[2] Louis the Fat came to the throne 1108.

Neither was it in virtue of election, or as being an emanation from divine power: every appearance of election had vanished, the principle of inheritance definitively prevailed; and notwithstanding the sanction given by religion to the accession of kings, the minds of men did not appear to be at all occupied with the religious character of the monarchy of Louis le Gros. A new element, a character hitherto unknown, was introduced into monarchy; a new species of monarchy began to exist.

Society, I need hardly repeat, was at this period in very great disorder, and subject to constant scenes of violence. Society, in itself, was destitute of means to struggle against this situation, and to recover some degree of order and unity. The feudal institutions,—those parliaments of barons, those seignorial courts,—all those forms under which, in modern times, feudalism has been represented as a systematic and orderly state of government,—all these things were unreal and powerless; there was nothing in them which could afford the means of establishing any degree of order or justice; so that, in the midst of social anarchy, no one knew to whom recourse could be had, in order to redress a great injustice, remedy a great evil, to constitute something like a state. The name of king remained, and was borne by some chief whose authority was acknowledged by a few others. The different titles, however, under which the royal power had been formerly exercised, though they had no great influence, yet were far from being forgotten, and were recalled on various occasions. It happened that, in order to re-establish some degree of order in a place near the king's residence, or to terminate some difference which had lasted a long time, recourse was had to him; he was called upon to intervene in affairs which were not directly his own; and he intervened as a protector of public order, as arbitrator, as redresser of wrongs. The moral authority which continued to be attached to his name gained for him, by little and little, this great accession of power.

Such was the character which monarchy began to assume under Louis le Gros, and under the administration of Suger. Now, for the first time, seems to have entered the minds of men the idea, though very incomplete, confused, and feeble, of a public power, unconnected with the local powers which had possession of society, called upon to render justice to

those who could not obtain it by ordinary means, and capable of producing, or at least commanding, order;—the idea of a great magistracy, whose essential character was to maintain or re-establish the peace of society, to protect the weak, and to decide differences which could not be otherwise settled. Such was the entirely new character, in which, reckoning from the twelfth century, monarchy appeared in Europe, and especially in France. It was neither as barbarian monarchy, as religious monarchy, nor as imperial monarchy, that the royal power was exercised; this kind of monarchy possessed only a limited, incomplete, and fortuitous power;—a power which I cannot more precisely describe than by saying that it was, in some sort, that of the chief conservator of the public peace.

This is the true origin of modern monarchy; this is its vital principle, if I may so speak; it is this which has been developed in the course of its career, and, I have no hesitation in saying, has ensured its success. At different periods of history we observe the re-appearance of the various characters of monarchy; we see the different kinds of monarchy which I have described, endeavoring, by turns, to recover the preponderance. Thus, the clergy have always preached religious monarchy; the civilians have labored to revive the principle of imperial monarchy; the nobility would sometimes have wished to renew elective monarchy, or maintain feudal monarchy. And not only have the clergy, the civilians, and the nobility, attempted to give such or such a character a predominance in the monarchy, but monarchy itself has made them all contribute towards the aggrandizement of its own power. Kings have represented themselves sometimes as the delegates of God, sometimes as the heirs of the emperors, or as the first noblemen of the land, according to the occasion or public wish of the moment; they have illegitimately availed themselves of these various titles, but none of them has been the real title of modern monarchy, or the source of its preponderating influence. It is, I repeat, as depositary and protector of public order, of general justice, and of the common interest,—it is under the aspect of a chief magistracy, the centre and bond of society, that modern monarchy has presented itself to the people, and, in obtaining their adhesion, has made their strength its own.

You will see, as we proceed, this characteristic of the

monarchy of modern Europe, which began, I repeat, in the twelfth century, and in the reign of Louis le Gros, confirm and develop itself, and become at length, if I may so speak, the political physiognomy of the institution. It is by this that monarchy has contributed to the great result which now characterizes European society, the reduction of all the social elements to two—the government and the nation.

Thus it appears, that, at the breaking out of the crusades, Europe entered upon the path which was to conduct her to her present state: you have just seen monarchy assume the important part which it was destined to perform in this great transformation. We shall consider, at our next meeting, the different attempts at political organization, made from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, in order to maintain, by regulating it, the order of things that was about to perish. We shall consider the efforts of feudalism, of the Church, and even of the free cities, to constitute society according to its ancient principles, and under its primitive forms, and thus to defend themselves against the general change which was preparing

LECTURE X

VARIOUS ATTEMPTS TO FORM THE SEVERAL SOCIAL ELEMENTS INTO ONE SOCIETY.

At the commencement of this lecture I wish, at once, to determine its object with precision. It will be recollected, that one of the first facts that struck us, was the diversity, the separation, the independence, of the elements of ancient European society. The feudal nobility, the clergy, and the commons, had each a position, laws, and manners, entirely different; they formed so many distinct societies whose mode of government was independent of each other. They were in some measure connected, and in contact, but no real union existed between them; to speak correctly, they did not form a nation—a state.

The fusion of these distinct portions of society into one is, at length, accomplished; this is precisely the distinctive organization, the essential characteristic of modern society. The ancient social elements are now reduced to two—the government and the people; that is to say, diversity ceased and similitude introduced union. Before, however, this result took place, and even with a view to its prevention, many attempts were made to bring all these separate portions of society together, without destroying their diversity and independence. No positive attack was made on the peculiar position and privileges of each portion, on their distinctive nature, and yet there was an attempt made to form them into one state, one national body, to bring them all under one and the same government.

All these attempts failed. The result which I have noticed above, the union of modern society, attests their want of success. Even in those parts of Europe where some traces of the ancient diversity of the social elements are still to be met with, in Germany, for instance, where a real feudal nobility and a distinct body of burghers still exist; in England, where we see an established Church enjoying its own revenues and

its own peculiar jurisdiction; it is clear that this pretended distinct existence is a shadow, a falsehood: that these special societies are confounded in general society, absorbed in the state, governed by the public authorities, controlled by the same system of polity, carried away by the same current of ideas, the same manners. Again I assert, that even where the form still exists, the separation and independence of the ancient social elements have no longer any reality.

At the same time, these attempts at rendering the ancient and social elements co-ordinate, without changing their nature, at forming them into national unity without annihilating their variety, are entitled to an important place in the history of Europe. The period which now engages our attention—that period which separates ancient from modern Europe, and in which was accomplished the metamorphosis of European society—is almost entirely filled with them. Not only do they form a principal part of the history of this period, but they had a considerable influence on after events, on the manner in which was effected the reduction of the various social elements to two—the government and the people. It is clearly, then, of great importance, that we should become well acquainted with all those endeavors at political organization which were made from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, for the purpose of creating nations and governments, without destroying the diversity of secondary societies placed by the side of each other. These attempts form the subject of the present lecture—a laborious and even painful task.

All these attempts at political organization did not, certainly, originate from a good motive; too many of them arose from selfishness and tyranny. Yet some of them were pure and disinterested; some of them had, truly, for their object the moral and social welfare of mankind. Society, at this time, was in such a state of incoherence, of violence and inequity, as could not but be extremely offensive to men of enlarged views—to men who possessed elevated sentiments, and who labored incessantly to discover the means of improving it. Yet even the best of these noble attempts miscarried; and is not the loss of so much courage—of so many sacrifices and endeavors—of so much virtue, a melancholy spectacle! And what is still more painful, a still more poignant sorrow, not only did these attempts at social melioration fail, but an enormous mass of error and of evil was mingled with

them. Notwithstanding good intention, the majority of them were absurd, and show a profound ignorance of reason, of justice, of the rights of humanity, and of the conditions of the social state; so that not only were they unsuccessful, but it was right that they should be so. We have here a spectacle not only of the hard lot of humanity, but also of its weakness. We may here see how the smallest portion of truth suffices so to engage the whole attention of men of superior intellect, that they forget every thing else, and become blind to all that is not comprised within the narrow horizon of their ideas. We may here see how the existence of ever so small a particle of justice in a cause is sufficient to make them lose sight of all the injustice which it contains and permits. This display of the vices and follies of man is, in my opinion, still more melancholy to contemplate than the misery of this condition; his faults affect me more than his sufferings. The attempts already alluded to will bring man before us in both these situations; still we must not shun the painful retrospect; it behooves us not to flinch from doing justice to those men, to those ages that have so often erred, so miserably failed, and yet have displayed such noble virtues, made such powerful efforts, merited so much glory.

The attempts at political organization which were formed from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries were of two kinds; one having for its object the predominance of one of the social elements; sometimes the clergy, sometimes the feudal nobility, sometimes the free cities, and making all the others subordinate to it, and by such a sacrifice to introduce unity; the other proposed to cause all the different societies to agree and to act together, leaving to each portion its liberty, and ensuring to each its due share of influence.

The attempts of the former kind are much more open to suspicion of self-interest and tyranny than the latter; in fact, they were not spotless; from their very nature they were essentially tyrannical in their mode of execution; yet some of them might have been, and indeed were, conceived in a spirit of pure intention, and with a view to the welfare and advancement of mankind.

The first attempt which presents itself, is the attempt at

theocratical organization; that is to say, the design of bringing all the other societies into a state of submission to the principles and sway of ecclesiastical society.

I must here refer to what I have already said relative to the history of the Church. I have endeavored to show what were the principles it developed—what was the legitimate part of each—how these principles arose from the natural course of events—the good and the evil produced by them. I have characterized the different stages through which the Church passed from the eighth to the twelfth century. I have pointed out the state of the imperial Church, of the barbarian Church, of the feudal Church, and lastly, of the theocratic Church. I take it for granted that all this is present in your recollection, and I shall now endeavor to show you what the clergy did in order to obtain the government of Europe, and why they failed in obtaining it.

The attempt at theocratic organization appeared at an early period, both in the acts of the court of Rome, and in those of the clergy in general; it naturally proceeded from the political and moral superiority of the Church; but, from the commencement, such obstacles were thrown in its way, that, even in its greatest vigor, it never had the power to overcome them.

The first obstacle was the nature itself of Christianity Very different, in this respect, from the greater part of religious creeds, Christianity established itself by persuasion alone by simple moral efforts; even at its birth it was not armed with power; in its earliest years it conquered by words alone, and its only conquest was the souls of men. Even after its triumph, even when the Church was in possession of great wealth and consideration, the direct government of society was not placed in its hands. Its origin, purely moral, springing from mental influence alone, was implanted in its constitution. It possessed a vast influence, but it had no power. It gradually insinuated itself into the municipal magistracies; it acted powerfully upon the emperors and upon all their agents; but the positive administration of public affairs—the government, properly so called—was not possessed by the Church. Now, a system of government, a theocracy, as well as any other, cannot be established in an indirect manner, by mere influence alone; it must possess the judicial and ministerial offices, the command of the forces, be in receipt of the im-

posts, have the disposal of the revenues, in a word, it must govern—take possession of society. Force of persuasion may do much, it may obtain great influence over a people, and even over governments its sway may be very powerful; but it cannot govern, it cannot found a system, it cannot take possession of the future. Such has been, even from its origin, the situation of the Christian Church; it has always sided with government, but never superseded it, and taken its place; a great obstacle, which the attempt at theocratic organization was never able to surmount.

The attempt to establish a theocracy very soon met with a second obstacle. When the Roman empire was destroyed, and the barbarian states were established on its ruins, the Christian Church was found among the conquered. It was necessary for it to escape from this situation; to begin by converting the conquerors, and thus to raise itself to their rank. This accomplished, when the Church aspired to dominion, it had to encounter the pride and the resistance of the feudal nobility. Europe is greatly indebted to the laic members of the feudal system in the eleventh century: the people were almost completely subjugated by the Church; sovereigns could scarcely protect themselves from its domination; the feudal nobility alone would never submit to its yoke, would never give way to the power of the clergy. We have only to recall to our recollection the general appearance of the middle ages, in order to be struck with the singular mixture of loftiness and submission, of blind faith and liberty of mind in the connexion of the lay nobility with the priests. We there find some of the remnants of their primitive situation. It may be remembered how I endeavored to describe the origin of the feudal system, its first elements, and the manner in which feudal society first formed itself around the habitation of the possessor of the fief. I remarked how much the priest was there below the lord of the fief. Yes, and there always remained, in the hearts of the feudal nobility, a feeling of this situation; they always considered themselves as not only independent of the Church, but as its superior,—as alone called upon to possess, and in reality to govern, the country; they were willing always to live on good terms with the clergy, but at the same time insisting that each should perform his own part, the one not infringing upon the duties of the other. During many centuries it was the lay aristocracy who main

tained the independence of society with regard to the Church; they boldly defended it when the sovereigns and the people were subdued. They were the first to oppose, and probably contributed more than any other power to the failure of the attempt at a theocratic organization of society.

A third obstacle stood much in the way of this attempt, an obstacle which has been but little noticed, and the effect of which has often been misunderstood.

In all parts of the world where a clergy made itself master of society, and forced it to submit to a theocratic organization, the government always fell into the hands of a married clergy of a body of priests who were enabled to recruit their ranks from their own society. Examine history; look to Asia and Egypt; every powerful theocracy you will find to have been the work of a priesthood, of a society complete within itself, and which had no occasion to borrow of any other.

But the celibacy of the clergy placed the Christian priesthood in a very different situation; it was obliged to have recourse incessantly to lay society in order to continue its existence; it was compelled to seek at a distance, among all stations, all social professions, for the means of its duration. In vain, attachment to their order induced them to labor assiduously for the purpose of assimilating these discordant elements; some of the original qualities of these new-comers ever remain; citizens or gentlemen, they always retained some vestige of their former disposition, of their early habits. Doubtless the Catholic clergy, by being placed in a lonely situation by celibacy, by being cut off, as it were, from the common life of men, became more isolated, and separate from society; but then it was forced continually to have recourse to this same lay society, to recruit, to renew itself from it, and consequently to participate in the moral revolutions which it underwent; and I have no hesitation in stating it as my opinion, that this necessity, which was always arising, did much more to prevent the success of the attempt at theocratic organization, than the *esprit de corps*, strongly supported as it was by celibacy, did to forward it.

The clergy, indeed, found within its own body the most powerful opponents of this attempt. Much has been said of the unity of the Church, and it is true that it has constantly endeavored to obtain this unity, and in some particulars has had the good fortune to succeed. But we must not suffer

ourselves to be imposed upon by high-sounding words, nor by partial facts. What society has offered to our view a greater number of civil dissensions, has been subject to more dismemberments than the clergy? What society has suffered more from divisions, from agitations, from disputes than the ecclesiastical nation? The national churches of the majority of European states have been incessantly at variance with the Roman court; the councils have been at war with the popes: heresies have been innumerable and ever springing up anew; schism always breaking out; nowhere was ever witnessed such a diversity of opinions, so much rancor in dispute, such minute parcelling out of power. The internal state of the Church, the disputations which have taken place, the revolutions by which it has been agitated, have been perhaps the greatest of all obstacles to the triumph of that theocratical organization which the Church endeavored to impose upon society.

All these obstacles were visibly in action even so early as the fifth century, even at the commencement of the great attempt of which we are now speaking. They did not, however, prevent the continuance of its exertions, nor retard its progress during several centuries. The period of its greatest glory, its crisis, as it may be termed, was the reign of Gregory the Seventh, at the end of the eleventh century. We have already seen that the predominant wish of Gregory was to render the world subservient to the clergy, the clergy to the pope, and to form Europe into one immense and regular theocracy. In the scheme by which this was to be effected, this great man appears, so far as one can judge of events which took place so long ago, to have committed two great faults—one as a theorist, the other as a revolutionist. The first consisted in the pompous proclamation of his plan; in his giving a systematical detail of his principles relative to the nature and the rights of spiritual power, of drawing from them beforehand, like a severe logician, their remotest, their ultimate consequences. He thus threatened and even attacked all the lay sovereignties of Europe, without having secured the means of success: not considering that success in human affairs is not to be obtained by such absolute proceedings, or by a mere appeal to a philosophic argument. Gregory the Seventh also fell into the common error of all revolutionists—that of attempting more than they can perform, and of not

fixing the measure and limits of their enterprises within the bounds of possibility. In order to hasten the predominance of his opinions, he entered into a contest against the Empire, against all sovereigns, even against the great body of the clergy itself. He never temporized—he consulted no particular interests, but openly proclaimed his determination to reign over all kingdoms as well as over all intellects; and thus raised up against him, not only all temporal powers, who discovered the pressing danger of their situation, but also all those who advocated the right of free inquiry, a party which now began to show itself, and dreaded and exclaimed against all tyranny over the human mind. It seemed indeed probable, on the whole, that Gregory the Seventh injured rather than advanced the cause which he wished to serve.

This cause, however, still continued to prosper throughout the whole of the twelfth and down to the middle of the thirteenth century. This was the epoch of the greatest power and splendor of the Church. I do not think it can be said that during this period she made much progress; to the end of the reign of Innocent III. she rather displayed her glory and power than increased them. But at this very moment of her apparently greatest success, a popular reaction seemed to declare war against her in almost every part of Europe. In the south of France broke out the heresy of the Albigenses, which carried away a numerous and powerful society. Almost at the same time similar notions and desires appeared in the north, in Flanders. Wickliffe, only a little later, attacked in England, with great talent, the power of the Church, and founded a sect which was not destined to perish. Sovereigns soon began to follow the bent of their nations. It was only at the beginning of the thirteenth century, that the emperors of the house of Hohenstaufen, who deservedly rank among the most able and powerful sovereigns of Europe, were overcome in their struggle with the Holy See; yet before the end of the same century, Saint Louis, the most pious of monarchs, proclaimed the independence of temporal power, and published the first pragmatic sanction, which has served as the basis of all the following.[22] At the opening of the four-

[22] This ordinance or edict was proclaimed by St. Louis in 1269. The term *Pragmatic Sanction* is commonly applied to *four* ordinances published at a subsequent date: 1. That of Charles VII. of

teenth century began the quarrel between Philip the Bel with Boniface VIII.: Edward I. of England was not more obedient to the court of Rome. At this epoch it is evident, that the attempt at theocratic organization had failed; the Church henceforward acted only upon the defensive; she no longer attempted to force her system upon Europe; but only considered how she might keep what she possessed. It is at the end of the thirteenth century that truly dates the emancipation of the laic society of Europe; it was then that the Church gave up her pretensions to its possession.

For a long time before this she had renewed this pretension in the very sphere in which it appeared most likely for her to be successful. For a long time in Italy itself, even around the very throne of the Church, theocracy had completely failed, and given way to a system its very opposite in character: to that attempt at democratic organization, of which the Italian republics are the type, and which displayed so brilliant a career in Europe from the eleventh to the sixteenth century.

It will be remembered, that, when speaking of the free cities, of their history, and of the manner of their formation, I observed that their growth had been more precocious and vigorous in Italy than in any other country; they were here more numerous, as well as more wealthy, than in Gaul, England, or Spain; the Roman municipal system had been preserved with more life and regularity. Besides this, the provinces of Italy were less fitted to become the habitation of its new masters than the rest of Europe. The lands had been

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France in 1438, by which the Papal power was limited, and the independence of the French church in various particulars declared—conformably to the canons of the Council of Basle. This council commenced in 1431 and closed 1449. It passed a great many canons declaring the Pope subject to the decrees of general councils, limiting his powers, and decreeing the reformation of various abuses and corruptions of discipline and practice. The history of this council, as well as that of the former council held at Constance in 1414–18, is deeply interesting. 2. The decree passed by Charles VI. emperor of Germany in 1449, confirming the canons of the council of Basle, is also called a *Pragmatic Sanction*. 3. The decree of Charles VI. respecting the succession to the imperial throne. 4. The law of succession proclaimed by Conrad III. of Spain in 1759

cleared, drained, and cultivated; it was not covered with forests, and the barbarians could not here devote their lives to the chase, or find occupations similar to what had amused them in Germany. A part of this country, moreover, did not belong to them. The south of Italy, the Campania, Romana, Ravenna, were still dependant on the Greek emperors. Favored by distance from the seat of government, and by the vicissitudes of war, the republican system soon took root, and grew very fast in this portion of the country. Italy, too, besides having never been entirely subdued by the barbarians, was favored by the circumstance, that the conquerors who overran it did not remain its tranquil and lasting possessors. The Ostrogoths were destroyed and driven off by Belisarius and Narses: the kingdom of the Lombards was not permanent. The Franks overthrew it under Pepin and Charlemagne, who, without exterminating the Lombard population, found it their interest to ally themselves with the ancient Italian inhabitants, in order to contend against the Lombards with more success. The barbarians, then, never became in Italy, as in the other parts of Europe, the exclusive and quiet masters of the territory and people. And thus it happened tha the feudal system never made much progress beyond the Alps where it was but weakly established, and its members few and scattered. Neither did the great territorial proprietors ever gain that preponderance here, which they did in Gaul and other countries, but it continued to rest with the towns. When this result clearly showed itself, a great number of the possessors of fiefs, moved by choice or necessity, left their country dwellings and took up their abode within the walls of some city. The barbarian nobles made themselves burgesses. It is easy to imagine what strength and superiority the towns of Italy acquired, compared with the other communities of Europe, by this single circumstance. What we have chiefly dwelt upon, as most observable in the character of town populations, is their timidity and weakness. The burgesses appear like so many courageous freedmen, struggling with toil and care against a master, always at their gates. The fate of the Italian towns was widely different; the conquering and conquered populations here mixed together within the same walls; the towns had not the trouble to defend themselves against a neighboring master; their inhabitants were citizens, who, at least for the most part, had always been free; who defended their independence and their rights against distant

foreign sovereigns; at one time against the kings of the Franks, and, at a later period, against the emperors of Germany. This will in some measure account for the immense and precocious superiority of the Italian cities: while in other countries we see poor insignificant communities arise after great trouble and exertion; we here see shoot up, almost at once, republics—states.

Thus becomes explained, why the attempt at republican organization was so successful in this part of Europe. It repressed, almost in its childhood, the feudal system, and became the prevailing form in society. Still it was but little adapted to spread or endure; it contained but few germs of melioration, a necessary condition for the extension and duration of any form of government.

In looking at the history of the Italian republics, from the eleventh to the fifteenth century, we are struck with two facts, seemingly contradictory, yet still indisputable. We see passing before us a wonderful display of courage, of activity, and of genius; an amazing prosperity is the result: we see a movement and a liberty unknown to the rest of Europe. But if we ask what was the real state of the inhabitants, how they passed their lives, what was their real share of happiness, the scene changes; there is, perhaps, no history so sad, so gloomy: no period, perhaps, during which the lot of man appears to have been so agitated, subject to so many deplorable chances, and which so abounds in dissensions, crimes, and misfortunes. Another fact strikes us at the same moment: in the political life of the greater part of these republics, liberty was always growing less and less. The want of security was so great, that the people were unavoidably driven to take shelter in a system less stormy, less popular, than that in which the state existed. Look at the history of Florence, Venice, Genoa, Milan, or Pisa; in all of them we find the course of events, instead of aiding the progress of liberty, instead of enlarging the circle of institutions, tending to repress it; tending to concentrate power in the hands of a smaller number of individuals. In a word, we find in these republics, otherwise so energetic, so brilliant, and so rich, two things wanting—security of life, the first requisite in the social state, and the progress of institutions

From these causes sprung a new evil, which prevented the

attempt at republican organization from extending itself. It was from without—it was from foreign sovereigns, that the greatest danger was threatened to Italy. Still this danger never succeeded in reconciling these republics, in making them all act in concert; they were never ready to resist in common the common enemy. This has led many Italians, the most enlightened, the best of patriots, to deplore, in the present day, the republican system of Italy in the middle ages, as the true cause which hindered it from becoming a nation; it was parcelled out, they say, into a multitude of little states, not sufficiently master of their passions to confederate, to constitute themselves into one united body. They regret that their country has not, like the rest of Europe, been subject to a despotic centralization which would have formed it into a nation, and rendered it independent of the foreigner.

It appears, then, that republican organization, even under the most favorable circumstances, did not contain, at this period, any more than it has done since, the principle of progress, duration, and extension. We may compare, up to a certain point, the organization of Italy, in the middle ages, to that of ancient Greece. Greece, like Italy, was a country covered with little republics, always rivals, sometimes enemies, and sometimes rallying together for a common object. In this comparison the advantage is altogether on the side of Greece There is no doubt, notwithstanding the frequent iniquities that history makes known, but that there was much more order security, and justice in the interior of Athens, Lacedemon and Thebes, than in the Italian republics. See, however, notwithstanding this, how short was the political career of Greece, and what a principle of weakness is contained in this parcelling out of territory and power. No sooner did Greece come in contact with the great neighboring states, with Macedon and Rome, than she fell. These little republics, so glorious and still so flourishing, could not coalesce to resist. How much more likely was this to be the case in Italy, where society and human reason had made no such strides as in Greece, and consequently possessed much less power.

If the attempt at republican organization had so little chance of stability in Italy where it had triumphed, where the feudal system had been overcome, it may easily be sup-

posed that it was much less likely to succeed in the other parts of Europe.

I shall take a rapid survey of its fortunes.

There was one portion of Europe which bore a great resemblance to Italy; the south of France, and the adjoining provinces of Spain, Catalonia, Navarre, and Biscay. In these districts the cities had made nearly the same progress, and had risen to considerable importance and wealth. Many little feudal nobles had here allied themselves with the citizens; a part of the clergy had likewise embraced their cause; in a word, the country in these respects was another Italy. So also, in the course of the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth century, the towns of Provence, of Languedoc, and Acquitaine, made a political effort and formed themselves into free republics, as had been done by the towns on the other side of the Alps. But the south of France was connected with a very powerful branch of the feudal system, that of the North. The heresy of the Albigenses appeared. A war broke out between feudal France and municipal France. The history of the crusade against the Albigenses, commanded by Simon de Montfort, is well known: it was the struggle of the feudalism of the North against the attempt at democratic organization of the South. Notwithstanding the efforts of Southern patriotism, the North gained the day; political unity was wanting in the South, but civilization was not yet sufficiently advanced there to enable men to bring it about. This attempt at republican organization was put down, and the crusade re-established the feudal system in the south of France.

A republican attempt succeeded better a little later, among the Swiss mountains. Here, the theatre was very narrow, the struggle was only against a foreign monarch, who, although much more powerful than the Swiss, was not one of the most formidable sovereigns of Europe. The contest was carried on with a great display of courage. The Swiss feudal nobility allied themselves, for the most part, with the cities a powerful help, which also raised the character of the revolution it sustained, and stamped it with a more aristocratical and stationary character than it seemingly ought to have borne.

I cross to the north of France to the free towns of Flan-

lers, to those on the banks of the Rhine, and belonging to the Hanseatic league. Here the democratic organization completely triumphed in the internal government of the cities; but from its origin, it is evident, that it was not destined to take entire possession of society. The free towns of the North were surrounded, pressed on every side by feudalism, by barons, and sovereigns, to such an extent that they were constantly obliged to stand upon the defensive It is scarcely necessary to say, that they did not trouble themselves to make conquests; they defended themselves sometimes well and sometimes badly. They preserved their privileges, but they remained confined to the inside of their walls. Within these, democratic organization was shut up and arrested; if we walk abroad over the face of the country, we find no semblance of it.

Such, then, was the state of the republican attempt: triumphant in Italy, but with little hope of duration and progress; vanquished in the south of Gaul; victorious upon a small scale in the mountains of Switzerland; while in the North, in the free communities of Flanders, the Rhine, and Hanseatic league, it was condemned not to appear outside their walls. Still, even in this state, evidently inferior to the other elements of society, it inspired the feudal nobility with prodigious terror. The barons became jealous of the wealth of the cities, they feared their power; the spirit of democracy stole into the country; insurrections of the peasantry became more frequent and obstinate. In nearly every part of Europe a coalition was formed among the nobles against the free cities. The parties were not equal; the cities were isolated; there was no correspondence or intelligence between them; all was local. It may be true that there existed, between the burgesses of different countries a certain degree of sympathy; the success or reverses of the towns of Flanders, in their struggles with the dukes of Burgundy, excited a lively sensation in the French cities: but this was very fleeting, and led to no result; no tie, no true union became established between them; the free communities lent no assistance to one another. The position of feudalism was much superior; yet divided, and without any plan of its own, it was never able to destroy them. After the struggle had lasted a considerable time, when the conviction became settled that a complete victory was impossible, concession became necessary; these

petty burgher republics were acknowledged, negotiated with and admitted as members of the state. A new plan was now begun, a new attempt was made at political organization. The object of this was to conciliate, to reconcile, to make to live and act together, in spite of their rooted hostility, the various elements of society; that is to say, the feudal nobility, the free cities, the clergy, and monarchs. It is to this attempt at mixed organization that I have still to claim your attention.

I presume there is no one who is not acquainted with the nature of the States-general of France, the Cortes of Spain and Portugal, the Parliament of England, and the States of Germany. The elements of these various assemblies were much the same; that is to say, the feudal nobility, the clergy, and the cities or commons, there met together and labored to unite themselves into one sole society, into one same state, under one same law, one same authority. Whatever their various names, this was the tendency, the design of all.

Let us take, as the type of this attempt, the fact which most interests us, as well as being best known to us—the States-general of France. I say this fact is best known, while I am still sure that the term States-general awakens in none of you more than a vague and incomplete idea. Who can say what there was in it of stability, of regularity; the number of its members, the subjects of their deliberations, the times at which they were convoked, or the length of their sessions? Of all this we know nothing, and it is impossible to obtain from history any clear, general, satisfactory information respecting it. The best accounts we can gather from the history of France, as regards the character of these assemblies, would almost lead us to consider them as pure accidents, as the last political resort both of people and kings; the last resort of kings, when they had no money and knew not how to free themselves from embarrassment; the last resort of the people, when some evil became so great that they knew not what remedy to apply to it. The nobles formed part of the States-general; so did the clergy; but they came to them with little interest, for they knew well that it was not in these assemblies that they possessed the greatest influence, that it was not there that they took a true part in the government. The burgesses themselves were not eager to attend them; it was not a right which they were anxious to exer-

cise, but rather a necessity to which they submitted. Again, what was the character of the political proceedings of these assemblies? At one time we find them perfectly insignificant, at others terrible. If the king was the stronger, their humility and docility were extreme; if the situation of the monarch was unfortunate, if he really needed the assistance of the States, they then became factious, either the instrument of some aristocratic intrigue, or of some ambitious demagogues. Their works died almost always with them; they promised much, they attempted much,—and did nothing. No great measure which has truly had any influence upon society in France, no important reform either in the general legislation or administration, ever emanated from the States general. It must not, however, be supposed that they have been altogether useless, or without effect; they had a moral effect, of which in general we take too little account; they served from time to time as a protestation against political servitude, a forcible proclamation of certain guardian principles,—such, for example, as that a nation has the right to vote its own taxes, to take part in its own affairs, to impose a responsibility upon the agents of power. That these maxims have never perished in France, is mainly owing to the States-general; and it is no slight service rendered to a country, to maintain among its virtues, to keep alive in its thoughts, the remembrance and claims of liberty. The States-general has done us this service, but it never became a means of government; it never entered upon political organization; it never attained the object for which it was formed, that is to say, the fusion into one only body of the various societies which divided the country.[23]

The Cortes of Portugal and Spain offered the same general result, though in a thousand circumstances they differ. The importance of the Cortes varied according to the kingdoms, and times at which they were held; they were most power-

[23] The first States-general of France, in the proper meaning of the word, as including the clergy, nobility, and commons or deputies from the towns, was convoked by Philip the Fair in 1302. The feudal nobility had before this time submitted to the appellant jurisdiction of the crown, exercised by the royal tribunals;—they had also lost the legislative supremacy in their fiefs; and now, by allowing the commons to become a co-ordinate branch of the national legislature, they lost their last privilege of territorial independence

ful and most frequently convoked in Aragon and Biscay, during the disputes for the successions to the crown, and the struggles against the Moors. To some of the Cortes—for example, that of Castile, 1370 and 1373—neither the nobles nor the clergy were called. There were a thousand accidents which it would be necessary to notice, if we had time to look closely into events; but in the general sketch to which I am obliged to confine myself it will be enough to state that the Cortes, like the States-general of France, have been an accident in history, and never a system—never a political organization, or regular means of government.[24]

The lot of England has been different. I shall not, however, enter into any detail upon this subject at present, as it

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[24] The cities of *Castile* were early invested with chartered privileges, including civil rights and extensive property, on condition of protecting their country. The deputies of the cities are not however mentioned as composing a branch of the *Cortes* or general legislative council of the nation until 1169, and then in only one case. But from the year 1189, they became a regular and essential part of that assembly. Subsequently, through the exercise of the royal prerogative in withholding the writ of summons, and through the neglect of many cities in sending deputies, the representation became extremely limited; and the privilege itself was gradually lost; so that in 1480 only seventeen cities retained the right of sending representatives. The concurrence of the Cortes of Castile was necessary to all taxation and grants of money, and also to legislation in general, as well as to the determination of all great and weighty affairs. The nobles and clergy formed the two other estates of the Cortes; but they seem to have been less regularly summoned than even the deputies of the towns.

In the kingdom of *Aragon*, no law could be enacted or repealed without the consent of the Cortes; and by the "General Privilege," a sort of Magna Charta, granted in 1283, this body was to be assembled every year at Saragossa—though it was afterwards summoned once in two years, and the place of assembling left to the discretion of the king. The Cortes of this kingdom consisted of four estates: the prelates; the commanders of military orders, who were reckoned as ecclesiastics; the barons; the knights or *infanzones*; and the deputies of the royal towns. This body by itself, when in session, and by a commission during its recess, exercised very considerable powers, both legislative and administrative. Valencia and Catalonia had also each its separate Cortes both before and after their union with Aragon. See Hallam, Middle Ages, Vol. I. Chap IV

is my intention to devote a future lecture to the special consideration of the political life of England. All I shall now do is to say a few words upon the causes which gave it a direction totally different from that of the continental states.

And, first, there were no great vassals, no subjects sufficiently powerful to enter single-handed into a contest with the crown. The great barons were obliged, at a very early period, to coalesce, in order to make a common resistance. Thus the principle of association, and proceedings truly political, were forced upon the high aristocracy. Besides this, English feudalism—the little holders of fiefs—were brought by a train of circumstances, which I cannot here recount, to unite themselves with the burgher class, to sit with them in the House of Commons; and by this, the Commons obtained in England a power much superior to those on the Continent, a power really capable of influencing the government of the country. In the fourteenth century, the character of the English Parliament was already formed: the House of Lords was the great council of the king, a council effectively associated in the exercise of authority. The House of Commons, composed of deputies from the little possessors of fiefs, and from the cities, took, as yet, scarcely any part in the government, properly so called; but it asserted and established rights, it defended with great spirit private and local interests. Parliament, considered as a whole, did not yet govern; but already it was a regular institution, a means of government adopted in principle, and often indispensable in fact. Thus the attempt to bring together the various elements of society, and to form them into one body politic, one true state or commonwealth, did succeed in England while it failed in every part of the Continent.

I shall not offer more than one remark upon Germany, and that only to indicate the prevailing character of its history. The attempts made here at political organization, to melt into one body the various elements of society, were spiritless and coldly followed up. These social elements had remained here more distinct, more independent than in the rest of Europe. Were any proof of this wanting, it might be found in its later usages. Germany is the only country of Europe (I say nothing of Poland and the Sclavonian nations, which entered so very late into the European system of civilization) in which feudal election has for a long time taken part in the

election of royalty; it is likewise the only country of Europe in which ecclesiastical sovereigns were continued; the only one in which were preserved free cities with a true political existence and sovereignty. It is clear, therefore, that the attempt to fuse the elements of primitive European society into one social body, must have been much less active and effective in Germany than in any other nation.

I have now run over all the great attempts at political organization which were made in Europe, down to the end of the fourteenth or beginning of the fifteenth century. All these failed. I have endeavored to point out, in going along, the causes of these failures; to speak truly, they may all be summed up in one: society was not yet sufficiently advanced to adapt itself to unity; all was yet too local, too special, too narrow; too many differences prevailed both in things and in minds. There were no general interests, no general opinions capable of guiding, of bearing sway over particular interests and particular opinions. The most enlightened minds, the boldest thinkers, had as yet no just idea of administration or justice truly public. It was evidently necessary that a very active, powerful civilization should first mix, assimilate, grind together, as it were, all these incoherent elements; it was necessary that there should first be a strong centralization of interests, laws, manners, ideas; it was necessary, in a word, that there should be created a public authority and a public opinion. We are now drawing near to the period in which this great work was at last consummated. Its first symptoms—the state of manners, mind, and opinions, during the fifteenth century, their tendency towards the formation of a central government and a public opinion—will be the subject of the following lecture.

LECTURE XI

CENTRALIZATION OF NATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS

We have now reached the threshold of modern history, in the proper sense of the term. We now approach that state of society which may be considered as our own, and the institutions, the opinions, and the manners which were those of France forty years ago, are those of Europe still, and, notwithstanding the changes produced by our revolution, continue to exercise a powerful influence upon us. It is in the sixteenth century, as I have already told you, that modern society really commences.

Before entering into a consideration of this period, let us review the ground over which we have already passed. We have discovered among the ruins of the Roman Empire, all the essential elements of modern Europe; we have seen them separate themselves and expand, each on its own account, and independently of the others. We have observed, during the first historical period, the constant tendency of these elements to separation, and to a local and special existence. But scarcely has this object appeared to be attained; scarcely have feudalism, municipal communities, and the clergy, each taken their distinct place and form, when we have seen them tend to approximate, unite, and form themselves into a general social system, into a national body, a national government. To arrive at this result, the various countries of Europe had recourse to all the different systems which existed among them: they endeavored to lay the foundations of social union, and of political and moral obligations, on the principles of theocracy, of aristocracy, of democracy, and of monarchy. Hitherto all these attempts have failed. No particular system has been able to take possession of society, and to secure it, by its sway, a destiny truly public. We have traced the cause of this failure to the absence of general interests and general ideas: we have found that everything, as yet, was too special, too individual, too local; that a long and powerfu

process of centralization was necessary, in order that society might become at once extensive, solid, and regular, the object which it necessarily seeks to attain. Such was the state in which we left Europe at the close of the fourteenth century.

Europe, however, was then very far from understanding her own state, such as I have now endeavored to explain it to you. She did not know distinctly what she required, or what she was in search of. Yet she set about endeavoring to supply her wants as if she knew perfectly what they were When the fourteenth century had expired, after the failure of every attempt at political organization, Europe entered naturally, and as if by instinct, into the path of centralization. It is the characteristic of the fifteenth century that it constantly tended to this result, that it endeavored to create general interests and general ideas, to raise the minds of men to more enlarged views, and to create, in short, what had not, till then, existed on a great scale—nations and governments.

The actual accomplishment of this change belongs to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, though it was in the fifteenth that it was prepared. It is this preparation, this silent and hidden process of centralization, both in the social relations and in the opinions of men—a process accomplished, without premeditation or design, by the natural course of events—that we have now to make the subject of our inquiry.

It is thus that man advances in the execution of a plan which he has not conceived, and of which he is not even aware. He is the free and intelligent artificer of a work which is not his own. He does not perceive or comprehend it, till it manifests itself by external appearances and real results; and even then he comprehends it very incompletely. It is through his means, however, and by the development of his intelligence and freedom, that it is accomplished. Conceive a great machine, the design of which is centred in a single mind, though its various parts are intrusted to different workmen, separated from, and strangers to each other. No one of them understands the work as a whole, nor the general result which he concurs in producing; but every one executes, with intelligence and freedom, by rational and voluntary acts, the particular task assigned to him. It is thus, that by the hand of man, the designs of Providence are wrought out

in the government of the world. It is thus that the two great facts which are apparent in the history of civilization come to co-exist; on the one hand, those portions of it which may be considered as fated, or which happen without the control of human knowledge or will; on the other hand, the part played in it by the freedom and intelligence of man, and what he contributes to it by means of his own judgment and will.

In order that we may clearly understand the fifteenth century; in order that we may give a distinct account of this prelude, if we may use the expression, to the *state* of society in modern times, we will separate the facts which bear upon the subject into different classes. We will first examine the *political* facts—the changes which have tended to the formation either of nations or of governments. From thence we will proceed to the *moral* facts: we will consider the changes which took place in ideas and in manners; and we shall then see what *general opinions* began, from that period, to be in a state of preparation.

In regard to *political* facts, in order to proceed with quickness and simplicity, I shall survey all the great countries of Europe, and place before you the influence which the fifteenth century had upon them—how it found them, how it left them.

I shall begin with France. The last half of the fourteenth, and the first half of the fifteenth century, were, as you all know, a time of great national wars against the English. This was the period of the struggle for the independence of the French territory and the French name against foreign domination. It is sufficient to open the book of history, to see with what ardor, notwithstanding a multitude of treasons and dissensions, all classes of society in France joined in this struggle, and what patriotism animated the feudal nobility, the burghers, and even the peasantry. If we had nothing but the story of Joan of Arc to show the popular spirit of the time, it alone would suffice for that purpose. Joan of Arc sprang from among the people; it was by the sentiments, the religious belief, the passions of the people, that she was inspired and supported. She was looked upon with mistrust, with ridicule, with enmity even, by the nobles of the court and the leaders of the army; but she had always the soldiers and the people on her side. It was the peasants of Lorraine who sent her

to succor the citizens of Orleans. No event could show in a stronger light the popular character of that war, and the feeling with which the whole country engaged in it.

Thus the nationality of France began to be formed. Down to the reign of the house of Valois, the feudal character prevailed in France; a French nation, a French spirit, French patriotism, as yet had no existence. With the princes of the house of Valois begins the history of France, properly so called.[25] It was in the course of their wars, amid the various turns of their fortune, that, for the first time, the nobility, the citizens, the peasants, were united by a moral tie, by the tie of a common name, a common honor, and by one burning desire to overcome the foreign invader. We must not, however, at this time, expect to find among them any real political spirit, any great design of unity in government and institutions, according to the conceptions of the present day. The unity of France, at that period, dwelt in her name, in her national honor, in the existence of a national monarchy, no matter of what character, provided that no foreigner had anything to do with it. It was in this way that the struggle against the English contributed strongly to form the French nation, and to impel it towards unity.

At the same time that France was thus forming herself in a moral point of view, she was also extending herself physically, as it may be called, by enlarging, fixing, and consolidating her territory. This was the period of the incorporation of most of the provinces which now constitute France. Under Charles VII., [1422—1461] after the expulsion of the English, almost all the provinces which they had occupied—Normandy, Angoumois, Touraine, Poitou, Saintonge, etc., became definitively French. Under Louis XI., [1461—1483] ten provinces, three of which have been since lost and regained, were also united to France—Roussillon and Cerdagne, Burgundy, Franche-Conté, Picardy, Artois, Provence, Maine, Anjou, and Perche. Under Charles VIII. and Louis XII [1483—1515] the successive marriages of Anne with these two kings gave her Britany. Thus, at the same period, and during the course of the same events, France, morally as well as physically, acquired at once strength and unity.

Let us turn from the nation to the government, and we shall

[25] Philip VI., the first king of the house of Valois, came to the throne in 1328.

see the accomplishment of events of the same nature; we shall advance towards the same result. The French government had never been more destitute of unity, of cohesion, and of strength, than under the reign of Charles VI., [1380—1422] and during the first part of the reign of Charles VII. At the end of this reign, [1461] the appearance of everything was changed. There were evident marks of a power which was confirming, extending, organizing itself. All the great resources of government, taxation, military force, and administration of justice, were created on a great scale, and almost simultaneously. This was the period of the formation of a standing army, of permanent militia, and of *compagnies-d'ordonnance*, consisting of cavalry, free archers, and infantry. By these companies, Charles VII. re-established a degree of order in the provinces, which had been desolated by the license and exactions of the soldiery, even after the war had ceased. All contemporary historians expatiate on the wonderful effects of the *compagnies-d'ordonnance*. It was at this period that the *taille*, one of the principal revenues of the crown, was made perpetual; a serious inroad on the liberty of the people, but which contributed powerfully to the regularity and strength of the government.[26] At the same time

[26] The general term *taille*, or *tax*, seems here appropriated to the particular tax made perpetual in the reign of Charles VII., who frequently levied money by his own authority. In general the kings did not claim the absolute prerogative of imposing taxes without the consent of the States-general; though they often in emergencies violently stretched their power. The *taille* was commonly assessed by respectable persons chosen by the advice of the parish priests—a privilege of importance to the tax-payers, who were allowed some voice in the repartition of the tax. This is, however, entirely distinct from that consent of the people to the tax which the theory of the French constitution made requisite. It is asserted that this perpetual *taille* was granted by the States-general in 1439, but this does not appear in the terms of any ordinance.

One thing is certain, that this tax, whether at first established with or without the concurrence of the States-general, was perpetual, and managed without any check upon the crown. The two acts of the reign of Charles VII., the establishment of a standing military force, and a perpetual tax for its support, were the great events of the period, and fatal to the liberties of France. There was henceforth but little check to the increasing power of the crown. The nobles lost their political influence; the people gained nothing. The precedent was improved by succeeding monarchs, until the absolute despotism of the crown was completely established.

the great instrument of power, the administration of justice, was extended and organized; parliaments were multiplied five new parliaments having been instituted in a short space of time:—under Louis XI., the parliaments of Grenoble (in 1451), of Bordeaux (in 1462), and of Dijon (in 1477); under Louis XII., the parliaments of Rouen (in 1499), and of Aix (in 1501.) The parliament of Paris also acquired, about the same time, much additional importance and stability, both in regard to the administration of justice, and the superintendence of the police within its jurisdiction.

Thus, in relation to the military force, the power of taxation, and the administration of justice, that is to say, in regard to those things which form its essence, government acquired in France, in the fifteenth century, a character of unity, regularity, and permanence, previously unknown; and the feudal powers were finally superseded by the power of the state.

At the same time, too, was accomplished a change of very different character; a change not so visible, and which has not so much attracted the notice of historians, but still more important, perhaps, than those which have been mentioned:—the change effected by Louis XI. in the mode of governing

A great deal has been said about the struggle of Louis XI [1461–1483] against the grandees of the kingdom, of their depression, and of his partiality for the citizens and the inferior classes. There is truth in all this, though it has been much exaggerated, and though the conduct of Louis XI. towards the different classes of society more frequently disturbed than benefited the state. But he did something of deeper import. Before his time the government had been carried on almost entirely by force, and by mere physical means. Persuasion, address, care in working upon men's minds, and in bringing them over to the views of the government—in a word, what is properly called policy—a policy, indeed, of falsehood and deceit, but also of management and prudence—had hitherto been little attended to. Louis XI. substituted intellectual for material means, cunning for force, Italian for feudal policy. Take the two men whose rivalry engrosses this period of our history, Charles the Bold and Louis XI.: Charles is the representative of the old mode of governing; he has recourse to no other means than violence; he constantly appeals to arms; he is unable to act with pa

fience, or to address himself to the dispositions and tempers of men in order to make them the instruments of his designs. Louis XI., on the contrary, takes pleasure in avoiding the use of force, and in gaining an ascendency over men, by conversation with individuals, and by skilfully bringing into play their interests and peculiarities of character. It was not the public institutions or the external system of government that he changed; it was the secret proceedings, the tactics, of power. It was reserved for modern times to attempt a still greater revolution; to endeavor to introduce into the means, as well as the objects, of public policy, justice in place of self-interest, publicity instead of cunning. Still, however, a great step was gained by renouncing the continued use of force, by calling in the aid of intellectual superiority, by governing through the understandings of men, and not by overturning every thing that stood in the way of the exercise of power. This is the great change which, among all his errors and crimes, in spite of the perversity of his nature, and solely by the strength of his powerful intellect, Louis XI. has the merit of having begun.

From France I turn to Spain; and there I find movements of the same nature. It was also in the fifteenth century that Spain was consolidated into one kingdom. At this time an end was put to the long struggle between the Christians and Moors, by the conquest of Grenada. Then, too, the Spanish territory became centralized: by the marriage of Ferdinand the Catholic, and Isabella, the two principal kingdoms, Castile and Arragon, were united under the same dominion. In the same manner as in France, the monarchy was extended and confirmed. It was supported by severer institutions, which bore more gloomy names. Instead of parliaments, it was the inquisition that had its origin in Spain. It contained the germ of what it afterwards became; but at first it was of a political rather than a religious nature, and was destined to maintain civil order rather than defend religious faith. The analogy between the countries extends beyond their institutions, it is observable even in the persons of the sovereigns. With less subtlety of intellect, and a less active and intriguing spirit, Ferdinand the Catholic, in his character and government, strongly resembles Louis XI. I pay no regard to arbitrary comparisons or fanciful parallels; but here the analogy

is strong, and observable in general facts as well as in minute details.

A similar analogy may be discovered in Germany. It was in the middle of the fifteenth century, in 1438, that the house of Austria came to the empire; and that the imperial power acquired a permanence which it had never before possessed. From that time election was merely a sanction given to hereditary right. At the end of the fifteenth century, Maximilian I. definitively established the preponderance of his house and the regular exercise of the central authority; Charles VII. was the first in France who, for the preservation of order, created a permanent militia; Maximilian, too, was the first in his hereditary dominions, who accomplished the same end by the same means. Louis XI. had established in France, the post-office for the conveyance of letters; Maximilian I. introduced it into Germany. In the progress of civilization the same steps were everywhere taken, in a similar way, for the advantage of central government.

The history of England in the fifteenth century consists of two great events—the war with France abroad, and the contest of the two Roses at home. These two wars, though different in their nature, were attended with similar results. The contest with France was maintained by the English people with a degree of ardor which went entirely to the profit of royalty. The people, already remarkable for the prudence and determination with which they defended their resources and treasures, surrendered them at that period to their monarchs, without foresight or measure. It was in the reign of Henry V. that a considerable tax, consisting of custom-house duties, was granted to the king for his lifetime, almost at the beginning of his reign. The foreign war was scarcely ended, when the civil war, which had already broken out, was carried on; the houses of York and Lancaster disputed the throne. When at length these sanguinary struggles were brought to an end, the English nobility were ruined, diminished in number, and no longer able to preserve the power which they had previously exercised. The coalition of the great barons was no longer able to govern the throne. The Tudors ascended it; and with Henry VII., in 1485, begins the era of political centralization, the triumph of royalty

Monarchy did not establish itself in Italy, at least under that name; but this made little difference as to the result. It was in the fifteenth century that the fall of the Italian republics took place. Even where the name was retained, the power became concentrated in the hands of one, or of a few families. The spirit of republicanism was extinguished. In the north of Italy, almost all the Lombard republics merged in the Dutchy of Milan. In 1434, Florence fell under the dominion of the Medicis. In 1464, Genoa became subject to Milan. The greater part of the republics, great and small, yielded to the power of sovereign houses; and soon afterwards began the pretensions of foreign sovereigns to the dominion of the north and south of Italy; to the Milanese and kingdom of Naples.

Indeed, to whatever country of Europe we cast our eyes, whatever portion of its history we consider, whether it relates to the nations themselves or their governments, to their territories or their institutions, we everywhere see the old elements, the old forms of society, disappearing. Those liberties which were founded on tradition were lost; new powers arose, more regular and concentrated than those which previously existed. There is something deeply melancholy in this view of the fall of the ancient liberties of Europe. Even in its own time it inspired feelings of the utmost bitterness. In France, in Germany, and above all, in Italy, the patriots of the fifteenth century resisted with ardor, and lamented with despair, that revolution which everywhere produced the rise of what they were entitled to call despotism. We must admire their courage and feel for their sorrow; but at the same time we must be aware that this revolution was not only inevitable, but useful. The primitive system of Europe—the old feudal and municipal liberties—had failed in the organization of a general society. Security and progress are essential to social existence. Every system which does not provide for present order, and progressive advancement for the future, is vicious, and speedily abandoned. And this was the fate of the old political forms of society, of the ancient liberties of Europe in the fifteenth century. They could not give to society either security or progress These objects naturally became sought for elsewhere; to obtain them, recourse was had to other principles and other means: and this

is the import of all the facts to which I have just called your attention.

To this same period may be assigned another circumstance which has had a great influence on the political history of Europe. It was in the fifteenth century that the relations of governments with each other began to be frequent, regular, and permanent. Now, for the first time, became formed those great combinations by means of alliance, for peaceful as well as warlike objects, which, at a later period, gave rise to the system of the balance of power. European diplomacy originated in the fifteenth century. In fact you may see, towards its close, the principal powers of the continent of Europe, the Popes, the Dukes of Milan, the Venetians, the German Emperors, and the Kings of France and Spain, entering into a closer correspondence with each other than had hitherto existed; negotiating, combining, and balancing their various interests. Thus at the very time when Charles VIII. set on foot his expedition to conquer the kingdom of Naples, a great league was formed against him, between Spain, the Pope, and the Venetians. The league of Cambray was formed some years later (in 1508), against the Venetians. The holy league directed against Louis XII. succeeded, in 1511, to the league of Cambray. All these combinations had their rise in Italian policy; in the desire of different sovereigns to possess its territory; and in the fear lest any of them, by obtaining an exclusive possession, should acquire an excessive preponderance. This new order of things was very favorable to the career of monarchy. On the one hand, it belongs to the very nature of the external relations of states that they can be conducted only by a single person, or by a very small number, and that they require a certain degree of secrecy: on the other hand, the people were so little enlightened that the consequences of a combination of this kind quite escaped them. As it had no direct bearing on their individual or domestic life, they troubled themselves little about it; and, as usual, left such transactions to the discretion of the central government. Thus diplomacy, in its very birth, fell into the hands of kings; and the opinion, that it belongs to them exclusively; that the nation, even when free, and possessed of the right of voting its own taxes, and interfering in the management of its domestic affairs, has no right to intermeddle in foreign matters;—this opinion, I say, became established in

all parts of Europe, as a settled principle, a maxim of common law. Look into the history of England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and you will observe the great influence of that opinion, and the obstacles it presented to the liberties of England in the reigns of Elizabeth, James I., and Charles I. It is always under the sanction of the principle, that peace and war, commercial relations, and all foreign affairs, belong to the royal prerogative, that absolute power defends itself against the rights of the country. The people are remarkably timid in disputing this portion of the prerogative; and their timidity has cost them the dearer, for this reason, that, from the commencement of the period into which we are now entering (that is to say, the sixteenth century), the history of Europe is essentially diplomatic. For nearly three centuries, foreign relations form the most important part of history. The domestic affairs of countries began to be regularly conducted; the internal government, on the Continent at least, no longer produced any violent convulsions, and no longer kept the public mind in a state of agitation and excitement. Foreign relations, wars, treaties, alliances, alone occupy the attention and fill the page of history; so that we find the destinies of nations abandoned in a great measure to the royal prerogative, to the central power of the state.

It could scarcely have happened otherwise. Civilization must have made great progress, intelligence and political habits must be widely diffused, before the public can interfere with advantage in matters of this kind. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the people were far from being sufficiently advanced to do so. Observe what occurred in England, under James I., at the beginning of the seventeenth century. His son-in-law, the Elector Palatine, who had been elected king of Bohemia, had lost his crown, and had even been stripped of his hereditary dominions, the Palatinate. Protestantism everywhere espoused his cause; and, on this ground, England took a warm interest in it. There was a great manifestation of public opinion in order to force James to take the part of his son-in-law, and obtain for him the restoration of the Palatinate. Parliament insisted violently for war, promising ample means to carry it on. James was indifferent on the subject; he made several attempts to negotiate, and sent some troops to Germany; he then told parliament that he required £900 000 sterling, to carry on the war with any chance of success. It is not said, and indeed it

does not appear, that his estimate was exaggerated. But parliament shrunk back with astonishment and terror at the sound of such a sum, and could hardly be prevailed upon to vote £70,000 sterling, to reinstate a prince, and re-conquer a country three hundred leagues distant from England. Such were the ignorance and political incapacity of the public in affairs of this nature; they acted without any knowledge of facts, or any consideration of consequences. How then could they be capable of interfering in a regular and effectual manner? This is the cause which principally contributed to make foreign relations fall into the hands of the central power; no other was in a condition to conduct them, I shall not say for the public benefit, which was very far from being always consulted, but with any thing like consistency and good sense.

It may be seen, then, that in whatever point of view we regard the political history of Europe at this period—whether we look upon the internal condition of different nations, or upon their relation with each other—whether we consider the means of warfare, the administration of justice, or the levying of taxes, we find them pervaded by the same character; we see everywhere the same tendency to centralization, to unity, to the formation and preponderance of general interests and public powers. This was the hidden working of the fifteenth century, which, at the period we are speaking of, had not yet produced any very apparent result, or any actual revolution in society, but was preparing all those consequences which afterwards took place.

I shall now bring before you a class of facts of a different nature; *moral* facts, such as stand in relation to the development of the human mind and the formation of general ideas. In these again we shall discover the same phenomena, and arrive at the same result.

I shall begin with an order of facts which has often engaged our attention, and under the most various forms, has always held an important place in the history of Europe—the facts relative to the Church. Down to the fifteenth century, the only general ideas which had a powerful influence on the masses were those connected with religion. The Church

alone was invested with the power of regulating, promulgating, and prescribing them. Attempts, it is true, at independence, and even at separation, were frequently made; and the Church had much to do to overcome them. Down to this period, however, she had been successful. Creeds rejected by the Church had never taken any general or permanent hold on the minds of the people: even the Albigenses had been repressed. Dissension and strife were incessant in the Church, but without any decisive and striking result. The fifteenth century opened with the appearance of a different state of things. New ideas, and a public and avowed desire of change and reformation, began to agitate the Church herself. The end of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth century were marked by the great schism of the west, resulting from the removal of the papal chair to Avignon, and the creation of two popes, one at Avignon, and the other at Rome. The contest between these two papacies is what is called the great schism of the west. It began in 1378. In 1409, the Council of Pisa endeavored to put an end to it by deposing the two rival popes and electing another. But instead of ending the schism, this step only rendered it more violent.

There were now three popes instead of two; and disorders and abuses went on increasing. In 1414, the Council of Constance assembled, convoked by desire of the Emperor Sigismund. This council set about a matter of far more importance than the nomination of a new pope; it undertook the reformation of the Church. It began by proclaiming the indissolubility of the universal council, and its superiority over the papal power. It endeavored to establish these principles in the Church, and to reform the abuses which had crept into it, particularly the exactions by which the court of Rome obtained money. To accomplish this object the council appointed what we should call a commission of inquiry, in other words, a *Reform College*, composed of deputies to the council, chosen in the different Christian nations. This college was directed to inquire into the abuses which polluted the Church, and into the means of remedying them, and to make a report to the council, in order that it might deliberate on the proceedings to be adopted. But while the council was thus engaged, the question was started, whether it could proceed to the reform of abuses without the visible concurrence of the head of the Church, without the sanction of the pope. It was carried in the negative through the influence of the Roman

party, supported by some well-meaning but timid individuals The council elected a new pope, Martin V., in 1417. The pope was instructed to present, on his part, a plan for the reform of the Church. This plan was rejected, and the council separated. In 1431, a new council assembled at Bâle with the same design. It resumed and continued the reforming labors of the Council of Constance, but with no better success Schism broke out in this assembly as it had done in Christendom. The pope removed the council to Ferrara, and afterwards to Florence. A portion of the prelates refused to obey the pope, and remained at Bâle; and, as there had been formerly two popes, so now there were two councils. That of Bâle continued its projects of reform; named as its pope, Felix V.; some time afterward removed to Lausanne; and dissolved itself in 1449, without having effected anything.

In this manner papacy gained the day, remained in possession of the field of battle, and of the government of the Church. The council could not accomplish that which it had set about; but it did something else which it had not thought of, and which survived its dissolution. Just at the time the Council of Bâle failed in its attempts at reform, sovereigns were adopting the ideas which it had proclaimed, and some of the institutions which it had suggested. In France, and with the decrees of the Council of Bâle, Charles VII. formed the pragmatic sanction, which he proclaimed at Bourges in 1438; it authorized the election of bishops, the suppression of annates (or first-fruits,) and the reform of the principal abuses introduced into the Church. The pragmatic sanction was declared in France to be a law of the state. In Germany, the Diet of Mayence adopted it in 1439, and also made it a law of the German empire. What spiritual power had tried without success, temporal power seemed determined to accomplish.

But the projects of the reformers met with a new reverse of fortune. As the council had failed, so did the pragmatic sanction. It perished very soon in Germany. It was abandoned by the Diet in 1448, in virtue of a negotiation with Nicholas V. In 1516, Francis I. abandoned it also, substituting for it his *concordat* with Leo X. The reform attempted by princes did not succeed better than that set on foot by the clergy. But we must not conclude that it was entirely thrown away. In like manner as the council had done things which

survived it, so the pragmatic sanction had effects which survived it also, and will be found to make an important figure in modern history. The principles of the Council of Bâle were strong and fruitful. Men of superior minds, and of energetic characters, had adopted and maintained them. John of Paris, D'Ailly, Gerson, and many distinguished men of the fifteenth century, had devoted themselves to their defence. It was in vain that the council was dissolved; it was in vain that the pragmatic sanction was abandoned; their general doctrines respecting the government of the Church, and the reforms which were necessary, took root in France. They were spread abroad, found their way into parliaments, took a strong hold of the public mind, and gave birth first to the Jansenists, and then to the Gallicans. This entire series of maxims and efforts tending to the reform of the Church, which began with the Council of Constance, and terminated in the four propositions of Bossuet, emanated from the same source, and was directed to the same object.[27] It is the same fact which has undergone successive transformations. Notwithstanding the failure of the legal attempts at reform made in the fifteenth century, they indirectly had an immense influence upon the progress of civilization; and must not be left out of its history.

The councils were right in trying for a legal reform, for it was the only way to prevent a revolution. Nearly at the time when the Council of Pisa was endeavoring to put an end to the great western schism, and the Council of Constance to reform the Church, the first attempts at popular religious reform broke out in Bohemia. The preaching of John Huss, and his progress as a reformer, commenced in 1404, when he began to teach at Prague. Here, then, we have two reforms going on side by side; the one in the very bosom of the

[27] These propositions, drawn up by Bossuet, were decreed by a convocation of the French clergy assembled by Louis XIV., in 1682, and are called the *Quatuor Propositiones Cleri Gallicani.* They declare that power and authority are given by God to the Vicar of Christ in spiritual, but not in temporal things; that this power is limited and restrained by the laws of the Church and general councils; and that the sentence of the pope is not unchangeable unless sanctioned by the Church Catholic. These decrees are the foundation of the independence of the Gallican Church.

Church,—attempted by the ecclesiastical aristocracy itself,—cautious, embarrassed, and timid; the other originating without the Church, and directed against it,—violent, passionate, and impetuous. A contest began between these two powers, these two parties. The council enticed John Huss and Jerome of Prague to Constance, and condemned them to the flames as heretics and revolutionists. These events are perfectly intelligible to us now. We can very well understand this simultaneous existence of separate reforms, one undertaken by governments, the other by the people, hostile to each other, yet springing from the same cause, and tending to the same object, and, though opposed to each other, finally concurring in the same result. This is what happened in the fifteenth century. The popular reform of John Huss was stifled for the moment; the war of the Hussites broke out three or four years after the death of their master; it was long and violent, but at last the empire was successful in subduing it. The failure of the councils in the work of reform, their not being able to attain the object they were aiming at, only kept the public mind in a state of fermentation. The spirit of reform still existed; it waited but for an opportunity again to break out, and this it found at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Had the reform undertaken by the councils been brought to any good issue, perhaps the popular reform would have been prevented. But it was impossible that one or the other of them should not succeed, for their coincidence shows their necessity.

Such, then, is the state, in respect to religious creeds, in which Europe was left by the fifteenth century: an aristocratic reform attempted without success, with a popular suppressed reform begun, but still ready to break out anew.

It was not solely to religious creeds that the human mind was directed, and busied itself about at this period. It was in the course of the fourteenth century, as you all know, that Greek and Roman antiquity was (if I may use the expression) restored to Europe. You know with what ardor Dante, Petrarch, Boccacio, and all their contemporaries, sought for Greek and Latin manuscripts, published them, and spread them abroad; and what general joy was produced by the smallest discovery in this branch of learning. It was in the midst of this excitement that the classical school took its

rise; a school which has performed a much more important part in the development of the human mind than has generally been ascribed to it. But we must be cautious of attaching to this term, classical school, the meaning given to it at present. It had to do, in those days, with matters very different from literary systems and disputes. The classical school of that period inspired its disciples with admiration, not only for the writings of Virgil and Homer, but for the entire frame of ancient society, for its institutions, its opinions, its philosophy, as well as its literature. Antiquity, it must be allowed, whether as regards politics, philosophy, or literature, was greatly superior to the Europe of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It is not surprising, therefore, that it should have exercised so great an influence; that lofty, vigorous, elegant, and fastidious minds should have been disgusted with the coarse manners, the confused ideas, the barbarous modes of their own time, and should have devoted themselves with enthusiasm, and almost with veneration, to the study of a state of society, at once more regular and more perfect than their own. Thus was formed that school of bold thinkers which appeared at the commencement of the fifteenth century, and in which prelates, jurists, and men of learning were united by common sentiments and common pursuits.

In the midst of this movement happened the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, 1453, the fall of the Eastern empire, and the influx of the fugitive Greeks into Italy. These brought with them a greater knowledge of antiquity, numerous manuscripts, and a thousand new means of studying the civilization of the ancients. You may easily imagine how this must have redoubled the admiration and ardor of the classic school. This was the most brilliant period of the Church, especially in Italy, not in respect of political power, but of wealth and luxury. The Church gave herself up to all the pleasures of an indolent, elegant, licentious civilization; to a taste for letters, the arts, and social and physical enjoyments. Look at the way in which the men who played the greatest political and literary parts at that period passed their lives; Cardinal Bembo, for example; and you will be surprised by the mixture which it exhibits of luxurious effeminacy and intellectual culture, of enervated manners and mental vigor. In surveying this period, indeed, when we look at the state of opinions and of social relations, we might imagine ourselves living among the French of the eighteenth century

There was the same desire for the progress of intelligence, and for the acquirement of new ideas; the same taste for an agreeable and easy life, the same luxury, the same licentiousness; there was the same want of political energy and of moral principles, combined with singular sincerity and activity of mind. The literati of the fifteenth century stood in the same relation to the prelates of the Church as the men of letters and philosophers of the eighteenth did to the nobility. They had the same opinions and manners, lived agreeably together, and gave themselves no uneasiness about the storms that were brewing round them. The prelates of the fifteenth century, and Cardinal Bembo among the rest, no more foresaw Luther and Calvin, than the courtiers of Louis XIV. foresaw the French revolution. The analogy between the two cases is striking and instructive.

We observe, then, three great facts in the moral order of society at this period: on one hand, an ecclesiastical reform attempted by the Church itself; on another a popular, religious reform; and lastly, an intellectual revolution, which formed a school of free-thinkers; and all these transformations were prepared in the midst of the greatest political change that has ever taken place in Europe, in the midst of the process of the centralization of nations and governments.

But this is not all. The period in question was also one of the most remarkable for the display of physical activity among men. It was a period of voyages, travels, enterprises, discoveries, and inventions of every kind. It was the time of the great Portuguese expedition along the coast of Africa; of the discovery of the new passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope, by Vasco de Gama; of the discovery of America, by Christopher Columbus; of the wonderful extension of European commerce. A thousand new inventions started up; others already known, but confined within a narrow sphere, became popular and in general use. Gunpowder changed the system of war; the compass changed the system of navigation. Painting in oil was invented, and filled Europe with masterpieces of art. Engraving on copper, invented in 1406, multiplied and diffused them. Paper made of linen became common. Finally, between 1436 and 1452, was invented printing;—printing, the theme of so many declamations and

common-places, but to whose merits and effect no common-places or declamations will ever be able to do justice.

From all this, some idea may be formed of the greatness and activity of the fifteenth century; a greatness which, at the time, was not very apparent; an activity of which the results did not immediately take place. Violent reforms seemed to fail; governments acquired stability. It might have been supposed that society was now about to enjoy the benefits of better order, and more rapid progress. The mighty revolutions of the sixteenth century were at hand; the fifteenth century prepared them.--They shall be the subject of the following lecture.

LECTURE XII

THE REFORMATION.

I have often referred to and lamented the disorder, the chaotic situation of European society; I have complained of the difficulty of comprehending and describing a state of society so loose, so scattered, and incoherent; and I have kept you waiting with impatience for the period of general interests, order, and social union. This period we have now reached; but, in treating of it, we encounter a difficulty of another kind. Hitherto, we have found it difficult to connect historical facts one with another, to class them together, to seize their common features, to discover their points of resemblance. The case is different in modern Europe; all the elements, all the incidents of social life modify, act and re-act upon each other; the mutual relations of men are much more numerous and complicated; so also are their relations with the government and the state, the relations of states with each other, and all the ideas and operations of the human mind. In the periods through which we have already travelled, we have found a great number of facts which were insulated, foreign to each other, and without any reciprocal influence. From this time, however, we find nothing insulated; all things press upon one another, and become modified and changed by their mutual contact and friction. What, let me ask, can be more difficult than to seize the real point of unity in the midst of such diversity, to determine the direction of such a widely spread and complicated movement, to sum up this prodigious number of various and closely connected elements, to point out at last the general and leading fact which is the sum of a long series of facts; which characterizes an era, and is the true expression of its influence, and of the part it has performed in the history of civilization? You will be able to measure at a glance the extent of this difficulty, in the great event which is now to engage our attention.

In the twelfth century we met with an event which was

religious in its origin if not in its nature; I mean the Crusades. Notwithstanding the greatness of this event, its long duration, and the variety of incidents which it brought about, it was easy enough for us to discover its general character, and to determine its influence with some degree of precision.

We have now to consider the religious revolution of the sixteenth century, which is commonly called THE REFORMATION. Let me be permitted to say in passing, that I shall use this word *reformation* as a simple ordinary term, synonymous with *religious revolution*, and without attaching it to any opinion. You must, I am sure, foresee at once, how difficult it is to discover the real character of this great crisis, and to explain in a general manner what has been its nature and its effects.

The period of our inquiry must extend from the beginning of the sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century; for this period embraces, so to speak, the life of this event from its birth to its termination. All historical events have in some sort a determinate career. Their consequences are prolonged to infinity; they are connected with all the past and all the future; but it is not the less true, on this account, that they have a definite and limited existence; that they have their origin and their increase, occupy with their development a certain portion of time, and then diminish and disappear from the scene, to make way for some new event which runs a similar course

The precise date which may be assigned to the Reformation is not of much importance. We may take the year 1520 when Luther publicly burnt at Wittemberg the bull of Leo X., containing his condemnation, and thus formally separated himself from the Romish Church. The interval between this period and the middle of the seventeenth century, the year 648, when the treaty of Westphalia was concluded, comprehends the life of the Reformation. That this is the case, may be thus proved. The first and greatest effect of the religious revolution was to create in Europe two classes of states, the Catholic and the Protestant, to set them against each other and force them into hostilities. With many vicissitudes, the

struggle between these two parties lasted from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth. It was by the treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, that the Catholic and Protestant states reciprocally acknowledged each other, and engaged to live in amity and peace, without regard to difference of religion. After this, from 1648, difference of religion ceased to be the leading principle of the classification of states, of their external policy, their relations and alliances. Down to that time, notwithstanding great variations, Europe was essentially divided into a Catholic league and a Protestant league. After the treaty of Westphalia this distinction disappeared; and alliances or divisions among states took place from considerations altogether foreign to religious belief. At this point, therefore, the preponderance, or, in other words, the career of the Reformation came to an end, although its consequences, instead of decreasing, continued to develop themselves.

Let us now take a rapid survey of this career, and merely mentioning names and events, point out its course. You will see from this simple indication, from this dry and incomplete outline, what must be the difficulty of summing up a series of such various and complicated facts into one general fact; of determining what is the true character of the religious revolution of the sixteenth century, and of assigning to it its true part in the history of civilization.

The moment in which the Reformation broke out is remarkable for its political importance. It was in the midst of the great struggle between Francis and Charles V.—between France and Spain; a struggle at first for the possession of Italy, but afterwards for the German empire, and finally for preponderance in Europe. It was the moment in which the house of Austria elevated itself and became predominant in Europe. It was also the moment in which England, through Henry VIII., interfered in continental politics, more regularly, permanently and extensively than she had ever done before

If we follow the course of the sixteenth century in France we shall find it entirely occupied by the great religious wars between Protestants and Catholics; wars which became the

means and the occasion of a new attempt of the great nobles to repossess themselves of the power which they had lost, and to obtain an ascendency over the sovereign. This was the political meaning of the religious wars of France, of the League, of the struggle between the houses of Guise and Valois,—a struggle which was put an end to by the accession of Henry IV.

In Spain, the revolution of the United Provinces broke out about the middle of the reign of Philip II. The inquisition on one hand, and civil and religious liberty on the other, made these provinces the theatre of war under the names of the Duke of Alva and the Prince of Orange. Perseverance and prudence secured the triumph of liberty in Holland, but it perished in Spain, where absolute power, ecclesiastical and civil, reigned without control

In England, the circumstances to be noted are, the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth ; the struggle of Elizabeth, as head of the Protestant interests, against Philip II. ; the accession of James Stuart to the throne of England ; and the rise of the great dispute between the monarchy and the people.

About the same time we note the creation of new powers in the north Sweden was raised into existence by Gustavus Vasa, in 1523. Prussia was created by the secularization of the Teutonic order. The northern powers assumed a place in the politics of Europe which they had not occupied before, and the importance of which soon afterwards showed itself in the thirty years' war.

I now come back to France, to note the reign of Louis XIII. ; the change in the internal administration of this country effected by Cardinal Richelieu ; the relations of France with Germany, and the support which she afforded to the Protestant party. In Germany, during the latter part of the sixteenth century, there was the war with the Turks ; in the beginning of the seventeenth, the thirty years' war, the greatest of modern events in eastern Europe ; Gustavus Adolphus, Wallenstein, Tilly, the Duke of Brunswick, the Duke of Weimar, are the greatest names which Germany at this time could boast of.

At the same period, in France, took place the accession

of Louis XIV. and the commencement of the Fronde, in England broke out the great revolution, or, as it is sometimes improperly called, the grand rebellion, which dethroned Charles I.

In this survey, I have only glanced at the most prominent events of history, events which everybody has heard of; you see their number, their variety, their importance. If we seek for events of another kind, events less conspicuous and less distinguished by great names, we shall find them not less abundant during this period; a period remarkable for the great changes which took place in the political institutions of almost every country; the period in which pure monarchy prevailed in most of the great states, while in Holland there arose the most powerful republic in Europe; and in England constitutional monarchy achieved, or nearly achieved, a final triumph. Then, in the Church, it was during this period that the old monastic orders lost almost all their political power, and were replaced by a new order of a different character, and whose importance, erroneously perhaps, is considered much superior to that of its precursors,—I mean the Jesuits. At the same period the Council of Trent obliterated all that remained of the influence of the Councils of Constance and Bâle, and secured the definitive ascendency of the court of Rome in ecclesiastical affairs. Leaving the Church, and taking a passing glance at the philosophy of the age, at the unfettered career of the human mind, we observe two men, Bacon and Descartes, the authors of the greatest philosophical revolution which the modern world has undergone, the chiefs of the two schools which contended for supremacy. It was in this period too that Italian literature shone forth in its fullest splendor, while that of France and England was still in its infancy. Lastly, it was in this period that the colonial system of Europe had its origin; that great colonies were founded; and that commercial activity and enterprise were carried to an extent never before known.

Thus, under whatever point of view we consider this era we find its political, ecclesiastical, philosophical, and literary events, more numerous, varied, and important, than in any of the preceding ages. The activity of the human mind displayed itself in every way; in the relations of men with each other—in their relations with the governing powers—in the

relations of states, and in the intellectual labors of individuals. In short, it was the age of great men and of great things. Yet, among the great events of this period, the religious revolution which now engages our attention was the greatest. It was the leading fact of the period; the fact which gives it its name, and determines its character. Among the many powerful causes which have produced so many powerful effects, the Reformation was the most powerful; it was that to which all the others contributed; that which has modified, or been modified by, all the rest. The task which we have now to perform, then, is to review, with precision, this event; to examine this cause, which, in a period of the greatest causes, produced the greatest effects—this event, which, in this period of great events, prevailed over all the rest.

You must, at once, perceive how difficult it is to link together facts so diversified, so immense, and so closely connected, into one great historical unity. It must, however, be done; when events are once consummated, when they have become matter of history, the most important business is then to be attempted; that which man most seeks for are general facts—the linking together of causes and effects. This is what I may call the immortal portion of history, which all generations must study, in order to understand the past as well as the present time. This desire after generalization, of obtaining rational results, is the most powerful and noblest of all our intellectual desires; but we must beware of being satisfied with hasty and incomplete generalizations. No pleasure is more seducing than that of indulging ourselves in determining on the spot, and at first sight, the general character and permanent results of an era or an event. The human intellect, like the human will, is eager to be in action, impatient of obstacles, and desirous of coming to conclusions. It willingly forgets such facts as impede and constrain its operations; but while it forgets, it cannot destroy them; they still live to convict it of error at some after period. There is only one way of escaping this danger; it is by a resolute and dogged study of facts, till their meaning is exhausted, before attempting to generalize, or coming to conclusions respecting their effects. Facts are, for the intellect, what the rules of morals are for the will. The mind must be thoroughly acquainted with facts, and must know their weight; and it is only when she has fulfilled this duty—when she has completely traversed, in every direction, the ground of investiga-

tion and inquiry—that she is permitted to spread her wings, and take her flight towards that higher region, whence she may survey all things in their general bearings and results If she endeavor to ascend prematurely, without having first acquired a thorough knowledge of the territory which she desires to contemplate from above, she incurs the most imminent risk of error and downfall. As, in a calculation of figures an error at the outset leads to others, *ad infinitum*, so, in history, if we do not, in the first instance, take every fact into account—if we allow ourselves to indulge in a spirit of precipitate generalization—it is impossible to tell how far we may be led astray from the truth.

In these observations, I am, in some measure, putting you on your guard against myself. In this course I have been able to do little more than make some attempts at generalization, and take some general views of facts which we had not studied closely and together. Being now arrived at a period where this task is much more difficult, and the chances of error greater than before, I think it necessary to make you aware of the danger, and warn you against my own speculations. Having done so, I shall now continue them, and treat the Reformation in the same way as I have done other events. I shall endeavor to discover its leading fact, to describe its general character, and to show the part which this great event has performed in the process of European civilization.

You remember the situation in which we left Europe, at the end of the fifteenth century. We saw, in the course of it, two great attempts at religious revolution or reform; an attempt at legal reform by the councils, and an attempt at revolutionary reform, in Bohemia, by the Hussites; we saw both these stifled and rendered abortive; and yet we concluded that the event was one which could not be staved off, but that it must necessarily reappear in one shape or another; and that what the fifteenth century attempted would be inevitably accomplished by the sixteenth. I shall not enter into any details respecting the religious revolution of the sixteenth century, which I consider as being generally known. I shall confine myself solely to the consideration of its general influence on the destinies of mankind.

In the inquiries which have been made into the causes which produced this great event, the enemies of the Refor-

mation have imputed it to accidents and mischances, in the course of civilization; for instance, to the sale of indulgences having been intrusted to the Dominicans, and excited the jealousy of the Augustines. Luther was an Augustine; and this, therefore, was the moving power which put the Reformation in action. Others have ascribed it to the ambition of sovereigns—to their rivalry with the ecclesiastical power, and to the avidity of the lay nobility, who wished to take possession of the property of the Church. In this manner the Reformation has been accounted for, by looking at the evil side of human nature and human affairs, by having recourse to the private interests and selfish passions of individuals.

On the other hand, the friends and partisans of the Reformation have endeavored to account for it by the pure desire of effectually reforming the existing abuses of the Church. They have represented it as a redress of religious grievances, as an enterprise conceived and executed with the sole design of re-constituting the Church in its primitive purity. Neither of these explanations appears to me well founded. There is more truth in the latter than in the former; at least, the cause assigned is greater, and in better proportion to the extent and importance of the event; but, still, I do not consider it as correct. In my opinion, the Reformation neither was an accident, the result of some casual circumstance, or some personal interests, nor arose from unmingled views of religious improvement, the fruit of Utopian humanity and truth. It had a more powerful cause than all these; a general cause, to which all the others were subordinate. It was a vast effort made by the human mind to achieve its freedom; it was a new born desire which it felt to think and judge, freely and independently, of facts and opinions which, till then, Europe received, or was considered bound to receive, from the hands of authority. It was a great endeavor to emancipate human reason; and to call things by their right names, it was an insurrection of the human mind against the absolute power of spiritual order. Such, in my opinion, was the true character and leading principle of the Reformation.

When we consider the state of the human mind, at this time, on one hand, and the state of the spiritual power of the Church, which had the government of the human mind, on the other, a double fact presents itself to our notice

In looking at the *human mind*, we observe much greater activity, and a much greater desire to develop its powers, than it had ever felt before. This new activity was the result of various causes which had been accumulating for ages. For example, there were ages in which heresies sprang up, subsisted for a time, and then gave way to others; there were other ages in which philosophical opinions ran just the same course as heresies. The labors of the human mind, whether in the sphere of religion or of philosophy, had been accumulating from the eleventh to the sixteenth century; and the time was now come when they must necessarily have a result. Besides this, the means of instruction created or favored in the bosom of the Church itself, had brought forth fruit. Schools had been instituted; these schools had produced men of considerable knowledge, and their number had daily increased. These men began to wish to think for themselves, for they felt themselves stronger than they had ever been before. At last came that restoration of the human mind to a pristine youth and vigor, which the revival of the learning and arts of antiquity brought about, the progress and effects of which I have already described.

These various causes combined, gave, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a new and powerful impulse to the human mind, an imperious desire to go forward.

The situation of the *spiritual power*, which then had the government of the human mind, was totally different; it, on the contrary, had fallen into a state of imbecility, and remained stationary. The political influence of the Church and Court of Rome was much diminished. European society had passed from the dominion of Rome to that of temporal governments. Yet in spite of all this, the spiritual power still preserved its pretensions, splendor, and outward importance. The same thing happened to it which has so often happened to long established governments. Most of the complaints made against it were now almost groundless. It is not true, that in the sixteenth century, the Court of Rome was very tyrannical; it is not true, that its abuses were more numerous and crying than they had been at former periods. Never, perhaps, on the contrary, had the government of the Church been more indulgent, more tolerant, more disposed to let things take their course, provided it was not itself implicated provided that the rights it had hitherto enjoyed were acknow

edged even though left unexercised, and that it was assured of its usual existence, and received its usual tributes. It would willingly have left the human mind to itself, if the human mind had been as tolerant towards its offences. But it usually happens, that just when governments have begun to lose their influence and power, just when they are comparatively harmless, that they are most exposed to attack; it is then that, like the sick lion, they may be attacked with impunity, though the attempt would have been desperate when they were in the plenitude of their power.

It is evident, therefore, simply from the consideration of the state of the human mind at this period, and of the power which then governed it, that the Reformation must have been, I repeat it, a sudden effort made by the human mind to achieve its liberty, a great insurrection of human intelligence. This, doubtless, was the leading cause of the Reformation, the cause which soared above all the rest; a cause superior to every interest either of sovereigns or of nations, superior to the need of reform properly so called, or of the redress of the grievances which were complained of at this period.

Let us suppose, that after the first years of the Reformation had passed away, when it had made all its demands, and insisted on all its grievances,—let us suppose, I say, that the spiritual power had conceded everything, and said, "Well, be it so; I will make every reform you desire; I will return to a more legal, more truly religious order of affairs. I will suppress arbitrary exactions and tributes; even in matters of belief I will modify my doctrines, and return to the primitive standard of Christian faith. But, having thus redressed all your grievances, I must preserve my station, and retain, as formerly, the government of the human mind, with all the powers and all the rights which I have hitherto enjoyed."—Can we believe that the religious revolution would have been satisfied with these concessions, and would have stopped short in its course? I cannot think so; I firmly believe that it would have continued its career, and that after having obtained reform, it would have demanded liberty. The crisis of the sixteenth century was not merely of a reforming character; it was essentially revolutionary. It cannot be deprived of this character, with all the good and evil that belongs to it; its nature may be traced in its effects

Let us take a glance at the destinies of the Reformation, let us see, more particularly, what it has produced in the different countries in which it developed itself. It can hardly escape observation that it exhibited itself in very different situations, and with very different chances of success; if then we find that, notwithstanding this diversity of situations and chances, it has always pursued a certain object, obtained a certain result, and preserved a certain character, it must be evident that this character, which has surmounted all the diversities of situation, all the inequalities of chance, must be the fundamental character of the event; and that this result must be the essential object of its pursuit.

Well then, wherever the religious revolution of the sixteenth century prevailed, if it did not accomplish a complete emancipation of the human mind, it procured it a new and great *increase of liberty*. It doubtless left the mind subject to all the chances of liberty or thraldom which might arise from political institutions; but it abolished or disarmed the spiritual power, the systematic and formidable government of the mind. This was the result obtained by the Reformation, notwithstanding the infinite diversity of circumstances under which it took place. In Germany there was no political liberty; the Reformation did not introduce it; it rather strengthened than enfeebled the power of princes; it was rather opposed to the free institutions of the middle ages than favorable to their progress. Still, in spite of this, it excited and maintained in Germany a greater freedom of thought, probably, than in any other country. In Denmark too, a country in which absolute power predominated in the municipal institutions, as well as the general institutions of the state, thought was emancipated through the influence of the Reformation, and freely exercised on every subject. In Holland, under a republic; in England, under a constitutional monarchy, and in spite of a religious tyranny which was long very severe, the emancipation of the human mind was accomplished by the same influence. And lastly, in France, which seemed from its situation the least likely of any to be affected by this religious revolution, even in this country, where it was actually overcome, it became a principle of mental independence, of intellectual freedom. Till the year 1685, that is, till the revocation of the edict of Nantes, the Reformation enjoyed a legal existence in France During this long space of time, the reformers wrote, disputed

and provoked their adversaries to write and dispute with them This single fact, this war of tracts and disputations between the old and new opinions, diffused in France a greater degree of real and active liberty than is commonly believed ; a liberty which redounded to the advantage of science and morality, to the honor of the French clergy, and to the benefit of the mind in general Look at the conferences of Bossuet with Claude, and at all the religious controversy of that period, and ask yourselves if Louis XIV. would have permitted a similar degree of freedom on any other subject. It was between the reformers and the opposite party that the greatest freedom of opinion existed in the seventeenth century. Religious questions were treated in a bolder and freer spirit of speculation than political, even by Fenelon himself in his Telemachus. This state of things lasted till the revocation of the edict of Nantes. Now, from the year 1685 to the explosion of the human mind in the eighteenth century, there was not an interval of forty years ; and the influence of the religious revolution in favor of intellectual liberty had scarcely ceased when the influence of the revolution in philosophy began to operate.

You see, then, that wherever the Reformation penetrated, wherever it acted an important part, whether conqueror or conquered, its general, leading, and constant result was an immense progress in mental activity and freedom ; an immense step towards the emancipation of the human mind.

Again, not only was this the result of the Reformation, but *it was content with this result.* Wherever this was obtained, no other was sought for ; so entirely was it the very foundation of the event, its primitive and fundamental character! Thus, in Germany, far from demanding political liberty, the Reformation accepted, I shall not say servitude, but the absence of liberty. In England, it consented to the hierarchical constitution of the clergy, and to the existence of a Church, as full of abuses as ever the Romish Church had been, and much more servile. Why did the Reformation, so ardent and rigid in certain respects, exhibit, in these instances, so much facility and suppleness ? Because it had obtained the general result to which it tended, the abolition of the spiritual power, and the emancipation of the human mind. I repeat it ; wherever the Reformation attained this object, it accommodated itself to every form of government, and to every situation.

Let us now test this fact by the opposite mode of proof; let us see what happened in those countries into which the Reformation did not penetrate, or in which it was early suppressed. We learn from history that, in those countries, the human mind was not emancipated; witness two great countries, Spain and Italy. While, in those parts of Europe into which the Reformation very largely entered, the human mind during the last three centuries, has acquired an activity and freedom previously unknown;—in those other parts, into which it was never allowed to make its way, the mind, during the same period, has become languid and inert: so that opposite sets of facts, which happened at the same time, concur in establishing the same result.

The impulse which was given to human thought, and the abolition of absolute power in the spiritual order, constituted, then, the essential character of the Reformation, the most general result of its influence, the ruling fact in its destiny.

I use the word *fact*, and I do so on purpose. The emancipation of the human mind, in the course of the Reformation, was a fact rather than a principle, a result rather than an intention. The Reformation, I believe, has in this respect, performed more than it undertook,—more, probably, than it desired. Contrary to what has happened in many other revolutions, the effects of which have not come up to their design, the consequences of the Reformation have gone beyond the object it had in view; it is greater, considered as an event, than as a system; it has never completely known all that it has done nor, if it had, would it have completely avowed it.

What are the reproaches constantly applied to the Reformation by its enemies? which of its results are thrown in its face, as it were, as unanswerable?

The two principal reproaches are, first, the multiplicity of sects, the excessive license of thought, the destruction of all spiritual authority, and the entire dissolution of religious society: secondly, tyranny and persecution. "You provoke licentiousness," it has been said to the Reformers,—"you produced it; and, after having been the cause of it, you wish to restrain and repress it. And how do you repress it? By the most harsh and violent means. You take upon your-

selves, too, to punish heresy, and that by virtue of an illegitimate authority."

If we take a review of all the principal charges which have been made against the Reformation, we shall find, if we set aside all questions purely doctrinal, that the above are the two fundamental reproaches to which they may all be reduced.

These charges gave great embarrassment to the reform party. When they were taxed with the multiplicity of their sects, instead of advocating the freedom of religious opinion and maintaining the right of every sect to entire toleration, they denounced sectarianism, lamented it, and endeavored to find excuses for its existence. Were they accused of persecution? They were troubled to defend themselves, they used the plea of necessity; they had, they said, the right to repress and punish error, because they were in possession of the truth. Their articles of belief, they contended, and their institutions, were the only legitimate ones; and if the Church of Rome had not the right to punish the reformed party, it was because she was in the wrong and they in the right.

And when the charge of persecution was applied to the ruling party in the Reformation, not by its enemies, but by its own offspring; when the sects denounced by that party said, "We are doing just what you did; we separate ourselves from you, just as you separated yourselves from the Church of Rome," this ruling party were still more at a loss to find an answer, and frequently the only answer they had to give was an increase of severity.

The truth is, that while laboring for the destruction of absolute power in the spiritual order, the religious revolution of the sixteenth century was not aware of the true principles of intellectual liberty. It emancipated the human mind, and yet pretended still to govern it by laws. In point of *fact* it produced the prevalence of free inquiry; in point of *principle* it believed that it was substituting a legitimate for an illegitimate power. It had not looked up to the primary motive, nor down to the ultimate consequences of its own work. It thus fell into a double error. On the one side it did not know or respect all the rights of human thought; at the very moment that it was demanding these rights for itself, it was violating them towards others. On the other side, it was unable to estimate the rights of authority in matters of reason. I do not speak

of that coercive authority which ought to have no rights at all in such matters, but of that kind of authority which is purely moral, and acts solely by its influence upon the mind. In most reformed countries something is wanting to complete the proper organization of intellectual society, and to the regular action of old and general opinions. What is due to and required by traditional belief, has not been reconciled with what is due to and required by freedom of thinking; and the cause of this undoubtedly is, that the Reformation did not fully comprehend and accept its own principles and effects.

Hence, too, the Reformation acquired an appearance of inconsistency and narrowness of mind, which has often given an advantage to its enemies. They knew very well what they were about, and what they wanted; they cited the principles of their conduct without scruple, and avowed all its consequences. There never was a government more consistent and systematic than that of the Church of Rome. In point of *fact*, the Court of Rome made more compromises and concessions than the Reformation; in point of *principle*, it adhered much more closely to its system, and maintained a more consistent line of conduct. Great strength is gained by a thorough knowledge of the nature of one's own views and actions, by a complete and rational adoption of a certain principle and design: and a striking example of this is to be found in the course of the religious revolution of the sixteenth century. Every body knows that the principal power instituted to contend against the Reformation was the order of the Jesuits. Look for a moment at their history; they failed everywhere; wherever they interfered, to any extent, they brought misfortune upon the cause in which they meddled. In England they ruined kings; in Spain, whole masses of the people. The general course of events, the development of modern civilization, the freedom of the human mind, all these forces with which the Jesuits were called upon to contend, rose up against them and overcame them. And not only did they fail, but you must remember what sort of means they were constrained to employ. There was nothing great or splendid in what they did; they produced no striking events, they did not put in motion powerful masses of men. They proceeded by dark and hidden courses; courses by no means calculated to strike the imagination, or to conciliate that public interest which always attaches itself to great things, whatever may be their principle and object. The party opposed

to them, on the contrary, not only overcame, but overcame signally; did great things and by great means: overspread Europe with great men; changed, in open day, the condition and form of States. Every thing, in short, was against the Jesuits, both fortune and appearances; reason, which desires success,—and imagination, which requires eclat,—were alike disappointed by their fate. Still, however, they were undoubtedly possessed of grandeur; great ideas are attached to their name, their influence, and their history. The reason is, that they knew what they did, and what they wished to accomplish; that they were fully and clearly aware of the principles upon which they acted, and of the object which they had in view. They possessed grandeur of thought and of will; and it was this that saved them from the ridicule which attends constant reverses, and the use of paltry means. Wherever, on the contrary, the event has been greater than the design, wherever there is an appearance of ignorance of the first principles and ultimate results of an action, there has always remained a degree of incompleteness, inconsistency, and narrowness of view, which has placed the very victors in a state of rational or philosophical inferiority, the influence of which has sometimes been apparent in the course of events. This, I think, in the struggle between the old and the new order of things, in matters of religion, was the weak side of the Reformation, which often embarrassed its situation, and prevented it from defending itself so well as it had a right to do.

I might consider the religious revolution of the sixteenth century under many other aspects. I have said nothing, and have nothing to say, respecting it as a matter of doctrine—respecting its effects on religion, properly so called, or respecting the relations of the human soul with God and an eternal futurity; but I might exhibit it in its various relations with social order, everywhere producing results of immense importance. For example, it introduced religion into the midst of the laity, into the world, so to speak, of believers. Till then, religion had been the exclusive domain of the ecclesiastical order. The clergy distributed the proceeds, but reserved to themselves the disposal of the capital, and almost the exclusive right even to speak of it. The Reformation again threw matters of religious belief into general circulation, and again opened to believers the field of faith into

which they had not been permitted to enter. It had, at the same time, a further result; it banished, or nearly so, religion from politics, and restored the independence of the temporal power. At the same moment that religion returned into the possession of believers, it quitted the government of society. In the reformed countries, in spite of the diversities of ecclesiastical constitutions, even in England, whose constitution is most nearly akin to the old order of things, the spiritual power has no longer any serious pretensions to the government of the temporal power.

I might enumerate many other consequences of the Reformation, but I must limit myself to the above general views, and I am satisfied with having placed before you its principal feature—the emancipation of the human mind, and the abolition of absolute power in the spiritual order; an abolition which, though, undoubtedly, not complete, is yet the greatest step which, down to our own times, has ever been made towards the attainment of that object.

Before concluding, I pray you to remark, what a striking resemblance of destiny there is to be found, in the history of modern Europe, between civil and religious society, in the revolutions they have had to undergo.

Christian society, as we have seen when I spoke of the Church, was, at first, a state of society perfectly free, formed entirely in the name of a common belief, without institutions or government, properly so called; regulated, solely, by moral and variable powers, according to the exigencies of the moment.* Civil society began, in like manner, in Europe, partly, at least, by bands of barbarians; it was a state of society perfectly free, in which every one remained, because he wished to do so, without laws or powers created by institutions. In emerging from that state which was inconsistent with any great social development, religious society placed itself under a government essentially aristocratic; its governors were the clergy, the bishops, the councils, the ecclesiastical aristocracy. A fact of the same kind took place in civil society when it emerged from barbarism; it was, in like manner, the aristocracy, the feudalism of the laity, which laid hold of the power of government. Religious society quitted the aristocratic form of government to assume that of pure mon-

* See note 5, page 51.

archy; this was the rationale of the triumph of the Court of Rome over the councils and the ecclesiastical aristocracy of Europe. The same revolution was accomplished in civil society; it was, in like manner, by the destruction of the aristocratic power, that monarchy prevailed, and took possession of the European world. In the sixteenth century, in the heart of religious society, an insurrection broke out against the system of pure ecclesiastical monarchy, against absolute power in the spiritual order. This revolution produced, sanctioned, and established freedom of inquiry in Europe. In our own time we have witnessed a similar event in civil society. Absolute temporal power, in like manner, was attacked and overcome. You see, then, that the two orders of society have undergone the same vicissitudes and revolutions; only religious society has always been the foremost in this career.

We are now in possession of one of the great facts in the history of modern society—freedom of inquiry, the liberty of the human mind. We see, at the same time, the almost universal prevalence of political centralization. In my next lecture I shall consider the revolution in England; the event in which freedom of inquiry and a pure monarchy, both results of the progress of civilization, came, for the first time, into collision.[28]

[28] The subject of the foregoing lecture is so vast, so important in itself, and so complicated with all the great political events of Europe for many years, that the views presented by the author cannot be competently appreciated (if even their force and bearing can be well comprehended) without a more thorough and familiar acquaintance with the facts, the history of the period, than is likely to be possessed by the young student. To give here such an exhibition of the facts as would enable him to judge for himself, to accept or modify the views of the author, is impossible. He must carefully study the history of the period in the best writers: there is no other way for him to acquire a clear and thorough comprehension of its spirit, of the meaning and value of the Reformation. Among the works to which he may be referred are Robertson's Charles the Fifth, Coxe's Austria, Roscoe's Leo X., Burnet's History of the Reformation; Ranke's History of the Popes, D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation, Gibbon, ch. 54; and for the English Reformation, Blunt's History, portions of Hume and Lingard, the histories of Heylin, Fuller, Collier.

Two or three remarks may be made on the foregoing lecture.

That the reformation in England "consented . . . . . to the existence of a Church as full of abuses as ever the Romish Church had been, and much more servile," (p. 259,) is an observation which

will be differently received, according to differences of individual views.

That the Reformation in regard to its leading principle was "an insurrection of the human mind against the absolute power of spiritual order" (p. 256) is a remark that needs qualification. No doubt the assertion of this principle of absolute independence, or the unlimited right of private judgment in religion, *became* and has continued to be the great characteristic result of the religious revolution. But the Reformation did not at the *outset* (any more than many other great revolutions) generalize itself, define and enunciate the principles on which it proceeded It began with opposition to special abuses and corruptions. Neither Luther nor his associates comprehended at first how far they should be carried. It was only in the sequel that the right of private judgment in religion was brought out, asserted, and contended for as a principle. Luther himself and the earliest reformers did not contend for it as an *absolute* principle. This is evident from the continual offers of Luther to submit himself implicitly to the decision of a general council. It is evident moreover from the fact that the reformers, just as much as the papists, held it right to inflict coercion, physical pains, and death upon those who denied what they regarded as the essential faith.

"The Roman Catholics," says Robertson, "as their system rested on the decisions of an infallible judge, never doubted that truth was on their side, and openly called on the civil power to repel the impious and heretical innovators who had risen up against it. The Protestants, no less confident that their doctrine was well founded, required with equal ardor the princes of their party to check such as presumed to impugn or oppose it. Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, Knox, the founders of the reformed church in their respective countries, inflicted, as far as they had power and opportunity, the same punishments, which were denounced by the Church of Rome, upon such as called in question any article of their creed."

Upon this passage of Robertson, Smythe (Lectures on Mod. Hist. p. 292, Am. ed.) remarks, that "Luther might have been favorably distinguished from Calvin and others. There are passages in his writings, with regard to the interference of the magistrate in religious concerns, that do him honor; but he was favorably situated and lived not to see the temporal sword at his command. He was never tried."

Now whether the principle of independence of *all* authority, the *absolutely* unlimited right of private judgment in matters of religious faith, be or be not a correct principle, it will not be disputed a the present day that absolute independence of all *human* authority, and so far forth the unlimited right of private judgment, is a correct principle, and that all coercion or physical punishment is a monstrous absurdity and a monstrous crime Yet nothing is clearer from history than that the reformers did not understand, did not act upon this principle · it was a century and a half before Protestants

learned definitively that they had no right to inflict death, imprisonment, stripes or fines upon heretics, and no right beyond that of simply separating from their communion. It is a prevalent opinion among us, that the Romanists are the only ones who put people to death on account of their religious opinions. Protestants should know that this is not the case. So far from it, much sad warrant was given for the taunt of the Papists, "that the reformers were only against burning when they were in fear of it themselves." It is far better therefore not to burden the defence of the Reformation with the impossible task of denying or palliating the indefensible acts of its first authors—acts to which they were led because they themselves were not yet fully emancipated from the corrupt principles of the age. The great cause of the Reformation does not stand or fall on such grounds; and nothing is lost by freely admitting all the persecuting acts of the early reformers.

Calvin burnt Servetus for heresy: the mild Melancthon approved the act; so did Bucer, (Calv. Epist. p. 147, ed. Genev. 1575).

Calvin, in his letter to the Earl of Somerset, lord Protector of England, (Epist. p. 67,) speaking of the Papists and of the fanatic sect of "Gospellers," says expressly, "they ought to be repressed by the avenging sword which the Lord has put into your hands,—*gladio ultore coercen quem tibi tradidit Dominus.*"

In 1550, in the reign of Edward VI., a woman was burnt at the stake for some opinion about the incarnation of Christ. The king was extremely reluctant to sign the death warrant, and yielded only to the authority of *Cranmer*. See Burnet. The Protestant historian Fuller, a *century afterwards*, has this passage about it: "She, with one or two Arians, were all who (and that justly) died in this king's reign for their opinions."—"And that justly!"

For an account of the executions and other severe punishments inflicted for religious opinions by the Protestants in England, see the Church Histories of Heylin, Fuller, and Collier, all Protestant writers. For a brief summary, see Smythe's Lectures on Mod. Hist. vol. i. p. 266, et seq. Am. ed. It appears that many were put to death in the reign of Henry VIII.; some in the time of Edward VI.; one hundred and sixty Roman Catholics in the reign of Elizabeth; sixteen or seventeen in that of James I.; and more than twenty by the Presbyterians and Republicans. Some of these were burned or hanged directly for their religious opinions; others under sanguinary laws enacted on supposed principles of state necessity

From a study of the history connected with these facts, the reader will be able to judge for himself how far the principle of the freedom of the mind in regard to religious faith, was recognised or respected by the reformers.

One more question the student should have before his mind in going through the history of this period. Admitting the right of individual judgment to be absolutely independent of all *human* authority, and all punishment for religious opinions to be absurd and monstrous,—has man, on the other hand, a right to oppose his

individual judgment to *divine* authority, and *arbitrarily* to reject the historical evidence by which the divine decision of any article of faith is established? On this point let the student recur to the remarks of Guizot, p. 261. "It [the Reformation] fell into a double error. On the one side it did not know or respect all the rights of human thought; at the very moment that it was demanding these rights for itself, it was violating them towards others. On the other side, it was unable to estimate the rights of authority in matters of reason. I do not speak of that coercive authority which ought to have no rights at all in such matters, but of that kind of authority which is purely moral, and acts solely by its influence upon the mind. In most reformed countries, something is wanting to complete the proper organization of intellectual society, and to the regular action of old and general opinions. What is due to and required by traditional belief, has not been reconciled with what is due to and required by freedom of thinking; and the cause of this undoubtedly is, that the Reformation did not fully comprehend and accept its own principles and effects."

This perhaps is the most important passage in the lecture for the student's meditation, and indicates a profound insight on the author's part into the great problem which it was the mission of the Reformation to solve; but which, as the author too truly says, is yet to be solved.

LECTURE XIII

THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION.

We have seen, that during the course of the sixteenth century, all the elements, all the facts, of ancient European society had merged in two essential facts, the right of free examination, and centralization of power; one prevailing in religious society, the other in civil society. The emancipation of the human mind and absolute monarchy triumphed at the same moment over Europe in general.

It could hardly be conceived that a struggle between these two facts—the characters of which appear so contradictory—would not, at some time, break out; for while one was the defeat of absolute power in the spiritual order, the other was the triumph of absolute power in the temporal order; one forced on the decline of the ancient ecclesiastical monarchy, the other was the consummation of the ruin of the ancient feudal and municipal liberty. Their simultaneous appearance was owing, as I have already observed, to the circumstance that the revolutions of the religious society followed more rapidly than those of the civil; one had arrived at the point in which the freedom of individual thought was secured, while the other still lingered on the spot where the concentration of all the powers in one general power took place. The co-incidence of these two facts, so far from being the consequence of their similitude, did not even prevent their contradiction. They were both advances in the march of civilization, but they were advances connected with different situations; advances of a different moral date, if I may be allowed the expression, although coincident in time. From their position it seemed inevitable that they must clash and combat before a reconciliation could be effected between them.

The first shock between them took place in England. The struggle of the right of free inquiry, the fruit of the Reformation, against the entire suppression of political liberty, the object

aimed at by pure monarchy—the attempt to abolish absolute power in the temporal order, as had already been done in the spiritual order—this is the true sense of the English revolution; this is the part it took in the work of civilization.

But how, it may be asked, came it to pass, that this struggle took place in England sooner than anywhere else? How happened it that the revolutions of a political character coincided here with those of a moral character sooner than they did on the Continent?

In England, the royal power had undergone the same vicissitudes as it had on the Continent. Under the Tudors it had reached a degree of concentration and vigor which it had never attained to before. I do not mean to say that the practical despotism of the Tudors was more violent and vexatious than that of their predecessors; there were quite as many, perhaps more, tyrannical proceedings, vexations, and acts of injustice, under the Plantagenets, as under the Tudors. Perhaps, too, at this very period the government of pure monarchy was more severe and arbitrary on the Continent than in England. The new fact under the Tudors was, that absolute power became systematic; royalty laid claim to a primitive, independent sovereignty; it held a language which it had never held before. The theoretic claims of Henry VIII., Elizabeth, James I., and Charles I., are very different from those of Edward I. and III., although, in point of fact, the power of the two latter monarchs was nowise less arbitrary or extensive. I repeat, then, it was the principle, the rational system of monarchy, which changed in England, in the sixteenth century, rather than its practical power; royalty now declared itself absolute and superior to all laws, even to those which it declared itself willing to respect.

There is another point to be considered; the religious revolution had not been accomplished in England in the same way as on the Continent; it was here the work of the monarchs themselves. It must not be supposed that the seeds had not been sown, or that even attempts had not been made at a popular reform, or that one would not probably have soon broken out. But Henry VIII. took the lead; power became revolutionary; and hence it happened, at least in its origin, that, as a redress of ecclesiastical abuses, as an emancipation of the human mind the reform in England was much less

complete than upon the Continent. It was made, as might naturally be expected, in accordance with the interests of its authors. The king and the episcopacy, which was here continued, divided between themselves the riches and the power, of which they despoiled their predecessors, the popes. The effect of this war soon felt. The Reformation people cried out, had been closed, while the greater part of the abuses which had induced them to desire it, were still continued.

The Reformation re-appeared under a more popular form, it made the same demands of the bishops that had already been made of the Holy See; it accused them of being so many popes. As often as the general fate of the religious revolution was compromised; whenever a struggle against the ancient Church took place, the various portions of the Reformation party rallied together, and made common cause against the common enemy: but this danger over, the struggle again broke out among themselves; the popular reform again attacked the aristocratic and royal reform, denounced its abuses, complained of its tyranny, called upon it to make good its promises, and not to usurp itself the power which it had just dethroned.

Much about the same time a movement for liberty took place in civil society; a desire before unknown, or at least but weakly expressed, was now felt for political freedom. In the course of the sixteenth century, the commercial prosperity of England had increased with amazing rapidity, while during the same time, much territorial wealth, much baronial property had changed hands. The numerous divisions of landed property, which took place during the sixteenth century, in consequence of the ruin of the feudal nobility, and from various other causes which I cannot now stop to enumerate, form a fact which has not been sufficiently noticed. A variety of documents prove how greatly the number of landed properties increased; the estates going generally into the hands of the gentry, composed of the lesser nobility, and persons who had acquired property by trade. The high nobility, the House of Lords, did not, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, nearly equal, in riches, the House of Commons. There had taken place, then, at the same time in England, a great increase in wealth among the industrious classes, and a great change in landed property. While these

two facts were being accomplished, there happened a third, a new march of mind.

The reign of Queen Elizabeth must be regarded as a period of great literary and philosophical activity in England, a period remarkable for bold and pregnant thought; the Puritans followed, without hesitation, all the consequences of a narrow, but powerful creed; other intellects, with less morality, but more freedom and boldness, alike regardless of principle or system, seized with avidity upon every idea, which seemed to promise some gratification to their curiosity, some food for their mental ardor. And it may be regarded as a maxim, that wherever the progress of intelligence is a true pleasure, a desire for liberty is soon felt, nor is it long in passing from the public mind to the state.

A feeling of the same kind, a sort of creeping desire for political liberty, almost manifested itself in some of the countries on the Continent in which the Reformation had made some way; but these countries, being without the means of success, made no progress; they knew not how to make their desire felt; they could find no support for it either in institutions, or in the habits and usages of the people; hence this desire remained vague, uncertain, and sought in vain for the means of satisfying its cravings. In England the case was widely different: the spirit of political liberty which showed itself here in the sixteenth century, as a sort of appendix to the Reformation, found both a firm support and the means of speaking and acting in the ancient institutions of the country, and indeed the whole frame-work of English society.

There is hardly any one who does not know the origin of the free institutions of England. How, in 1215, a coalition of the great barons wrested Magna Charta from John; but it is not quite so generally known, that this charter was renewed and confirmed, from time to time, by almost every king. It was confirmed upwards of thirty times between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, besides which new statutes were passed to confirm and extend its enactments. Thus it lived, as it were, without gap or interval. In the mean time the House of Commons had been formed, and taken its place among the sovereign institutions of the country. Under the Plantagenets it had taken deep root and became firmly established; not that at this time it played any great part or had even much influence in the government; it scarcely in

lced interfered in this except when called upon to do so by the king, and then only with hesitation and regret; afraid rather of bringing itself into trouble and danger, than jealous of augmenting its power and authority. But the case was different when it was called upon to defend private rights, the house or property of the citizens, or in short the rights and privileges of individuals; this duty the House of Commons performed with wonderful energy and perseverance, putting forward and establishing all those principles which have become the basis of the English constitution. Under the Tudors the House of Commons, or rather the Parliament altogether, put on a new character. It no longer defended individual liberty so well as under the Plantagenets. Arbitrary detentions, and violations of private rights, which became much more frequent, were often passed in silence. But, as a counterbalance for this, the Parliament interfered to a much greater extent than formerly in the general affairs of government. Henry VIII., in order to change the religion of the country, and to regulate the succession, required some public support, some public instrument, and he had recourse to Parliament, and especially to the House of Commons, for this purpose. This, which under the Plantagenets had only been a means of resistance, a guarantee of private rights, became now, under the Tudors, an instrument of government, of general policy; so that at the end of the sixteenth century, notwithstanding it had been the tool, and submitted to the will of nearly all sorts of tyrannies, its importance had greatly increased; the foundation of its power was laid, the foundation of that power upon which truly rests representative government.

In taking a view, then, of the free institutions of England at the end of the sixteenth century, we find them to consist: *first*, of maxims—of principles of liberty, which had been constantly acknowledged in written documents, and of which the legislation and country had never lost sight; *secondly*, of precedents, of examples of liberty; these, it is true, were mixed with a great number of precedents and examples of an opposite nature; still they were quite sufficient to maintain, to give a legal character to the claims of the friends of liberty, and to support them in their struggle against arbitrary and tyrannical government; *thirdly*, particular and local institutions, pregnant with the seeds of liberty, the jury, the right

of holding public meetings, of bearing arms, to which must be added the independence of municipal administration and jurisdiction: *fourthly and finally*, the parliament and its authority became more necessary now than ever to the monarchs, as these having dilapidated the greater part of their independent revenues, crown domains, feudal rights, &c., could not support even the expenses of their households, without having recourse to a vote of parliament.

The political state of England then was very different to that of the continent; notwithstanding the tyranny of the Tudors, notwithstanding the systematic triumph of absolute monarchy, there still remained here a firm support for the new spirit of liberty, a sure means by which it could act.

At this epoch, two national wants were felt in England: on one hand, a want of religious liberty and of a continuation of the reformation already begun; on the other, a want of political liberty, which seemed arrested by the absolute monarchy now establishing its power. These two parties formed an alliance; the party which wished to carry forward religious reform, invoked political liberty to the aid of its faith and conscience against the bishops and the crown. The friends of political liberty, in like manner, sought the aid of the friends of popular religious reform. The two parties joined their forces to struggle against absolute power, both spiritual and political, now concentrated in the hands of the king. Such is the origin and signification of the English revolution.

It appears, then, to have been essentially devoted to the defence or conquest of liberty. For the religious party it was a means, for the political party it was an end; but the object of both was still liberty, and they were determined to pursue it in common. Properly speaking, there had been no true quarrel between the episcopal and puritan party; the struggle was not about doctrines, about matters of faith, properly so called. I do not mean that these were not very positive, very important, and differences of great consequence between them; but this was not the main affair. What the puritan party wished to obtain from the episcopal was practical liberty; this was the object for which it struggled. It must, however, be admitted that there did exist at the same time, a religious party which had a system to found, a set of doctrines, a form of discipline, an ecclesiastic constitution, which it wished to es-

tablish—I mean the Presbyterians; but though it did its best, it had not the power to obtain its object. Acting upon the defensive, oppressed by the bishops, unable to take a step without the sanction of the political reformers, its necessary allies and chieftains, liberty naturally became its predominant interest; this was the general interest, the common desire of all the parties which concurred in the movement, however different in other respects might be their views. Taking these matters then altogether, we must come to the conclusion, that the English revolution was essentially political; it was accomplished in the midst of a religious people and a religious age; religious ideas and passions often became its instruments; but its primary intention and its definite object were decidedly political, a tendency to liberty, the destruction of all absolute power.

I shall now briefly run over the various phases of this revolution, and analyze it into the great parties that succeeded one another in its course. I shall afterwards connect it with the general career of European civilization; I shall show its place and influence therein; and you will be satisfied, from the detail of facts as well as from its first aspect, that it was truly the first collision of free inquiry and pure monarchy, the first onset that took place in the struggle between these two great and opposite powers.

Three principal parties appeared upon the stage at this important crisis; three revolutions seem to have been contained within it, and to have successively appeared upon the scene. In each party, in each revolution, two parties moved together in alliance, a political party and a religious party; the former took the lead, the second followed, but one could not go without the other, so that a double character seems to be imprinted upon it in all its changes.

The first party which appeared in the field, and under whose banners at the beginning marched all the others, was the high, pure-monarchy party, advocating legal reform. When the revolution began, when the long parliament assembled in 1640, it was generally said, and sincerely believed by many, that a legal, a constitutional reform would suffice, that the ancient laws and practices of the country were suf-

cient to correct every abuse, to establish a system of government which would fully meet the wishes of the public.

This party highly blamed and earnestly desired to put a stop to illegal imposts, to arbitrary imprisonments—to all acts, indeed, contrary to the known law and usages of the country But under these ideas, there lay hid, as it were, a belief in the divine right of the king, and in his absolute power. A secret instinct seemed to warn it that there was something false and dangerous in this notion; and on this account it appeared always desirous to avoid the subject. Forced, however, at last to speak out, it acknowledged the divine right of kings, and admitted that they possessed a power superior to all human origin, to all human control; and as such they defended it in time of need. Still, however, they believed that this sovereignty, though absolute in principle, was bound to exercise its authority according to certain rules and forms; that it could not go beyond certain limits; and that these rules, these forms, and these limits were sufficiently established and guarantied in Magna Charta, in the confirmative statutes, in the ancient laws and usages of the country. Such was the political creed of this party. In religious matters, it believed that the episcopacy had greatly encroached; that the bishops possessed far too much political power; that their jurisdiction was far too extensive, that it required to be restrained, and its proceedings jealously watched. Still it held firmly to episcopacy, not merely as an ecclesiastical institution, not merely as a form of church government, but as a necessary support of the royal prerogative, and as a means of defending and maintaining the supremacy of the king in matters of religion. The absolute power of the king over the body politic, exercised according to the forms and within the limits legally acknowledged; the supremacy of the king as head of the Church, applied and sustained by the episcopacy, was the twofold system of the legal reform party. We may enumerate as its chiefs, Lord Clarendon, Colepepper, Capel, and, though a more ardent friend of public liberty, Lord Falkland; and into their ranks were enlisted nearly all the nobility and gentry not servilely devoted to the court.

Behind this party advanced a second, which I shall call the political-revolutionary party; it differed from the foregoing, inasmuch as it did not believe the ancient guarantees, the ancient legal barriers sufficient to secure the rights and liber-

ties of the people. It saw that a great change, a genuine revolution was wanting, not only in the forms, but in the spirit and essence of the government; that it was necessary to deprive the king and his council of the unlimited power which they possessed, and to place the preponderance in the House of Commons; so that the government should, in fact, be in the hands of this assembly and its leaders. This party made no such open and systematic profession of its principles and intentions as I have done; but this was the real character of its opinions, and of its political tendencies. Instead of acknowledging the absolute sovereignty of the king, it contended for the sovereignty of the House of Commons as the representatives of the people. Under this principle was hid that of the sovereignty of the people; a notion which the party was as far from considering in its full extent, as it was from desiring the consequences to which it might ultimately lead, but which they nevertheless admitted when it presented itself to them in the form of the sovereignty of the House of Commons.

The religious party most closely allied to this political-revolutionary one was that of the Presbyterians. This sect wished to operate much the same revolution in the Church as their allies were endeavoring to effect in the state. They desired to erect a system of church government emanating from the people, and composed of a series of assemblies dovetailed, as it were, into each other; and thus to give to their national assembly the same authority in ecclesiastical matters that their allies wished to give in political to the House of Commons: only that the revolution contemplated by the Presbyterians was more complete and daring than the other, forasmuch as it aimed at changing the form as well as the principles of the government of the Church; while the views of the political party went no farther than to place the influence, the preponderance, in the body of the people, without mediating any great alteration in the form of their institutions.

Hence the leaders of this political party were not all favorable to the Presbyterian organization of the Church. Hampden and Hollis, as well as some others, it appears, would have given the preference to a moderate episcopacy, confined strictly to ecclesiastical functions, with a greater extent of liberty of conscience. They were obliged, however, to give way, as they could do nothing without the assistance of their fanatical allies.

The third party, going much beyond these two, declared that a change was required not only in the form, but also in the foundation of the government; that its constitution was radically vicious and bad. This party paid no respect to the past life of England, it renounced her institutions, it swept away all national remembrances, it threw down the whole fabric of English government, that it might build up another founded on pure theory, or at least one that existed only in its own fancy. It aimed not merely at a revolution in the government, but at a complete revolution of the whole social system. The party of which I have just spoken, the political-revolutionary party, proposed to make a great change in the relations in which the parliament stood with the crown; it wished to extend the power of the two houses, particularly of the commons, by giving to it the nomination of the great officers of state, and the supreme direction of affairs in general; but its notions of reform scarcely went beyond this. It had no idea, for example, of changing the electoral system, the judicial system, the administrative and municipal systems of the country. The republican party contemplated all these changes, dwelt upon their necessity, wished, in a word, to reform not only the public administration, but the relations of society, and the distribution of private rights.

Like the two preceding, this party was composed of a religious sect, and a political sect. Its political portion were the genuine republicans, the theorists, Ludlow, Harrington, Milton, &c. To these may be added the republicans of circumstance, of interest, such as the principal officers of the army, Ireton, Cromwell, Lambert, &c., who were more or less sincere at the beginning of their career, but were soon controlled and guided by personal motives and the force of circumstances. Under the banners of this party marched the religious republicans, all those religious sects which would acknowledge no power as legitimate but that of Jesus Christ, and who, awaiting his second coming, desired only the government of his elect. Finally, in the train of this party followed a mixed assemblage of subordinate free-thinkers, fanatics, and levellers, some hoping for license, some for an equal distribution of property, and others for universal suffrage.

In 1653, after twelve years of struggle, all these parties had successively appeared and failed; they appear at least to

have thought so, and the public was sure of it. The legal reform party quickly disappeared; it saw the old constitution and laws insulted, trampled under foot, and innovations forcing their way on every side. The political-revolutionary party saw the destruction of parliamentary forms in the new use which it was proposed to make of them—it had seen the House of Commons reduced, by the successive expulsions of royalists and Presbyterians, to a few members, despised, detested by the public, and incapable of governing. The republican party appeared to have succeeded better; it seemed to be left master of the field and of power; the House of Commons consisted of but fifty or sixty members, all republicans. They might fancy themselves, and call themselves, the rulers of the country; but the country rejected their government; they were nowhere obeyed; they had no power either over the army or the nation. No social bond, no social security was now left; justice was no longer administered, or if it was, it was controlled by passion, chance, or party. Not only was there no security in the relations of private life, but the highways were covered with robbers and companies of brigands. Anarchy in every part of the civil, as well as of the moral world, prevailed; and neither the House of Commons, nor the republican Council of State, had the power to restrain it.

Thus, the three great parties which had brought about the revolution, and which in their turn had been called upon to conduct it—had been called upon to govern the country according to their principles and their will—had all signally failed. They could do nothing—they could settle nothing. "Now it was," says Bossuet, "that a man was found who left nothing to fortune, which he could gain by counsel and foresight;" a remark which has no foundation whatever in truth, and which every part of history contradicts. No man ever left more to fortune than Cromwell. No one ever risked more—no one ever pushed forward more rashly, without design, without an aim, yet determined to go as far as fate would carry him. Unbounded ambition, and admirable tact for drawing from every day, from every circumstance, some new progress—the art of profiting by fortune without seeming ever to possess the desire to constrain it, formed the character of Cromwell. In one particular his career was singular, and differs from that of every individual with whom we are apt to compare him: he adapted himself to all the various changes,

numerous as they were, as well as to the state of things they led to, of the revolution. He appears a prominent character in every scene, from the rise of the curtain to the close of the piece. He was now the instigator of the insurrection—now the abetter of anarchy—now the most fiery of the revolutionists—now the restorer of order and social re-organization; thus playing himself all the principal parts which, in the common run of revolutions, are usually distributed among the greatest actors. He was not a Mirabeau, for he failed in eloquence, and, though very active, he made no great figure in the first years of the long parliament. But he was successively Danton and Bonaparte. Cromwell did more than any one to overthrow authority; he raised it up again, because there was no other than he that could take it and manage it. The country required a ruler; all others failed, and he succeeded. This was his title. Once master of the government, Cromwell, whose boundless ambition had exerted itself so vigorously, who had so constantly pushed fortune before him, and seemed determined never to stop in his career, displayed a good sense, a prudence, a knowledge of how much was possible, which overruled his most violent passions. There can be no doubt of his extreme fondness for absolute power, nor of his desire to place the crown upon his own head and keep it in his family. He saw the peril of this latter design and renounced it; and though, in fact, he did exercise absolute authority, he saw very well that the spirit of the times would not bear it; that the revolution which he had helped to bring about, which he had followed through all its phases, had been directed against despotism, and that the uncontrollable will of England was to be governed by a parliament and parliamentary forms. He endeavored, therefore, despot as he was, by taste and by deeds, to govern by a parliament. For this purpose he had recourse to all the various parties; he tried to form a parliament from the religious enthusiasts, from the republicans, from the Presbyterians, and from the officers of the army. He tried every means to obtain a parliament able and willing to take part with him in the government; but he tried in vain; every party, the moment it was seated in St. Stephen's, endeavored to wrest from him the authority which he exercised, and to rule in its turn. I do not mean to deny that his personal interest, the gratification of his darling ambition was his first care; but it is no less certain that if he had abdicated his authority one day, he would have been obliged to resume

the next. Puritans or royalists, republicans or officers, there was no one but Cromwell who was in a state at this time to govern with any thing like order or justice. The experiment had been made. It seemed absurd to think of leaving to parliaments, that is to say, to the faction sitting in parliament, a government which it could not maintain. Such was the extraordinary situation of Cromwell: he governed by a system which he knew very well was foreign and hateful to the country, he exercised an authority which was acknowledged necessary by all, but which was acceptable to none. No party looked upon his domination as a definitive government. Royalists, Presbyterians, republicans, even the army itself, which appears to have been the party most devoted to Cromwell, all looked upon his rule as transitory. He had no hold upon the affections of the people; he was never more than a *pis-aller*, a last resort, a temporary necessity. The protector, the absolute master of England, was obliged all his life to have recourse to force to preserve his power; no party could govern so well as he, but no party liked to see the government in his hands; he was repeatedly attacked by them all at once.

Upon Cromwell's death, there was no party in a situation to seize upon the government except the republicans; they did seize upon it, but with no better success than before. This happened from no lack of confidence, at least, in the enthusiasts of the party. A spirited and talented tract, published at this juncture by Milton, is entitled "A Ready and Easy Way to establish a free Commonwealth." You may judge of the blindness of these men, who soon fell into a state which showed that it was quite as impossible for them to carry on the government now as it had been before. Monk undertook the direction of that event which all England now seemed anxious for. The Restoration was accomplished

The restoration of the Stuarts was an event generally pleasing to the nation. It brought back a government which still dwelt in its memory, which was founded upon its ancient traditions, while, at the same time, it had some of the advantages of a new government, in that it had not recently been tried, in that its faults and its power had not lately been felt. The ancient monarchy was the only system of government

which had not been decried, within the last twenty years, for its abuses and want of capacity in the administration of the affairs of the kingdom. From these two causes the restoration was extremely popular; it was unopposed by any but the dregs of the most violent factions, while the public rallied round it with great sincerity. All parties in the country seemed now to believe that this offered the only chance left of a stable and legal government, and this was what, above all things, the nation now desired. This also was what the restoration seemed especially to promise; it took much pains to present itself under the aspect of legal government.

The first royalist party, indeed, to whom, upon the return of Charles the Second, the management of affairs was intrusted, was the legal party, represented by its able leader, the Lord Chancellor Clarendon. From 1660 to 1667, Clarendon was prime minister, and had the chief direction of affairs: he and his friends brought back with them their ancient principles of government, the absolute sovereignty of the king, kept within legal bounds, limited by the House of Commons as regards taxation, by the public tribunals, in matters of private right, or relating to individual liberty,—possessing, nevertheless, in point of government, properly so called, an almost complete independence, and the most decided preponderance, to the exclusion or even in opposition to the votes of the majorities of the two houses, but particularly to that of the House of Commons. In other matters there was not much to complain of: a tolerable degree of respect was paid to legal order; there was a tolerable degree of solicitude for the national interests; a sufficiently noble sentiment of national dignity was preserved, and a color of morality that was grave and honorable. Such was the character of Clarendon's administration, during the seven years the government was committed to his charge

But the fundamental principles upon which this administration was based—the absolute sovereignty of the king, and a government beyond the preponderating control of parliament —were now become old and powerless. Notwithstanding the temporary reaction which took place at the first burst of the restoration, twenty years of parliamentary rule against royalty had destroyed them for ever. A new party soon showed itself among the royalists; libertines, profligates, wretches who, imbued with the free opinions of the times, and seeing

that power was with the commons,—caring themselves but little about legal order, or the absolute power of the king,—were only anxious for success, and to discover the means of influence and power in whatever quarter they were likely to be found. These formed a party, and allying themselves with the national, discontented party, Clarendon was discarded.

A new system of government now took place under that portion of the royalists I have just described; profligates and libertines formed the administration of the Cabal, and several others which followed it. What was their character? Without inquietude respecting principles, laws, or rights, or care for justice or truth; they sought the means of success upon every occasion, whatever these means might be; if success depended on the influence of the commons, the commons were everything; if it was necessary to cajole the commons, the commons were cajoled without scruple, even though they had to apologize to them the next day. At one moment they attempted corruption, at another they flattered the national wishes; no regard was shown for the general interests of the country, for its dignity or its honor; in a word, it was a government profoundly selfish and immoral, totally unacquainted with all theory, principle, or public object; but, withal, in the practical management of affairs, showing considerable intelligence and liberality. Such was the character of the Cabal ministry, of Earl Danby's, and of the English government from 1667 to 1679. Yet notwithstanding its immorality, notwithstanding its disdain of all principle, and of the true interests of the country, this government was not so unpopular not so odious to the nation as that of Clarendon; and this simply because it adapted itself better to the times, better understood the sentiments of the people, even while it derided them. It was neither foreign nor antiquated, like that of Clarendon; and though infinitely more dangerous to the country, the people accommodated themselves better to it.

But this corruption, this servility, this contempt of public rights and public honor, were at last carried to such a pitch as to be no longer supportable. A general outcry was raised against this government of profligates. A patriotic party, supported by the nation, became gradually formed in the House of Commons, and the king was obliged to take the leaders of it into his council. Lord Essex, the son of him who had com-

manded the first parliamentary armies in the civil war, Lord Russel, and Lord Shaftesbury, who, without any of the virtues of the other two, was much their superior in political abilities, were now called to the management of affairs. The national party, to whom the direction of the government was now committed proved itself unequal to the task: it could not gain possession of the moral force of the country: it could neither manage the interests, the habits, nor the prejudices of the king, of the court, nor of any with whom it had to do It inspired no party, either king or people, with any confidence in its energy or ability; and after holding power for a short time, this national ministry completely failed. The virtues of its leaders, their generous courage, the beauty of their death, have raised them to a distinguished niche in the temple of fame, and entitled them to honorable mention in the page of history; but their political capacities in no way corresponded to their virtues: they could not wield power, though they could withstand its corrupting influence, nor could they achieve a triumph for that glorious cause, for which they could so nobly die!

The failure of this attempt left the English restoration in rather an awkward plight; it had, like the English revolution, in a manner tried all parties without success. The legal ministry, the corrupt ministry, the national ministry, having all failed, the country and the court were nearly in the same situation as that which England had been in before, at the close of the revolutionary troubles in 1653. Recourse was had to the same expedient: what Cromwell had turned to the profit of the revolution, Charles II. now turned to the profit of the crown; he entered upon a career of absolute power.

James II. succeeded his brother; and another question now became mixed up with that of despotism: the question of religion. James II. wished to achieve, at the same time, a triumph for popery and for absolute power: now again, as at the commencement of the revolution, there was a religious struggle and a political struggle, and both were directed against the government. It has often been asked, what course affairs would have taken if William III. had not existed, and come over to put an end to the quarrel between James and the people. My firm belief is that the same event would have taken

place. All England, except a very small party, was at this time arrayed against James; and it seems very certain, that, under some form or other, the revolution of 1688 must have been accomplished. But at this crisis, causes even superior to the internal state of England conduced to this event. It was European as well as English. It is at this point that the English revolution links itself, by facts, and independently of the influence of its example, to the general course of European civilization.

While the struggle which I have just been narrating took place in England, the struggle of absolute power against religious and civil liberty—a struggle of the same kind, however different the actors, the forms, and the theatre, took place upon the continent—a struggle which was at bottom the same, and carried on in the same cause. The pure monarchy of Louis XIV. attempted to become universal monarchy, at least it gave the world every reason to fear it; and, in fact, Europe did fear it. A league was formed in Europe between various political parties to resist this attempt, and the chief of this league was the chief of the party that struggled for the civil and religious liberty of Europe—William, Prince of Orange. The Protestant republic of Holland, with William at its head, had made a stand against pure monarchy, represented and conducted by Louis XIV. The fight here was not for civil and religious liberty in the interior of states, but for the interior independence of the states themselves. Louis XIV. and his adversaries never thought of debating the questions which were debated so fiercely in England. This struggle was not one of parties, but of states; it was carried on, not by political outbreaks and revolutions, but by war and negotiation; still, at bottom, the same principle was the subject of contention.

It happened, then, that the strife between absolute power and liberty, which James II. renewed in England, broke out at the very moment that this general struggle was going on in Europe between Louis XIV. and the Prince of Orange, the representatives of these two great systems, as well in the affairs which took place on the Thames as on the Scheldt. The league against Louis was so powerful that many sovereigns entered into it, either publicly, or in an underhand, though very effective manner, who were rather opposed than

not to the interests of civil and religious liberty. The Emperor of Germany and Innocent XI. both supported William against France. And William crossed the channel to England less to serve the internal interests of the country, than to draw it entirely into the struggle against Louis. He laid hold of this kingdom as a new force which he wanted, but of which his adversary had had the disposal, up to this time, against him. So long as Charles II. and James II. reigned, England belonged to Louis XIV.; he had the disposal of it, and had kept it employed against Holland. England then was snatched from the side of absolute and universal monarchy, to become the most powerful support and instrument of civil and religious liberty. This is the view which must be taken, as regards European civilization, of the revolution of 1688; it is this which gives it a place in the assemblage of European events, independently of the influence of its example, and of the vast effect which it had upon the minds and opinions of men in the following century.

Thus, I think, I have rendered it clear, that the true sense, the essential character of this revolution is, as I said at the outset of this lecture, an attempt to abolish absolute power in the temporal order, as had already been done in the spiritual. This fact appears in all the phases of the revolution, from its first outbreak to the restoration, and again in the crisis of 1688: and this not only as regards its interior progress, but in its relations with Europe in general.

It now only remains for us to study the same great event, the struggle of free inquiry and pure monarchy, upon the continent, or at least the causes and preparation of this event This will be the object of the next and final lecture

LECTURE XIV

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

I ENDEAVORED, at our last meeting, to ascertain the true character and political object of the English revolution. We have seen that it was the first collision of the two great facts to which, in the course of the sixteenth century, all the civilization of primitive Europe tended,—monarchy on the one hand, and free inquiry on the other. These two powers came to blows, if I may use the expression, for the first time in England. It has been attempted, from this circumstance, to deduce a radical difference between the social state of England and that of the Continent; it has been contended, that no comparison could be made between countries so differently situated; and it has been affirmed, that the English people had lived in a sort of moral separation from the rest of Europe, analogous to its physical insulation.

It is true that between the civilization of England, and that of the continental states, there has been a material difference which it is important that we should rightly understand. You have already had a glimpse of it in the course of these lectures. The development of the different principles, the different elements of society, took place, in some measure, at the same time, at least much more simultaneously than upon the Continent. When I endeavored to determine the complexion of European civilization as compared with the civilization of ancient and Asiatic nations, I showed that the former was varied, rich, and complex, and that it had never fallen under the influence of any exclusive principle; that, in it, the different elements of the social state had combined, contended with, and modified each other, and had continually been obliged to come to an accommodation, and to subsist together. This fact, which forms the general character of European civilization, has in an especial manner been that of the civilization of England; it is in that country that it has appeared most evidently and uninterruptedly; it is there that the civil

and religious orders, aristocracy, democracy, monarchy, local and central institutions, moral and political development, have proceeded and grown up together, if not with equal rapidity at least but at a little distance from each other. Under the reign of the Tudors, for example, in the midst of the most remarkable progress of pure monarchy, we have seen the democratic principle, the popular power, make its way and gain strength almost at the same time. The revolution of the seventeenth century broke out; it was at the same time religious and political. The feudal aristocracy appeared in it in a very enfeebled state, and with all the symptoms of decay, it was, however, still in a condition to preserve its place in this revolution, and to have some share in its results. The same thing has been the case in the whole course of English history; no ancient element has ever entirely perished, nor any new element gained a total ascendency; no particular principle has ever obtained an exclusive influence There has always been a simultaneous development of the different forces, and a sort of negotiation or compromise between their pretensions and interests.

On the continent the march of civilization had been less complex and complete. The different elements of society, the civil and religious orders, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, have developed themselves, not together, and abreast, as it were, but successively. Every principle, every system, has in some measure had its turn. One age, for example, has belonged, I shall not say exclusively, but with a decided predominance, to the feudal aristocracy; another to the principle of monarchy; another to the principle of democracy. Compare the middle ages in France, with the middle ages in England; the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries of our history with the corresponding centuries on the other side of the channel; you will find in France, at that epoch, feudalism in a state of almost absolute sovereignty, while monarchy and the democratic principle scarcely had an existence. But turn to England, and you will find, that although the feudal aristocracy greatly predominated, that monarchy and democracy possessed, at the same time, strength and importance. Monarchy triumphed in England under Elizabeth, as in France under Louis XIV.; but what precautions it was constrained to take! how many restrictions, sometimes aristocratic, sometimes democratic, it was obliged to submit to! In England

every system, every principle, has had its time of strength and success; but never so completely and exclusively as on the continent: the conqueror has always been constrained to tolerate the presence of his rivals, and to leave them a certain share of influence.

To this difference in the march of these two civilizations there are attached advantages and inconveniences which are apparent in the history of the two countries. There is no doubt, for example, that the simultaneous development of the different social elements has greatly contributed to make England arrive more quickly than any of the continental states, at the end and aim of all society, that is to say, the establishment of a government at once regular and free. It is the very nature of a government to respect all the interests, all the powers of the state, to conciliate them and make them live and prosper in common: now such was, beforehand, and by the concurrence of a multitude of causes, the despotism and mutual relation of the different elements of English society; and, therefore, a general and somewhat regular government had the less difficulty in establishing itself. In like manner the essence of liberty is the simultaneous manifestation and action of every interest, every kind of right, every force, every social element. England, therefore, had made a nearer approach to liberty than most other states. From the same causes, national good sense and intelligence of public affairs must have formed themselves more quickly than elsewhere; political good sense consists in understanding and appreciating every fact, and in assigning to each its proper part; in England it has been a necessary consequence of the state of society a natural result of the course of civilization.

In the states of the Continent, on the contrary, every system, every principle, having had its turn, and having had a more complete and exclusive ascendency, the development took place on a larger scale, and with more striking circumstances. Monarchy and feudal aristocracy, for example, appeared on the continental stage with more boldness, extent, and freedom. Every political experiment, so to speak, was broader and more complete. The result was, that political ideas—I speak of general ideas, and not of good sense applied to the conduct of affairs; that political ideas and doctrines took a greater elevation, and displayed themselves with

much greater rational vigor. Every system having, in some sort, presented itself singly, and having remained a long time on the stage, people could contemplate it in its general aspect, ascend to its first principles, pursue it into its remotest consequences, and lay bare its entire theory. Whoever observes with some degree of attention the genius of the English nation, will be struck with a double fact; on the one hand, its steady good sense and practical ability; on the other, its want of general ideas, and of elevation of thought upon theoretical questions. Whether we open an English work on history, jurisprudence, or any other subject, we rarely find the great and fundamental reason of things. In every subject, and especially in the political sciences, pure philosophical doctrines —science properly so called—have prospered much more on the continent, than in England; their flights, at least, have been bolder and more vigorous. Indeed, it cannot be doubted that the different character of the development of civilization in the two countries has greatly contributed to this result.

At all events, whatever may be thought of the inconveniences or advantages which have been produced by this difference, it is a real and incontestable fact, and that which most essentially distinguishes England from the Continent. But, though the different principles, the different social elements have developed themselves more simultaneously there, and more successively in France, it does not follow that, at bottom, the road and the goal have not been the same. Considered generally, the continent and England have gone through the same great phases of civilization; events have followed the same course; similar causes have led to similar effects. You may have convinced yourselves of this by the view I have given you of civilization down to the sixteenth century; you will remark it no less in studying the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The development of free inquiry, and that of pure monarchy, almost simultaneous in England, were accomplished on the Continent at pretty long intervals; but they were accomplished; and these two powers, after having successively exercised a decided predominance, came also into collision. The general march of society, then, on the whole, has been the same; and, though the differences are real, the resemblance is still greater. A rapid sketch of modern times will leave you no doubt on this subject.

The moment we cast our eyes on the history of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we cannot fail to perceive that France marches at the head of European civilization. At the beginning of this course, I strongly affirmed this fact, and endeavored to point out its cause. We shall now find it more strikingly displayed than it has ever been before

The principle of pure and absolute monarchy had predominated in Spain, under Charles V. and Philip II., before its development in France under Louis XIV In like manner the principle of free inquiry had reigned in England in the seventeenth century, before its development in France in the eighteenth. Pure monarchy, however, did not go forth from Spain, nor free inquiry from England, to make the conquest of Europe. The two principles or systems remained, in some sort, confined within the countries in which they sprang up They required to pass through France to extend their dominion; pure monarchy and liberty of inquiry were compelled to become French before they could become European. That communicative character of French civilization, that social genius of France, which has displayed itself at every period, was peculiarly conspicuous at the period which now engages our attention. I shall not dwell upon this fact; it has been expounded to you, with equal force of argument and brilliancy, in the lectures in which your attention has been directed to the influence of the literature and philosophy of France in the eighteenth century. You have seen how the philosophy of France had, in regard to liberty, more influence on Europe than the liberty of England. You have seen how French civilization showed itself much more active and contagious than that of any other country. I have no occasion, therefore, to dwell upon the details of this fact; I avail myself of it only in order to make it my ground for making France comprehend the picture of modern European civilization. There were, no doubt, between French civilization at this period, and that of the other states of Europe, differences on which I ought to lay great stress, if it were my intention at present to enter fully into this subject; but I must proceed so rapidly, that I am obliged to pass over whole nations, and whole ages. I think it better to confine your attention to the course of French civilization, as being an image, though an imperfect one, of the general course of things in Europe.

The influence of France in Europe, in the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries, appears under very different aspects. In the first of these centuries, it was the French government which acted upon Europe, and took the lead in the march of general civilization. In the second, it was no longer to the French government, but to the French society, to France herself, that the preponderance belonged. It was at first Louis XIV. and his court, and then France herself, and her public opinion, that attracted the attention, and swayed the minds of the rest of Europe. There were, in the seventeenth century nations, who, as such, made a more prominent appearance on the stage, and took a greater share in the course of events, than the French nation. Thus, during the thirty years' war, the German nation, and the revolution of England, the English nation played, within their respective spheres, a much greater part than the French nation, at that period, played within theirs. In the eighteenth century, in like manner, there were stronger, more respected, and more formidable governments than that of France. There is no doubt that Frederick II. and Maria Theresa had more activity and weight in Europe than Louis XV. Still, at both of these periods, France was at the head of European civilization, first through her government, and afterwards through herself; at one time through the political action of her rulers, at another through her own intellectual development. To understand thoroughly the predominant influence on the course of civilization in France, and consequently in Europe, we must therefore study, in the seventeenth century, the French government, and in the eighteenth, the French nation. We must change our ground and our objects of view, according as time changes the scene and the actors.

Whenever the government of Louis XIV. is spoken of, whenever we attempt to appreciate the causes of his power and influence in Europe, we have little to consider beyond his splendor, his conquests, his magnificence, and the literary glory of his time. We must resort to exterior causes in order to account for the preponderance of the French government in Europe.

But this preponderance, in my opinion, was derived from causes more deeply seated, from motives of a more serious kind. We must not believe that it was entirely by means of victories, festivals, or even master-pieces of genius, that Louis

XIV. and his government played, at that period, the part which no one can deny them.

Many of you may remember, and all of you have heard of the effect which, twenty-nine years ago, was produced by the consular government in France, and the state in which it found our country. Abroad, foreign invasion impending, and continual disasters in our armies; at home, the elements of government and society in a state of dissolution; no revenues, no public order; in short, a people beaten, humbled, and disorganized—such was France at the accession of the consular government. Who is there that does not remember the prodigious and successful activity of that government, an activity which, in a short time, secured the independence of our territory, revived our national honor, re-organized the administration of government, re-moddled our legislation, in short, gave society, as it were, a new life under the hand of power?

Well—the government of Louis XIV., when it began, did something of the same kind for France; with great differences of times, of proceedings, and of forms, it prosecuted and attained very nearly the same results.

Remember the state into which France had fallen after the government of Cardinal Richelieu, and during the minority of Louis XIV: the Spanish armies always on the frontiers, and sometimes in the interior; continual danger of invasion; internal dissensions carried to extremity, civil war, the government weak, and decried both at home and abroad. There never was a more miserable policy, more despised in Europe, or more powerless in France, than that of Cardinal Mazarin. In a word, society was in a state, less violent perhaps, but very analogous to ours before the 18th of Brumaire. It was from that state that the government of Louis XIV. delivered France. His earliest victories had the effect of the victory of Marengo; they secured the French territory and revived the national honor. I am going to consider this government under its various aspects, in its wars, its foreign relations, its administration, and its legislation; and you will see, I believe, that the comparison which I speak of, and to which I do not wish to attach a puerile importance, (for I care very little about historical comparisons,) you will see, I say, that this comparison has a real foundation, and that I am fully justified in making it.

I shall first speak of the wars of Louis XIV. European wars were originally (as you know, and as I have several times had occasion to remind you) great popular movements; impelled by want, by some fancy, or any other cause, whole populations, sometimes numerous, sometimes consisting of mere bands, passed from one territory to another. This was the general character of European wars, till after the crusades, at the end of the thirteenth century.

After this another kind of war arose, but almost equally different from the wars of modern times: these were distant wars, undertaken, not by nations, but by their governing powers, who went, at the head of their armies, to seek, at a distance, states and adventures. They quitted their country, abandoned their own territory, and penetrated, some into Germany, others into Italy, and others into Africa, with no other motive save their individual fancy. Almost all the wars of the fifteenth, and even a part of the sixteenth century, are of this character. What interest—and I do not speak of a legitimate interest—but what motive had France for wishing that Charles VIII. should possess the kingdom of Naples? It was evidently a war dictated by no political considerations; the king thought he had personal claims on the kingdom of Naples; and, for this personal object, to satisfy his own personal desire, he undertook the conquest of a distant country, which was by no means adapted to the territorial conveniences of his kingdom, but which, on the contrary, only endangered his power abroad and his repose at home. Such, again, was the case with regard to the expedition of Charles V. into Africa. The last war of this kind was the expedition of Charles XII. against Russia.

The wars of Louis XIV. were not of this description; they were the wars of a regular government—a government fixed in the centre of its dominions, endeavoring to extend its conquests around, to increase or consolidate its territory; in short, they were political wars. They may have been just or unjust, they may have cost France too dear;—they may be objected to on many grounds—on the score of morality or excess; but, in fact, they were of a much more rational character than the wars which preceded them; they were no longer fanciful adventures; they were dictated by serious motives; their objects were to reach some natural boundary, some population who spoke the same language, and might be annexed to the kingdom, some point of defence against a

neighboring power. Personal ambition, no doubt, had a share in them; but examine the wars of Louis XIV., one after the other, especially those of the early part of his reign, and you will find that their motives were really political; you will see that they were conceived with a view to the power and safety of France.

This fact has been proved by results. France, at the present day, in many respects, is what the wars of Louis XIV. made her. The provinces which he conquered, Franche-Comté, Flanders, and Alsace, have remained incorporated with France. There are rational conquests as well as foolish ones: those of Louis XIV. were rational; his enterprises have not that unreasonable, capricious character, till then so general, their policy was able, if not always just and prudent.

If I pass from the wars of Louis XIV. to his relations with foreign states, to his diplomacy properly so called, I find an analogous result. I have already spoken of the origin of diplomacy at the end of the fifteenth century. I have endeavored to show how the mutual relations of governments and states, previously accidental, rare, and transient, had at that period become more regular and permanent, how they had assumed a character of great public interest; how, in short, at the end of the fifteenth and during the first half of the sixteenth century, diplomacy had begun to perform a part of immense importance in the course of events. Still, however, it was not till the seventeenth century that it became really systematic; before then, it had not brought about long alliances, great combinations, and especially combinations of a durable nature, directed by fixed principles, with a steady object, and with that spirit of consistency which forms the true character of established governments. During the course of the religious revolution, the foreign relations of states had been almost completely under the influence of religious interests; the Protestant and Catholic leagues had divided Europe between them. It was in the seventeenth century, under the influence of the government of Louis XIV., that diplomacy changed its character. On the one hand, it got rid of the exclusive influence of the religious principle; alliances and political combinations took place from other considerations. At the same time it became much more systematic and regular, and was always directed towards a certain object, according to permanent principles. The regular birth of the system

of the balance of power in Europe, took place at this period. It was under the government of Louis XIV. that this system, with all the considerations attached to it, really took possession of the politics of Europe. When we inquire what was, on this subject, the general idea or ruling principle of the policy of Louis XIV., the following seems to be the result.

I have spoken of the great struggle which took place in Europe between the pure monarchy of Louis XIV., pretending to establish itself as the universal system of monarchy, and civil and religious liberty, and the independence of states, under the command of the Prince of Orange, William III. You have seen that the great European fact, at that epoch, was the division of the powers of Europe under these two banners. But this fact was not then understood as I now explain it; it was hidden, and unknown even to those by whom it was accomplished. The repression of the system of pure monarchy, and the consecration of civil and religious liberty, was necessarily, at bottom, the result of the resistance of Holland and her allies to Louis XIV.; but the question between absolute power and liberty was not then thus absolutely laid down. It has been frequently said that the propagation of absolute power was the ruling principle in the diplomacy of Louis XIV. I do not think so. It was at a late period, and in his old age, that this consideration assumed a great part in his policy. The power of France, her preponderance in Europe, the depression of rival powers,—in short, the political interest and strength of the state, was the object which Louis XIV. always had in view, whether he was contending against Spain, the Emperor of Germany, or England. He was much less actuated by a wish for the propagation of absolute power than by a desire for the aggrandizement of France and his own government. Among many other proofs of this, there is one which emanates from Louis XIV. himself. We find in his *Memoirs*, for the year 1666, if I remember rightly, a note conceived nearly in these terms:—

"This morning I had a conversation with Mr. Sidney, an English gentleman, who spoke to me of the possibility of reviving the republican party in England. Mr. Sidney asked me for £400,000 for this purpose. I told him I could not give him more than £200,000. He prevailed on me to send to Switzerland for another English gentleman, called Mr. Ludlow, that I might converse with him upon the same subject."

We find accordingly, in Ludlow's Memoirs, about the same date, a paragraph to the following import:—

"I have received from the French government an invitation to go to Paris, to have some discussion on the affairs of my country; but I distrust this government."

And, in fact, Ludlow did remain in Switzerland.

You see that the object of Louis XIV. at that time was to weaken the royal power of England. He fomented internal dissensions, he labored to revive the republican party, in order to hinder Charles II. from becoming too powerful in his own country. In the course of Barillon's embassy to England, the same fact is constantly apparent. As often as the authority of Charles II. seems to be gaining the ascendency, and the national party on the point of being overpowered, the French ambassador turns his influence in that direction, gives money to the leaders of the opposition, and, in short contends against absolute power, as soon as that becomes the means of weakening a rival of France. Whenever we attentively examine the conduct of foreign relations under Louis XIV., this is the fact which we are struck with.

We are also surprised at the capacity and ability of the French diplomacy at this period. The names of Torcy, D'Avaux, and Bonrepaus, are known to all well-informed persons. When we compare the despatches, the memorials, the skill, the management of these counsellors of Louis XIV., with those of the Spanish, Portuguese, and German negotiators, we are struck with the superiority of the French ministers; not only with their serious activity and application to business, but with their freedom of thought. These courtiers of an absolute king judge of foreign events, of parties, of the demands for freedom, and of popular revolutions, much more soundly than the greater part of the English themselves of that period. There is no diplomacy in Europe in the seventeenth century which appears equal to the diplomacy of France, except perhaps that of Holland. The ministers of John de Witt and William of Orange, those illustrious leaders of the party of civil and religious liberty, are the only ones who appear to have been in a condition to contend with the servants of the great absolute king.

You see, that, whether we consider the wars of Louis XIV. or his diplomatic relations, we arrive at the same results. We can easily conceive how a government which conducted in such a manner its wars and negotiations, must have acquired

great solidity in Europe, and assumed not only a formidable, but an able and imposing aspect.

Let us now turn our eyes to the interior of France, and the administration and legislation of Louis XIV.; we shall everywhere find new explanations of the strength and splendor of his government.

It is difficult to determine precisely what ought to be understood by administration in the government of a state. Still, when we endeavor to come to a distinct understanding on this subject, we acknowledge, I believe, that, under the most general point of view, administration consists in an assemblage of means destined to transmit, as speedily and surely as possible, the will of the central power into all departments of society, and, under the same conditions, to make the powers of society return to the central power, either in men or money. This, if I am not mistaken, is the true object, the prevailing character, of administration. From this we may perceive that, in times where it is especially necessary to establish union and order in society, administration is the great means of accomplishing it,—of bringing together, cementing, and uniting scattered and incoherent elements. Such, in fact, was the work of the administration of Louis XIV. Till his time, nothing had been more difficult, in France as well as in the rest of Europe, than to cause the action of the central power to penetrate into all the parts of society, and to concentrate into the heart of the central power the means of strength possessed by the society at large. This was the object of Louis's endeavors, and he succeeded in it to a certain extent, incomparably better, at least, than preceding governments had done. I cannot enter into any details; but take a survey of every kind of public service, the taxes, the highways, industry, the military administration, and the various establishments which belong to any branch of administration whatever; there is hardly any of them which you will not find to have either been originated, developed, or greatly meliorated, under the reign of Louis XIV. It was as administrators that the greatest men of his time, such as Colbert and Louvois, displayed their genius and exercised their ministerial functions. It was thus that his government acquired a comprehensiveness, a decision, and a consistency, which were wanting in all the European governments around him.

The same fact holds with respect to this government, as

regards its legislative capacity. I will again refer to the comparison I made in the outset to the legislative activity of the Consular government, and its prodigious labor in revising and remodelling the laws. A labor of the same kind was undertaken under Louis XIV. The great ordinances which he passed and promulgated,—the ordinances on the criminal law, on forms of procedure, on commerce, on the navy, on waters and forests,—are real codes of law, which were constructed in the same manner as our codes, having been discussed in the Council of State, sometimes under the presidency of Lamoignon. There are men whose glory it is to have taken a share in this labor and those discussions,—M. Pussort, for example. If we had to consider it simply in itself, we should have a great deal to say against the legislation of Louis XIV. It is full of faults which are now evident, and which nobody can dispute; it was not conceived in the spirit of justice and true liberty, but with a view to public order, and to give regularity and stability to the laws. But even that alone was a great progress; and it cannot be doubted that the legislative acts of Louis XIV., very superior to the previous state of legislation, powerfully contributed to the advancement of French society in the career of civilization.

Under whatever point of view, then, we regard this government, we can at once discover the means of its strength and influence. It was, in truth, the first government which presented itself to the eyes of Europe as a power sure of its position, which had not to dispute for its existence with domestic enemies, which was tranquil in regard to its territory and its people, and had nothing to think of but the care of governing. Till then, all the European governments had been incessantly plunged into wars which deprived them of security as well as leisure, or so assailed by parties and enemies at home, that they passed their time in fighting for their existence. The government of Louis XIV. appeared to be the first that was engaged solely in managing its affairs like a power at once definitive and progressive, which was not afraid of making innovations, because it reckoned upon the future. In fact, few governments have been more given to innovation. Compare it with a government of the same nature, with the pure monarchy of Philip II. in Spain, which was more absolute than that of Louis XIV., and yet was less regular and tranquil. How did Philip II. succeed in

establishing absolute power in Spain? By stifling every kind of activity in the country; by refusing his sanction to every kind of improvement, and thus rendering the state of Spain completely stationary. The government of Louis XIV., on the contrary, was active in every kind of innovation, and favorable to the progress of letters, arts, riches—favorable, in a word, to civilization. These were the true causes of its preponderance in Europe—a preponderance so great, that it was, on the Continent, during the seventeenth century, not only for sovereigns, but even for nations, the type and model of governments.

It is frequently asked, and it is impossible to avoid asking, how a power so splendid and well established—to judge from the circumstances I have pointed out to you, should have fallen so quickly into a state of decay? how, after having played so great a part in Europe, it became in the following century so inconsiderable, so weak, and so little respected? The fact is undeniable: in the seventeenth century, the French government stood at the head of European civilization. In the eighteenth century it disappeared; it was the society of France, separated from its government, and often in a hostile position towards it, which led the way and guided the progress of the European world.

It is here that we discover the incorrigible vice and infallible effect of absolute power. I shall not enter into any detail respecting the faults of the government of Louis XIV.; and there were great ones. I shall not speak either of the war of the succession in Spain, or the revocation of the edict of Nantes, or the excessive expenditure, or many other fatal measures which affected its character. I will take the merits of the government, such as I have described them. I will admit that, probably, there never was an absolute power more completely acknowledged by its age and nation, or which has rendered more real services to the civilization of its country as well as to Europe in general. It followed, indeed, from the single circumstance, that this government had no other principle than absolute power, and rested entirely on this basis, that its decay was so sudden and deserved. What was essentially wanting to France in Louis XIV.'s time was institutions, political powers, which were independent and self existent, capable, in short, of spontaneous action and resist

ance. The ancient French institutions, if they deserve the name, no longer subsisted; Louis XIV. completed their destruction. He took care not to replace them by new institutions; they would have constrained him, and he did not choose constraint. The will and action of the central power were all that appeared with splendor at that epoch. The government of Louis XIV. is a great fact, a powerful and brilliant fact, but it was built upon sand. Free institutions are a guarantee, not only for the prudence of governments, but also for their stability. No system can endure otherwise than by institutions. Wherever absolute power has been permanent, it has been based upon, and supported by, real institutions; sometimes by the division of society into *castes*, distinctly separated, and sometimes by a system of religious institutions. Under the reign of Louis XIV., power, as well as liberty, needed institutions. There was nothing in France, at that time, to protect either the country from the illegitimate action of the government, or the government itself against the inevitable action of time. Thus, we behold the government assisting its own decay. It was not Louis XIV. only who grew old, and became feeble, at the end of his reign; it was the whole system of absolute power. Pure monarchy was as much worn out in 1712, as the monarch himself. And the evil was so much the more serious, that Louis XIV. had destroyed political habits as well as political institutions. There can be no political habits without independence. He only who feels that he is strong in himself, is always capable either of serving the ruling power, or of contending with it. Energetic characters disappear along with independent situations, and a free and high spirit arises from the security of rights.

We may, then, describe in the following terms the state in which the French nation and the power of the government were left by Louis XIV.: in society there was a great development of wealth, strength, and intellectual activity of every kind; and, along with this progressive society, there was a government essentially stationary, and without means to adapt itself to the movement of the people; devoted, after half a century of great splendor, to immobility and weakness, and already fallen, even in the lifetime of its founder, into a decay almost resembling dissolution. Such was the situation of France at the expiration of the seventeenth

century, and which impressed upon the subsequent period so different a direction and character.

It is hardly necessary for me to remark that a great movement of the human mind, that a spirit of free inquiry, was the predominant feature, the essential fact of the eighteenth century. You have already heard from this chair a great deal on this topic; you have already heard this momentous period characterized, by the voices of a philosophic orator and an eloquent philosopher.* I cannot pretend, in the small space of time which remains to me, to follow all the phases of the great revolution which was then accomplished; neither, however, can I leave you without calling your attention to some of its features which perhaps have been too little remarked.

The first, which occurs to me in the outset, and which, indeed, I have already pointed out, is the almost entire disappearance (so to speak) of the government in the course of the eighteenth century, and the appearance of the human mind as the principal and almost sole actor. Excepting in what concerned foreign relations, under the ministry of the Duke de Choiseul, and in some great concessions made to the general bent of the public mind, in the American war, for example—excepting, I say, in some events of this kind, there perhaps never was a government so inactive, apathetic, and inert, as the French government of that time. In place of the ambitious and active government of Louis XIV., which was everywhere, and at the head of everything, you have a power whose only endeavor, so much did it tremble for its own safety, was to slink from public view—to hide itself from danger. It was the nation which, by its intellectual movement, interfered with everything, and alone possessed moral authority, the only real authority.

A second characteristic which strikes me in the state of the human mind in the eighteenth century, is the universality of the spirit of free inquiry. Till then, and particularly in the sixteenth century, free inquiry had been exercised in a very limited field; its object had been sometimes religious questions, and sometimes religious and political questions conjoined; but its pretensions did not extend much further. In the eighteenth century, on the contrary, free inquiry became uni-

* The lectures of Villemain and Cousin.

versal in its character and objects: religion, politics, pure philosophy, man and society, moral and physical science—everything became, at once, the subject of study, doubt, and system; the ancient sciences were overturned; new sciences sprang up. It was a movement which proceeded in every direction, though emanating from one and the same impulse.

This movement, moreover, had one peculiarity, which perhaps can be met with at no other time in the history of the world; that of being purely speculative. Until that time, in all great human revolutions action had promptly mingled itself with speculation. Thus, in the sixteenth century, the religious revolution had begun by ideas and discussions purely intellectual; but it had, almost immediately, led to events. The leaders of the intellectual parties had very speedily become leaders of political parties; the realities of life had mingled with the workings of the intellect. The same thing had been the case, in the seventeenth century, in the English revolution. In France, in the eighteenth century, we see the human mind exercising itself upon all subjects,—upon ideas which, from their connexion with the real interests of life necessarily had the most prompt and powerful influence upon events. And yet the promoters of, and partakers in, these great discussions, continued to be strangers to every kind of practical activity, pure speculators, who observed, judged, and spoke without ever proceeding to practice. There never was a period in which the government of facts, and external realities, was so completely distinct from the government of thought. The separation of spiritual from temporal affairs has never been real in Europe, except in the eighteenth century. For the first time, perhaps, the spiritual world developed itself quite separately from the temporal world; a fact of the greatest importance, and which had a great influence on the course of events. It gave a singular character of pride and inexperience to the mode of thinking of the time: philosophy was never more ambitious of governing the world, and never more completely failed in its object. This necessarily led to results; the intellectual movement necessarily gave, at last, an impulse to external events; and, as they had been totally separated, their meeting was so much the more difficult, and their collision so much the more violent.

We can hardly now be surprised at another character of the human mind at this epoch, I mean its extreme boldness.

Prior to this, its greatest activity had always been restrained by certain barriers; man had lived in the midst of facts, some of which inspired him with caution, and repressed, to a certain degree, his tendency to movement. In the eighteenth century, I should really be at a loss to say what external facts were respected by the human mind, or exercised any influence over it; it entertained nothing but hatred or contempt for the whole social system; it considered itself called upon to reform all things; it looked upon itself as a sort of creator, institutions, opinions, manners, society, even man himself,—all seemed to require to be re-modelled, and human reason undertook the task. Whenever, before, had the human mind displayed such daring boldness?

Such, then, was the power which, in the course of the eighteenth century, was confronted with what remained of the government of Louis XIV. It is clear to us all that a collision between these two unequal forces was unavoidable. The leading fact of the English revolution, the struggle between free inquiry and pure monarchy, was therefore sure to be repeated in France. The differences between the two cases, undoubtedly, were great, and necessarily perpetuated themselves in the results of each; but, at bottom, the general situation of both was similar, and the event itself must be explained in the same manner.

I by no means intend to exhibit the infinite consequences of this collision in France. I am drawing towards the close of this course of lectures, and must hasten to conclude. I wish, however, before quitting you, to call your attention to the gravest, and, in my opinion, the most instructive fact which this great spectacle has revealed to us. It is the danger, the evil, the insurmountable vice of absolute power, wheresoever it may exist, whatsoever name it may bear, and for whatever object it may be exercised. We have seen that the government of Louis XIV. perished almost from this single cause. The power which succeeded it, the human mind, the real sovereign of the eighteenth century, underwent the same fate; in its turn, it possessed almost absolute power; in its turn its confidence in itself became excessive. Its movement was noble, good, and useful; and, were it necessary for me to give a general opinion on the subject, I should readily

say that the eighteenth century appears to me one of the grandest epochs in the history of the world, that perhaps which has done the greatest service to mankind, and has produced the greatest and most general improvement. If I were called upon, however, to pass judgment upon its ministry (if I may use such an expression), I should pronounce sentence in its favor. It is not the less true, however, that the absolute power exercised at this period by the human mind corrupted it, and that it entertained an illegitimate aversion to the subsisting state of things, and to all opinions which differed from the prevailing one ;—an aversion which led to error and tyranny. The proportion of error and tyranny, indeed, which mingled itself in the triumph of human reason at the end of the century—a proportion, the greatness of which cannot be dissembled, and which ought to be exposed instead of being passed over—this infusion of error and tyranny, I say, was a consequence of the delusion into which the human mind was led at that period by the extent of its power. It is the duty, and will be, I believe, the peculiar event of our time, to acknowledge that all power, whether intellectual or temporal, whether belonging to governments or people, to philosophers or ministers, in whatever cause it may be exercised—that all human power, I say, bears within itself a natural vice, a principle of feebleness and abuse, which renders it necessary that it should be limited. Now, there is nothing but the general freedom of every right, interest, and opinion, the free manifestation and legal existence of all these forces—there is nothing, I say, but a system which ensures all this, can restrain every particular force or power within its legitimate bounds, and prevent it from encroaching on the others, so as to produce the real and beneficial subsistence of free inquiry. For us, this is the great result, the great moral of the struggle which took place at the close of the eighteenth century, between what may be called temporal absolute power and spiritual absolute power

I am now arrived at the end of the task which I undertook You will remember, that, in beginning this course, I stated that my object was to give you a general view of the development of European civilization, from the fall of the Roman Empire to the present time. I have passed very rapidly over this long career ; so rapidly that it has been quite out of my

power even to touch upon every thing of importance, or to bring proofs of those facts to which I have drawn your attention. I hope, however, that I have attained my end, which was to mark the great epochs of the development of modern society. Allow me to add a word more. I endeavored, at the outset, to define civilization, to describe the fact which bears that name. Civilization appeared to me to consist of two principal facts, the development of human society and that of man himself; on the one hand, his political and social, and on the other, his internal and moral, advancement. This year I have confined myself to the history of society. I have exhibited civilization only in its social point of view. I have said nothing of the development of man himself. I have made no attempt to give you the history of opinions,—of the moral progress of human nature. I intend, when we meet again here, next season, to confine myself especially to France, to study with you the history of French civilization, but to study it in detail and under its various aspects. I shall try to make you acquainted not only with the history of society in France, but also with that of man; to follow, along with you, the progress of institutions, opinions, and intellectual labors of every sort, and thus to arrive at a comprehension of what has been, in the most complete and general sense, the development of our glorious country. In the past, as well as in the future, she has a right to our warmest affections

THE END.

TABLE

OF

THE CONTEMPORARY SOVEREIGNS

OF

ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY RUSSIA, AND SPAIN AND OF THE POPES.

[From Sir Harris Nicholas's "Chronology of History."]

A. D	England.	France.	Germany.	Papal States.	Russia.	Spain.	Scotland.
800	Egbert.	Charlemagne.	Charlemagne.	Leo III.	. .	. .	Achaius.
814	. .	Louis I.	Louis I.				
816	. .	. .	. .	Stephen V.			
817	. .	. .	. .	Paschal I.			
819	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Congalc III.
820	. .	. .	. .	Eugene II.			
824	. .	.	. .	Valentine.	. .	. .	Dougal.
827	. .	. .	. .	Gregory IV.			
831	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Alpin.
834	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Kenneth II.
836	Ethelwolf.						
843	. .	Charles le Chauve.	Louis II.	Sergius II.			
847	. .	. .	. .	Leo IV.	Rurick		
854	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Donald V
855	. .	. .	. .	Benedict III.			
857	Ethelbald.						
858	. .	. .	. .	Nicolas I.	. .	Garcia I.	Constantine II
860	Ethelbert.						
866	Ethelred I.						
868	. .	. .	. .	Adrian II.			
872	Alfred the Great.						
873	. .	. .	. .	John VIII.			
874	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Ethus.
876	. .	. .	Carloman.	. .	. .	. .	Gregory.
—	. .	. .	Louis III.				
—	. .	. .	Charles le Gros.				
877	. .	Louis II.					
879	. .	Louis III.					
—	. .	Carloman.	. .	. .	Oleg		
880	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Fortunio	
883	. .	. .	. .	Martin I.			
884	. .	Charles le Gros	. .	Adrian III.			
885	. .	. .	. .	Stephen VI.			
887	. .	. .	Arnold.				

A. D.	England.	France	Germany	Papal States.	Russia	Spain.	Scotland
888	. .	Hugh					
891	. .	. .	. .	Formosus.			
892	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Donald VI
897	. .	. .	. .	Stephen VII.			
898	. .	Charles le Simple.					
899	. .	. .	Louis IV.				
	[the Elder.						
900	Edward	. .	. .	Rom. Formosus.			
—	. .	. .	. .	John IX.			
901	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Constantine
902	. .	. .	. .	Benedict IV.	. .	Sancho I.	[III
906	. .	. .	. .	Leo V.			
—	. .	. .	. .	Christopher.			
907	. .	. .	. .	Sergius III.			
910	. .	. .	. .	Anastasius.			
911	. .	. .	Conrad I.				
912	. .	. .	. .	Lando.			
—	. .	. .	. .	John X.			
913	. .	. .	. .	. .	Igor I		
919	. .	. .	Henry I.				
922	. .	Robert.					
923	. .	Ralph.					
925	Athelstan.						
926	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Garcia	
928	. .	. .	. .	Leo VI.		[II.	
929	. .	. .	. .	Stephen VIII.			
931	. .	. .	. .	John XI.			
936	. .	Louis IV.	Otho the Great.	Leo VII.			
938	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Malcolm I.
940	. .	. .	. .	Stephen IX.			
941	Edmund.						
943	. .	. .	. .	Martin II.	[slaw I.		
945	. .	. .	. .	. .	Swiato-		
946	Edred.	. .	. .	Agapet II.			
954	. .	Lothaire					
955	Edwy.						
956	. .	. .	. .	John XII			
958	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Indulphus.
959	Edgar.						
965	. .	. .	. .	Benedict V			
966	. .	. .	. .	John XIII			
968	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Duffus.
970	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Sancho	
972	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	[I.	
973	. .	. .	Otho II	Domnus II.	Jaropolk	. .	Cullenus.
—	. .	. .	. .	Benedict VI.	[I.		Kenneth III.
974	. .	. .	. .	Benedict VII.			
975	Edw'd the Martyr.						
978	Ethelred II						
980	. .	. .	. .	. .	Waldimir I. the Great.		
983	. .	. .	Otho III.				
984	. .	. .	. .	John XIV.			
985	. .	. .	. .	John XV.			
986	. .	Louis V.	. .	John XVI			
987	. .	Hugh Capet.					
994	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	[III. Garcia	Constantine
996	. .	. .	.	Gregory V			[IV
997	. .	Robert.	. .	. .	. .	. .	Grimus.

A D.	England.	France.	Germany.	Papal States.	Russia.	Spain.	Scotland
999	. .	. .	. .	Silvester II.			
1000	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Sancho III. the Great.	
1002	. .	. .	Henry II.				
1003	. .	. .	. .	John XVII. and XVIII.		. .	
1004	. .	.	. .	. .	. .		Malcolm II.
1009	. .	. .	. .	Sergius IV.			
1012	. .	. .	. .	Benedict VIII	[polk I		
1015	. .	. .	. .	. .	Swiato-		
1016	Edmund Ironside.						
1017	Canute.				[slaw I.		
1018	. .	. .	. .	. .	Jaro-		
1024	. .	. .	Conrad II.	John XIX.			
1031	. .	Henry I					
1033	. .	. .	. .	Benedict IX.	. .	Ferdinand I. *in Castile*	
1034	.	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Duncan
1035	. .		. .	. .	. .	Garcia IV. *in Navarre.*	
—	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Ramirez I. *in Aragon.*	
1036	Harold.						
1039	Hardicanute.		Henry III.				
1040	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Macbeth
1041	Edward the Confessor.	.	. .				
1044	. .	. .	. .	Gregory VI.			
1047	. .	.	. .	Clement II.			
1048	. .	.	. .	Damasius II.			
1049	. .	.	. .	Leo IX.	[I.		
1051	. .		. .	. .	Isaslaw		
1054	. .		. .	. .	. .	Sancho IV. *Navarre*	
1055	. .		. .	Victor II.			
1056	. .	.	Henry IV.				
1057	. .	. .	. .	Stephen X	. .	. .	Macduff III
1058	. .	. .	. .	Nicolas II.			
1060	. .	Philip I.					
1061	. .	. .	. .	Alexander II			
1063	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Sancho I *Aragon*	
1065	Harold II.	. .	. .	. .	. .	Sancho I. *Castile.*	
—	William I						
1072	. .	. .	.	. .	. .	Alphonso I. *Castile.*	
1075	. .	. .	. .	Gregory VII.	Swato-		
1076	. .	. .	. .	. .	slaw II.		
					. .	Sancho V. *Nav. & Ar*	
1078	. .	. .	. .	. .	[lod I.		
1085	. .	. .	. .	Victor III.	Wsewo-		
1087	William II.	. .	. .	Urban II.	[polsk II.		
1093	. .	. .	. .	. .	Swato-	. .	Donald VI

A D	England.	France	Germany.	Papal States.	Russia.	Spain.	Scotland.
1094	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Peter I. *Nav. & Ar.*	Duncan II
1096	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Edgar.
1099	. .	.	. .	Paschal II			
1100	Henry I.						
1104	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Alphonso I. *Nav. & Ar.*	
1106	. .	. .	Henry V.				
1107	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Alexander I
1108	. .	Louis VI.					
1109	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Urraca, *Ca.*	
1113	. .	. .	. .	. .	Wadimir II.		
1118	. .	. .	. .	Ielas II.			
1119	. .	. .	. .	Calixtus II.			
1124	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	David I
1125	. .	. .	Lothaire II.	Honorius II.	Mistislaw.		
1126	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Alphon. II. *Castile.*	
1130	. .	. .	. .	Innocent II.			
1132	. .	. .	. .	. .	Jaropo'k II.		
1133	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Garcia V. *N.*	
1134	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Ramirez II. *Aragon.*	
1135	Stephen.						
1137	. .	Louis VII.	. .	. .	. .	Petronilla & Raymondo, *Aragon.*	
1138	. .	. .	Conrad III.	. .	Wsewolod II.		
1143	. .	. .	. .	Celestine II.			
1144	. .	. .	. .	Lucius II.			
1145	. .	. .	. .	Eugene III.		. .	
1146	. .	. .	. .	. .	Isaslaw II.		
1149	. .	. .	. .	. .	Jurje I. D.		
1150	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Sancho VI the Wise, *N.*	
1152	. .	. .	Frederick I.				
1153	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Malcolm IV
1154	Henry II			Anastasius IV.			
1155	. .	. .	. .	Adrian IV.			
1157	. .	. .	. .	. .	Andrej	Sancho II. *Castile.*	
1158	. .	.	. .	. .	. .	Alphon. III. *Castile.*	
1159	. .	. .	. .	Alexander III			
1162	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Alphonso II. *Aragon.*	
1165	.	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	William I.
1175	. .	. .	. .	. .	Michel I.		
1177	. .	. .	. .	. .	Wsewolod III.		
1180	. .	Philip II.					

A. D.	England.	France.	Germany.	Papal States.	Russia.	Spain.	Scotland.
1181	. .	. .	. .	Lucius III.			
1185	. .	. .	. .	Urban III.			
1187	. .	. .	. .	Gregory VIII.			
1188	. .	. .	. .	Clement III.			
1189	Richard I						
1190	. .	. .	Henry VI.				
1191	. .	. .	. .	Celestine III.			
1194	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Sancho VII. *Navarre.*	
1195	. .	. .	. .	. .	.	Peter II.	
1198	. .		Philip Otho IV.	Innocent III		*Aragon.*	
1199	John						
1212	. .	. .	Frederic II.				
1213	. .	. .	. .	. .	Jurje II	Jas. I. *Ar*	
1214	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Henry I. *Castile.*	Alex. II.
1216	Henry III.						
1217	. .	. .	. .	Honorius III	Constantine.	Ferd. III. *Castile.*	
1223	. .	Louis [VIII.					
1226	. .	St. Louis [IX.					
1227	. .	. .	. .	Gregory IX.			
1234	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Theobald I. *Nav.*	
1238	. .	. .	. .	. .	Jaroslaw [II.		
1241	. .	. .	. .	Celestine IV.			
1243	. .	. .	. .	Innocent IV.			
1245	. .	. .	. .	. .	Alexander Newskoi.		Alex III
1249	. .	. .	. .				
1250	. .	. .	Conrad IV.			[C.	
1252	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Alph. IV.	
1253	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Theobald II. *Nav.*	
1254	. .	. .	William of Holland	Alexander IV.			
1257	. .	. .	Richard, E. of Cornwall				
1262	. .	. .	. .	Urban IX.	Jaroslaw [III.		
1264	. .	. .	. .	Gregory X.			
1265	. .	. .	. .	Clement IV.			
1270	. .	Philip III.	. .	. .	Wasilej [I.	Hen. I. *Navarre.*	
1272	Edward I						
1273	. .	. .	Rodolph of Hapsburg.				
1274	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Joanna I.	
1275	. .	. .	. .	. .	Dimitrej	*Navarre.*	
1276	. .		. .	Innocent V.	. .	Peter III.	
—	. .	. .	. .	Adrian V.		*Aragon.*	
—	. .	. .	. .	John XX.			
1277	. .	. .	. .	Nicolas III.			
1281	. .	. .	. .	Martin IV.	Andrej.		
1284	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Sancho IV. *Cas.*	
1285	. .	Philip IV.		Honorius IV.	. .	Alphonso III. *Ar.*	
1286	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Margaret
1288	. .	. .	. .	Nicolas IV.			John Baliol
1291	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	James II.	
1292	. .	. .	Adolphus of Nassau.			*Aragon.*	
1294	. .	. .	. .	Celestine V.	Danillo.	[*Castile.*	
1295	. .	. .	. .	Boniface VIII	. .	Ferd. IV	

A. D	England.	France.	Germany.	Papal States.	Russia.	Spain.	Scotland
1296	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Interreg-
1298	. .	. .	Albert of Austria.				[num
1303	. .	. .	. .	Benedict X.	[low.		
1305	. .	. .	. .	Clement V.	Michai-		
1306	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Robert I.
1307	Edward II.						
1308	. .	. .	Henry VII.				
1312	. .	. .	. .	. .			
1314	. .	Louis X. K. of Navarre.	Louis IV.	. .	. .	Alphonso V. *Cast.*	
1316	. .	John I.					
1316	. .	Philip V.	. .	John XXI.			
1317	. .	. .	. .	. .	Jurje III.		
1322	. .	Chas. IV					
1327	Edward [III.	. .	. .	Alexander II.	. .	Alphonso IV. *Ar.*	
1328	. .	Philip VI.	. .	. .	Iwan I. of Moscow.	Joanna II *Navarre.*	
1329	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	David II.
1334	. .	. .	. .	Benedict XI.			[Edw. Baliol usurped
1336	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Peter II. *Aragon.*	in 1332, but was deposed in the same
1340	. .	. .	. .	. .	Semen.		year.]
1342	. .	. .	. .	Clement VI.			
1346	. .	. .	Charles IV			[*Nav.*	
1349	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Charles II	
1350	. .	John II.	. .	. .	. .	Peter I. *Castile.*	
1353	. .	. .	. .	Innocent VI.	Iwan II.		
1359	. .	. .	. .	. .	Dimitrej II.		
1363	. .	. .	. .	Urban V.	Dimitrej III.	[*Castile.*	
1364	. .	Chas. V.	. .			Henry II.	
1369	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	
1371	. .	. .	. .	Gregory XI.	. .	. .	Robert II.
1377	Richard II.		[laus.				
1378	. .	. .	Wences-	Urban VI.		[*Castile.*	
1379	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	John I.	
1380	. .	Chas. VI.				[*Nav.*	
1386	. .	. .	. .			Chas. III.	
1387	. .	. .		. .	. .	John I.	
1389	. .	. .	. .	. .	Wasilej II.	*Aragon.* [*Cast.*	
1390	. .	. .	. .	Boniface IX	. .	Henry III.	Robert III
1395	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Martin,	
1399	Henry IV.					*Aragon.*	
1400	. .	. .	Robert.				
1404	. .	. .	. .	Innocent VII.			
1406	. .	. .	. .	Gregory XII.	. .	John II. *Castile.*	James I.
1409	. .	. .	. .	Alexander V.			
1410	. .	. .	. .	John XXII.			
1411	. .	. .	Sigismond.				
1412	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Ferd. I. *Aragon.*	
1413	Henry V.						
1416	. .	.	. .	. .	. .	Alphonso V. *Ar.*	
1417	. .	. .	. .	Martin V.			
1422	Henry V.	Chas. VII.					

A. D.	England.	France.	Germany.	Papal States.	Russia.	Spain.	Scotland.
1425	. .	. .	. .	. .	Wasilej III.	Blanche, *Nav.* & John I. *Ar.*	
1431	. .	. .	. .	Eugene IV			
1437	. .	. .	Albert II.	. .	. .		James II.
1440	. .	. .	Fred. III.				
1447	. .	. .	. .	Nicolas V			
1454	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Henry IV. *Castile.*	
1455	. .	. .	. .	Calixtus III.			
1458	. .	. .	. .	Pius II.			
1460	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	James III.
1461	Edw IV.	Louis XI.					
1462	. .	. .	. .	. .	Iwan Wasilej I.		
1464	. .	. .	. .	Paul II.			
1471	. .	. .	. .	Sixtus IV.			
1474	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Ferd. II. & Isabella of *Castile.*	
1479	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Ferd. II., the Catholic, *A.* Eleanor, *N* Francis. Phœbus, *N.*	
1483	Edward V. Rich. III.	Charles VIII.	. .	. .	. .	Catherine *Nav*	
1484	. .	. .	. .	Innocent VIII			
1485	Henry VII.						
1488	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	James IV
1492	. .	. .	. .	Alexand. VI.			
1493	. .	. .	Maximilian. I.				
1498	. .	Louis XII.					
1503	. .	. .	. .	Pius III. Julius II.			
1505	. .	. .	. .	. .	Wasilej IV.		
1509	Hen. VIII.						
1513	. .	. .	. .	Leo X.	. .	. .	James V
1515	. .	Francis I.					
1516	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Charles I.	
1519	. .	. .	Charles V.	. .	. .	Emperor Chas. V	
1522	. .	. .	. .	Adrian VI.			
1523	. .	. .	. .	Clement VII			
1533	. .	. .	. .	. .	Iwan Wasile-jevitch.		
1534	. .	. .	. .	Paul III.			
1542	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .		Mary.
1547	Edw. VI	Henry II.					
1550	. .	. .	. .	Julius III.			
1553	Mary.			[II.			
1555	. .	. .	. .	Marcellinus			
1556	. .	. .	. .	Paul IV.	. .	Philip II.	
1558	Elizabeth	. .	Ferd. I.				
1559	. .	Francis II.	. .	Pius IV.			
1560	. .	Chas. IX.					
1564	. .	. .	Maximilian II.				
1566	. .	. .	. .	Pius V.			
1567	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .		James VI.
1572	. .	. .	. .	Gregory XIII.			
1574	. .	Henry III.					
1576	. .	. .	Rodolph II.				

A. D.	England.	France	Germany.	Papal States.	Russia.	Spain.	Scotland.
1584	. .	. .	. .	. .	Feodore		
1585	. .	.	. .	Sixtus V.	I.		
1589	. .	Henry IV.	. .				
1590	. .	. .	. .	Urban VII. Gregory XIV.			
1591	. .	. .	. .	Innocent IX.			
1592	. .	. .	. .	Clement VIII			
1598	. .	. .	. .	. .	Boris Godunow.	Philip III.	
	GREAT BRITAIN.						
1603	James I.	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Ascended the throne of England March, 1603.
1605	. .	. .	. .	Leo XI Paul V.			
1606	. .	. . [XIII.	. .	. .	Wasilej Schuiskoi.		
1610	. .	Louis					
1612	. .	. .	Matthias.				
1613	.	. .	. .	. .	Michael Fedrowitsch		
1619	. .	. .	Ferd. II.				
1621	. .	. .	. .	Gregory XV.	. .	Philip IV	
1623	. .	. .	. .	Urban VIII.			
1625	Charles I.						
1637	. .	. .	Ferd. III.				
1643	. .	Lou. XIV.					
1644	. .	. .	. .	Innocent X.			
1645	. .	. .	. .	. .	Alexej Mic.		
1655	. .	. .	. .	Alexand. VII.			
1658	. .	. .	Leopold I.				
1660	Charles II.		. .				
1665	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Charles II.	
1667	. .	. .	. .	Clement IX.			
1670	. .	. .	. .	Clement X.	[II.		
1676	. .	. .	. .	Innocent XI.	Feodore		
1682	. .	. .	. .	. .	Iwan Alex.		
1685	James II.	. .	. .	. .	Peter the Great.		
1689	Mary & William III.	. .	. .	Alexand. VIII			
1691	. .	. .	. .	Innocent XII.			
1694	Wm. III.						
1700	. .	.	. .	Clement XI.	. .	Philip V	
1702	Anne.						
1705	. .	. .	Joseph I.				
1711	. .	. .	Charles VI.				
1714	George I.						
1715	. .	Louis XV.					
1721	. .	. .	. .	Innoc. XIII.			
1724	. .	. .	. .	Bened. XIII.	[rine I.		
1725	. .	. .	. .	. .	Cathe-		
1727	George II	. .	. .	. .	Peter II.		
1730	. .	. .	. .	Clement XII.	Anne.		
1740	. .	. .	. .	Bened. XIV.	Iwan III.		
1741	. .	. .	. .	. .	Eliza-		
1742	.	. .	Chas. VII.		beth.		
1745	. .	. .	Francis I. & Maria Teresa.				
1751	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Ferdi-	
1758	. .	. .	.	Clement XIII		nand VI.	
1759	. .	. .	. .	. .	.	Charles	
1760	George III					III	

A. D.	Great Britain.	France.	Germany.	Papal States.	Russia.	Spain.	Scotland.
1762	. .	. .	. .	. .	Peter III.		
1765	. .	. .	Joseph II.	. .	Cathe-		
1769	. .	. .	. .	Clement	rine II.		
1774	. .	Lou. XVI.		XIV.			
1775	. .	. .	. .	Pius VI.			
1788	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Chas. IV.	
1790	. .	. .	Leopold II.				
1792	. .	Republic.	Francis II.*				
1796	. .	. .	. .	. .	Paul I.		
1800	. .	. .	. .	Pius VII.			
1801	. .	. .	. .	. .	Alexan-		
1804	. .	Napoleon Emperor			der.		
			AUSTRIA.				
1806	. .	. .	Francis I.				
1808	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Ferd. VII.	
1811	Regency.					J. Napo- leon.	
1814	. .	Louis XVIII	. .	. .	. .	Ferd. VII.	
1820	George IV.						
1823	. .	. .	. .	Leo XII.			
1824	. .	Chas X.					
1825	. .	. .	. .	. .	Nicolas I.		
1828							
1829	[IV	[Philip.					
1830	William	Louis					
1831	. .	. .	. .	Gregory			
1832				XVI.			
1833	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Isabella.	
1834							
1835	. .	. .	Ferdin. I.				
1836							
1837	Victoria.						

Vide Great Britain.

* Upon the establishment of the confederation of the Rhine, in 1806, Francis ceased to be Emperor of Germany and became hereditary Emperor of Austria, under the title of Francis I.

THE LESSER EUROPEAN STATES, FROM 1699 TO 1838.

A. D.	DENMARK.	NAPLES	POLAND	PORTUGAL.	PRUSSIA.	SARDINIA.	SWEDEN.
	Christian V	. .	Augustus II.	Peter II.	Frederic William.	. .	Chas. XII.
1699	Freder. IV.						
1701	. .	. .	. .	. .	Frederic I		
1704	. .	. .	Stanislaus (Leczinsky.)				
1706	. .	. .	. .	John V.			
1709	. .	. .	Augus. II.		[Wm. I.		
1713	. .	Chas. II.	. .	. .	Frederic		[anora.
1719	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Ulrica Ele-
1720	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Victor Amadeus II	Frederic.
	[VI.						
1730	Christian	. .	. .	. .	. .	Charles Eman. III.	
1733	. .	. .	Augustus III				
1735	. .	Chas. III.					
1740	. .	. .	. .	. .	Fred. II. the Great.		
1746	Frederic V.						
1750	. .		. .	Joseph Emanuel.			
1758	. .	. .					
1759	. .	Ferd. IV	. .	. .	. .	. .	Adolphus Frederic
1764	. .	. .	Stanislaus (Peniatowsky.)				
1766	Chris. VII.	. .					
1771	. .	. .	. .				
1772	. .	. .	1st Partition.	. .	. .	. .	Gustavus III.
1773	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Victor Am. III.	
1777	. .	. .	. .	Maria.	[Wm. II.		
1786	. .	. .	. .	. .	Frederic		
1792	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Gustavus IV. Adol.
1793	. .	. .	2d Part'n.				
1795	. .	. .	3d Part'n.				
1796	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Charles Eman. IV.	
1797	. .	. .	. .	. .	Fred. W. III.		
1799	. .	. .	. .	John VI.			
1802	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Victor Eman.	
1808	Freder. VI.	Jos. Napoleon.					
1809	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Chas. XIII.
1815	. .	Joachim Murat.	Alexander.				
1818	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Charles John XIV
		[nand I.					
1821	. .	Ferdi-	. .	. .	. .	Charles Felix.	
1825	. .	. .	Nicolas.				
1826	. .	Francis.	. .	Pedro IV.			
1828	. .	. .	. .	Maria da Gloria.			
1830	. .	Ferdin. II.	. .				
1831	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	Charles Amadeus.	
1832							
1833							
1834							
1835							
1836							
1837							

THE

HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION

FROM THE

FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

TO

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

BY F. GUIZOT,

THE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE,

AUTHOR OF "HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF 1640."

TRANSLATED BY WILLIAM HAZLITT.

VOLUME II.

NEW YORK:
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1881.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The following Lectures were delivered by M. Guizot, in the years 1828, 1829, and 1830, at the Old Sorbonne now the seat of the *Faculté des Lettres*, of Paris, on alternate days with MM. Cousin and Villemain, a triad of lecturers whose brilliant exhibitions, the crowds which thronged their lecture-rooms, and the stir they excited in the active and aspiring minds so numerous among the French youth, the future historian will commemorate as among the remarkable appearances of that important era.

The first portion of these Lectures, those comprising the *General History of Civilization in Europe*, have already appeared. The *Lectures on the History of Civilization in France*, are now for the first time translated. Of these Lectures, it is most justly observed by the *Edinburgh Review:* "There is a consistency, a coherence, a comprehensiveness, and what the Germans would term many-sidedness, in the manner of M Guizot's fulfilment of his task, that manifests him one to whom the whole subject is familiar that exhibits a full

possession of the facts which have any important bearing upon his conclusions ; and a deliberateness, a matureness an entire absence of haste or crudity, in his explanations of historical phenomena, which give evidence of a general scheme so well wrought out and digested beforehand, that the labors of research and of thought necessary for the whole work, seem to have been performed before any part was committed to paper."

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HISTORY

OF

CIVILIZATION IN FRANCE,

FROM THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

LECTURE THE FIRST.

Object of the course—Two methods of studying in detail the history of European civilization—Reasons for preferring the study of the history of the civilization of a particular country—Reasons for studying that of France—Of the essential facts which constitute the perfection of civilization—Comparison of the great European nations under this point of view—Of civilization in England—Germany—Italy—Spain—France—French civilization is the most complete, and offers the most faithful representation of civilization in general—That the student has other things to bear in mind besides the mere study—Of the present prevailing tendencies in the intellectual order—Of the prevailing tendencies in the social order—Two problems resulting therefrom—Their apparent contradiction—Our times are called upon to solve them—A third and purely moral problem, rendered equally important by the present state of civilization—The unjust reproaches of which it is the object—The necessity of meeting them—All science, in the present day, exerts a social influence—All power should tend to the moral perfection of the individual, as well as to the improvement of society in general

Many of you will call to mind the nature and aim of a course of lectures which were brought to a close some months since. That course was cursory and of a general nature. I then attempted, in a very short period of time, to place before you an historical view of European civilization. I hastened, as it were, from point to point, confining myself strictly to general facts and assertions, at the risk of being sometimes misunderstood and perhaps discredited.

Necessity, as you know, imposed this method upon me; but in spite of this necessity I should have been much pained

by the inconveniences which arose from it, had I not foreseen that in a future course I should be enabled to remedy it; and had I not proposed to myself, at the time, to complete, at some future period, the outline which I then traced, and of leading you to the general results which I placed before you, by the same path which I myself had followed, an attentive and complete study of the facts. Such is the end at which I now aim.

Two methods offer themselves as tending to the attainment of the proposed end. I might either recommence the course of last summer, and review the general history of European civilization in its whole extent, by giving in detail that which it was impossible to give in mass, and by again passing over with more leisurely steps that ground which before was gone over in almost breathless haste. Or I might study the history of civilization in a single great country, in one of the principal European nations in which it has been developed, and thus, by confining the field of my researches, be the better enabled thoroughly to explore it.

The first method seemed to offer serious inconveniences. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain any unity in a history with so extensive a range, and which, at the same time, should be perfect in all its details. We discovered last summer, that there was a true unity running through European civilization; but this unity is only visible in general actions and grand results. We must ascend the highest mountain before the petty inequalities and diversities of the surface will become invisible, and before we can discover the general aspect, and the true and essential nature of the entire country. When we quit general facts and wish to look into particulars, the unity vanishes, the diversities again appear, and in the variety of occurrences one loses sight of both causes and effects; so that to give a detailed history, and still to preserve some harmony, it is absolutely necessary to narrow the field of inquiry.

There is also another great objection to this method, in the immense extent and diversity of knowledge which it presupposes and requires both in the speaker and his audience. Those who wish to trace with moderate accuracy the course of European civilization should have a sufficiently intimate acquaintance, not only with the events which have passed among each people, with their history, but likewise, with their language, literature, and philosophy, in short, with all

phases of their career; a work which is evidently almost impossible, and certainly so in the time which we could spend upon it.

It appears to me, that by studying the history of civilization in one great European nation, I shall arrive more quickly at the desired result. The unity of the narrative will then, indeed, be compatible with details; there is in every country a certain national harmony, which is the result of the community of manners, laws, language, and events, and this harmony is imprinted in the civilization. We may pass from fact to fact without losing sight of the whole picture. And lastly, though I will not say that it can easily be done, it is yet possible to combine the knowledge necessary for such a work.

I have therefore decided upon this second method, upon that of abandoning the general history of European civilization, in all the nations which have contributed thereto, and confining myself to the civilization of one country, which, if we note the differences between it and other countries, may become, for our purpose, an image of the whole destiny of Europe.

The choice of method being once made, that of a nation easily follows; I have taken the history and civilization of France. I shall certainly not deny having experienced a sensation of pleasure while making this choice. No one will deny that the emotions of patriotism are legitimate, provided they be sanctioned by truth and reason. Some there are, in the present day, who seem to fear that patriotism suffers much from the enlargement of ideas and sentiments, arising from the actual state of European civilization; they predict that it will become enervated, and lose itself in cosmopolitism. I cannot share such fears. In the present day, it will be with patriotism as with all human actions, feelings, and opinions. It is condemned, I admit, incessantly to undergo the test of publicity, of inquiry and discussion; it is condemned no longer to remain a mere prejudice, habit, or a blind and exclusive passion; it must give a reason for itself. It will be oppressed by this necessity no more than any natural and legitimate feelings are; on the contrary, it will become refined and elevated. These are the tests to which it must submit, and it will soar above them. I can truly say, if any other history in Europe had appeared to me greater, more instructive, or better suited to represent the general course

of civilization than that of France, I should have chosen it. But I have reasons for selecting France; independently of the special interest which its history has for us, France has long since been proclaimed by all Europe the most civilized of its nations. Whenever the opinion of the struggle has not been between the national all-love, when one seeks the true and disinterested opinion of people in the ideas and actions wherein it manifests itself indirectly, without taking the form of a controversy, we find that France is acknowledged to be the country in which civilization has appeared in its most complete form, where it has been most communicative, and where it has most forcibly struck the European imagination.

And we must not suppose, that the superiority of this country is solely attributable to the amenity of our social relations, to the gentleness of our manners, or to that easy and animated life which people so often come to seek among us. There can be no doubt that it partly arises from these attributes; but the fact of which I speak has more profound and universal causes: it is not a fashion, as might have been supposed when the question was concerning the civilization of the age of Louis XIV., neither is it a popular ebullition, as a view of our own times would lead us to suppose. The preference which the disinterested opinion of Europe accords to French civilization is philosophically just; it is the result of an instinctive judgment, doubtless in some measure confused, but well based, upon the essential elements and general nature of civilization.

You will call to mind the definition of civilization I attempted to give in the commencement of the former course of lectures. I there sought to discover what ideas attach themselves to this word in the common use of men. It appeared to me, on a reference to general opinion, that civilization essentially consists of two principles; the improvement of the exterior and general condition of man, and that of his inward and personal nature; in a word, in the improvement both of society and of humanity.

And it is not these two principles of themselves, which constitute civilization; to bring it to perfection, their intimate and rapid union, simultaneousness, and reciprocal action, are absolutely necessary. I showed that if they do not always arrive conjointly—that if, at one time, the improvement of society, and at another, that of individual man, progresses more quickly or extends further, they are not the less neces-

sary the one to the other; they excite each other, and sooner or later will amalgamate. When one progresses for any length of time without the other, and when their union is long interrupted, a feeling of regret, and of a painful hiatus and incompleteness, seizes the spectators. If an important social improvement, a great progress in material well being, is manifested among a people without being accompanied by intellectual improvement, or an analogous progression in mind; the social improvement seems precarious, inexplicable, and almost unjust. One asks what general ideas have produced and justified it, or to what principles it attaches itself. One wishes to assure oneself that it will not be limited to particular generations, to a single country; but that it will spread and communicate itself, and that it will fill every nation. And how can social improvement spread and communicate itself but by ideas, upon the wings of doctrines? Ideas alone mock at distance, pass over oceans, and everywhere make themselves received and comprehended. Besides, such is the noble nature of humanity, that it cannot see a great improvement in material strength, without aspiring to the moral strength which should be joined with it and direct it; something subordinate remains imprinted on social improvement, as long as it bears no fruit but mere physical prosperity, as long as it does not raise the mind of man to the level of his condition.

So, on the other hand, if any great intellectual improvement appears, unaccompanied by a social progress, one feels uneasy and surprised. It seems as if we saw a beautiful tree devoid of fruit, or a sun bringing with it neither heat nor fertility. One feels a kind of disdain for ideas thus barren, and not seizing upon the external world. And not only do we feel a disdain for them, but in the end we doubt their reasonable legitimacy and truth; one is tempted to believe them chimerical, when they show themselves powerless and incapable of governing human condition. So powerfully is man impressed with the feeling that his business upon earth is to transform the ideal into the actual, to reform and regulate the world which he inhabits according to the truth he conceives; so closely are the two great elements of civilization, social and intellectual development, bound to one another; so true is it that its perfection consists, not only in their union, but in their simultaneousness, and in the extent, facility, and rapidity with which they mutually evoke and produce themselves.

Let us now endeavor to regard from this point of view the

several nations of Europe: let us investigate the particular characteristics of the civilization in each particular case, and inquire how far these characteristics coincide with that essential, fundamental, and sublime fact, which now constitutes for us the perfection of civilization. We shall thus discover which of the various kinds of European civilization is the most complete, and the most conformable to the general type of civilization, and, consequently, which possesses the best right to our attention, and best represents the history of Europe.

I begin with England. English civilization has been especially directed towards social perfection; towards the amelioration of the external and public condition of men; towards the amelioration, not only of their material but also of their moral condition; towards the introduction of more justice, more prosperity into society; towards the development of right as well as of happiness.

Nevertheless, all things considered, in England the development of society has been more extensive and more glorious than that of humanity; social interest and social facts have, in England, maintained a more conspicuous place, and have exercised more power than general ideas: the nation seems greater than the individual. This is so true, that even the philosophers of England, men who seem devoted by their profession to the development of pure intelligence—as Bacon, Locke, and the Scotch philosophers—belong to what one may call the practical school of philosophy; they concern themselves, above all things, with direct and positive results; they trust themselves neither to the flights of the imagination, nor to the deductions of logic: theirs is the genius of common sense. I turn to the periods of England's greatest intellectual activity, the periods when ideas and mental movements occupied the most conspicuous place in her history: I take the political and religious crisis of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. No man is ignorant of the mighty movement which was going on at that time in England. Can any one, however, tell me of any great philosophical system, of any great general doctrines since become law in Europe, which were born of this movement? It has had immense and admirable results; it has established rights, manners; it has not only powerfully influenced social relations, it has influenced the souls of men; it has made sects and enthusiasts, but it has hardly exalted or extended—at all events directly—the horizon of the human mind; it has not ignited one of those great

intellectual torches which illuminate an entire epoch. Perhaps in no country have religious creeds possessed, nor at the present day do they possess more power than in England; but they are, above all things, practical; they exert a great influence over the conduct, happiness, and sentiments of individuals; but they have few general and mental results, results which address themselves to the whole of the human race. Under whatever point of view you regard this civilization, you will discover this essentially practical and social character. I might investigate this development in a more extended degree; I might review every class of English society, and I should everywhere be struck with the same fact. In literature, for instance, practical merit still predominates. There is no one who will say that the English are skilful at composing a book, the artistical and rational arrangement of the whole, in the distribution of the parts, in executing so as to strike the imagination of the reader with that perfection of art and form, which, above all things, gratifies the understanding. This purely intellectual aim in works of genius is the weak point of English writers, whilst they excel in the power of persuasion by the lucidity of their expositions, by frequently returning to the same ideas, by the evidence of good sense, in short, by all the ways of leading to practical effects.

The same character is seen, even in the English language. It is not a language rationally, uniformly, and systematically constructed; it borrows words on all sides, from the most various sources, without troubling itself about maintaining any symmetry or harmony. Its essential want is that logical beauty which is seen in the Greek and Latin languages: it has an appearance of coarseness and incoherence. But it is rich, flexible, fitted for general adaptation, and capable of supplying all the wants of man in the external course of life. Everywhere the principle of utility and application dominates in England, and constitutes at once the physiognomy and the force of its civilization.

From England I shall pass to Germany. The development of civilization has here been slow and tardy; the brutality of German manners has been proverbial throughout Europe for centuries. Still when, under this apparent grossness, one seeks the comparative progress of the two fundamental elements of civilization, we find that, in Germany, intellectual development has always surpassed and left behind social development, that the human spirit has there prospered much more than the human condition.

Compare the intellectual state of the German reformers at the sixteenth century—Luther, Melancthon, Bucer, and many others—compare, I say, the development of mind which is shown in their works with the contemporaneous manners of the country. What a disparity! In the seventeenth century, place the ideas of Leibnitz, the studies of his disciples, and the German universities, by the side of the manners which prevailed, not only among the people, but also among the superior classes; read, on one side, the writings of the philosophers, and, on the other, the memoirs which paint the court of the elector of Brandenburg or Bavaria. What a contrast! When we arrive at our own times, this contrast is yet more striking. It is a common saying in the present day, that beyond the Rhine, ideas and facts, the intellectual and the real orders, are almost entirely separated. No one is ignorant of what has been the activity of spirit in Germany for the last fifty years; in all classes, in philosophy, history, general literature, or poetry, it has advanced very far. It may be said that it has not always followed the best path; one may contest part of the results at which it has arrived; yet concerning its energy and extensive development it is impossible to dispute. But assuredly the social state and public condition have not advanced at the same pace. Without doubt, there also progress and amelioration have been made; but it is impossible to draw a comparison between the two facts. Thus, the peculiar character of all works in Germany, in poetry, philosophy, or history, is a non-acquaintance with the external world, the absence of the feeling of reality. One perceives, in reading them, that life and facts have exercised but little influence upon the authors, that they have not pre-occupied their imagination; they have lived retired within themselves, by turns enthusiasts or logicians. Just as the practical genius everywhere shows itself in England, so the pure intellectual activity is the dominant feature of German civilization.

In Italy we shall find neither one nor the other of these characters. Italian civilization has been neither essentially practical as that of England, nor almost exclusively speculative as that of Germany; in Italy, neither great development of individual intelligence, nor social skill and ability have been wanting; the Italians have flourished and excelled at one and the same time in the pure sciences, the arts and philosophy, as well as in practical affairs and life. For some time, it is true, Italy seems to have stopped in both of these progres-

sions; society and the human mind seem enervated and paralysed; but one feels, upon looking closely, that this is no the effect of an inward and national incapacity; it is from without that Italy is weighed down and impeded; she resembles a beautiful flower that wishes to blossom, but is compressed in every part by a cold and rude hand. Neither intellectual nor political capacity has perished in Italy; it wants that which it has always wanted, and which is everywhere one of the vital conditions of civilization,—it wants faith, the faith in truth. I wish to make myself correctly understood, and not to have attributed to my words a different sense from that which I intend to convey. I mean here, by faith, that confidence in truth, which not only causes it to be held as truth, and which satisfies the mind, but which gives men a confidence in right to reign over the world, to govern facts, and in its power to succeed. It is by this feeling that, once having possession of truth, man feels called upon to introduce it into external facts, to reform them, and to regulate them according to reason. Well, it is this which is almost universally wanted in Italy; she has been fertile in great minds, and in universal ideas; she has been thronged with men of rare practical ability, versed in the knowledge of all conditions of external life, and in the art of conducting and managing society; but these two classes of men and facts have remained strangers to each other. The men of universal ideas, the speculative spirits, have not believed in the duty, perhaps not even in the right, of influencing society; although confident in the truth of their principles, they have doubted their power. Men of action, on the other hand, the masters of society, have held small account of universal ideas; they have scarcely ever felt a desire to regulate, according to fixed principles, the facts which came under their dominion. Both have acted as if it was desirable merely to know the truth, but as if it had no further influence, and demanded nothing more. It is this, alike in the fifteenth century and in later times, that has been the weak side of civilization in Italy; it is this which has struck with a kind of barrenness both its speculative genius and its practical ability; here the two powers have not lived in reciprocal confidence, in correspondence, in continual action and reaction.

There is another great country of which, indeed, I speak more out of consideration and respect for a noble and unhappy nation, than from necessity; I mean Spain. Neither great

minds nor great events have been wanting in Spain; understanding and human society have at times appeared there in all their glory; but these are isolated facts, cast here and there throughout Spanish history, like palm-trees on a desert. The fundamental character of civilization, its continued and universal progress, seems denied in Spain, as much to the human mind as to society. There has been either solemn immobility, or fruitless revolutions. Seek one great idea, or social amelioration, one philosophical system or fertile institution, which Spain has given to Europe; there are none such: this nation has remained isolated in Europe; it has received as little from it as it has contributed to it. I should have reproached myself, had I wholly omitted its name; but its civilization is of small importance in the history of the civilization of Europe.

You see that the fundamental principle, the sublime fact of general civilization, the intimate and rapid union, and the harmonious development of ideas and facts, in the intellectual and real orders, has been produced in neither of the great countries at which we have glanced. Something is essentially wanting in all of them to complete civilization; neither of them offers us the complete image, the pure type of civilization in all its conditions, and with all its great characteristics.

In France it is different. In France, the intellectual and social development have never failed each other. Here society and man have always progressed and improved, I will not say abreast and equally, but within a short distance of each other. By the side of great events, revolutions, and public ameliorations, we always find in this country universal ideas and corresponding doctrines. Nothing has passed in the real world, but the understanding has immediately seized it, and thence derived new riches; nothing within the dominion of understanding, which has not had in the real world, and that almost always immediately, its echo and result. Indeed, as a general thing, in France, ideas have preceded and impelled the progress of the social order; they have been prepared in doctrines, before being accomplished in things, and in the march of civilization mind has always taken the lead. This two-fold character of intellectual activity and practical ability, of meditation and application, is shown in all the great events of French history, and in all the great classes of French society, and gives them an aspect which we do not find elsewhere.

At the commencement of the twelfth century, for example, burst forth the great movement for the enfranchisement of the Commons, a great step in social condition; at the same time was manifested a vivid aspiration after freedom of thought. Abailard was contemporary with the citizens of Laon and Vezelay. The first great struggle of free-thought against absolute power in the intellectual order, is contemporaneous with the struggle of the citizens for public liberty. These two movements, it is true, were apparently foreign to each other; the philosophers had a very ill opinion of the insurgent citizens, whom they treated as barbarians; and the citizens, in their turn, when they heard them spoken of, regarded the philosophers as heretics. But the double progress is not the less simultaneous.

Quit the twelfth century; take one of the establishments which have played the most conspicuous part in the history of mind in France, the university of Paris. No one is ignorant of what have been its scientific labors, dating from the thirteenth century; it was the first establishment of the kind in Europe. There was no other in the same age which had so important and active a political existence. The University of Paris is associated with the policy of kings, and with all the struggles of the French clergy against the court of Rome, and those of the clergy against the temporal power; ideas developed themselves, and doctrines were established in its bosom; and it strove almost immediately to propagate them in the external world. It was the principles of the University of Paris which served as the standard of the reformers at the councils of Constance and Basle; which were the origin of, and sustained the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VII.

Intellectual activity and positive influence have for centuries been inseparable in this great school. Let us pass to the sixteenth century, and glance at the history of the Reformation in France; it has here a distinguishing character; it was more learned, or, at least, as learned as elsewhere, and more moderate and reasonable. The principal struggle of erudition and doctrine against the Catholic church was sustained by the French Reformers; it was either in France or Holland, and always in French, that so many philosophical, historical, and polemical works were written in this cause; it is certain, that at this epoch, neither in Germany nor in England, was there so much spirit and learning employed;

the French Reformation, too, was a stranger to the flights of the German anabaptists and the English sectarians; it was seldom it was wanting in practical prudence, and yet one cannot doubt the energy and sincerity of its creed, since for so long a period it withstood the most severe reverses.

In modern times, in the seventeenth and eigtheenth centuries, the intimate and rapid union of ideas with facts, and the development both of society and of man as an individual, are so evident, that it is needless to insist upon them.

We see, then, four or five great epochs, and four or five grand events, in which the particular character of French civilization is shown. Let us take the various classes of our society; let us regard their manners and physiognomy, and we shall be struck with the same fact. The clergy of France is both learned and active, it is connected with all intellectual works and all worldly affairs as reasoner, scholar, administrator; it is, as it were, neither exclusively devoted to religion, science, nor politics, but is constantly occupied in combining and conciliating them all. The French philosophers also present a rare mixture of speculation and practical knowledge; they meditate profoundly and boldly; they seek the pure truth, without any view to its application; but they always keep up a sympathy with the external world, and with the facts in the midst of which they live; they elevate themselves to the greatest height, but without ever losing sight of the earth. Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal, Bayle, almost all the great French philosophers, are neither pure logicians nor enthusiasts. Last summer, in this place, you heard their eloquent interpreter[1] characterize the genius of Descartes, who was at the same time a man of science and a man of the world. "Clear, firm, resolved, and daring, he thought in his study with the same intrepidity with which he fought under the walls of Prague;" having an inclination alike for the movement of life and for the activity of thought. Our philosophers have not all of them possessed the same genius, nor experienced the same adventurous destiny as Descartes; but almost all of them, at the same time that they sought truth, have comprehended the world. They were alike capable of observing and of meditating.

Finally, in the history of France, what is the particular

[1] M. Villemain.

trait which characterizes the only class of men who have there taken a truly public part, the only men who have attempted to thoroughly bring the country within its administration, and to give a legal government to the nation, the French magistracy and the bar, the parliaments and all that surrounds them? Is it not essentially this mixture of learning and practical wisdom, this respect for ideas and facts, for science and its application? Wherever pure knowledge is exercised, in erudition, philosophy, literature, or history, everywhere you encounter the parliaments and the French bar; they take part, at the same time, in all affairs, both public and private; and they have had a hand in all the real and positive interests of society.

From whatever point of view we regard France, we shall discover this two-fold character. The two essential principles of civilization are there developed in a strict correspondence. There man has never been wanting in individual greatness; nor has his individual greatness been devoid of public importance and utility. Much has been said, especially latterly, of good sense as a distinguishing trait of French genius. This is true; but it is not a purely practical good sense, merely calculated to succeed in its enterprises; it is an elevated and philosophical good sense, which penetrates to the roots of ideas, and comprehends and judges them in all their bearings, while at the same time it attends to external facts. This good sense is reason; the French mind is at the same time reasoning and reasonable.

To France, then, must be ascribed this honor, that her civilization has reproduced more faithfully than any other the general type and fundamental idea of civilization. It is the most complete, the most veritable, and, so to speak, the most civilized of civilizations. This it is has given her the first rank in the disinterested opinion of Europe. France has proved herself at once intelligent and powerful, rich in ideas, and in the means of giving effect to those ideas. She has addressed herself at once to the intellect of the nations, and to their desire for social amelioration; she has aroused at once imagination and ambition; she has manifested a capability of discovering the truth, and of making it prevail. By this double title, she has rendered herself popular, for this is the double want of humanity.

We are, then, fully entitled to regard civilization in France as having the first claim on our attention, as being the most

important in itself, the most fruitful of consequences. In studying it, we must earnestly regard it under the double aspect I have indicated, of social development and of intellectual development; we must closely watch the progress of ideas, of mind, of the interior individual man, and of his exterior and general condition. Considering it upon this principle, there is not in the general history of Europe any great event, any great question which we shall not meet with in our own. We shall thus attain the historical and scientific object which we proposed to ourselves; we shall be constantly present at the spectacle of European civilization, without being ourselves lost in the number and variety of the scenes and actors.

But we have before us, as I conceive, something more, and something more important than a spectacle, or even than study; unless I am altogether mistaken, we seek something beyond mere information. The course of civilization, and in particular that of the civilization of France, has raised a great problem, a problem peculiar to our own time, in which all futurity is interested, not only our own future but that of humanity at large, and which we, we of the present generation, are, perhaps, especially called upon to solve.

What is the spirit which now prevails in the intellectual world, which presides over the search after truth, in whatever direction truth is sought? A spirit of rigorous reserve, of strict, cautious prudence, a scientific spirit, a philosophical spirit pursuing a philosophical method. It is a spirit which carefully observes facts, and only admits generalization slowly, progressively, concurrently with the ascertainment of facts. This spirit has, for more than a half century past, manifestly prevailed in the conduct of the sciences which occupy themselves in the material world; it has been the cause of their progress, the source of their glory; and now, every day it infuses itself more and more deeply into the sciences of the moral world, into politics, history, philosophy. In every direction the scientific method is extending and establishing itself; in every direction the necessity is more and more felt of taking facts as the basis and rule of our proceedings; and we all fully understand that facts constitute the subject matter of science, and that no general idea can be of any real value, unless it be founded upon, and supported throughout its progress by facts. Facts are now in the intellectual order, the power in authority.

In the real order, in the social world, in the government, in the public administration, in political economy, we perceive a different tendency; there prevails the empire of ideas, of reasoning, of general principles, of what is called theory. Such is evidently the feature of the great revolution which has developed itself in our time, of all the labors of the eighteenth century; and the feature is not merely one characterizing a crisis, a period of transient agitation; it is the permanent, regular, calm characteristic of the social state which is now establishing, or, at all events, announcing itself in every direction—a social state, which has its basis on discussion and publicity, that is to say, on the empire of public reason, on the empire of doctrines, of convictions common to all the members of the society. On the one hand, then, never before have facts held so large a place in science; on the other, never before have ideas played so leading a part in the outer world.

Matters were very different a hundred years ago: then, in the intellectual order, in science properly so called, facts were but slightly consulted, but little respected; reason and imagination gave themselves full career, and men yielded without hesitation to the wildest impulses of hypothesis, dashing on recklessly, with no other guide than the thread of deduction. In the political order, on the contrary, in the real world, facts were all powerful, were admitted without a doubt or a murmur, as the authority alike *de jure* and *de facto*. Men complained, indeed, of particular facts, but scarcely ever ventured to contest them; sedition itself was more common in those times than freedom of thought. He who should have claimed for an idea, though in the name of truth itself, any place in the affairs of this world, would have had reason to repent of his temerity.

The course of civilization, then, has reversed the former order of things: it has established the empire of facts where once the free movement of mind dominated, and raised ideas to the throne once filled exclusively by facts.

This proposition is so true, that the result stated forms a marked feature in the reproaches of which modern civilization is made the object. Whenever the adversaries of that civilization speak of the actual condition of the human mind, of the direction of its labors, they charge it with being hard, dry, narrow. This rigorous positive method, this scientific spirit, cramps, say they, the ideas, freezes up the imagination,

takes from the understanding its breadth, its freedom, confines, materializes it. When the question turns upon the actual state of societies, upon what societies are attempting, are effecting, these same men exclaim: "Out upon chimeras! Place no faith in theories: it is facts alone which should be studied, respected, valued; it is experience alone which should be believed." So that modern civilization is accused at once of dryness and of dreamy reverie, of hesitation and of precipitation, of timidity and of temerity. As philosophers, we creep along the earth; as politicians, we essay the enterprise of Icarus, and we shall undergo the same fate.

It is this double reproach, or rather this double danger, which we have to repel. We are called upon, in fact, to solve the problem which has occasioned it. We are called upon to confirm, more and more, in the intellectual order, the empire of facts—in the social order, the empire of ideas; to govern our reason more and more according to reality, and reality according to our reason; to maintain at once the strictness of the scientific method, and the legitimate empire of the intellect. There is nothing incongruous or inconsistent in this, far from it; it is, on the contrary, the natural, necessary result of the position of man, as a spectator of the world, and of his mission as an actor in its mighty drama. I take nothing for granted here, I make no comment; I merely describe what I see before me. We are thrown into the midst of a world which we neither invented nor created; we find it before us, we look at it, we study it: we must needs take it as a fact, for it subsists out of us, independently of us; it is with facts our mind exercises itself; it has only facts for materials; and when it comes to the general laws resulting from them, the general laws themselves are facts like any others. So much for our position as spectators. As actors, we proceed in a different way: when we have observed external facts, our acquaintance with these developes in us ideas hich are of a nature superior to them; we feel ourselves called upon to reform, to perfectionate, to regulate that which is; we feel ourselves capable of acting upon the world, of extending therein the glorious empire of reason. This is the mission of man: as spectator, he is subject to facts; as actor, he takes possession of them, and impresses upon them a more regular, a more perfect form. I was justified, then, in saying that there is nothing incongruous, nothing self-contradictory in the problem which we have to solve. It is quite true,

however, that there is a double danger involved in this double task: it is quite true, that in studying facts, the understanding may be overwhelmed by them; that it may become depressed, confined, materialized; it may conceive that there are no other facts than those which strike us at first glance, which present themselves directly, obviously before us, which make themselves palpable to the senses; a great and grievous error: there are facts, facts so remote as to be obscure, facts vast, sublime, most difficult to compass, to observe, to describe, but which are none the less facts, and facts which man is, none the less, absolutely called upon to study and to know. If he fail to make himself acquainted with them, if he forget them, the character of his thought will be inevitably and prodigiously lowered, and all the learning which he may possess will bear the impress of that abasement. On the other hand, it is quite possible for intellectual ambition, in its action upon the real world, to be carried away, to become excessive, chimerical; to lose itself in its eagerness to extend too far and too rapidly the empire of its ideas over external things. But this double danger itself proves the double mission whence it originates; and this mission must be accomplished, the problem must be solved, for the actual condition of civilization lays it down with perfect clearness, and will not permit it to be lost sight of. Henceforth, whosoever, in the search after truth, shall depart from the scientific method, will not be in a position to take the study of facts as the basis of intellectual development; and whosoever, in administering the affairs of society, shall refuse the guidance of general principles and ideas, of doctrines, will assuredly achieve no permanent success, will find himself without any real power; for power and success, whether rational or social, now wholly depend upon the conformity of our labors with these two laws of human activity, with these two tendencies of civilization.

This is not all; we have still a far different problem to solve. Of the two which I have laid down, the one is scientific and the other social; the one concerns pure intelligence, the study of truth; the other applies the results of this study to the external world. There is a third, which arises equally from the present state of civilization, and the solution of which is equally prescribed to us; a moral problem which refers not to science, not to society, but to the in-

ternal development of each of us to the merit, the worth of the individual man.

In addition to the other reproaches of which, as I have said, our civilization is made the object, it is accused of exercising a baleful effect upon our moral nature. Its opponents say, that by its everlastingly disputative spirit, by its mania for discussing and weighing everything, for reducing everything to a precise and definite value, it infrigidates, dries up, concentres the human soul; that the result of its setting up a pretension to universal infallibility, of its assumption of a superiority to all illusion, all impulse of the thought, of its affecting to know the real value of all things, will be, that man will become severally disgusted with all the rest of the world, will become absorbed in self. Further, it is said, that owing to the tranquil ease of life in our times, to the facility and amenity of social relations, to the security which prevails throughout society, men's minds become effeminate, enervated; and that thus, at the same time that we acquire the habit of looking only to oneself, one acquires also a habit of requiring all things for oneself, a disposition to dispense with nothing, to sacrifice nothing, to suffer nothing. In a word, it is asserted that selfishness on the one hand, and captious effeminacy on the other, the dry hardness of manners, and their puerile enervation, are the natural matter-of-course results of the actual condition of civilization; that high-souled devotion and energy, at once the two great powers and the two great virtues of man, are wanting, and will be more and more wanting, in the periods which we call civilized, and more especially in our own.

It were easy, I think, to repel this double reproach, and to establish: 1, the general proposition, that the actual condition of civilization, considered thoroughly and as a whole, by no means as a matter of moral probability, induces as its results selfishness and effeminacy; 2, the fact that neither devotion nor energy have been found to be wanting, in time of need, to the civilized members of modern times. But this were a question which would carry us too far. It is true, the actual state of civilization imposes upon moral devotion and energy, as upon patriotism, as upon all the noble thoughts and feelings of man, an additional difficulty. These great faculties of our nature have hitherto often manifested themselves somewhat fortuitously, in a manner characterized by no reflection, by no reference to motives; so to speak, at

random. Henceforth they will be bound to proceed only upon the basis of reason; legitimacy of motives, and utility of results will be required of them. Doubtless, this is an additional weight for nature to raise up ere she can manifest herself in all her grandeur; but she will raise it up. Never yet has human nature been wanting to herself, never has she failed of that which circumstances have required at her hands; the more has been asked of her, the more she has given. Her revenue ever more than keeps pace with her expenditure. Energy and devotion will derive from other sources, will manifest themselves under other forms. Doubtless, we possess not fully as yet those general ideas, those innate convictions which must inspire the qualities I speak of; the faith which corresponds with our manners is as yet weak, shadowy, tottering; the principles of devotion and energy which were in action in past times are now without effect, for they have lost our confidence. It must be our task to seek out until we discover principles of a character to take strong hold of us, to convince our minds and to move our hearts at one and the same time. These will inspire devotion and energy; these will keep our minds in that state of disinterested activity, of simple, unsophisticated steadfastness which constitutes moral health. The same progress of events which imposes the necessity of doing this upon us, will supply us with the means of doing it.

In the study, then, upon which we are about to enter, we have to aim at far more than the mere acquisition of knowledge; intellectual development cannot, may not remain an isolated fact. We are imperatively called upon to derive from it, for our country, new materials of civilization; for ourselves, a moral regeneration. Science is a beautiful thing, undoubtedly, and of itself well worth all the labor that man may bestow upon it; but it becomes a thousand times grander and more beautiful when it becomes a power; when it becomes the parent of virtue. This, then, is what we have to do in the course of these lectures: to discover the truth; to realize it out of ourselves in external facts, for the benefit of society; in ourselves, to convert it into a faith capable of inspiring us with disinterestedness and moral energy, the force and dignity of man in this world. This is our triple task; this the aim and object of our labor; a labor difficult of execution and slow of progress, and

which success, instead of terminating, only extends. But in nothing, perhaps, is it given to man ever to arrive at the goal he has proposed to himself; his glory is in advancing towards it.

SECOND LECTURE.

Necessity of reading a general history of France before we study that of civilization—M. de Sismondi's work—Why we should study the political state of a country before its moral state, the history of society before that of man—The social state of Gaul in the 5th century—Original monuments and modern works descriptive of that subject—Difference between the civil and religious society of that period—Imperial government of Gaul—The provincial governors—Their official establishments—Their salaries—Benefits and defects of the administration—Fall of the Roman empire—Gaulish society: 1. The senators; 2. The *curiales;* 3. The people; 4. The slaves—Public relations of these various classes—Decline and helplessness of Gaulish civil society—Causes of this—The people attach themselves to the religious community.

Before entering upon the history of French civilization, I would engage those among you who propose to make a serious study of the subject, to read with attention one of the larger histories of France, which may serve, as it were, for a frame in which to place the facts and ideas we shall together collect. For I do not propose to relate to you the course of what are more especially called events, which yet it is indispensable for you to know. Of all the histories of France I could point out to you, the best, beyond any question, is that of M. de Sismondi. It is no part of my intention to enter here into a discussion of the merits and defects of that work, but I will, in a few words, indicate to you what you will more peculiarly find there, and what I advise you more peculiarly to seek there. Considered as a critical exposition of the institutions, the political development, the government of France, the *Histoire des Français* of M. de Sismondi is incomplete,[1] leaving in my opinion something to be desired. Speaking of the volumes already published, I should say that its account of the two epochs most important for the political destiny of France, the reign of Charlemagne and that of St. Louis, is, perhaps, among the feeblest portions of the work. As a

[1] M Guizot speaks of the first twelve volumes of the Paris edition

history of intellectual development of ideas, it is deficient, to a certain extent, in depth of research, and in exactness as to results. But, as a narrative of events, as a picture of the revolutions and vicissitudes of the social state, of the mutual relations of the various classes of society at different periods, of the progressive formation of the French nation, it is a work of the highest order, a work whence instruction of the most valuable kind is to be derived. You may, perhaps, find occasion to desire in it somewhat more impartiality, somewhat greater freedom of imagination; you may, perhaps, detect in it, at times, too much of the influence upon the writer's mind of contemporary events and opinions; but, nevertheless, it is a prodigious, a splendid work, infinitely superior to all those which preceded it, and one which, read with attention, will admirably prepare you for the studies we are about to pursue.

It is part of my plan, whenever we approach a particular epoch, or a crisis of French society, to point out to you the original literary monuments which are extant with respect to it, and the principal modern works which have treated of the subject. You will thus be enabled to test for yourselves, in the crucible of your own studies, the results which I shall endeavor to lay before you.

You will remember that I proposed to consider civilization in its aggregate, as a social development, and as a moral development in the history of the mutual relations of man, and in that of ideas; I shall accordingly examine each epoch under this double aspect. I shall commence in every case with the study of the social state. I am quite aware that in so doing, I shall not begin with the beginning: the social state derives, among a number of other causes, from the moral state of nations; creeds, feelings, ideas, manners, precede the external condition, the social relations, the political institutions; society, saving a necessary and powerful reaction, is that which men make it. Conformably with true chronology, with the internal and moral chronology, we ought to study man before society. But the true historic order, the order in which facts succeed one another, and reciprocally create each other, differs essentially from the scientific order, from the order in which it is proper to study them. In reality, facts develope themselves, so to speak, from within to without; causes inward produce effects outward. Study, on the contrary—study, science, proceed, and properly proceed, from without to within. It is with the outward that its attention is

first occupied; it is the outward which it first seizes upon, and following which, it advances, penetrates on and on, until by degrees it arrives within.

And here we come to the great question, the question so often and so well treated, but not as yet, perhaps, exhausted, the question between the two methods of analysis and synthesis; the latter, the primitive method, the method of creation; the other, the method of the second period, the scientific method. If science desired to proceed according to the method of creation, if it sought to take facts in the order according to which they reproduce each other, it would run a great risk, to say the least, of missing the full, pure source of things, of not embracing the whole broad principle, of arriving at only one of the causes whence effects have sprung; and thus involved in a narrow, tortuous, fallacious path, it would wander more and more remote from the right direction; and instead of arriving at the veritable creation, instead of finding the facts such as they really are, such as they really produce one the other, it would give birth to mere valueless chimeras, grand, indeed, in appearance, but in reality, notwithstanding the amount of intellectual wealth expended in their pursuit, utterly frivolous and of no account.

On the other hand, were science, in proceeding from without to within, according to its own proper method, to forget that this is not the primitive productive method, that facts in themselves subsist and develope themselves in another order than that in which it views them, it might in time also forget that it was preceded by facts, it might exclude from its remembrance the very foundation of things, it might be dazzled with itself, it might fancy that it was reality; and it would thus speedily become a mere combination of appearances and terms, as vain, as fallacious as the hypothesis and deductions of the contrary method.

It is highly important not to lose sight of this distinction and its consequences; we shall meet with them again more than once on our way.

In a former lecture, on seeking in the cradle of European civilization for its primitive and essential elements, I found, on the one side, the Roman world, on the other, the barbarians. In commencing, therefore, in any quarter of Europe, the study of modern civilization, we must first investigate the state of Roman society there, at the moment when the Roman empire fell, that is to say, about the close of the fourth and

the opening of the fifth century. This investigation is peculiarly necessary in the case of France. The whole of Gaul was subject to the Empire, and its civilization, more especially in its southern portions, was thoroughly Roman. In the histories of England and of Germany, Rome occupies a less prominent position; the civilization of these countries, in its origin, was not Roman, but Germanic; it was not until a later period of their career that they really underwent the influence of the laws, the ideas, the traditions of Rome. The case with our civilization was different; it was Roman from its very outset. It is characterized, moreover, by this peculiar feature, that it drew nourishment from both the sources of general European civilization. Gaul was situated upon the limits of the Roman world and of the Germanic world. The south of Gaul was essentially Roman, the north essentially Germanic. Germanic manners, institutions, influences, prevailed in the north of Gaul; Roman manners, institutions, influences, in the south. And here we already recognize that distinctive character of French civilization, which I endeavored to demonstrate in my first lecture, namely, that it is the most complete, the most faithful image of European civilization in the aggregate. The civilization of England and of Germany is especially Germanic; that of Spain and Italy especially Roman; that of France is the only one which participates almost equally of the two origins, which has reproduced, from its outset, the complexity, the variety of the elements of modern society.

The social state of Gaul, then, towards the end of the fourth and the commencement of the fifth century, is the first object of our studies. Before entering upon it, I will mention what are the great original monuments, and what the principal modern works on the subject which I would advise you to consult.

Of the original monuments, the most important, beyond all doubt, is the Theodosian code. Montesquieu, though he does not exactly say so, is evidently[1] of opinion that this code constituted, in the fifth century, the whole Roman law, the entire body of Roman legislation. It constitutes nothing of the sort. The Theodosian code is a collection of the constitutions of the emperors, from Constantine to Theodosius the younger, and

[1] *Esprit des Loix*, xxviii. chap. 4.

was published by the latter in 438. Independently of these constitutions, the ancient Senatus Consulta, the ancient Plebiscita, the law of the Twelve Tables, the Pretorian Edicts, and the opinions of the jurisconsults, constituted a part of the Roman law. Just previously, by a decree of Valentinian III. in 426, the opinions of five of the great lawyers, Papinian, Ulpian, Paul, Gaius, and Modestinus, had expressly been invested with the force of law. It were, however, quite accurate to say that, in a practical point of view, the Theodosian code was the most important law book of the Empire; it is, moreover, the literary monument which diffuses the greatest light over this period.[1]

The second original document to which I would invite your attention, is the *Notitia Imperii Romani*, that genuine imperial almanac of the fifth century, giving lists of all the functionaries of the empire, and presenting a complete review of the whole of its administration, of all the relations between the government and its subjects.[2] The *Notitia* has been illustrated with the greatest learning by the jurisconsult Pancirolus; I know of no work which contains so many remarkable and curious facts as to the interior of Roman society.

I will refer you, for a third original source, to the great collections of the acts of the councils. Of these there are two; the collections of the councils held in Gaul, which were published by Père Sirmond,[3] with a supplementary volume compiled by Lalande,[4] and the general collection of councils compiled by the Père Labbe.[5]

Of modern works connected with the subject, I will first mention those French productions which I think you may consult with great advantage.

1. There is the *Theorie des Lois politiques de la Monarchie Française*, a work very little known, published at the commencement of the revolution.[6] It was compiled by a woman, Mademoiselle de Lezardière, and consists of very little more

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[1] Six vols. folio, *avec les Commentaires de J. Godefroy.* Ritter Leipsig, 1738

[2] The best edition is that printed in the 7th vol. of the *Thesaurus Antiquitatum Romanarum* of Grævius.

[3] Three vols folio. Paris, 1629.
One vol. folio. Paris, 1660.

[4] Eighteen vols. folio. Paris, 1672.

[5] In 1792; eight vols. 8vo. Paris.

than original texts, legislative and historical, illustrating the condition, the manners, the constitutions, of the Franks and Gauls from the third to the ninth century; but these texts are selected, arranged, and translated with a skill and exactness rarely to be met with.

2. You will permit me to point out to you, in the second place, the *Essais sur l'Histoire de France* that I myself have published,[1] inasmuch as in them I have more especially applied myself to retracing, under its different aspects, the state of society in Gaul, immediately before and immediately after the fall of the Roman empire.

As to ecclesiastical history, Fleury's appears to me the best.

Those who are acquainted with the German, will do well to read,

1. The *History of the Roman Law in the Middle Ages*, by M. de Savigny,[2] a work the purpose of which is to show that the Roman law has never perished in Europe, but is to be met with throughout the period extending from the fifth to the thirteenth centuries, in a multitude of institutions, laws, and customs. The moral state of society is not always accurately appreciated in this work, nor represented with fidelity; but as to facts, its learning and critical acumen are of a superior character.

2. The *General History of the Christian Church*, by M. Henke;[3] a work incompletely developed, and which leaves much to be desired in reference to the knowledge and appreciation of facts, but learned and judicious in the criticisms it furnishes, and characterized by an independence of spirit too seldom met with in works of this nature.

3. The *Manual of Ecclesiastical History*, of M. Gieseler, the latest and most complete, upon this subject, of those learned summaries so extensively diffused in Germany, and which serve as guides when we are desirous of entering upon any particular study.

You have probably remarked that I point out here two classes of works; the one relating to civil, the other to ecclesiastical history. I do so for this reason; that at the period we speak of, there existed in the Roman world two very

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[1] One vol. 8vo. Paris.
[2] Six vols. 8vo.
[3] Six vols 8vo. 4th ed. Brunswick, 1800

different societies—the civil society and the religious society. They differed not only in their object, not only in that they were governed by principles and by institutions entirely dissimilar, not only in that the one was old and the other young; there existed between them a diversity far more profound, far more important. The civil society, to all outward appearances, seemed Christian, equally with the religious society. The great majority of the European kings and nations had embraced Christianity; but, at bottom, the civil society was pagan. Its institutions, its laws, its manners, were all essentially pagan. It was entirely a society formed by paganism; not at all a society formed by Christianity. Christian civil society did not develope itself till a later period, till after the invasion of the barbarians; it belongs, in point of time, to modern history. In the fifth century, whatever outward appearances may say to the contrary, there existed between civil society and religious society incoherence, contradiction, contest; for they were essentially different both in their origin and in their nature.

I would pray you never to lose sight of this diversity; it is a diversity which alone enables us to comprehend the real condition of the Roman world at this period.

What then was this civil society, nominally Christian, but in reality the pagan?

Let us first consider it in its outward, most obvious aspect, in its government, in its institutions, its administration.

The empire of the west was divided, in the fifth century into two prefectures, that of Gaul and that of Italy. The prefecture of Gaul comprised three dioceses—that of Gaul, that of Spain, and that of Britain. At the head of the prefecture was a pretorian-prefect; at the head of each diocess a vice-prefect.

The pretorian-prefect of Gaul resided at Trèves. Gaul was divided into seventeen provinces, the affairs of each of which were administered by a governor of its own, under the general orders of the prefect. Of these provinces, six were governed by *consulares*,[1] the other eleven by presidents.[2]

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[1] Viennensis, Lugdunensis 1; Germania Superior, Germania Inferior, Belgica 1 and 2.

[2] Alpes Maritimæ, Alpes Penninæ, Sequanensis 1; Aquitanica 1 and 2; Novempopulonia, Narbonensis 1 and 2; Lugdunensis 2 and 3 Lugdunensis Senonensis.

As to the mode of administration, there existed no important distinction between these two classes of governors; they exercised in reality the same power, differing only in rank and title.

In Gaul, as elsewhere, the governors had two kinds of functions:

1st. They were the emperor's immediate representatives, charged, throughout the whole extent of the Empire, with the interests of the central government, with the collection of taxes, with the management of the public domains, the direction of the imperial posts, the levy and regulation of the armies —in a word, with the fulfilment of all the relations between the emperor and his subjects.

2d. They had the administration of justice between the subjects themselves. The whole civil and criminal jurisdiction was in their hands, with two exceptions. Certain towns of Gaul possessed what was called *jus Italicum*—the Italian law. In the municipia of Italy, the right of administering justice to the citizens, at least in civil matters and in the first instance, appertained to certain municipal magistrates, *Duumviri*, *Quatuorviri*, *Quinquenvales*, *Ædiles*, *Prætores*, &c. It has been often stated that the case was the same out of Italy, in all the provinces as a rule, but this is a mistake: it was only in a limited number of these towns assimilated to the Italian municipia, that the municipal magistrates exercised any real jurisdiction; and this in every instance subject to an appeal to the governor.

There was also, subsequent to the middle of the fourth century, in almost all the towns, a special magistrate, called *defensor*, elected not merely by the curia or municipal body but by the population at large, whose duty it was to defend the interests of the people, even against the governor himself, if need were. The *defensor* exercised in such matters the jurisdiction in the first instance; he also acted as judge in that class of cases, which we now term police cases.

With these two exceptions, the governors alone adjudicated all suits; and there was no appeal from them except direct to the emperor.

This jurisdiction of theirs was exercised in the following manner:—In the first ages of the Empire, conformably with ancient custom, he to whom the jurisdiction appertained, prætor provincial governor, or municipal magistrate, on a case being submitted to him, merely determined the rule of

law, the legal principle according to which it ought to be adjudged. He decided, that is to say, the question of law involved in the case, and then appointed a private citizen, called the *judex*, the veritable juror, to examine and decide upon the question of fact. The legal principle laid down by the magistrate was applied to the fact found by the *judex*, and so the case was determined.

By degrees, in proportion as imperial despotism established itself, and the ancient liberties of the people disappeared, the intervention of the *judex* became less regular. The magistrates decided, without any reference to this officer, certain matters which were called *extraordinariæ cognitiones*. Diocletian formally abolished the institution in the provinces; it no longer appeared but as an exception; and Justinian testifies, that in his time it had fallen completely into desuetude. The entire jurisdiction in all cases then appertained to the governors—agents and representatives of the emperor in all things, and masters of the lives and fortunes of the citizens, with no appeal from their judgments but to the emperor in person.

In order to give you an idea of the extent of their power, and of the manner in which it was exercised, I have drawn up from the *Notitia Imperii Romani*—a list of the officers of a provincial governor; a list exactly similar to that which we might at the present day derive from the *Almanach Royal*, of the official establishment of a government office, or a prefecture. They are the officers of the pretorian prefect whom I am about to introduce to you, but the governors subordinate to the pretorian prefect, the *consulares*, *correctores*, *præsides*, exercised, under his superintendence, the same powers with himself; and their establishments were almost entirely the same as his, only on a smaller scale.

The principal officers of a prætorian prefect were:

1. *Princeps*, or *primiscrinius officii*. He cited before the tribunal of the prefect those who had business there: he drew up the judgments: it was upon his order that accused persons were taken into custody. His principal business, however, was the collection of taxes. He enjoyed various privileges.

2. *Cornicularius*.—He made public the ordinances, edicts, and judgments of the governor. His post was one of very great antiquity; the tribunes of the people had their *cornicularius* (Val. Maximus, I., vi. c. 11). He was so entitled

because he carried with him, as a distinctive badge, a horn, of which he made use, in all probability, to impose silence on the crowd when he was about to perform his official duty. The *præco*, or herald, was under his direction, and he had a large establishment of clerks. His period of office was only a year. He was a species of recorder.

3. *Adjutor*, a supplementary officer, whose services appear to have been due to all the other functionaries, when required; his specific business was to arrest accused persons, to superintend the infliction of the torture, &c. He had an office of his own.

4. *Commentariensis*, the director of prisons, an officer higher in rank than our jailers, but having the same functions; he had the internal regulation of the prisons, conducted the prisoners before the tribunals, furnished them with provisions when they were destitute, had the torture administered to them, &c.

5. *Actuarii vel ab actis*.—These officers drew up contracts for the citizens, and all such deeds as the law required to bear a legal character, such as wills, grants, &c. They were the predecessors of our notaries. As the *actuarii* attached to the office of the pretorian prefect or of the præses, could not be everywhere, the decemvirs and other municipal magistrates were authorized to act as their deputies.

6. *Numerarii*.—These were the keepers of the accounts. The ordinary governors had two, called *tabularii;* the prætorian prefects four:—1. The *Numerarius Bonorum*, who kept an account of the funds appertaining to the exchequer, the revenues of which went to the *comes rerum privatarum;* 2. The *numerarius tributorum*, who was entrusted with the accounts of the public revenues which went to the *ærarium*, and to the account of the sacred donatives; 3. The *numerarius auri*, who received the gold drawn from the provinces, had the silver money he received changed into gold, and kept the accounts of the gold mines within his district; 4. The *numerarius operum publicorum*, who kept the accounts of the various public works, such as forts, walls, aqueducts, baths, &c., all of which were maintained by a third of the revenues of the cities, and by a land tax levied on and according to occasion. These *numerarii* had under their orders a large body of clerks.

7. *Sub-adjuva;* an assistant to the *adjutor*.

8. *Curator Epistolarum*.—This was the secretary who had

charge of the correspondence; he had a number of subordinates, called *epistolares*.

9. *Regerendarius*.—The officer charged to transmit to the prefect the petitions of the subject, and to write the answers.

10. *Exceptores*.—They wrote out all the documents relating to the judgments given by the prefects, and read them before his tribunal; they were under the direction of a *primicerius*. They may be assimilated to our registrars.

11. *Singularii*, or *Singulares*, *Ducenarii*, *Centenarii*, *&c.*—Officers commanding a sort of military police attached to the service of the provincial governors. The *singulares* attended these functionaries as a guard, executed their orders in the province, arrested accused parties, and conducted them to prison. They acted as collectors of the taxes; the office of the ducenarii (captains of two hundred men, or *cohortales*), of the *centenarii*, the *sexagenarii*, was the same.

12. *Primilipus*.—The chief officer of these *cohortales*; it was his especial charge to superintend the distribution of provisions to the soldiers, in the name of the pretorian prefect, and to inspect the provisions previous to delivery.

It is obvious that only the more prominent employments are indicated here, and that these officers must have had a great many others under their direction. In the offices of the prætor of Africa, there were 398 persons employed, in those of the count of the East, 600. Independently of their number, you perceive, from the nature of their functions, that the jurisdiction of the provincial governors comprehended all things, all classes, that the whole society had to do with them, and they with the whole of society.

I will now direct your attention, for a moment, to the salaries which these officers received; you may derive from this information some rather curious illustrations of the social state of the period.

Under Alexander Severus, according to a passage in his biographer Lampridius,[1] the governors of a province received twenty pounds of silver and one hundred pieces of gold,[2] six pitchers (phialas) of wine, two mules, and two horses, two state suits (vestes forenses), and one ordinary suit (vestes domesticas), a bathing tub, a cook, a muleteer, and lastly (I have to solicit your pardon for this detail, but it is too charac-

[1] Chap. xlii

[2] About 150*l*.

teristic to be omitted), when they were not married, a concubine, *quod sine his esse non possent*, says the text. When they quitted office, they were obliged to return the mules, the horses, the muleteer, and the cook. If the emperor was satisfied with their administration, they were allowed to retain the other gifts he had bestowed upon them; if he was dissatisfied, they were compelled to give him four times the value of what they had received. Under Constantine, the part payment in goods still subsisted; we find the governors of two great provinces, *Asiana* and *Pontus*, receiving an allowance of oil for four lamps. It was not until the reign of Theodosius II., in the first half of the fifth century, that this mode of paying the governors was altogether discontinued. The subordinate *employés*, however, continued, down to the time of Justinian, to receive in the eastern empire a portion of their salaries in provisions and other goods. I dwell upon this circumstance because it furnishes a striking idea of the inactive state of commercial relations, and of the imperfect circulating medium of the Empire.

The facts I have stated, which are perfectly clear, make equally evident the nature of the government under our consideration; an utter absence of independence on the part of the various functionaries; all of them subordinate one to the other, up to the emperor, who absolutely disposes and decides the fate of them all. No appeal for the subject from the functionary, but to the emperor; nothing like co-ordinate, co-equal powers, destined to control and limit one another, is to be met with. All proceeds straight upwards or downwards, on the principle of a sole, strict hierarchy. It is a pure, unmitigated, administrative despotism.

Do not, however, conclude from what I have stated, that this system of government, this administrative machinery, was instituted for the sole behoof of absolute power, that it never aimed at or produced any other effect than that of promoting the views of despotism. In order to appreciate the matter fairly, we must present to our minds a just idea of the state of the provinces, and more especially of Gaul, at the moment preceding that when the empire took the place of the republic. There were two powers in authority, that of the Roman proconsul, sent to administer, for a temporary period, such or such a province, and that of the old national chiefs, the governors whom the country obeyed before it passed under the Roman yoke. These two powers were, upon the whole, more iniqui-

tous, in my opinion, and more noxious in their operation, than the imperial administration which superseded them. I can conceive no affliction more fearful for a province than the government of a Roman proconsul, a greedy tyrant, coming there for a greater or less period, in the sole view of making his fortune, and giving unchecked way for a time to all the impulses of grasping self-interest, to all the caprices of absolute power. I do not mean to say that these proconsuls were every one a Verres or a Piso, but the great crimes of a period enable us in their history to estimate the measure of iniquity in that period; and if it required a Verres to arouse the indignation of Rome, we may fairly judge how far a proconsul might go, so that he kept within the limits outstepped by the more daring monster denounced by Cicero. As to the ancient chiefs of the country, theirs was, I have no doubt, a government altogether irregular, oppressive, barbarous. The civilization of Gaul, when it was conquered by the Romans, was very inferior to that of Rome: the two powers which held sway there were, on the one hand, that of the priests, the Druids; on the other, that of the chiefs, whom we may assimilate with the more modern chiefs of clans. The ancient social organization of the country part of Gaul had, in point of fact, a close resemblance to that of Ireland or of the Highlands of Scotland in later times; the population clustered round the more considerable personages, round the great landed proprietors: Vercingetorix, for example, was probably a chief of this description, the leader of a multitude of peasantry and of petty landholders connected by personal considerations with his domains, with his family, with his interests. This system may doubtless give birth to lofty and honorable sentiments, it may inspire those who live under it with powerfully marked habits and associations, with strong mutual attachments; but it is, on the whole, far from favorable to the progress of civilization. There is nothing regular, nothing comprehensive in it; the ruder passions have full and unchecked sway; private warfare is incessant; manners make no advance; the decision of all questions is entirely a matter of individual or local interest; every feature in the system is an obstacle to the increase of prosperity, to the extension of ideas, to the rich and rapid development of man and of society. When therefore the imperial administration came into operation in Gaul, however bitter may have been the resentment and regret which naturally filled patriotic minds, we can en-

tertain no doubt that it was more enlightened, more impartial, more guided by general views and by considerations of really public interests, than the old national government had been. It was neither mixed up with jealousies of family, city, or tribe, nor fettered to savage and stagnant ideas and manners by prejudices of religion or birth. On the other hand, the new governors, invested with more permanent functions, controlled, up to a certain point, by the imperial authority, were less grasping, less violent, less oppressive than the proconsuls of the senate had been. We accordingly observe with the progress of the first, second, and even the third centuries, a progress in the prosperity and civilization of Gaul. The towns grew rich, and extended themselves; the freemen became more and more numerous. It had been, amongst the ancient Gauls, a custom, or rather a necessity, for the individual freemen to place themselves under the protection of some great man, to enrol themselves under the banner of a patron, as the only mode of effecting security for themselves. This custom, without entirely disappearing, abated in the first ages of imperial administration; the freemen assumed a more independent existence, which proves that their existence was better secured by the general operation of the laws, by the public power. There was greater equality introduced among the various classes, none of whom were now arbitrarily excluded from the attainment of fortune and power. Manners were softened, ideas expanded, the country became covered with roads and buildings. Everything indicated a society in course of development, a civilization in progress.

But the benefits of despotism are shortlived; it poisons the very springs which it lays open. If it display a merit, it is an exceptional one; if a virtue, it is created of circumstances; and once this better hour has passed away, all the vices of its nature break forth with redoubled violence, and weigh down society in every direction.

In proportion as the Empire, or more properly speaking, the power of the emperor, grew weaker, in proportion as it found itself a prey to external and internal dangers, its wants grew greater and more urgent; it required more money, more men, more means of action of every description; it demanded more and more at the hands of the subject nations, and at the same time did less and less for them in return. The larger reinforcements of troops were sent to the frontiers to resist the barbarians, the fewer of course remained to maintain order

in the interior. The more money there was spent at Constantinople or at Rome to purchase the services of auxiliaries, or to bribe dangerous courtiers, the less had the emperor to expend upon the due administration of the provinces. Despotism thus found itself at once more exacting and more feeble, necessitated to take more from the people, and incapable of protecting for them the little it left them. This double evil had fully developed itself at the close of the fourth century. Not only at this epoch had all social progress ceased, but a retrograde movement was sensibly felt; the empire was invaded in every direction, and its interior swept and devastated by bodies of barbarians; the population fell off, more especially in the provinces; in the towns, all public works were put a stop to, all embellishments suspended; the freemen once more went in crowds to solicit the protection of some powerful chief. Such are the incessant complaints of the Gaulish writers of the fourth and fifth centuries, of Salvienus, for example, in his work *De Gubernatione Dei*, perhaps the most vivid and most interesting picture that we have of the period. In a word, in every direction we see manifesting themselves unequivocal symptoms of the decline of the government, of the desolation of the land.

At length the evil grew so great, that the Roman empire found itself unable to go on; it began by recalling its troops; it said to the provinces, to Britain, to Gaul: "I can no longer defend you: you must take care of yourselves." Ere long it ceased to govern them, as it had ceased to protect them: its administrative officers withdrew as its armies had done. This was the fact which was accomplished in the middle of the fifth century. The Roman empire fell back in every direction, and abandoned, either to the barbarians or to themselves, the provinces which it had taken so much pains to conquer.

What, more especially in Gaul, was the society thus left to itself, thus compelled to provide for itself? How was it constituted? What means, what strength had it with which to protect itself?

Four classes of persons, four different social conditions existed at this period in Gaul. 1. The senators; 2. the *curiales;* 3. the people, properly so called; 4. the slaves.

The distinct existence of the senatorial families is attested by all the monuments of the period. We meet with the designation at every step, in the legislative documents, and in

the historians. Did it indicate families whose members belonged or had belonged to the Roman senate, or did it merely refer to the municipal senators of the Gaulish towns? This is a legitimate question, since the senate of each town, the municipal body known under the name of *curia*, often also called itself *senate*.

There can be little doubt, I think, that it meant families which had belonged to the Roman senate. The emperors, who filled up that senate just as they pleased, used to recruit it from the provinces with members of the most distinguished families in the principal cities. Those who had occupied high local offices, who had acted, for instance, as provincial governors, were entitled to expect a seat in the Roman senate; at a later period, the same favor was granted to persons who had been nominated to certain honorary charges; and ultimately the possession of a mere title, that of *clarissimus*, which was conferred in the same way that the title of baron or count is now, was sufficient to give its holder a seat in the senate.

This quality gave certain privileges which raised the senators to a position superior to that of the other citizens. 1, the title itself; 2, the right to be tried by a special tribunal: when a senator had to be tried for a capital offence, the magistrate was obliged to associate with himself five assessors, drawn by lot; 3, exemption from torture; 4, exemption from filling municipal offices, which at this time had become a very serious burden.

Such was the condition of the senatorial families. It were, perhaps, extravagant to say that they formed a class of citizens essentially distinct from the rest, for the senators were taken from all classes of the population; we find even freedmen among them—and the emperor could at any time deprive them, or any of them, of the privileges he had conferred. But, at the same time, as these privileges were real and substantial, and moreover hereditary, at least in reference to children born after the elevation of the father to the senatorial dignity, we may fairly point to them as creating an essential distinction in social relations, as manifesting the principle, or at all events, the very decided appearance of a political aristocracy.

The second class of citizens was that of the *curiales* or *decuriones*, men of easy circumstances, members, not of the Roman senate, but of the *curia* or municipal body of their

own city. I have, in my *Essai sur l'Histoire de France*, drawn up a summary of laws and facts relative to the curiales; and in order to give an exact picture of their condition, I will, with your permission, introduce this summary here:

The class of curiales comprised all such inhabitants of towns, whether natives (*municipes*) or settlers (*incolæ*), as possessed landed property to the extent of not less than twenty-five acres (*jugera*), and were not included in any way among the privileged persons exempt from curial functions.

Persons belonged to this class either by origin or by nomination.

Every son of a curialis was himself a curialis, and bound to fulfil all the duties inherent in that quality.

Every inhabitant of a town, trader or otherwise, who acquired landed property to the extent of twenty-five acres and upwards, was liable to be claimed by the *curia*, and could not refuse to join it.

No curialis was allowed by any personal and voluntary act to relinquish his condition. They were prohibited from living in the country, from entering the army, from accepting offices which would relieve them from municipal functions, until they had exercised all these functions, from that of simple member of the curia up to that of first magistrate of the city. Then, and not till then, were they permitted to become soldiers, public functionaries, and senators. The children born to them before their elevation remained in the class of curiales.

They were not allowed to become priests unless they transferred their property to some one who was willing to become a curialis in their place, or to the curia itself.

The curiales were constantly endeavoring to relinquish their condition, and we accordingly find a multitude of laws prescribing the rigorous pursuit of all such as had fled, or surreptitiously entered the army, or the order of priests, or the senate, or into public functions, and ordering them, when discovered, to be compelled to return to their curia.

The functions and duties of the curiales thus forcibly confined within their curia, were as follow:—

1. To administer the affairs of the municipium, its revenue and its expenditure, either deliberatively as a private member of the curia, or executively as a municipal magistrate. In this double situation, the curiales were not only responsible

for their own individual conduct, but they were called upon to provide for the wants of the town out of their own means, if the civic revenue was insufficient.

2. To collect the public taxes. Here also they were themselves responsible if they failed to levy the full amount imposed. Any lands subject to the land-tax which were abandoned by their possessors reverted to the curia, who were bound to pay the tax in respect of them, until some one was found who was willing to take the land and its liabilities upon himself. If no such person appeared, the tax continued to be made up amongst the other proprietors.

3. No curialis could sell, without the permission of the provincial governor, the property in respect of which he was a curialis.

4. Heirs of curiales, not themselves members of the curia, and the widow or inheriting daughter of a curialis who married a man not a curialis, were obliged to resign a fourth of their property to the curia.

5. Curiales without children could only dispose by will of a fourth of their property. The other three-fourths went to the curia.

6. They were not allowed to absent themselves from the municipium, even for a limited time, without the permission of the provincial governor.

7. If they quitted their curia without such permission, and could not, after a certain interval, be found, their property was confiscated for the benefit of the curia.

8. The burden of the impost designated *Aurum Coronarium*, which was a tribute paid to the prince on certain solemn occasions, fell solely upon the curiales.

By way of compensating the curiales for these heavy incumbrances, they were:—

1. Exempt from the torture, except in very grave cases.

2. Exempt from certain corporeal and ignominious punishments, which were reserved for the lower classes.

3. After having gone through the whole series of municipal offices, those who had managed to escape the ruinous risks which had presented themselves at every stage of their progress, were exempt from serving any municipal office for the future, enjoyed certain honors, and not unfrequently received the title of *comes*.

4. Decayed decuriones were maintained at the expense of the town.

I need not point out to you how hard and oppressive this condition was—into what a state it necessarily tended to reduce the burgher class in all the towns. We accordingly find every indication that this class became, day after day, less numerous. There are no documents from which we can form any satisfactory idea of the number of curiales. A list of the members of each curia, *album curiæ*, was, indeed, drawn up every year; but these lists have disappeared. M. de Savigny cites one, after Fabretti, the *album* of Canusium (Canosa), a small town of Italy. It is for the year 223, and sets down the number of the curiales of that town at a hundred and forty-eight. Judging from their extent and comparative importance, the larger towns of Gaul, Arles, Narbonne, Toulouse, Lyons, Nismes, had far more than this number. There can be no doubt, indeed, that such was the case in the earlier periods; but as I have said, the *curiales* became constantly fewer and fewer, and at the epoch on which we are now engaged, there were scarcely more than a hundred of them in the very largest cities.

The third class of the Gaulish community consisted of the people, especially so called—the *plebs*. This class comprehended, on the one hand, the petty landholders, whose property was not sufficient to qualify them for the curia; on the other, the small tradespeople and the free artisans. I have no observations to make with reference to the petty landholders in this class; they were probably very few in number; but with reference to the free artisans, it is necessary to enter into some explanations.

You are all aware that under the republic and in the earlier years of the empire, operative industry was a domestic profession, carried on by the slaves for the benefit of their masters. Every proprietor of slaves had whatever mechanical production he required manufactured in his own house; he had slave-blacksmiths, slave-shoemakers, slave-carpenters, slave-ironworkers, &c. And he not only employed them in making things for himself, but he sold the products of their industry to freemen, his clients and others, who had no slaves of their own.

By one of those revolutions which work on slowly and unseen until they become accomplished and manifest at a particular epoch, whose course we have not followed, and whose origin we never trace back, it happened that industry threw off the domestic menial character it had so long worn, and that

instead of slave artisans, the world saw free artisans, who worked, not for a master, but for the public, and for their own profit and benefit. This was an immense change in the state of society, a change pregnant with incalculable results. When and how it was operated in the Roman world, I know not, nor has any one else, I believe, identified its precise date; but at the period we are now considering, at the commencement of the fifth century, it was in full action; there were in all the large towns of Gaul a numerous class of free artisans, already erected into corporations, into bodies formally represented by some of their own members. The majority of these trade-corporations, the origin of which is usually assigned to the middle ages, may readily be traced back, more especially in the south of Gaul and in Italy, to the Roman world. Ever since the fifth century, we come upon indications of them, more or less direct, at every epoch of history; already, at that period, they constituted in many towns one of the principal, one of the most important portions of the popular community.

The fourth class was that of slaves; of these there were two kinds. We are too much in the habit of attaching to the word *slave*, one bare single idea,—of connecting with the term one sole condition; this is an entire misconception. We must carefully distinguish, at the period now under our consideration, between the domestic slaves and the predial or rural slaves. As to the former, their condition was everywhere very nearly the same; but as to those who cultivated the soil, we find them designated by a multitude of different names—*coloni*, *inquilini*, *rustici*, *agricolæ*, *aratores*, *tributarii*, *originarii*, *adscriptitii*, each name, well nigh, indicating a difference of condition. Some were domestic slaves, sent to a man's country estate, to labor in the fields there, instead of working indoors, at his town-house. Others were regular serfs of the soil, who could not be sold except with the domain itself; others were farmers, who cultivated the ground, in consideration of receiving half the produce; others, farmers of a higher class, who paid a regular money rent; others, a sort of comparatively free laborers, farm-servants, who worked for wages. Sometimes, moreover, these very different conditions seem mixed up together under the general denomination of *coloni*, sometimes they are designated under various names.

Thus, judging from appearances, and from existing terms,

a political nobility, an upper burgher class or municipal nobility, the people especially so called, domestic or rural slaves, in their different conditions, constituted Gaulish society, constituted the strength which subsisted in Gaul, after the withdrawal of Rome.

But what is the real value to be attached to these appearances? What was the real strength of this strength? What living and powerful society could the concurrences of these various classes form?

We are in the habit of giving to every privileged class the name of aristocracy. I do not conceive that this name properly appertains to the senatorial families of which I have just spoken. It was an hierarchical collection of functionaries, but not an aristocracy. Neither privilege, nor wealth, nor even with these the possession of power, are sufficient to constitute an aristocracy. Permit me to call your attention for a moment, to the true meaning of this term; I shall not go far in search of it; I will consult, for the history of the word, the language whence we have derived it.

In the more ancient Greek authors, the word αρειων, αριστος, generally means the strongest, the person possessing the superiority in personal, physical, material strength. We find the term thus employed in Homer, Hesiod, and even in some of the choruses of Sophocles; it came, perhaps, from the word which designated the God Mars, the God of Strength, Αρης.

As we advance in the progress of Greek civilization, as we approach the period when social development gave effect to other causes of superiority than physical force, the word αριστος designates the great, powerful, the most considerable, the most wealthy; it is the title assigned to the principal citizens, whatever the sources of their power and influence.

Going a little further, we come to the philosophers, to the men whose work it was to elevate and purify ideas; with them the word αριστος is often used to convey a meaning of a far more moral character; it indicates the best, the most virtuous, the most able man; intellectual superiority. In the eyes of these definers, the aristocratic government was the government of the best, that is to say, the ideal of governments.

Thus, then, physical force, social preponderance, moral superiority—thus, so to speak, and judging from the vicissitudes in the meanings of the words, thus have these been the

gradations of aristocracy, the various states through which it has had to pass.

And, indeed, for an aristocracy to be real, for it to merit its name, it must possess, and possess of itself, one or the other of these characteristics; it must have either a force of its own, a force which it borrows from no one, and which none can wrest from it, or a force admitted, proclaimed by the men over whom it exercises this force. It must have either independence or popularity. It must either have power, in its mere personal right, as was the case with the feudal aristocracy, or it must receive power by national and free election, as is the case in representative governments. Nothing resembling either of these characteristics is to be met with in the senatorial aristocracy of Gaul; it possessed neither independence nor popularity. Power, wealth, privilege, all it had and exercised, was borrowed and precarious. Undoubtedly the senatorial families occupied a position in society and in the eyes of the people, for they were rich, and had filled public offices; but they were incapable of any great effort, incapable of carrying the people with them, or using them either to defend or to govern the country.

Let us now turn to the second class, the curiales, and examine what the real extent of their strength was. Judging from appearances, these had something beyond what the preceding class possessed; among them, the presence of principles of liberty is evident. I have already endeavored to explain these in the following manner, in my *Essai sur le regime Municipal Romain au V. Siecle :*

1. Every inhabitant of a town, possessor of a fortune sufficient to secure his independence and the development of his understanding, is a curialis, and as such called upon to take part in the administration of civic affairs.

The right of curialship, then, is attached to the presumed capacity of filling it, and not to any privilege of birth, and without any limit as to numbers; and this right is not a mere right of election, but a right to deliberate upon and to participate directly in the administration of affairs, a right to discuss matters and interests, the comprehension of which, and the ability to discuss which, it may reasonably be supposed that all persons above the very lowest in the scale of existence possess. The *curia* is not a limited and select town council, but an assembly of all such inhabitants as come within the curial qualification.

2. An assembly cannot act administratively; there must be magistrates to do this. Such magistrates are all elected by the curia, for a very limited period, and are responsible with their fortunes for the integrity of their administration.

3. In great emergencies, when the fate of a city is in question, or when it is proposed to elect a magistrate invested with uncertain and more arbitrary powers, the curia itself does not suffice; the whole population is summoned to concur in these solemn acts.

Who, at the aspect of such rights existing, would not imagine he recognized a petty republic, in which the municipal life and the political life were mixed up and confounded together, in which democracy of the most unequivocal description prevailed? Who would imagine, for one instant, that a town so governed formed part of a great empire, and was connected by strict and necessary bonds with a distant and sovereign central power? Who would not expect to find here all the impulsive manifestations of liberty, all the agitation, all the faction and cabal, all the violence, all the disorder, which invariably characterize small societies, inclosed and self-governed within their own walls?

Nothing of the sort was the fact; all these apparent principles were without life, and there were others existent, which absolutely precluded their reanimation.

1. Such are the effects, such the exigencies of the central despotism, that the quality of curialis becomes not a right recognized in all those who are capable of exercising it, but a burden imposed upon all who are capable of bearing it. On the one hand the central government has relieved itself of the duty of providing for any branch of the public service in which it is not immediately interested, throwing this duty upon the class of citizens in question; on the other hand, it employs this class of citizens in collecting the taxes which it imposes on its own peculiar account, and makes them responsible for the full amount. It ruins the curiales, in order to pay its functionaries and its soldiers; it grants its functionaries and its soldiers all sorts of practical advantages and priviieges, as inducements to them to aid it in preventing the curiales from saving themselves from ruin. Completely null as citizens, the curiales only live to be stripped of all they gain as men of labor and industry.

2. The magistrates elected by the *curiæ* are, in point of fact, merely the imperial agents of despotism, for whose

benefit they despoil their fellow-citizens, until some opportunity or other occurs to them of getting rid of this hard obligation.

3. Their election itself is valueless, for the imperial representative in the province may annul it; a favor which they have the greatest desire to obtain at his hands; another circumstance putting them more firmly in his power.

4. Their authority is not real, for they cannot enforce it. No effective jurisdiction is placed in their hands; they take no step which may not be annulled. Nay, more: despotism, perceiving more and more clearly their ill-will to the task, or their inability to execute it, encroaches more and more, by itself or its immediate representatives, into the sphere of their functions. The business of the curia gradually disappears with its powers, and a day will come when the municipal system may be abolished at a single blow, in the still subsisting empire, "because," as the legislator will say, "all these laws wander, as it were, vainly and without object around the legal soil."[1]

Thus, then, it is seen, force, real life, were equally wanting to the curiales, as to the senatorial families; equally with the senatorial families, they were incapable of defending or of governing the society.

As to the people, I need not dwell upon their situation; it is obvious that they were in no condition to save and regenerate the Roman world. Yet we must not think them altogether so powerless, so utterly null, as is ordinarily supposed. They were tolerably numerous, more especially in the south of Gaul, both from the development of industrial activity during the first three ages of Christianity, and from the circumstance of a portion of the rural population taking refuge in the towns from the devastation of the barbarians. Besides, with the progress of disorder in the higher ranks, the popular influence had a tendency to increase. In times of regularity, when the administration, its functionaries, and its troops were on the spot, ere the curia had become altogether ruined and powerless, the people remained in their ordinary state of inaction, or passive dependence. But when all the various masters of the society had fallen away or disappeared, when the dissolution of things became general, the people, in their

[1] Nov. 46, rendered by the Emperor of the East, Leo the Philosopher, towards the close of the ninth century

turn, grew to be something, and assumed, at all events, a certain degree of activity and importance.

I have nothing to say about the slaves; they were nothing for themselves; how, then, could they do anything for society? It was, moreover, the coloni who underwent well nigh all the disasters of invasion; it was they whom the barbarians pillaged, hunted, carried away captive, pell-mell with their cattle. I may remark, however, incidentally, that under the Empire the condition of the slaves was greatly improved; this is clear from its legislation.

Let us now collect all these scattered features of Gaulish civil society in the fifth century, and form a collective idea, as near the fact as we can, of its aggregate.

Its government was monarchical, even despotic; and yet all the monarchical institutions and powers were falling, were themselves abandoning their post. Its internal organization seemed aristocratic; but it was an aristocracy without strength, without coherence, incapable of playing a public part. A democratic element, municipalities, free burghers, were still visible; but democracy was as enervated, as powerless, as aristocracy and monarchy. The whole of society was in a state of dissolution, was dying.

And here we see the radical vice of the Roman society, and of every society where slavery exists on a large scale, where a few masters rule over whole herds of people. In all countries, at all times, whatever the political system which prevails, after an interval more or less long, by the sole effect of the enjoyment of power, of wealth, of the intellectual development, of the various social advantages they enjoy, the higher classes wear themselves out, become enervated, unless they are constantly excited by emulation, and refreshed by the immigration of the classes who live and labor below them. See what has taken place in modern Europe. There has been in it a prodigious variety of social conditions, infinite gradations in wealth, liberty, enlightenment, influence, civilization. And up all the steps of this long ladder, an ascending movement has constantly impelled each class and all classes, the one by the other, towards greater development, to which none was allowed to remain a stranger. Hence the fecundity, the immorality, so to speak, of modern civilization, thus incessantly recruited and renewed.

Nothing at all resembling this existed in the Roman society; there, men were divided off into two great classes,

separated from each other by an immense interval; there was no variety, no ascending movement, no genuine democracy; it was, as it were, a society of officers, who did not know whence to recruit their numbers, and did not, in point of fact, recruit them. There was, indeed, from the first to the third century, as I have just now said, a progressive movement on the part of the lower classes of the people; they increased in liberty, in number, in activity. But the movement was far too slow, far too limited, to enable the people by reintegrating in time the superior classes, to save them from their decline and fall.

Besides these, there became formed another society, young, energetic, fruitful of results,—the ecclesiastical society. It was around this society that the people rallied; no powerful bond united them to the senators, nor, perhaps, to the curiales; they assembled, therefore, around the priests and bishops. Alien to pagan civil society, whose chiefs created therein no place for it, the mass of the population entered with ardor into the Christian society, whose leaders opened their arms to it. The senatorial and curial aristocracy was a mere phantom; the clergy became the real aristocracy; there was no Roman people; a Christian people arose. It is with them we shall occupy ourselves in the next lecture.

THIRD LECTURE.

Object of the lecture—Variety of the principles and forms of religious society in Europe—Classification of the different systems, 1. According to the relations of the church in the state; 2. According to the internal constitution of the church—All these systems assign their origin to the primitive church—Critical examination of these pretensions—They have all a certain degree of foundation—Fluctuation and complexity of the external situation and internal position of Christian society from the first to the fifth century—Predominant tendencies—Prevalent facts of the fifth century—Causes of liberty in the church at this period—The election of bishops—Councils—Comparison of religious with civil society—Of the chiefs of these two societies—Letters of Sidonius Apollinaris.

The subject which is now about to occupy our attention, is the state of religious society in the fifth century. I need not remind you of the great part it has played in the history of modern civilization: that is a fact perfectly well understood. Nor is it in modern history that this fact first manifested itself; the world has seen more than one striking example of the power of the religious society, of its ideas, its institutions, its government. But there is a fundamental difference to be remarked. In Asia, in Africa, in antiquity, everywhere before the organization of Europe, religious society presents itself under a general and simple form; this is the clear prevalence of a system, the domination of a principle: sometimes the society is subordinate; it is the temporal power which exercises the spiritual functions and directs the worship, and even the faith: sometimes it occupies the chief place; it is the spiritual power which rules the civil order. In both the one case and the other, the position and organization of the religious society are clear, simple, stable. In modern Europe, on the contrary, it presents every possible variety of system; we find in it every possible principle; it seems made up of samples of all the forms under which it has appeared elsewhere.

Let us endeavor, for the sake of greater perspicuity, to disintricate and classify the different principles, the different systems which have been in various measure, adopted into

European religious society, the different constitutions it has received.

Two great questions here present themselves: on the one hand, the exterior situation of the religious society, its position with reference to civil society, the relations, that is to say, of church with state; and on the other, its interior organization, its internal government.

With both the one and the other of these questions, we must connect the modifications of which religious society has been the object in the particular respect.

I will first consider its external situation, its relations with the state.

Four systems, essentially differing from one another, have been maintained on this subject.

1. The state is subordinate to the church; in the moral point of view, in the chronological order itself, the church precedes the state; the church is the first society, superior, eternal; civil society is nothing more than the consequence, than an application of its principles; it is to the spiritual power that sovereignty belongs of right; the temporal power should merely act as its instrument.

2. It is not the state which is in the church, but the church which is in the state: it is the state which rules the land, which makes war, levies taxes, governs the external destiny of the citizens. It is for the state to give to the religious society the form and constitution which best accord with the interests of general society. Whenever creeds cease to be individual, whenever they give birth to associations, these come within the cognizance and authority of the temporal power, the only veritable power in a state.

3. The church ought to be independent, unnoticed in the state; the state has nothing to do with her; the temporal power ought to take no cognizance of religious creeds; it should let them approximate or separate, let them go on and govern themselves as they think best; it has no right, no occasion, to interfere in their affairs.

4. The church and the state are distinct societies, it is true; but they are at the same time close neighbors, and are nearly interested in one another: let them live separate, but not estranged; let them keep up an alliance on certain conditions, each living to itself, but each making sacrifices for the other, in case of need, each lending the other its support.

In the internal organization of the religious society, the diversity of principles and forms is even still greater.

And first, we see before us two leading systems: in the one, power is concentrated in the hands of the clergy; the priests alone form a constituted body; the ecclesiastical society governs the religious society: in the other, the religious society governs itself, or at least participates in the administration of its affairs; the social organization comprehends the body of the faithful, as well as the priests.

Government in the hands of the ecclesiastical society solely may be constituted in various ways. 1. Under the form of pure monarchy; there are several examples of this in the history of the world. 2. Under the form of an aristocracy; where the bishops, for instance, each in his own diocese, or in a collective assembly, govern the church in their own right, without the concurrence of the inferior clergy. 3. Under a democratic form, where, for instance, the government of the church belongs to the whole body of the clergy, to assemblies of priests all equal among themselves.

In cases where the society governs itself, the diversity of forms is equally great. 1. The body of the faithful, the laity, sit with the priests in the assemblies charged with the general government of the church. 2. There is no general government of the church; each congregation forms a several local, independent church, which governs itself; whose members select their own spiritual chief, according to their particular views and purposes. 3. There is no distinct and permanent spiritual government at all; no clergy, no priests; teaching, preaching, all the spiritual functions are exercised by the body of the faithful themselves, according to circumstances, according to inspiration; there is constant change, constant agitation.

I might combine in an infinity of ways these various forms, mixing their elements together in various proportions, and thus create a host of other diversified forms, but with my utmost ingenuity I could devise no combination which has not already been exhibited to the world.

And not only have all these principles been professed, not only have all these systems been maintained each as the only true and legitimate system, but all of them have been brought into practical operation, all of them have existed.

Every one knows that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the spiritual power claimed as its right, sometimes the

direct exercise, sometimes the indirect nomination of the temporal power. Every one sees that in England, where Parliament has disposed of the faith as of the crown of the country, the church is subordinate to the state. What are popery, Erastianism,[1] episcopacy, presbyterianism, the independents, the quakers, but applications of the doctrines I have pointed out? All doctrines have become facts: there are examples of all systems, and of all the so varied combinations of systems. And not only have all systems been realized, but they have, every one of them, set up a claim to historical as well as to rational legitimacy; they have, every one of them, referred their origin to the earliest age of the Christian church; they have, every one of them, claimed ancient facts for their own, as their own peculiar foundation and justification.

Nor are they wholly wrong any of them; we find in the first ages of the age, facts with which all of them are entitled to claim a connexion. I do not mean to say that they are all alike true, rationally, all alike authentic, historically, nor that they all represent a series of different facts, through which the church has necessarily passed. What I mean is simply, that there is in each of these systems a greater or less proportion of moral truth and of historical reality. They have all played a part, have occupied a place, in the history of modern religious history: they have all, in various measure, contributed to the work of its formation.

I will view them successively in the first ages of the church; we shall have no difficulty in tracing them there.

Let us first consider the external situation of the church, and its relations with civil society.

As to the system of a church, independent, unnoticed in the state, existing and governing itself without the intervention of the temporal power, this is evidently the primitive situation of the Christian church. So long as it was confined within a limited space, or disseminated only in small and isolated congregations, the Roman government took no notice of it, and allowed it to exist and regulate its affairs as it thought proper.

This state of things terminated: the Roman empire took cognizance of the Christian society; I do not refer to the

[1] The system in which the church is governed by the state, so named from Erastus, a German theologian and physician of the 16th century, who first maintained this principle with any distinguished effect

period when it took notice of it in the way of persecution, but to that when the Roman world became Christian, when Christianity ascended the throne with Constantine. The position of the church with reference to the state underwent a great change at this epoch. It were incorrect to say that it fell at this period under the government of the church, that the system of its subordination to power then came into operation. In general, the emperors did not pretend to regulate the faith; they took the doctrines of the church as they found them. The majority of the questions which, at a later period, excited the rivalship of the two powers, had not as yet arisen. Still, even at this period, we meet with a great number of facts wherein the system of the sovereignty of the state over the church might have sought, and has, indeed, sought its origin. Towards the close of the third and the commencement of the fourth century, for instance, the bishops observed an extremely humble and submissive tone with the emperors; they were incessantly exalting the imperial majesty. Doubtless, had it attempted to assail the independence of their faith, they would have defended themselves, as, in point of fact, they often did defend themselves, with energy; but they were greatly in need of the emperors' protection so recently extended to them. But just recognized and adopted by the temporal power, they were anxious to treat it with the utmost respect and consideration. Besides, they could do nothing of themselves; the religious society, or rather its government, had at this epoch no means of carrying its will into execution; it had no institutions, no rules, no system; it was constantly obliged to have recourse to the intervention of the civil government, the ancient and only organized authority. This continual necessity for a foreign sanction gave religious society an air of subordination and dependence, more apparent than real; at bottom, its independence and even its power were considerable, but still, in almost all its affairs, in all matters affecting the interest of the church, the emperor interfered; his consent and approbation were invariably solicited. The councils were generally assembled by his order; and not only did he convene them, but he presided over them, either in person or by deputy, and decided what subjects should be discussed by them. Thus Constantine was present in person at the council of Arles, in 314, and at the council of Nicea, in 325, and, apparently at least, superintended the deliberations. I say apparently; for the mere presence of

the emperor at a council was a triumph for the church, a proof of victory far more than of subjection. But however this may have been, the forms, at all events, were those of respectful subordination; the church availed herself of the power of the Empire, covered herself with its majesty; and Erastianism, independently of the national grounds upon which it proceeds, has found, in the history of this epoch, facts which have served as its justification.

As to the opposite system, the general and absolute sovereignty of the church, it is clear that it cannot be met with in the cradle of a religious society; it necessarily belongs to the period of its greatest power, of its fullest development. Yet one may already detect glimpses of it, and very distinct glimpses, in the fifth century. The superiority of spiritual over temporal interests, of the destiny of the believer as compared with that of the mere citizen, the principle enunciated by the religious society, was already recognized and admitted by the civil society.

We accordingly find the language of the heads of the spiritual society, erewhile so gentle, so reserved, so modest, now becoming confident, bold, often even haughty; whilst, on the other hand, that of the chiefs of the civil society, of the superiors themselves, despite the pomp still clinging round its forms, is in reality mild and submissive. At this period, indeed, the whole framework of temporal power was in a state of rapid decay; the Empire was expiring; the imperial power was day by day more and more nearly approaching the condition of an utter, of a ridiculous nonentity. The spiritual power, on the contrary, grew stronger and stronger, and penetrated more deeply and widely into civil society; the church became more wealthy, her jurisdiction more extended; she was visibly progressing towards domination. The complete fall of the Empire in the west, and the rise of the barbarous monarchies, contributed greatly to the exaltation of her pretensions and of her power. The church had long been under the emperors, obscure, feeble, a mere child, so to speak; she had thence acquired a sort of reserve in her intercourse with them; a habit of respect for their ancient power, their name; and it is quite possible that had the Empire continued to exist, the church would never have completely emancipated herself from this custom of her youth. What corroborates this supposition is the fact that such has been the case in the eastern Empire; that Empire lived on for twelve centu

ries in a state of gradual decay; the imperial power became little more than nominal. Yet the church there never attained, never even sought to attain the sovereignty. The Greek church remained, with the eastern emperors, in nearly the same relation in which the Romish church stood with the Roman emperors. In the west, the Empire fell; kings covered with furs took the place of princes clothed in purple; the church yielded not to these new comers the same consideration, the same respect which she had paid to their predecessors. Moreover, to contend successfully against their barbarism, she found herself under the necessity of stretching to its utmost bent the spring of spiritual power: the exaltation of popular feeling in this direction, was her means of safety and of action. Hence the so rapid progress now of those pretensions of hers to the sovereignty, which in the fifth century were scarce perceptible.

As to the system of alliance between the two distinct and independent societies, it is not difficult to recognize it at this period; there was nothing precise or fixed in the conditions of the alliance; the two powers never continued long upon equal terms under them; they kept each in its own sphere, and treated together whenever they happened to come in contact.

We find, then, from the first to the fifth century, in germ and in development, all the systems according to which the relations between church and state may be regulated; they all of them derive their origin from facts dating from the cradle of religious society. Let us pass on to the interior organization of this society, to the internal government of the church; we shall arrive at the same result.

It is clear that this last form cannot be that of an infant church; no moral association begins with the *inertia* of the mass of those associated, with the separation of the people and the government. It is certain, accordingly, that at the outset of Christianity, the body of the faithful participated in the administration of the affairs of the society. The presbyterian system, that is to say, the government of the church by its spiritual chiefs, assisted by the leading members of the body, was the primitive system. There may be many questions raised as to the titles, functions, and mutual relations of these lay and ecclesiastical chiefs of the rising congregations; but as to the fact of their concurrence in the regulation of their common affairs, there can be no doubt.

Equally unquestionable is it that at this period the separate societies, the Christian congregations in each town, were far more independent of each other than they have been at any subsequent time; there is no doubt that they governed themselves, perhaps not completely, but almost so, each for itself, and apart from the rest. Hence the system of the *Independents*, who insist that the religious society should have no general government, but that each local congregation should be an entire and sovereign society in itself.

No doubt, again, that in these petty Christian societies of early date, unconnected with one another, and often without the means of preaching and teaching, no doubt that in the absence of a spiritual leader instituted by the original founder of the faith, it often occurred that, under the influence of an inward impulse, some individual member of the body, of strong mind, and endowed with the gift of acting upon his fellows, arose and preached the word to the association to which he belonged. Hence the system of the Quakers, the system of spontaneous individual preaching, without any order of priests, of regular and permanent clergy.

These are some of the principles, some of the forms of the religious societies in the first age of the Christian church. It comprehended many others; perhaps, indeed, those which I have mentioned were not the most powerful in their influence.

In the first place, it is incontestable that the first founders, or, more correctly speaking, the first instruments in the foundation of Christianity, the apostles, regarded themselves as invested with a special mission received from on high, and that they in turn transmitted to their disciples by the laying on of hands, or in some other form, the right to teach and to preach. Ordination is a primitive fact in the Christian church; hence an order of priests, a distinct permanent clergy, invested with peculiar functions, duties, and rights.

Let us turn to another primitive fact. The particular congregations were, it is true, isolated; but the tendency of them all was to unite, to live under one common discipline as under one common faith; it was the tendency, the aim, natural to every society in progress of self-formation; it is the necessary condition of its extension, of its firm establishment.

Approximation, assimilation of the various elements, movement towards unity, such is the regular course of creation.

The first propagators of Christianity, the apostles or their disciples, preserved, moreover, over the most distant congregations a certain amount of authority, a remote but efficacious superintendence. They took care to form and to maintain ties not only of moral brotherhood, but of organizations between the particular churches. Hence a constant tendency toward a general government of the churches, an identical and permanent constitution.

It appears to me perfectly clear that in the minds of the first Christians, in their common and simple feeling, the apostles were regarded as superior to their disciples, and the immediate disciples of the apostles as superior to their successors; a superiority purely moral, not established as an institution, but real and admitted. In it we have the first germ, the religious germ of the episcopal system. That system derives also from another source. The towns into which Christianity had made its way, were very unequal in population, in wealth, in importance; and the inequality in intellectual development, in moral power, was as great as the material inequality. There was, consequently, an inequality likewise in the distribution of influence among the spiritual heads of the congregations. The chiefs of the more important, of the more enlightened towns, naturally took the lead and exercised an authority, at first moral, then institutional, over the minor congregations within a certain circle around them. This was the political germ of the episcopal system.

Thus, at the same time that we recognize in the primitive state of the religious society the association of lay-members with the priests in the government, that is to say, the Presbyterian system; the isolation of the particular congregations, that is to say, the system of the Independents; free, spontaneous, casual preaching, that is to say, the system of the Quakers: on the other hand, we see rising up in opposition to the system of the Quakers, an order of priests, a permanent clergy; in opposition to the system of the Independents, a general government of the church; in opposition to the Presbyterian system, the principle of inequality among the priests themselves, the Episcopal system.

How have these principles, so various, so contrary to each other, become developed? To what causes have been owing the abasement of one, the elevation of another? And, first, how was the transition from a government, shared by the body

of the faithful, to a government vested in the clergy alone, accomplished? By what progress did the religious society pass under the empire of the ecclesiastical society?

In the revolution by which this change was effected, the ambition of the clergy, personal interests, human passions, had a large share. I do not seek to under-estimate its proportion. It is quite undeniable that all these causes contributed to the result which now occupies our attention; but yet, had there been only these causes at work, the result would never have been realized. I have already observed, and it is a remark I repeat on all available occasions, that no great event is accomplished by causes altogether illegitimate. Beneath these, or at their side, there are always legitimate causes in operation, good and sound reasons why an important fact should be accomplished. We have here a fresh example of this.

It is, I believe, a clear principle—a principle generally established—that participation in power presupposes the moral capacity to exercise it; where the capacity is wanting, participation in power comes to an end, as a matter of course. The right to exercise it continues virtually to reside in human nature; but it slumbers, or rather rests only in germ, in perspective, until the capacity needed developes itself, and then it awakens and developes itself with the capacity.

You will remember what I said in our last lecture, as to the state of Roman civil society in the fifth century. I endeavored to describe its profound decay. You saw the aristocratic classes perishing away, their numbers immensely reduced, their influence gone—their virtue gone.

Whosoever amongst them possessed any energy, any moral activity, entered into the body of the Christian clergy. There remained, in point of fact, only the mere populace, the *plebs romana*, who rallied around the priests and the bishops, and formed the Christian people.

Between this people and its new chiefs, between religious society and ecclesiastical society, the inequality was extremely great; an inequality not only in wealth, in influence, in social situation, but in information, in intellectual and moral development. And the more Christianity, by the mere fact of its continuous duration, developed itself, extended itself, elevated itself, the more this inequality increased and manifested itself. The questions of faith and doctrine became, year after year, more complex and more difficult of solution; the rules of church discipline, her relations with civil society, in like

manner grew more extensive and complicated; so that in order to take part in the administration of its affairs, there was requisite, from epoch to epoch, a greater and still greater development of mind, of learning, of character; in a word, moral conditions more and more elevated, more and more difficult to be met with; and yet, such was the general disorder in society, such the universal calamity of the period, that the moral condition of the people, instead of growing better, and of a higher character, fell lower and lower every day.

We have here, after having made every allowance for the part taken in the change by human passions and personal interests, we have here, I say, the true cause which transferred religious society to the empire of ecclesiastical society, which took all power from the body of the faithful and gave it to the clergy alone.

Let us inquire how this second revolution, of which we have seen the origin, was worked out. How, in the very bosom of ecclesiastical society, power passed from the priests to the bishops.

We have here an important distinction to observe: the position of the bishops in their diocese, and in relation to the general government of the church, was, in the fifth century, no longer what it had been. Within his diocese, the bishop did not govern by his sole authority; he required the concurrence and assent of his clergy. This, indeed, was not an absolute institution: the fact was not regulated in any fixed manner, nor according to permanent forms; but the existence of the fact is manifested by every document connected with urban or diocesan administration. The words, *cum assensu clericorum*, constantly recur in the monuments of the period. In questions, however, concerning the general government, whether of the ecclesiastical province, or of the church at large, the case was different; the bishops alone attended the councils, as representatives of this government; when simple priests appeared there it was as delegates of their bishops. The general government of the church at this period was entirely episcopal.

You must not, however, attach to the words which have just occurred, the meaning which they assumed at a later period: you must not imagine that each bishop went to the councils solely on his own account, in virtue of his own right. He went there as the representative of his clergy. The idea that the bishop, the natural chief of his priests, should speak

and act everywhere on their behalf, and in their name, was a this period prevalent in all minds, in the minds of the bishops themselves, and limited their power, while it practically served as a ladder whereby they ascended higher and higher, and gradually emancipated themselves from control.

Another cause, and one perhaps still more decisive, limited the councils to the bishops alone; this was the small number of priests, and the consequent inconvenience which would have arisen from their too frequent absence from their posts. To judge merely from the great part which they play, and, permit me the expression, from the noise which they make in the fifth century, one is disposed to imagine the priests a very numerous body. Such was not at all the case: we have positive indications, historical proofs, which show the contrary. In the commencement of the fifth century, for instance, we meet with a question as to the number of the priests at Rome; and we find it mentioned, as an illustration of the peculiar wealth and importance of that city, that she possessed eighty churches and seventy-seven priests.

The indirect proofs we have supply the same conclusions; the acts of the councils of the fourth and fifth centuries are full of canons prohibiting a simple clerk from going into any other diocese than his own to be ordained; a priest from quitting his diocese to perform duty elsewhere, or even from travelling at all without the consent of his bishop.[1] All sorts of means were adopted for keeping the priests in their own immediate district; they were watched with a care amounting to the oppressive, so limited was their number, so anxious were the other bishops to get possession of them. After the establishment of the barbarian monarchies, the Frank or Burgundian kings, the rich and more notable chiefs, were constantly endeavoring to seduce from each other those companions, those *leudes*, those *anstrustions*, who constituted their immediate train, their select guard: the barbarian laws are full of enactments intended to check these attempts. We find the kings constantly undertaking, in their mutual treaties, not to invite to their courts, nor even to receive, their respective *leudes*. The ecclesiastical legislation of the fourth and fifth centuries exhibits similar regulations with respect to the priests, doubtless, on the same grounds.

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[1] See the canons of the councils of Arles, in 314; of Turin, in 397 of Arles, in 450; of Tours, in 461

It was therefore a very serious affair for a priest to quit on a distant mission the church to which he was attached; it was difficult to replace him—the service of religion suffered in his absence. The establishment of the representative system, in church as in state, presupposes a sufficient body of men to admit of one easily supplying the place of another upon occasion, and of their moving about without inconvenience to themselves or to the society. Such was not the case in the fifth century; and in order to have procured the attendance at councils of the priests, indemnification and coercive measures might perhaps have been necessary, as they were for a long time necessary in England, to bring the citizens to parliament. Everything, therefore, tended to transfer the government of the church to the bishops; and, accordingly, in the fifth century, the episcopal system was almost in full operation.

As to the system of pure monarchy, the only one upon which we have not as yet remarked, because it is a system which facts have not as yet presented to us, it was very far from dominating at this epoch, or even from claiming to dominate; and the most practised sagacity, the most ardent aspirations of personal ambition, could not then have foreseen its future destinies. Not that but we see, even thus early, the papacy increasing daily in consideration and influence; it is impossible to read with impartiality the monuments of the period, without perceiving that, from every part of Europe, applications were constantly being made to the bishop of Rome for his opinion, nay, his decision, in matters of faith, of discipline, in the trials of bishops, in a word, upon all the great occasions wherein the church is interested. Very often, indeed, it was merely an opinion for which he was asked; and when he had given it, those of the interested parties who disapproved of his judgment, refused to abide by it; but, on the other hand, it was supported by a more or less powerful party, and, as a general result, his preponderance became more and more decided after every one of their appeals. There were two causes which more especially contributed to produce these references to the bishop of Rome: on the one hand, the patriarchate principle still held sway in the church; above bishops and archbishops, with privileges more nominal than real, but still generally admitted in theory, there was a patriarch presiding. The east had several patriarchs, the patriarch of Jerusalem, the patriarch of Antioch, the patriarch of Constantinople, of Alexandria. In the west there

was but one patriarch, the bishop of Rome; and this circumstance had a great share in the exclusive elevation of the papacy. The tradition, moreover, that St. Peter had been bishop of Rome, and the idea that the popes were his successors, already strongly possessed the minds of the western Christians.

We thus clearly trace, in the first five ages, the historical foundations of all the systems which have been cited or applied, both as to the internal organization, and as to the external position of the religious society. These systems are far from being of the same importance; some of them have only appeared, in passing, as mere transitory, accidental circumstances; the others have remained for a long time in germ, have developed themselves slowly and deliberately; they are of different dates, and, as I have said, of very various importance; but they are all connected with some fact, they can all cite some authority.

When we seek what principles prevailed amidst this variety of principles, what great results were accomplished in the fifth century, we discover the following facts:—

1. The separation of the religious society and of the ecclesiastical society: a result more especially due to the extreme intellectual and social inequality which existed between the people and the Christian clergy.

2. The predominance of the aristocratic system in the interior organization of the ecclesiastical society: the intervention of simple priests in the government of the church became less and less frequent, less and less influential; power concentrated itself more and more in the hands of the bishops.

3. Finally, as to the relations of the religious society with the civil society of the church, with the state, the system in force was that of alliance, of intercourse between powers distinct, but in perpetual contact with each other.

These are the three great features which characterize the state of the church at the commencement of the fifth century. At the bare statement of them, in their general appearance alone, it is impossible not to perceive the germs of danger, on the one hand, in the bosom of the religious society, to the liberty of the body of the faithful, and in the bosom of the ecclesiastical society to the liberty of the body of the clergy. The almost exclusive predominance of the priests over the faithful, and of the bishops over the priests, gave clear presage of the abuses of power and of the disorders of revolu-

tions. The men of the fifth century, however, though they might well have conceived such fears, had no notion whatever of them; the Christian society of that period was wholly absorbed in regulating itself, in constituting itself a fixed and determinate body; it required, beyond all things, order, law, government; and despite the dangerous tendency of some of the principles which then prevailed, the liberties, both of the people in the religious society, and of the simple priests in the ecclesiastical society, were not without reality and security.

The first consisted in the election of the bishops, a fact which I need not seek to establish, for it is perfectly self-evident, to any one who but glances over the monuments of the period. This election was conducted neither according to general rules, nor with permanent forms; it was altogether irregular, various, and influenced by fortuitous circumstances. In 374, the bishop of Milan, Auxentius, an Arian in his opinions, being dead, his successor was about to be elected in the cathedral.

The people, the clergy, the bishops of the province, were all there, and all very animated; the two parties, the orthodox and the Arians, each wished to nominate a bishop. The tumult ended in a violent confusion. A governor had just arrived at Milan, in the name of the emperor; he was a young man named Ambrose. Informed of the tumult, he repaired to the church in order to quiet it; his words, his air, were pleasing to the people. He had a good reputation: a voice arose in the midst of the church—according to tradition, the voice of a child; it cried, "Let Ambrose be nominated bishop!" And, forthwith, Ambrose was nominated bishop; he afterwards became Saint Ambrose.

This is an example of the manner in which episcopal elections were still made at the end of the fourth century. It is true they were not all so disorderly and sudden; but these characteristics did not shock or astonish any one, and the day following his elevation, Saint Ambrose was acknowledged by all to be properly elected. Would you wish that we should look to a posterior epoch, to the end of the fifth century, for example? I open the collection of the letters of Sidonius Apollinarius, the most curious, and, at the same time, the most authentic monument of the manners of that time, especially the manners of religious society; Sidonius was bishop of Clermont; he himself collected and revised his letters; what

we find there written is exactly what he wished to bequeath to posterity. Here is a letter which he addressed to his friend Domnulus.

"SIDONIUS TO HIS DEAR DOMNULUS; HEALTH.

"Since you desire to know what our father in Christ, the Pontiff Patient,[2] with his customary piety and firmness, has done at Châlons, I can no longer delay causing you to share our great joy. He arrived in this town, partly preceded and partly followed by the bishops of the province, assembled, in order to give a chief to the church of this city, so troubled and unsteady in its discipline since the retirement and death of bishop Paul.

"The assembly found various factions in the town, all those private intrigues which can never be formed but to the detriment of public welfare, and which were excited by a triumvirate of competitors. One of them, destitute of all virtue, made a parade of his antique race; another, like a new Apicius, got himself supported by the applause and clamors of noisy parasites, gained by the agency of his kitchen; a third engaged himself by a secret bargain, if he attained the object of his ambition, to abandon the domains of the church to the pillage of his partisans. Saint Patient and Saint Euphronius,[3] who, setting aside all aversion and all favor, were the first to maintain firmly and rigidly the most sound views, were not long in learning the state of things. Before manifesting anything in public, they first held counsel in secret with the bishops their colleagues; then, braving the cries of a mob of furies, they suddenly nominated, without his having formed any desire or having any idea of being elected, a pious man named John, commendable from his honesty, charity, and mildness. John had first been a reader, and had served at the altar from his infancy; after much time and labor, he became an archdeacon. . . . He was, therefore, a priest only of the second order, and amidst these furious factions no one exalted by his praise a man who asked nothing; but neither did any one dare to accuse a man who merited only eulogies. Our bishops have proclaimed him their colleague,

[1] Book IV., Letter 25
[2] Bishop of Lyons.
[3] Bishop of Autun.

to the great astonishment of the intriguers, to the extreme confusion of the wicked, but with the acclamations of good men, and without any person daring or wishing to oppose him."

Just now we were at a popular election ; here is one equally irregular and unforeseen, brought about at once, in the midst of the people, by two pious bishops. Here is a third, if possible, still more singular. Sidonius himself is at once the narrator and actor of it.

The bishop of Bourges was dead : such was the ardor of the competitors and their factions, that the town was thrown into disorder by them, and could find no means of coming to a decision. The inhabitants of Bourges thought of addressing themselves to Sidonius, illustrious throughout Gaul for his birth, wealth, eloquence, and knowledge, long since invested with the highest civil functions, and recently nominated bishop of Clermont. They begged him to choose them a bishop, almost in the same way as, in the infancy of the Greek republics, the people, tired of civil storms and its own powerlessness, sought a foreign sage to give them laws. Sidonius, rather surprised at first, nevertheless consented, assured himself of the concurrence of the bishops, who would have to ordain the person whom he alone had the charge of electing, and repairing to Bourges, assembled the people in the cathedral. I will cite the letter in which he gives an account of the whole affair to Perpetuus, bishop of Tours, and sends him the discourse which he pronounced in this assembly : they are both rather lengthy ; but this mixture of rhetoric and religion, these literary puerilities amidst the most animated scenes of real life, this confusion of the *bel esprit* and of the bishop, make this singular society better known than all the dissertations in the world ; this society at once old and young in decline and in progress : I shall only here and there omit a passage without interest.

"SIDONIUS TO THE LORD POPE PERPETUUS ; HEALTH.[1]

"In your zeal for spiritual reading, you go so far as to wish to become acquainted with writings which are not in any way worthy of your attention, or of exercising your judg-

[1] Book VII., Letter 9.

ment. You thus ask me to send you the discourse which I delivered in the church to the people of Bourges, a discourse to which neither the divisions of rhetoric, nor the movements of the oratorical art, nor grammatical figures, have lent fitting elegance or regularity; for on this occasion I was unable to combine, according to the general usage of orators, the grave testimonies of history, the fictions of poets, the flashes of controversy. The seditions, cabals, and differences of parties, hurried me away; and if the occasion furnished me with ample materials, affairs did not allow me time to meditate upon them. There was such a crowd of competitors, that two benches could not accommodate all the candidates for a single see; all were pleasing to themselves, and each displeasing to the rest. We could not even have done anything for the common good, if the people, more calm, had not renounced its own judgment in order to submit itself to that of the bishops. A few priests whispered in a corner, but in public not a sound of disapprobation was heard from them, for the greater part dreaded their own order no less than the other orders. . . . Accept, then, this sheet: I have dictated it, Christ is witness, in two watches of a summer night; but I much fear that in reading it you will think more of it than I propose.

"THE DISCOURSE.

"Dearly beloved, profane history reports that a certain philosopher taught his disciples patience in keeping silence, before he disclosed to them the art of speaking, and that for this purpose all novices observed a rigorous silence for five years, amid the discussions of their co-disciples; so that the most prompt minds could not be praised until a suitable time had elapsed for them to be understood. With regard to myself, my weakness is reserved for a very different condition, I who, before having filled with any man the more humble function of disciple, see myself obliged to undertake with you the task of doctor.[1] . . . But since it is your pleasure in your error, to wish that I, devoid of wisdom, should seek for you, with the aid of Christ, a bishop full of wisdom, and in whose person all kinds of virtues are to be united, know

[1] Sidonius had just been nominated bishop; towards the end of 471

that your agreement in this desire, while it does me great honor, also imposes upon me a great burden. . . .

"And first, it is necessary, that you should know what torrents of injuries await me, and to what bayings of human voices the crowd of pretenders will give way against you. . . If I should nominate one from among the monks, if he were even comparable with Paul, with Auton, Hilarius, or Macarius, already do I feel resounding round my ears the noisy murmurs of an ignoble crowd of pigmies who complain, saying: 'he they have nominated, fills the functions, not of a bishop, but of an abbot; he is far more fitted to intercede for souls with the celestial judge, than for bodies before the judges upon earth.' Who will not be profoundly irritated, at seeing the most sincere virtues represented as vices? If we select an humble man, they will call him abject; if we select one of a proud character they will treat him as haughty; if we propose a man with but little enlightenment, his ignorance will bring ridicule upon him; if, on the contrary, he is a scholar, his learning will be called puffed up pride; if he be austere, they will hate him as cruel; if he be indulgent, they will accuse him of too great facility; if simple, they will disdain him as a beast; if full of penetration, they will reject him as cunning; if he be exact, they will call him peddling; if easy, they will call him negligent; if he has an astute mind, they will declare he is ambitious; if tranquil in his manner, they will reckon him lazy; if sober, they will take him to be avaricious; if he eat in order to nourish himself, they will accuse him of gormandizing; if he fast regularly, they will tax him with ostentation. . . . Thus, in whatever manner one lives, good conduct and good qualities will always be abandoned to the keen tongues of slander, which resemble hooks with two barbs. And moreover, the people in its stubbornness, the priests in their indocility, are with difficulty brought under monastic discipline.

"If I nominate a priest, those who have been ordained after him will be jealous, those who have been ordained before him will defame him; for among them there are some (and be it said without offence to others) who think that the length of the duration of priesthood is the only measure of merit, and who consequently wish, that in the election of a prelate we should proceed not with a view to the common welfare, but according to age . . .

"If, by chance, I were to point out to you a man who had

filled military offices, I should soon hear these words: "Sidonius, because he has passed from the secular functions to the spiritual, will not take a man from the religious order for a bishop; proud of his birth, raised to the first rank by the insignia of his dignities, he scorns the poor in Christ.' It is for this reason that I at once make the declaration which I owe, not so much to the charity of good people, as to the suspicions of the wicked. In the name of the Holy Spirit, our Almighty God, who, by the voice of Peter, condemned Simon the magician for having thought that the grace of the Holy Ghost could be bought with gold, I declare that, in the choice of the man whom I believed most worthy, I have not been influenced by either money or favor; and that, after having examined as much and even more than was necessary, the individual, the time, the province, and the town, I have judged that he who was the best suited to be given to you, is the man whose life I shall review in a few words.

"Simplicius, blessed of God, answers to the wishes of the two orders both by his conduct and profession; the republic may find in him much to admire, the church much to cherish. If we would bear respect to birth (and the Evangelist himself has proved to us that this consideration must not be neglected, for Luke, in beginning the eulogy of John, reckons it a great advantage that he descended from a sacerdotal race), the relations of Simplicius have presided in the church and in the tribunals; his family has been illustrious in bishops and prelates; so that his ancestors have always been in possession of the power of carrying out the laws, both human and divine . . . If we look to his age, he has at once all the activity of youth and the prudence of age . . . If charity be desired, he has shown it in profusion to the citizen, the priest, and the pilgrim, to the common people as to the great; and his bread has been more frequently and the rather tasted by him who gave nothing in return. If the fulfilment of a mission be necessary, more than once has Simplicius presented himself for your town, before kings covered with ermine and before princes adorned with purple. . . I had almost forgotten to speak of a thing which, notwithstanding, should not be omitted. Formerly, in those ancient times of Moses, according to the Psalmist, when it was necessary to elevate the ark of the covenant, all Israel, in the desert, heaped the produce of its offerings at the feet of Beseleel. Afterwards, Solomon, in order to construct the temple of Jerusalem, put in motion the whole force of the

people, although he had united the gifts of the queen of the southern country of Saba to the riches of Palestine, and to the tributes of the neighboring kings. Simplicius, young, a soldier, unaided, still under the paternal roof, though already a father, has also constructed you a church; he was arrested in his pious work, neither by the attachment of old men to their property, nor by consideration for his young children; and still his modesty is such that he has kept silence upon this subject. And in fact, if I do not deceive myself, this man is a stranger to all popular ambition; he seeks not the favor of all, but only that of good men; he does not lower himself to an imprudent familiarity, but he attaches a high value to solid friendships. . . . Lastly, he should especially be desired for a bishop, because he is not in the least desirous of it; he labors not to obtain the priesthood, but to deserve it.

"Some one will, perhaps, say to me, But how, in so short a time, have you learned so much concerning this man? I will answer him: I knew the inhabitants of Bourges before knowing the town. I have learnt much of them on my road, in the military service, in the relations of money and affairs, in their travels and mine. One also learns much of things from public opinion, for nature does not confine fame to the narrow limits of a particular country.

"The wife of Simplicius descends from the family of the Palladii, who have occupied professorships of letters and served altars, with the approbation of their order; and as the character of a matron should only be called back succinctly and with modesty, I shall content myself with affirming that this lady worthily responds to the merit and honors of the two families, whether of that where she was born and has grown up, or of that into which she has passed by an honorable choice. Both bring up their sons worthily and with all wisdom, and the father, in comparing them with himself, finds a new subject of happiness that his children already surpass himself.

"And since you have sworn to acknowledge and accept my declaration upon the subject of this election, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, Simplicius is he whom I declare bishop of our province, and sovereign pontiff of your town. With regard to yourselves, if you adopt my decision concerning the man whom I have been speaking of, approve it conformably to your first engagements."

It is needless to add more; these three examples are fully

sufficient thoroughly to explain what the election of bishops was in the fifth century. Without doubt it possessed none of the characteristics of a veritable constitution; devoid of rules, of permanent and legal forms, abandoned to the chance of circumstances and passions, it was not one of those powerful liberties before which a long future opens itself, but, for the time being, it was a genuine reality; it led to a great movement in the interior of cities; it was an efficacious guarantee.

There was a second, the frequent holding of councils. The general government of the church, at this epoch, was completely in the hands of the councils—general, national, provincial councils. They there discussed questions of faith and discipline, the actions of bishops, all the great or difficult affairs of the church. In the course of the fourth century, we find fifteen councils, and in the fifth century twenty-five;[1] and these are only the principal councils, those of which written notices have been left; there were certainly besides a large number of local councils, of short duration, which have left no monument, of which even the recollection is lost.

An indirect evidence shows the importance of councils at this epoch. Every one knows that, in England, in the origin of representative government, at the time of the formation of the House of Commons, many statutes were made, prescribing

[1] *List of the principal Councils of the Fourth Century.*

Date.	*Place.*	*Present.*
314	Arles	33 bishops, 14 priests, 25 deacons, 8 readers or exorcists.
346	Cologne	14 bishops, 10 delegate priests
353	Arles	
355	Poitiers	The bishops of Gaul.
356	Beziers	
358	Vaison	Ibid.
358	Place unknown	Ibid.
360	Place unknown	Ibid.
362	Paris	Ibid.
374	Valencia	21 bishops.
385	Bordeaux	
386	Trèves	
386	Place unknown	The bishops of Gaul.
387	Nîmes	
397	Turin	

the regular and frequent holding of parliaments. The same fact appears, at the fifth century, with regard to councils Many canons—among others, those of the council of Orange, held in 441—enact that a council, shall never separate without indicating the following council and that, if the misfortunes of the times prevent them from holding a council twice a year, according to the canons, all possible precautions shall be taken to insure that no long period shall elapse without one.

Thus the two great guarantees of liberty in society, election and discussion, existed, in fact, in the ecclesiastical society of the fifth century—disordered, it is true, incomplete, precarious, as after times have clearly proved, for the time being, real and powerful, at once the cause and the evidence of the movement and ardor of mind.

List of the principal Councils of the Fifth Century.

Date.	*Place.*	*Present.*
406	Toulouse	The bishops of Gaul.
419	Valencia	Ibid.
429	Place uncertain . .	
439	Riez	13 bishops, 1 delegate priest.
441	Orange	16 bishops, 1 priest.
442	Vaison	
444	Place uncertain . .	
451	Place uncertain . .	
452	Arles	44 bishops.
452	Narbonne	The bishops of Narbonnensis prima.
453	Angers. . . .	8 bishops.
454	Bourges . .	The bishops of Gaul.
455	Arles . . .	13 bishops.
460	Lyons . . .	
461	Tours . . .	8 bishops, 1 delegate priest.
		1 bishop, subscribed afterwards.
463	Arles	19 bishops.
465	Vannes	6 bishops.
470	Châlons-sur-Saône .	The bishops of the Lyonnese.
472	Bourges	
474	Vienne	
475	Arles	30 bishops
475	Lyons	
495	Lyons	
496	Reims	
499	Lyons . . .	8 bishops.

Now, let us put this state of the religious society by the side of the civil society which I endeavored to picture in our last meeting. I shall not stay to deduce the consequences of this comparison; they hasten before the eyes, and already must be recognized. I shall recapitulate them thus:

In the civil society, there is no people nor government; the imperial administration is fallen, the senatorial aristocracy is fallen, the municipal aristocracy is fallen; everywhere there is dissolution; power and liberty are struck by the same sterility, the same nullity. In religious society, on the contrary, a very animated people and a very active government show themselves. The causes of anarchy and tyranny are numerous, but liberty is real, and power also. Everywhere, the germs of a very energetic popular activity, and a very strong government, develope themselves. It is, in a word, a society replete with the future, a stormy future, charged with good and with evil, but powerful and fertile.

Do you wish that we should prosecute this comparison any further? We have hitherto considered only general facts, the public life, so to speak, of the two societies. Do you wish that we should penetrate into the domestic life, into the interior of houses? that we should seek how, on the one side, men of note in civil society, and on the other the chiefs of the religious society, are employed, how they pass their time? It is worth while to address this question to the fifth century, because its answer cannot but be instructive.

At the end of the fourth and in the fifth century, there was in Gaul a large number of important and honored men, long invested with the great charges of the state, semi-pagans, semi-Christians,—that is, having taken no part, and not wishing to take any part in religious matters; men of mind, literati, philosophers, full of desire for study and intellectual pursuits; rich, and living in magnificence. Such, at the end of the fourth century, was the poet Ausonius, count of the imperial palace, questor, pretorian-prefect, consul, and who possessed much beautiful property in Saintonge and near Bourdeaux; such, at the end of the fifth century, was Tonance Ferréol, prefect of Gaul, in great credit with the kings of the Visigoths, and whose domains were situated in Languedoc and Rouergue, upon the borders of the Gardon, and near Milhau; Eutropius, also prefect of the Gauls, a platonist by profession, who lived in Auvergne; Consencius, of Narbonne, one of the richest citizens of the south, and whose

country house, called *Octaviana*, situated upon the road to Beziers, passed for the most magnificent in the province. These were the great lords of Roman Gaul; after having occupied the superior posts of the country, they lived upon their estates far from the mass of the population, passing their time in the chase, or fishing, in amusements of all kinds; they had fine libraries, often a theatre, where they played the dramas of some Rhetor, their client: the rhetorician, Paul, had his comedy, the *Delirius*, played at the house of Ausonius, composed himself the music for the interludes, and presided at the representation. At these entertainments were combined intellectual discussions, literary conversation; the merits of the ancient authors were canvassed; their works examined, commented upon; the guests made verses upon all the petty incidents of life. In this way passed time, agreeable, smooth, varied, but enervated, egoistical, sterile; stranger to all serious occupation, to all powerful and general interest. And I speak here of the most honorable remnant of the Roman society, of men who were neither corrupt, profligate, nor debased, who cultivated their intellect, and who were disgusted with the servile manners and the decay of their age.

See what was the life of a bishop; for example, of Saint Hilary, bishop of Arles, and of Saint Loup, bishop of Troyes, at the commencement of the fifth century.

Saint Hilary arose very early in the morning: he always dwelt in the town; from the time that he arose, any one who wished to see him was received. He heard complaints, adjusted differences, performed the office of a justice of the peace. He afterwards repaired to the church, performed service, preached, taught, sometimes many hours consecutively. Returned home, he took his repast, and while this lasted he heard some pious reading; or else he dictated, and the people often entered freely, and listened. He also performed manual labor, sometimes spinning for the poor, sometimes cultivating the fields of his church. Thus passed his day, in the midst of the people, in grave, useful occupations, of a public interest, which, every hour, had some result.

The life of Saint Loup was not exactly the same; his manners were more austere, his activity less varied; he lived severely; and the rigidity of his conduct, the assiduity of his prayers, were incessantly celebrated by his contemporaries. Thus he exercised more ascendency by his general example than by his actions in detail. He struck the imagination of

men to such a point, that according to a tradition, the truth of which is of little importance—true or false, it equally shows contemporaneous opinion—Attila, in quitting Gaul, carried Saint Loup with him to the banks of the Rhine, supposing that so sainted a man would protect his army. Saint Loup was besides of a cultivated mind, and took an active interest in intellectual development. He was solicitous in his diocese about schools and pious reading; and when it was necessary to go and contend against the doctrines of Pelagius in Britain, it was upon his eloquence, as well as that of Saint Germain d'Auxerre, that the council of 429 confided for success.

What more need be said? the facts speak clearly; between the great lords of the Roman society and the bishops, it is not difficult to say where the power was, to whom the future belonged.

I will add one fact, indispensable to the completion of this picture of Gaulish society in the fifth century, and of its singular state.

The two classes of men, the two kinds of activity which I have just placed before your eyes, were not always as distinct, as separate as one would be tempted to believe, and as their difference might cause it to be supposed. Great lords, scarcely Christians, ex-prefects of Gaul, men of the world and of pleasure, often became bishops. They ended, even, by being obliged so to do, if they wished to take any part in the moral movement of the epoch, to preserve any real importance, to exercise any active influence. This is what happened to Sidonius Apollinaris, as to many others. But, in becoming bishops, they did not completely lay aside their habits, their tastes; the rhetorician, the grammarian, the man of wit, the man of the world and of pleasure, did not always vanish under the episcopal mantle; and the two societies, the two kinds of manners sometimes showed themselves singularly mixed up together. Here is a letter from Sidonius, a curious example and monument of this strange alliance. He writes to his friend Eriphius:

"SIDONIUS TO HIS DEAR ERIPHIUS; HEALTH.

"You are always the same, my dear Eriphius; neither the chase, the town, nor the fields attract you so strongly, that the love of letters cannot still detain you. You direct

me to send you the verses which I made at the request of your father-in-law,[1] that respectable man who, in the society of his equals, was equally ready to command or to obey. But as you desire to know in what place and upon what occasion those verses were made, to the end better to understand this valueless production, lay the blame only on yourself if the preface be longer than the work.

"We were met at the sepulchre of Saint Just,[2] illness preventing you from joining us. Before day, the annual procession was made, amidst an immense populace of both sexes, that could not be contained in the church and the crypt, although surrounded by immense porticoes; after the monks and priests had performed morning service, alternately singing the psalms with great sweetness, each retired—not very far, however—to the end that all might be ready for tierce, when the priests should celebrate the divine sacrifice. The narrow dimensions of the place, the crowd which pressed around us, and the large quantity of lights, had choked us; the oppressive vapor of a night still bordering upon summer, although cooled by the first freshness of an autumnal dawn, made this inclosure still warmer. While the various classes of society dispersed on all sides, the chief citizens assembled round the tomb of the consul Syagrius, which was not at the distance of an arrow-shot.

"Some were seated under the shade of an arbor formed of stakes covered with the branches of the vine; we were stretched upon the green turf embalmed with the perfume of flowers. The conversation was sweet, cheerful, pleasant; moreover (and this was far more agreeable), there was no question either of power or tributes no word which could compromise, nor person who could be compromised. Whosoever could in good terms relate an interesting history, was sure to be listened to with earnestness. Nevertheless, no continuous narration was made, because gaiety frequently interrupted the discourse. Tired at length of this long repose, we desired to do something else. We soon separated into two bands, according to ages; one party loudly demanded the game of tennis, the others a table and dice. For myself, I was the first to give the signal for tennis, because I love it,

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[1] Philimathius.

[2] Bishop of Lyons, towards the end of the fourth century. His fête is celebrated on the 2d of September.

as you know, as much as books. On the other side, my brother Dominicius, a man full of kindness and cheerfulness, seized the dice, shook them, and struck with his dice-box, as if he had sounded a trumpet, to call players to him. As to us, we played a good deal with the crowd of scholars, so as to reanimate by this salutary exercise the vigor of our limbs stiffened by too long repose. The illustrious Philimathius himself, as says the poet of Mantua,

"Ausus et ipse manu juvenum tentare laborem,"

constantly mixed with the players at tennis. He succeeded very well at it when he was younger, but now, as he was often driven from the middle, where people were standing, by the shock of some running player; as at other times, if he entered the arena, he could neither make way nor avoid the ball, and as frequently overthrown, he only raised himself with pain from the unlucky fall, he was the first to leave the scene of the game, heaving sighs, and very much heated: this exercise had swollen the fibres of the liver, and he experienced poignant pains. I left off at once, charitably to cease at the same time as he, and thus save our brother from feeling embarrassed at his fatigue. We then seated ourselves again, and soon he was forced to ask for water to bathe his face; they brought him some, and at the same time a napkin covered with hair, which had been washed and was by chance suspended from a cord, held by a pulley before the folding-door of the house of the porter. While he leisurely dried his cheeks, he said to me: 'I wish you would dictate for me a quatrain upon the cloth that has rendered me this office.' 'Be it so,' I answered. 'But,' added he, 'let my name be contained in these verses.' I replied, that what he asked was feasible. 'Well!' he replied, 'dictate them.' 'I then said to him, with a smile: 'Know, however, that the muses will soon be irritated if I attempt to meddle with their choir amidst so many witnesses.' He then answered very briskly, and yet with politeness (for he is of great readiness of imagination and an inexhaustible fund of wit): 'Rather take care, lord Solius, that Apollo does not become far more irritated, if you attempt to seduce his dear pupils in secret and alone.' You may imagine the applause excited by this prompt and well-turned answer. Then, and without further delay, I called his secretary, who was there already, tablets in hand, and I dictated to him a quatrain to this effect:

" ' Another morning, whether in going out of the hot bath, or when the chase has heated his brow, may the handsome Philimathius still find this linen to dry his dripping face, so that the water may pass from his forehead into this fleece as into the throat of a drinker!'

" Scarcely had your Epiphanius written these verses when they announced to us that the hour was come when the bishop came forth, when we immediately arose."

Sidonius was then bishop, and doubtless many of those who accompanied him to the tomb of Saint Just and to that of the consul Syagrius, who participated with him in the celebration of divine service, and at the game of tennis, in the chanting of the psalms, and in the taste of trifling verses, were bishops like him.

We are now at the end of the first question which we laid down; we have considered the social state of civil and religious, Roman and Christian Gaul, at the fifth century. It remains for us to study the moral state of the same epoch, the idears, the doctrines, the sentiments which agitated it; in a word, the internal and intellectual life of men. This will form the subject of the next lecture.

FOURTH LECTURE

Object of the lecture—What must be understood by the moral state of a society—Reciprocal influence of the social state upon the moral state, and of the moral state upon the social state—At the fourth century, civil Gaulish society alone possessed institutions favorable to intellectual development—Gaulish schools—Legal situation of the professors—Religious society has no other mediums of development and influence than its ideas—Still one languishes, and the other prospers—Decline of the civil schools—Activity of the Christian society—Saint Jerome, Saint Augustin, and Saint Paulin of Nola—Their correspondence with Gaul—Foundation and character of monasteries in Gaul—Causes of the difference of the moral state of the two societies—Comparative view of the civil literature and the Christian literature in the fourth and fifth centuries—Inequality of the liberty of mind in the two societies—Necessity for religion lending its aid to studies and letters.

Before entering into the examination of the moral state of Gaulish society at the end of the fourth and at the commencement of the fifth century, I must be allowed to say a few words as to the nature of this part of my task. These words, *moral state*, have, in the eyes of some people, a somewhat vague appearance. I would wish to determine their meaning with precision. Moral sciences, now-a-days, are accused of a want of exactitude, of perspicuity, of certainty; they are reproached as not being sciences. They should, they may be sciences, just the same as physical sciences, for they also exercise themselves upon facts. Moral facts are not less real than others: man has not invented them: he discovered and named them; he takes note of them every moment of his life; he studies them as he studies all that surrounds him, all that comes to his intelligence by the interposition of his senses. Moral sciences have, if the expression be allowed, the same matter as other sciences; they are, then, not by any means condemned by their nature to be less precise or less certain. It is more difficult, I grant, for them to arrive at exactitude, perspicuity, precision. Moral facts are, on the one hand, more extended and more exact, and, on the other, more profoundly concealed, than physical facts; they are at once more complex in their development, and more simple in

their origin. Hence arises a much greater difficulty of observing them, classifying them, and reducing them to a science. This is the true source of the reproaches of which the moral sciences have often been the subject. Mark their singular fate: they are evidently the first upon which the human race occupied itself; when we go back to the cradle of societies, we everywhere encounter moral facts, which, under the cloak of religion or of poetry, attracted the attention, and excited the thought of men. And yet, in order to succeed in thoroughly knowing them, scientifically knowing them, all the skill, all the penetration, and all the prudence of the most practised reason is necessary. Such, therefore, is the state of moral sciences, that they are at once the first and the last in the chronological order; the first, the necessity which works upon the human mind; the last, that it succeeds in elevating to the precision, clearness, and certainty, which is the scientific character. We must not, therefore, be astonished nor affrighted by the reproaches which they have incurred; they are natural and legitimate: let it be known that neither the certainty nor the value of the moral sciences are in the least affected by them; and thence let this useful lesson be drawn, that, in their study, in the observation and description of moral facts, it is necessary, if possible, to be still more nice, exact, attentive, and strict, than in anything else. Profiting by the lesson, I commence by determining with precision, what I intend to convey by these words—the *moral state* of society.

We have hitherto been occupied with the social state of Gaul, that is, the relations of men among themselves, and their external and natural condition. This done, the social relations described, are the facts, whose aggregate constitutes the life of an epoch, exhausted? Certainly not: there remains to be studied the internal, the personal state of men, the state of souls, that is, on one side, the ideas, doctrines, the whole intellectual life of man; on the other, the relations which connect ideas with actions, creeds with the determinations of the will, thought with human liberty.

This is the two-fold fact which constitutes, in my opinion, the moral state of a society, and which we have to study in the Gaulish society of the fifth century.

According to a very general opinion, I might dispense with insisting long upon this inquiry. It has often been said that the moral state depends upon the social state, that the rela-

tions of men between themselves, the principles or customs which preside in these relations, decide their ideas, their sentiments, their internal life; that governments and institutions make the people. This was a dominant idea in the last century, and was produced, under different forms, by the most illustrious writers of the age, Montesquieu, Voltaire, the economists, the publicists, &c. Nothing is more simple: the revolution that the last century brought forth was a social revolution; it was far more occupied in changing the respective situation of men, than their internal and personal disposition; it desired rather to reform society than the individual. Who will be surprised that it was everywhere preoccupied with what it sought, with what it did—that it was too much taken up with the social state? Yet there were circumstances which might have served to have warned it: it labored to change the relations, the external condition of men; but what were the instruments, the fulcrum of its work? ideas, sentiments, internal and individual dispositions: it was by the aid of the moral state that it undertook the reform of the social state. The moral state, then, must be acknowledged to be, not only distinct from, but, to a certain point, independent of the social state; it should be seen that situations, institutions are not all, nor do they decide all, in the life of nations; that other causes may modify, contend with, even surmount these; and that if the external world acts upon man, man in his turn acts upon the world. I would not, that it should be thought that I reject the idea which I combat; far from it; its share of legitimacy is great: no doubt but that the social state exercised a powerful influence upon the moral state. I do not so much as wish that this doctrine should be exclusive; the influence is shared and reciprocal: if it be correct to say that governments make nations, it is no less true that nations make governments. The question which is here encountered is higher and greater than it appears: it is a question whether events, the life of the social world, are, as the physical world, under the empire of external and necessary causes, or whether man himself, his thought, his will, concur to produce and govern them; a question what is the share of fatality and that of liberty in the lot of the human race. A question of immense interest, and which I shall one day perhaps have occasion to treat in the manner which it merits; at present, I can only assign it its place, and I content myself by claiming for liberty, for man himself, a place

a great place, among the authors of events in the creation of history.

I return to the inquiry into the moral state of civil society and religious society in Gaul, in the fourth and fifth centuries.

If institutions could do all, if laws supplied and the means furnished to society could do everything, the intellectual state of Gaulish civil society at this epoch would have been far superior to that of the religious society. The first, in fact, alone possessed all the institutions proper to second the development of mind, the progress and empire of ideas. Roman Gaul was covered with large schools. The principal were those of Trèves, Bordeaux, Autun, Toulouse, Poitiers, Lyons, Narbonne, Arles, Marseilles, Vienne, Besançon, &c. Some were very ancient; those of Marseilles and of Autun, for example, dated from the first century. They were taught philosophy, medicine, jurisprudence, literature, grammar, astrology, all the sciences of the age. In the greater part of these schools, indeed, they at first taught only rhetoric and grammar; but towards the fourth century, professors of philosophy and law were everywhere introduced.

Not only were these schools numerous, and provided with many chairs, but the emperors continually took the professors of new measures into favor. Their interests are, from Constantine to Theodosius the younger, the subject of frequent imperial constitutions, which sometimes extended, sometimes confirmed their privileges; here are the principal of these:

1. *Constantinus*[1] *Augustus to Volusianus* (in 321).—"We order that physicians, grammarians, and the other learned professors be for the future, they and the property they possess in their respective cities, exempt from all municipal charges, but that, nevertheless, they may be capable of being invested with the *honores*.[2] We forbid them to be harassed by law, or that any wrong be done them. If any one annoys them, let him be prosecuted by the magistrates, to the end that they themselves may be spared that trouble, and let him pay one hundred thousand pieces to the exchequer; if a

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1 Probably prætorian prefect.

2 There was a distinction made in the Roman cities and municipalities between the *munera*, municipal functions of an inferior class, which conferred no privileges; and the *honores*, superior functions, regular magistracies, to which certain privileges were attached

slave offend them let him be whipped by his master before him he has offended; and if the master has consented to the outrage, let him pay twenty thousand pieces to the exchequer, and let his slave remain in pledge till the whole sum be delivered. We order to be paid to the said professors their salaries; and as they must not be charged with onerous functions, we allow them to have the *honores* conferred upon them when they desire, but we do not oblige them to it."[1]

2. *Constantinus Augustus to the people* (in 133).—"Confirming the good deeds of our divine predecessors, we order that physicians and professors of letters, as well as their wives and children, be exempt from all public functions and charges; that they be not included in the service of the militia, nor obliged to receive guests, or to acquit themselves of any charge, to the end that they may have more facility to instruct many people in the liberal studies and the above-mentioned professions."[2]

3. *Gratianus Augustus to Antonius, prætorian prefect of the Gauls* (in 376).—"In the heart of the great cities which, in all the diocese confided to your Magnificence, flourish with illustrious masters, let the best preside over the education of youth (we mean the rhetoricians and grammarians in the Attic and Roman tongues), let the orators receive from the exchequer twenty-four rations;[3] let the less considerable number of twelve rations be, according to usage, accorded to Greek and Latin grammarians. And to the end that the cities which enjoy metropolitan rights may select famous professors, and as we do not think that each city should be left free to pay its rhetoricians and masters according to its inclination, for the illustrious city of Trèves we wish to do something more; accordingly, let thirty rations be there granted to the rhetoricians, twenty to the Latin grammarian, and twelve to the Greek grammarian, if a capable one can be found."[4]

Valentinian, Honorius, Theodosius II. issued many similar decrees. After the Empire was divided among many masters,

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[1] Cod. Theod., l. III., tit. 3, l. i. [2] Ibid. l. 3.

[3] *Annona*, a certain measure of wheat, oil, and other provisions, probably what was necessary for the daily consumption of a single person, ἡμερήσιον.

[4] Cod. Theod., XIII., tit. 3, b. 11.

each of them concerned himself rather more about the prosperity of his states and the public establishments which were in them. Thence arose a momentary amelioration, of which the schools felt the effects, particularly those of Gaul, under the administration of Constantius Clorus, of Julian, and of Gratian.

By the side of the schools were, in general, placed other analogous establishments. Thus, at Trèves there was a grand library of the imperial palace, concerning which no special information has reached us, but of which we may judge by the details which have reached us concerning that of Constantinople. This last had a librarian and seven scribes constantly occupied—four for Greek, and three for Latin. They copied both ancient works and new works. It is probable that the same institution existed at Trèves, and in the great towns of Gaul.

Civil society, then, was provided with means of instruction and intellectual development. It was not the same with religious society. It had at this epoch no institution especially devoted to teaching; it did not receive from the state any aid to this particular aim. Christians, as well as others, could frequent the public schools; but most of the professors were still pagans, or indifferent in religious matters, and, in their indifference, had sufficient ill-will towards the new religion. They therefore attracted very few Christians. The sciences which they taught, grammar and rhetoric, pagan by origin, dominated by the ancient pagan mind, had besides but little interest for Christianity. Lastly, it was for a long time in the inferior classes, among the people, that Christianity was propagated, especially in the Gauls, and it was the superior classes which followed the great schools. Moreover, it was hardly until the commencement of the fourth century that the Christians appeared there, and then but few in number.

No other source of study was open to them. The establishments which, a little afterwards, became, in the Christian church, the refuge and sanctuary of instruction, the monasteries, were hardly commenced in the Gauls. It was only after the year 360 that the two first were founded by St. Martin—one at Ligugé, near Poitiers, the other at Marmoutiers, near Tours; and they were devoted rather to religious contemplation than to teaching.

Any great school, any special institution devoted to the

service and to the progress of intellect, was at that time, therefore, wanting to the Christians; they had only their own ideas, the internal and personal movement of their thought. It was necessary that they should draw everything from themselves; their doctrines, and the empire of their doctrines over the will—the desire which they had to propagate themselves, to take possession of the world—that was their whole power.

Still, the activity and intellectual strength of the two societies were prodigiously unequal. With its institutions, its professors, its privileges, the one was nothing and did nothing—with its single ideas, the other incessantly labored and seized everything.

All things, in the fifth century, attest the decay of the civil schools. The contemporaneous writers, Sidonius Apollinaris and Mamertius Claudianus, for example, deplore it in every page, saying that the young men no longer studied, that professors were without pupils, that science languished and was being lost. They attempted, by a multitude of petty expedients, to escape the necessity of long and vigorous studies. This was a time of abbreviators of history, philosophy, grammar, and rhetoric; and they evidently proposed to themselves not to propagate instruction in the classes who would not study, but to spare the labor of science to those who could, but would not, devote themselves to it. It was especially the young men of the superior classes who frequented the schools; but these classes, as has been seen, were in rapid dissolution. The schools fell with them; the institutions still existed, but they were void—the soul had quitted the body.

The intellectual aspect of Christian society was very different. Gaul, in the fifth century, was under the influence of three spiritual chiefs, of whom none lived there: Saint Jerome[1] residing at Bethlehem, Saint Augustin[2] at Hippo, Saint Paulin[3] at Nola: the latter only was a Gaul by birth. They truly governed Gaulish Christianity; it was to them that it addressed itself on all occasions, to receive ideas, solutions, councils. Examples abound. A priest, born at the foot of the Pyrenees, and who was called Vigilantius, travelled to Palestine. He there saw Saint Jerome, and engaged with him in controversy concerning some questions of ecclesiastical

[1] Born in 331, died in 420.
[2] Born in 354, died in 430
[3] Born in 354, died in 431.

doctrine or discipline. Upon his return to the Gauls, he wrote concerning what he regarded as abuses. He attacked the worship of martyrs, their relics, the miracles worked at their tombs, frequent fasts, austerities, even celibacy. Scarcely was his work published, than a priest named Reparius, who lived in his neighborhood, probably in Dauphiny or Savoy, acquainted Saint Jerome with it, giving him an account at large of the contents of the book, and of its danger, as he said. Saint Jerome immediately answered Reparius, and his answer is a first refutation, which promises a second more in detail. Reparius and another neighboring priest, Didier, immediately sent to Bethlehem by a third priest, Sisinnius, the writings of Vigilantius; and in less than two years after the commencement of the contest, Saint Jerome sent into the Gauls a complete refutation, which rapidly spread there. The same fact took place almost at the same moment between Gaul and St. Augustin, upon the subject of the heresy of Pelagius concerning free-will and grace; there was the same care on the part of the Gaulish priests to inform the grand bishop of everything; the same activity on his part to answer their questions, to remove their doubts, to sustain, to direct their faith. Every heresy which threatened, every question which arose, became, between the Gauls on one side, and Hippo, Bethlehem, and Nola on the other, the occasion of a long and rapid succession of letters, messages, journeys, pamphlets. It was not even necessary that a great question should arise, that general and pressing religious interest should be involved. Simple Christians, and women, were pre-occupied with certain ideas, certain scruples; light was wanting to them; they had recourse to the same doctors, the same remedies. A woman of Bayeux, Hédibie, and at the same time a woman of Cahors, Algasie, drew up, in order to address them to Saint Jerome, the one twelve, the other eleven questions concerning philosophical, religious, historical matters: they asked him the explanation of certain passages of the Holy Scriptures; they wished to know from him what were the conditions of moral perfection, or what conduct should be pursued in certain circumstances of life. In a word, they consulted him as a family spiritual director; and a priest named Apodemus set out from the heart of Brittany, charged to carry these letters into the heart of Palestine, and to bring back the answers. The same activity, the same rapidity of circulation reigned in the interior of Gaulish Christianity. Saint Sulpicius Severus, the com-

panion and friend of Saint Martin of Tours, wrote a *Life* of that Saint while still living. It spread everywhere, in Gaul, in Spain, and in Italy; copies of it were sold in all the great towns; bishops sent for it with eagerness. Whenever a religious desire, doubt, or difficulty was manifested, doctors labored, priests travelled, writings circulated. And this was no easy thing, this quick and vast correspondence. Physical means were wanting; the roads were few and perilous; questions had far to be carried, and long to wait for an answer; active zeal—immovable, inexhaustible patience—was necessary; lastly, that perseverance in moral wants was necessary which at all times is a rare virtue, and which can alone supply the imperfection of institutions.

Nevertheless, institutions began to rise, and to be regulated among the Christians of Gaul. The foundation of the greater portion of the large monasteries of the southern provinces belongs to the first half of the fifth century. That of Saint Faustin at Nimes, and another in his diocese, has been attributed to Saint Castor, bishop of Apt, about 422. About the same time, Cassienus founded at Marseilles that of Saint Victor; Saint Honoratus and Saint Caprais that of Lerins, the most celebrated of the age, in one of the isles of Hyères; rather later arose that of Condat or Saint Claude in Franche-Comté, that of Grigny in the diocese of Vienne, and many others of less importance. The primitive character of the Gaulish monasteries was entirely different from that of the eastern monasteries. In the east, the monasteries were chiefly for the purposes of solitude and contemplation; the men who retired into the Thebaid desired to escape pleasures, temptations, and the corruption of civil society; they wished to abandon themselves, far from social intercourse, to the transports of their imagination, and to the rigors of their conscience. It was not until a later period that they drew near each other in places where at first they had been dispersed, and anchorites or solitaries became cenobites, κοινοβιοί, living in common. In the west, despite the imitation of the east, monasteries had a different origin; they began with life, in common with the desire, not of isolation, but of union. Civil society was a prey to all kinds of disorders; national, provincial, or municipal, it was dissolving on all sides; a centre and an asylum was entirely wanting to men who wished to discuss, exercise themselves, live together; they found one in the monasteries; thus monastic life, in its rise, had neither the contemplative nor

solitary character; on the contrary, it was highly social and active; it kindled a focus of intellectual development; it served as the instrument of fermentation and propagation of ideas. The monasteries of the south of Gaul were philosophical schools of Christianity; it was there that intellectual men meditated, discussed, taught; it was from thence that new ideas, daring thoughts, heresies, were sent forth. It was in the abbeys of Saint Victor and of Lerins that all the great questions of free-will, predestination, grace, original sin, were the most warmly agitated, and where the Pelagian opinions, for fifty years, found the greatest nourishment and support.

It will be seen that the intellectual state of religious society, and that of civil society, cannot be compared; on one side, all is decay, languor, inertia; on the other, all is movement, eagerness, ambition, progress. What are the causes of such a contrast? It is necessary to know from whence so striking a difference arose, how it continued, why each day it was aggravated: by this only shall we arrive at a full knowledge and comprehension of their moral state.

There were, I believe, two great causes for the fact which I have just described: 1st. the very nature of the subjects, questions, intellectual labors with which the two societies occupied themselves: 2d. the very unequal freedom of minds in one and the other.

Civil literature, if I may use the expression, presents at this epoch in Gaul only four kinds of men and of works: grammarians, rhetoricians, chroniclers, and poets; poets not on a large scale, but on a small one, makers of epithalamiums, inscriptions, descriptions, idyls, eclogues. These are the subjects upon which what remained of the Roman mind exercised itself.

Christian literature was entirely different. It abounded in philosophers, politicians, and orators; it agitated the most important questions, the most pressing interests. I shall now place before you, always taking heed to confine myself to Gaul, some proper names and some titles, a comparative view of the principal writers and works of the two literatures. You yourselves will deduce the consequences.

I do not here pretend to give a biographical or literary enumeration, however far from complete. I only point out the most eminent names and facts.

Among the grammarians with whom civil literature was crowded, I shall name, 1st. Agroetius or Agritius, professor

at Bordeaux about the middle of the fourth century, by whom we have a remaining treatise, or fragment of a treatise, on the property and varieties of the Latin tongue; Latin synonymes, for example, *temperantia*, *temperatio* and *temperies*; *percussus* and *perculsus*; the author rests upon examples drawn from the best authors—Cicero, Horace, Terence, Livy, &c.—for the distinctions which he establishes. 2d. Urbicus, also professor at Bordeaux, celebrated chiefly for his profound knowledge of the Greek language and literature. 3d. Ursulus and Harmonius, professors at Trèves. Harmonius collected the poems of Homer, adding thereto notes on false readings, interpretations, &c.

By the side of the grammarians are the rhetoricians, whose business was not only with teaching eloquence, but with writing discourses, panegyrics on all the chief circumstances of life, upon the occasion of fêtes, civil solemnities, the death or accession of an emperor, &c. Twelve of these bravuras of vain eloquence have been specially preserved and collected. The four principal panegyrists are—first, Claudius Mamertinus, author of an eulogy on the emperor Maximian, delivered at Trèves, the 20th of April, 292, the day on which the foundation of Rome was celebrated; secondly, Eumenius, professor of eloquence at Autun, author of four discourses delivered from 297 to 311, in the presence and in honor of Constantius Chlorus, and of Constantine; thirdly, Nazarius, professor at Bordeaux, author of a panegyric on Constantine; fourthly, Claudius Mamertinus, perhaps the son of the first, author of a discourse delivered in 362 before Julian.

Among the Gaulish and pagan chroniclers of this epoch, the most distinguished is Eutropius, who wrote his abridgment of Roman history about the year 370.

I might extend the list of poets at pleasure, but it will not be complained of that I only name three of them. The most fertile, the most celebrated, and incontestably the most spiritual and elegant, is Ausonius, who was born at Bordeaux about 309, and died upon one of his estates in 394, after having filled the highest public offices, and composed—first, one hundred and forty epigrams; secondly, thirty-eight epitaphs; thirdly, twenty idyls; fourthly, twenty-four epistles; fifthly, seventeen descriptions of towns, and a multitude of small poems upon such subjects as the professors of Bordeaux the persons and incidents of his family, the twelve Cæsars, the seven wise men of Greece, &c., &c.

An uncle of Ausonius, named Arborius, of Toulouse, has left a small poem, addressed to a young girl too finely dressed, *Ad virginem nimis cultam.*

A poet of Poitiers, Rutilius Numatianus, who lived for some time at Rome, and who returned to his country about the year 416, upon his return wrote a poem entitled *Itinerarium*, or *de Reditu;* a curious work enough for details of places, manners, and for the anger of the poet against the invasion of society by the Jews and the monks. He was evidently a pagan.

I pass to the Gaulish Christian society at the same epoch.

The first name that I meet with is that of Saint Ambrose; although he passed his life in Italy, I reckon him as a Gaul, for he was born at Trèves, about the year 340. His works have been collected in two volumes folio. They contain thirty-six different works—religious treatises, commentaries upon the Bible, discourses, letters, hymns, &c. The most extensive, and also the most curious, is entitled De Officiis Ministrorum (concerning the duties of ministers of the church).

At a future period I shall, perhaps, return to this work in detail; at present I only wish to explain its character. You would be tempted to believe, from the title, that it was a treatise upon the particular duties of priests, and on the manner in which they should acquit themselves of their duties. You would be deceived; it is a complete moral treatise, in which the author, while on the subject of priests, passes in review all human duties; he there sets down and resolves a multitude of questions of practical philosophy.

By the side of Saint Ambrose I shall place Saint Paulin, born, like him, in Gaul (at Bordeaux, about the year 353), and who died, like him, a bishop, in Italy (at Nola, in 431). Many of his works, among others his book against the pagans, are lost; all that remains of him are some letters and poems; but letters, at this period, had a very different importance from what they have in modern times. Literature, properly so called, held but little place in the Christian world; men wrote very little for the sake of writing; for the mere pleasure of manifesting their ideas; some event broke forth, a question arose, and a book was often produced under the form of a letter to a Christian, to a friend, to a church. Politics, religion, controversy, spiritual and temporal interests, general and special councils—all are met with in the letters of this

time, and they are among the number of its most curious monuments.

I have already named Saint Sulpicius Severus, of Toulouse[1] (or of some other town of Aquitaine, for his origin is not known with certainty), and his *Life of Saint Martin*, of Tours. He moreover wrote a *Sacred History*, one of the first essays at ecclesiastical history attempted in the west; it reaches from the beginning of the world up to the year 400, and contains many important facts which are not found elsewhere.

Nearly at the same time, or rather later, the monk Cassienus,[2] a provincial by birth, as it would appear, though he lived for a very long time in the east, published at Marseilles, at the request of Saint Castor, bishop of Apt, his *Institutions* and his *Conferences*, works written for the purpose of making the western world acquainted with the origin, principles, practices, and ideas of the eastern monks. It was at this period, as you have heard, that most of the earlier monasteries in southern Gaul were founded by the co-operation of Cassienus himself; so that these books of his were prepared to meet an actual and practical want.

It recurs to me that before Cassienus I should have mentioned Saint Hilary, bishop of Poitiers, one of the most active, most upright, and most eminent chiefs of the Gaulish church, who wrote a number of works, all of them of limited extent, but all highly important in their time. They are, in fact, for the most part, mere pamphlets upon the various questions which were then engaging attention. After Christianity had grown beyond its infancy, the more eminent bishops had two parts to play at one and the same time—that of philosopher and that of statesman. They possessed the empire over ideas, or, at all events, the preponderating influence in the intellectual order; and they had also to administer the temporal affairs of the religious society. They were called upon concurrently to fulfil two missions—to mediate and to act, to convince and to govern. Hence the prodigious variety, and hence also the haste, which very often characterize their writings. These, in general, were works got up altogether for the occasion—pamphlets intended, now to solve a question of doctrine, now to discuss a matter of business, to enlighten

[1] Born about 355, died about 420.
[2] Born about 360, died about 440. [3] Died about 368

a soul, or oppose a civil disorder, to answer a heresy, or to obtain a concession from the government. The works of Saint Hilary are more especially impressed with this character.

A monk, who was possibly acquainted with Saint Hilary, since he lived for some time with St. Martin of Tours, Evagrius, wrote two dialogues, entitled—the one, *Conference between Theophilus, a Christian, and Simon, a Jew*—the other, *Conference between Zacheus, a Christian, and Apollonius, a philosopher*—curious monuments of the manner in which a Christian monk of the end of the fourth century framed in his mind the question, on the one hand, between Judaism and Christianity; and on the other, between Christianity and philosophy.

A little later than this, a priest of Marseilles, Salvienus, a native of Trèves, wrote his treatise *On Avarice*, a treatise on religious morality, and his book, which I have already mentioned, *De Gubernatione Dei*, a work remarkable both as a picture of the social state and manners of the period, and as an attempt to acquit Providence from any share in the miseries of the world, the blame of which he entirely throws upon mankind themselves.

The Pelagian schism gave rise to a vast number of works, among which, however, I will only mention those of Saint Prosper of Aquitaine, and especially his poem, *Against Ingrates*, one of the happiest efforts of philosophical poetry that ever emanated from the bosom of Christianity. His Chronicle, which extends from the origin of the world to the year 455, is not without importance.

While the question of free will and of grace was agitating the whole church, and more especially that of Gaul, that of the immateriality of the soul was being more quietly discussed in the Narbonnese, between Faustus,[1] bishop of Riez, who maintained that the soul is material, and Mamertius Claudienus,[2] priest of Vienne, and brother of the bishop Saint Mamertius, who defended the contrary opinion. The letter in which Faustus sets forth his views, and the treatise of Mamertius Claudienus, entitled *On the Nature of the Soul*, are amongst the most curious monuments of the state of the human mind in the fifth century, and I therefore propose to make you acquainted with them in detail at a future period.

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[1] Died in 490

[2] Died about 473.

Of the Christian literature of this period, I will cite but one more name, that of Gennadius, priest at Marseilles, who, in his work entitled, *Treatise on Illustrious Men, or Ecclesiastical Authors, from the middle of the fourth century to the end of the fifth*, has given us more information on the literary history of the period than we find anywhere else. When you compare these two lists, dry and incomplete as they are, of authors and of works, do not the names, the titles alone, explain the difference in the intellectual state of the two societies? The Christian writers address themselves at once to the highest interests of thought and of life; they are active and potent at once in the domain of intellect, and in that of reality; their activity is rational, and their philosophy popular; they treat of things which alike stir up the soul of the anchorite in his solitude, and of nations in their cities. The civil literature, on the contrary, has no reference to questions either of principle or of passing events, to either the moral wants or the household sentiments of the masses; it is entirely a literature of convention and luxury, of coteries and of schools, wholly and solely devoted, from the very nature of the subjects which engage its attention, to the passing entertainment of the nobles and the wits.

This is not all; we find another and a far different cause for the diversity of the moral condition of the two societies; liberty, that is to say, liberty of mind, was entirely wanting to the one, while in the other it was real and powerful.

Indeed, it was impossible but that liberty should be wholly wanting to the civil literature; that literature belonged to civil society, to the old Roman world; it was its image, its amusement; it bore all its characteristics,—decay, sterility, fertility, servility. The very nature, however, of the subjects upon which it exercised itself, rendered the presence of these characteristics very endurable. It kept entirely apart from all the great moral questions, from all the real interests of life, that is to say, from every career in which freedom of mind is indispensable. Grammar, rhetoric, minor poetry, very readily adapt themselves to servitude. To compile Latin synonymes like *Agræcius*—to criticise, like Arborius, a girl over dressed—or even to celebrate, like Ausonius, the beauties of the Moselle, required neither freedom nor, in truth, even movement of mind. This subordinate literature has more than once prospered extremely well under despotism, and in the decline of society.

In the very heart of the schools, there was an entire absence of liberty; the whole of the professors were removable at any time. The emperor had full power, not only to transfer them from one town to another, but to cancel their appointment whenever he thought fit. Moreover, in a great many of the Gaulish towns, the people themselves were against them, for the people were Christians, at least in a great majority, and as such had a distaste for schools which were altogether pagan in origin and intention. The professors, accordingly, were regarded with hostility, and often maltreated; they were, in fact, quite unsupported except by the remnant of the higher classes, and by the imperial authority, which still maintained order, and which having heretofore often persecuted the Christians solely in compliance with the clamorous demands of the people, now, in the fourth century, protected the pagans against the people, either from an abstract desire to preserve order, from deference to the wishes of distinguished citizens, themselves pagans or indifferent about the matter, or out of that respect for old institutions, old principles, which an old government ever retains. You may thus readily perceive, in how dependent, powerless, precarious, painful a position the professors were placed. That of the students was scarcely any better. They were the object of a multitude of inquisitorial, vexatious, police regulations, against which they had no practical security. I will read to you an edict of Valentinian, which will give you a clear idea of their situation; the edict itself only refers to the students of the school at Rome, but the other schools of the empire were conducted upon analogous rules and principles:

"*Valentinian, Valerius, and Gratian, to Olybrius, Prefect of Rome* (370).

"1. All persons coming to study at Rome, must immediately upon their arrival lay before the master of the census[1] letters from the provincial governors who have given them permission to travel, setting forth their place of abode, their age, their name, condition, and description. 2. They must declare, also, at the same time, what studies they intend more especially to pursue. 3. They must let the census office know,

[1] A magistrate, some of whose functions were analogous with those of our prefect of police

from time to time, their place of abode in Rome, so that the officers of that department may see to their following out the studies which they have indicated as the object of their pursuit. 4. The aforesaid officers are charged to take care that the students conduct themselves at the lectures in a becoming manner, avoiding all occasion of gaining an ill reputation, and taking no part in any of those private associations among themselves, which we regard as very little short of crimes; they are not to visit the theatre too frequently, not to indulge in overfeasting and revelry. Any student who shall forget the dignified demeanor due from him who pursues the liberal arts, shall be publicly beaten with rods, put on board some vessel, and, ignominiously expelled the city, be sent back whence he came. They who apply themselves assiduously to their studies, may remain in Rome until their twentieth year; should they then omit to return home of their own accord, let the prefect have them removed, whether they will or no. And that these regulations may be properly attended to, your High Sincerity will forthwith direct the chief officers of the census department to have drawn up, every month, a report upon the said students, setting forth how many there are, who they are, whence they came, their general character, and who of them, their time in Rome being completed, have to be sent back to Africa, or other provinces. . . . . Let a copy of these reports be annually sent to us, that, thereby made acquainted with the merits and acquirements of the students, we may judge how far any of them are necessary or desirable for our service."[1]

Some of these precautions may very possibly have been, in certain cases, necessary and proper; but it is at the same time quite clear that in the system of which they were a leading, a dominant feature, in the schools of whose discipline they formed the basis, there was no liberty.

In Christian literature, on the contrary, liberty manifests itself in full luxuriance. the activity of mind, the diversity of opinion publicly declared, are of themselves sufficient to prove the fact of this liberty. The human mind does not spread its wings so broadly, so energetically, when it is loaded with irons. Liberty, besides, was inherent in the intellectual situation of the church: she was laboring at the formation of her

[1] Cod. **Theod., l. xiv.**, t. ix., l i.

doctrines, which, as to a great number of points, she had not as yet promulgated or fixed. From time to time, some question was raised by an event, by a polemical writing; it was then examined and discussed by the chiefs of the religious society; and the decision formed, the belief adopted, the dogma was in due time proclaimed. It is evident that, in such a period as this, there must exist liberty, precarious, perhaps, and transitory, but still real, and, to a considerable extent, practical.

The state of the legislation against heresy was not as yet mortal to it; the principle of persecution, the idea that truth had a right to govern by force, occupied men's minds, but it did not yet dominate in facts. Civil power began to lend a strong hand to the church against the heretics, and to be severe against them; they were exiled, certain functions were interdicted them, they were despoiled of their property; some even, as the Priscillianists, in 385, were condemned to death: the laws of the emperors, especially those of Theodosius the Great, were full of menaces and provisions against heresy; the course of things, in short, evidently tended to tyranny; civil power, however, still hesitated to make itself the instrument of doctrines; the greatest bishops, Saint Hilary, Saint Ambrose, Saint Martin, still cried out against all capital condemnation of heretics, saying that the church had no right to employ other than spiritual arms. In a word, although the principle of persecution was in progress, and in very threatening progress, liberty was still stronger: a dangerous and tempestuous liberty, but active and general; a man was a heretic at his peril; but he might be one if he pleased; and men might sustain, they did sustain, their opinions, for a long period, with energy, with publicity. It will suffice to glance at the canons of the councils of this epoch in order to be convinced that liberty was still great: with the exception of two or three great general councils, these assemblies, particularly in Gaul, scarcely concerned themselves with anything more than discipline; questions of theory, of doctrine, appeared there rarely and only upon great occasions; it was more especially the government of the church, her situation, the rights and duties of priests, that they treated of and decided upon: a proof that, in numerous points diversity of ideas was admitted and debate still open.

Thus, on one side, the very nature of the labors, and on the other the situation of minds, fully explain the intellectual

superiority of the religious society over the civil society; the one state was earnest and free, the other servile and frivolous: what is there to add?

But one final observation, one, however, which is not without importance, and which, perhaps, fully explains why civil literature was on the point of death, while religious literature lived and prospered so energetically.

For the culture of mind, for the sciences, for literature, to prosper by themselves, independently of all near and direct interest, happy and peaceable times are requisite, times of contentment and good fortune for men. When the social state becomes difficult, rude, unhappy, when men suffer much and long, study runs a great risk of being neglected and of declining. The taste for pure truth, the appreciation of the beautiful, apart from all other desire, are plants as delicate as they are noble; they must have a pure sky, a brilliant sun, a soft atmosphere; amid storms they droop the head and fade. Intellectual development, the labor of mind to attain truth, will stop unless placed in the train, and under the shield, of some one of the actual, immediate, powerful interests of humanity. This is what happened at the fall of the Roman empire: study, literature, pure intellectual activity, were unable alone to resist disasters, sufferings, universal discouragement; it was necessary that they should be attached to popular sentiments and interests; that they should cease to appear a luxury, and should become a need. The Christian religion furnished them with the means; by uniting with it, philosophy and literature were saved the ruin which menaced them; their activity had then practical, direct results; they showed an application to direct men in their conduct, towards their welfare. It may be said without exaggeration that the human mind proscribed, beaten down with the storm, took refuge in the asylum of churches and monasteries; it supplicatingly embraced the altars, and entreated to live under their shelter and in their service, until better times permitted it to re-appear in the world and to breathe the free air.

I shall not go any further into this comparison of the moral state of the two societies in the fifth century; we know enough of it, I think, to understand them both clearly. It is now necessary to enter deeper into the examination of the religious society, alone living and fertile; it is necessary to seek to discover what questions occupied it, what solutions

were proposed to it, what controversies were powerful and popular, what was their influence upon the life and actions of mankind. This will be the subject of our next lectures.

FIFTH LECTURE.

Of the principal questions debated in Gaul in the fifth century—Of Pelagianism—Of the method to follow in its history—Of the moral facts which gave place to this controversy: 1st, of human liberty: 2d, of the impotency of liberty, and the necessity for an external succor; 3d, of the influence of external circumstances upon liberty; 4th, of the moral changes which happen in the soul without man attributing them to his will—Of the questions which naturally arose from these facts—Of the special point of view under which we should consider them in the Christian church in the fifth century—History of Pelagianism at Rome, in Africa, in the East, and in Gaul—Pelagius—Celestius—Saint Augustin—History of semi-Pelagianism—Cassienus—Faustus—Saint Prosper of Aquitaine—Of predestination—Influence and general results of this controversy.

In the last lecture, I attempted to picture, but only under its general features, the comparative moral state of civil society and of religious society in Gaul at the fifth century. Let us enter deeper into the examination of religious society, the only one which furnishes ample matter for study and reflection.

The principal questions which occupied the Gaulish Christian society in the fifth century were—1st, Pelagianism, or the heresy of Pelagius, the principal opponent of which was Saint Augustin; 2d, the nature of the soul, debated in the south of Gaul between bishop Faustus and the priest Mamertius Claudienus; 3d, various points of worship and of discipline, rather than of doctrine, such as the worship of the martyrs, the value to be attached to fastings, austerities, celibacy, &c.; these, as you have seen, were the objects to which Vigilantius applied his writings; 4th, the prolongation of the struggle of Christianity against Paganism and Judaism, the theses of the two dialogues of the monk Evagrius, between the Jew Simon and the Christian Theophilus, and the Christian Zacheus, and the philosopher Apollonius.

Of all these questions, Pelagianism was by far the most important: it was the great intellectual controversy of the church in the fifth century, as Arianism had been in the

fourth. It is with its history that we are now about to occupy ourselves.

Every one is aware that this controversy turned upon the question of free-will and of grace, that is to say, of the relations between the liberty of man, and the Divine power, of the influence of God upon the moral activity of men.

Before proceeding with the history of this affair, I will indicate the method upon which I propose to proceed.

The mere statement of the question will show you that it was one not peculiar either to the fifth century or to Christianity, but that it is a universal problem common to all times and all places, and which all religions, all systems of philosophy, have propounded to themselves, and have endeavored to solve.

It has, therefore, manifest reference to primitive, universal, moral facts, facts inherent in human nature, and which observation may discover there. I will, in the first place, seek out these facts; I will endeavor to distinguish in man in general, independently of all considerations of time, place, or particular creed, the natural elements, the first matter, so to speak, of the Pelagian controversy. I shall bring these facts to light, without adding anything thereto, without retrenching anything therefrom, without discussing them, solely applied to prove and describe them.

I shall then show what questions naturally flowed from natural facts, what difficulties, what controversies, arose out of them, independently of all particular circumstances of time, place, or social state.

This done, and, if I may so express myself, the general theoretical side of the question once thoroughly established, I shall determine under what special point these moral facts should be considered at the fifth century, by the defenders of the various opinions in debate.

Finally, after having thus explained from what sources and under what auspices Pelagianism was born, I shall recount its history; I shall attempt to follow, in their relations and their progress, the principal ideas which it suscitated, in order properly to understand what was the state of mind at the moment when this great controversy arose, what it did therein, and at what point it left it.

I must request your most scrupulous attention, especially in the examination of the moral facts to which the question attaches itself: they are difficult properly to understand, to ex-

press with precision; I should wish nothing should be wanting to them in clearness and certainty, and I have hardly time to indicate them in a cursory manner.

The first, that which forms the foundation of the whole quarrel, is liberty, free-will, the human will. In order to understand this fact exactly, it must be disengaged from all foreign element, and strictly reduced to itself. It is, I believe, for want of this care that it has been so often but ill comprehended; men have not placed themselves in front of the fact of liberty, and of that alone; they have seen and described it, so to speak, mixed up with other facts which occupy a very close position to it in moral life, but do not the less essentially differ from it. For example, they have made human liberty to consist in the power to deliberate and choose between motives of action: the deliberation and judgment which proceed therefrom have been considered as the essence of free-will. It is nothing of the kind. These are acts of intellect, and not of liberty; it is before the intellect that the different motives of action, interests, passions, opinions, &c., appear: the intellect considers compares, estimates, weighs, and finally judges them. This is a preparatory work, which precedes the act of will, but does not in any way constitute it. When the deliberation has taken place, when man has taken full cognizance of the motives which presented themselves to him, and of their value, then comes an entirely new fact, entirely different, the fact of liberty; man takes a resolution, that is to say, commences a series of facts which have their source in himself, of which he looks upon himself as the author, which arise because he wishes it, and which would not arise unless he wished it, which would be different if he desired to produce them differently. Remove all recollection of intellectual deliberation, of motives known and appreciated; concentre your thought and that of the man who takes a resolution at the very moment that it occurs to him, when he says: "I will, I will do so," and ask yourself, ask him, if he could not will and do otherwise. Of a surety, you will answer—he will answer, "Yes." Here the fact of liberty is shown: it resides complete in the resolution which man takes after deliberation: it is the resolution which is the proper act of man, which subsists by him, and by him alone; a simple act, independent of all the facts which precede it, or surround it; identical in the most diverse circumstances; always the same, whatever may be its motives and its results.

Man sees this act just as he produces it; he knows himself to be free, he is conscious of his liberty. The conscience is that faculty which man possesses of contemplating what passes within him, of being present at his own existence, of being as it were a spectator of himself. Whatever may be the facts which are accomplished within man, it is by the fact of conscience that they are shown to him; the conscience attests liberty, the same as sensation, as thought; man sees, knows himself free, as he sees, as he knows himself thinking, reflecting, judging. People have often attempted, even now they attempt to establish, between these various facts, some sort of inequality of clearness, of certainty: they rise against what they call the assumption of introducing the facts of conscience, unknown and obscure facts, into science; sensation, perception, say they, these are clear, proved: but the facts of conscience, where are they? what are they? I do not think there is any need to insist long on this point: sensation, perception, are facts of conscience as well as liberty; man sees them in the same manner, with the same degree of light, and of certainty. He may lend his attention to certain facts of conscience, rather than others, and forget or misunderstand those which he regards not: the opinion to which I have this moment made allusion is proof of this: but when he observes himself in a complete manner, when he is present without losing any part of it, at the spectacle of his internal life, he has little trouble in being convinced that all the scenes pass upon the same stage, and are known to him on the same principle and in the same manner.

I desire that the fact of human liberty, thus reduced to its proper and distinctive nature, should remain fully present to your thought; for its confusion with other facts, bordering upon, but different from it, was one of the chief causes of trouble and debate in the great controversy with which we have to occupy ourselves.

A second fact, equally natural, equally universal, played a considerable part in this controversy.

At the same time that man felt himself free, that he saw in himself the faculty of commencing, by his will alone, a series of facts, he also acknowledged that his will was placed under the empire of a certain law which, according to the occasions to which it applied itself, took different names, moral law, reason, good sense, &c. He is free; but, in his own thought, his freedom is not arbitrary; he may use it in a senseless,

unjust, guilty manner; and each time that he uses it, a certain rule must preside at it. The observation of this rule is his duty, the task of his liberty.

He will soon see that he never fully acquits himself of his task, nor acts perfectly according to reason, moral law; that, always free, that is to say, morally capable of conforming himself to this rule, he, in fact, does not accomplish all that he ought, or even all that he can. Upon every occasion, when he scrupulously interrogates himself, and sincerely answers himself, he is forced to say: "I might have done so and so, if I had chosen;" but his will was enervated, backward; it went neither to the end of its duty, nor of its power.

This fact is evident, one of which all may give witness; there is even this singularity, that the feeling of this weakness of the will becomes often so much the more clear, so much the more pressing, as the moral man is developed and perfected: the best men, that is, those who have best conformed their will to reason, to morality, have often been the most struck with their insufficiency, the most convinced of the profound inequality between the conduct of man and his task, between liberty and its law.

Hence arises a sentiment which is found under various forms, in all men; the feeling of the necessity of an external support, of a fulcrum for the human will, a power which may be added to its present power, and sustain it at need. Man seeks on all sides to discover this fulcrum, this aiding power; he demands it in the encouragements of friendship, in the councils of the wise, in the example, the approbation of those like himself; in the fear of blame; there is no one but has every day, in his own conduct, a thousand proofs to cite of this movement of the soul, eager to find beyond itself an aid to its liberty, which it feels at once to be real and insufficient. And as the visible world, the human society, do not always answer to his desire, as they are afflicted with the same insufficingness which is seen in his own case, the soul goes beyond the visible world, above human relations, to seek this fulcrum of which it has need: the religious sentiment developes itself; man addresses himself to God, and invokes his aid. Prayer is the most elevated, but not the only form, under which the universal sentiment of the weakness of human will, this recourse to an external and allied power, is manifested.

And such is the nature of man, that when he sincerely

asks this support, he obtains it, that his merely seeking it is almost sufficient to secure it. Whosoever, feeling his will weak, sincerely invokes the encouragement of a friend, the influence of wise counsels, the support of public opinion, or addresses himself to God by prayer, soon feels his will fortified, sustained, in a certain measure, and for a certain time. This is a fact of daily experience, and which is easy of verification.

Here is a third whose importance should not be forgotten; I mean the influence of circumstances independent of man upon the human will, the empire of the external world upon liberty. No one denies the fact, but it is necessary to estimate it with exactness, for, if I do not deceive myself, it is generally ill-comprehended.

I just now distinguished liberty from the deliberation which precedes it, and which is accomplished by the intellect. Now the circumstances independent of man, whatsoever they be, the place, the time when the man was born, habits, manners, education, events, influence in no way the act of liberty, such as I have endeavored to describe it; it is not reached nor modified by them; it always remains identical and complete, whatever the motives which it call forth. It is upon these motives, in the sphere where intellect displays itself, that external circumstances exercise and exhaust their power. The age, the country, the world, in the heart of which life passes away, infinitely vary the elements of the deliberation which precedes the will: in consequence of this variation, certain facts, certain ideas, certain sentiments, in this intellectual labor, are present or absent, near or at a distance, powerful or weak; and the result of this deliberation, that is to say the judgment formed upon the motives, is greatly affected by it. But the act of the will which follows it remains essentially the same: it is only indirectly, and by reason of the diversity of the elements introduced into the deliberation, that the conduct of men undergoes this influence of the external world. One illustration, I hope, will make me fully understood. In accordance with the customs of his tribe, to fulfil what he regards as a duty, a savage reluctantly kills his aged and infirm father: a European, on the contrary, supports his parent, tends him, devotes himself to the alleviation of his old age and infirmities; nothing assuredly can be more different than the ideas which, in the two cases, constitute the groundwork of the deliberation which precedes the action,

and the results which accompany it: nothing more unequa. than the legitimacy, the moral worth of the two actions in themselves, but as to the resolution, the free and personal act of the European, and of the savage, are they not alike, if accomplished with the same intention, and with the same degree of effort?

Thus the influence of circumstances independent of the will, upon the motives and the consequences of free action, is immense, but that is the only field in which it exercises itself: the lower fact placed between deliberation and exterior action, the fact of liberty, remains the same, and accomplishes itself in like manner amidst the most varying elements.

I now come to the fourth and last of the great moral facts, a knowledge of which is indispensable, before we can comprehend the history of Pelagianism. There are many others which I might enumerate; but these are of minor importance, obvious results of those which I here describe, and I have no time to enter into an account of them.

There are certain changes, certain moral events, which accomplish and manifest themselves in man without his being able to refer their origin to an act of his will, or being able to recognize their author.

This assertion may at first glance surprise some of you; I will endeavor to illustrate it by analogous facts, which occur more frequently within the domain of intelligence, and are more readily apprehended.

There is no one who at some time or other of his life after laboriously seeking some idea, some reminiscence, has not fallen asleep in the midst of the search without having succeeded in it, and next morning, on awaking, found the desired object fully present to his mind. There is no scholar to whom it has not occurred to have retired to rest without having acquired the lesson he has been studying, and to have arisen next morning and learned it without the least difficulty. I might show many other illustrations of the same description: I select these as the simplest and most incontestable.

I deduce from them this consequence: independently of the voluntary and deliberate activity of the will, a certain interior and spontaneous labor accomplishes itself in the understanding of man, a labor which we do not direct or control, of which we have no opportunity of observing the progress, and yet a real and productive labor.

There is, after all, nothing strange in this: every one of

man brings with him into the world an intellectual nature of his own. Man, by the operation of his will, directs and modifies, exalts or debases his moral being, but he does not create it; he has received it, and received it endowed with certain individual dispositions, with a spontaneous force. The inborn diversity of men in the moral point of view, as in the physical, is beyond dispute. Now, in the same way that the physical nature of each man developes itself spontaneously and by its own virtue, so, in the same way, though in a very unequal degree, there is operated in his intellectual nature, set in motion by his relations with the external world, or by his will itself, a certain involuntary, imperceptible development, and, to use an expression, which I only avail myself of because it figuratively expresses the idea I wish to convey, a sort of vegetation, bearing naturally, and in due course, its fruits.

That which takes place in the intellectual order, happens in like manner in the moral order. Certain facts occur in the interior of the human soul which it does not refer to itself, which it does not recognize as the work of its own will; there are certain days, certain moments, in which it finds itself in a different moral state from that which it was last conscious of under the operation of its own will. It cannot trace back the progress of the change to its source; it had nothing to do with it, it took place without its concurrence. In other words, the moral man does not wholly create himself; he is conscious that causes, that powers external to himself, act upon him and modify him imperceptibly; in his moral life, as in his future destiny, there are points utterly inexplicable to him, of which he knows nothing.

Nor is it necessary, to convince himself of this fact, that he should turn to those great moral revolutions, those sudden, marked changes, which the human soul, undoubtedly, may at times experience, but which ever receive a high coloring from the imagination of the narrators, and of which it is difficult to form an adequate appreciation. It is only necessary to look into oneself, to discover there more than one example of these involuntary modifications. There is no one, who, on observation of his internal life, will not easily recognize that the vicissitudes, the development of his moral being, are not all the result, either of the action of his will, or of the external circumstances that are known to him.

Such are the principal moral facts connected with the

Pelagian controversy, such as human nature, simple, universal nature, communicates them to us, apart from the historical details, the particular circumstance of Pelagianism itself. You at once see, that from these facts alone, still apart from all special and accidental elements, there results a multitude of questions, the groundwork of many a grave discussion. And, in the first place, we may question the reality of the facts themselves: all of them, indeed, are not equally exposed to this danger; the fact of human liberty, for instance, is more evident, more irresistible, than any of the rest; yet even this has been denied, as all things may be denied, seeing that there are no bounds to the vast field of error.

Admit the facts, acknowledge them fully: then comes the question, whether we may not be mistaken as to the place which each occupies, or to the part which each plays in the moral life; we may have measured inexactly their extent, their importance; we may have given too large or too small a part to liberty, to external circumstances, to the weakness of the will, to unknown influences, &c.

Again, altogether different explanations of the facts themselves may be suggested. In reference, for example, to the involuntary, imperceptible changes which occur in the moral state of man; it may be said that these are assignable to some want of due attention on the part of the soul, to its not remembering all that passes within itself, to its having forgotten some act of the will, some resolution, some impression, which has produced consequences, the thread of which it has not followed, the development of which it has not observed. Or, to explain these obscure, doubtful facts of the moral life, recourse may at once be had to a direct, special action, of God upon man, to a permanent relation between the action of God and the activity of man. Or, finally, attempts may be made to reconcile these facts together in various ways; to reduce them into a system upon such or such a principle, to refer them to such or such a general doctrine upon the nature and destiny of man and of the world. Thus, in a variety of ways, an infinity of questions may arise; from the nature alone of the facts under consideration, taken in themselves and in their generality, they are a fruitful subject of discussion.

And how much wider still the field of controversy, when particular, local, temporary causes vary still more the point of view under which we regard these questions, modify the cognizance which the human mind takes of them, diverting

its inquiries into one direction rather than into another, giving greater or less prominence, greater or less effect to this or to that fact. This, which always happens, happened of course in the fifth century. I have endeavored to reascend with you to the natural and purely moral sources of the Pelagian controversy: it is now necessary that we should consider its historical origins; they are no less necessary to the proper comprehension of it.

In the bosom of the Christian church, the moral facts which I have described were, as a matter of inevitable course, considered in various points of view.

Christianity was an essentially practical revolution, not a mere scientific, speculative reform. Its prominent aim was to change the moral state, to govern the life of men; and not only that of particular men, but of whole nations, of the entire human race.

This was a prodigious innovation. The Greek philosophy, at least since the period when its history becomes clear and certain, was essentially scientific, was applied far more to the research of truth than to the reformation and direction of manners. There were only two of its schools which took a somewhat different direction. It entered into the formal plan of the stoics, and of the new Platonists, to exercise a moral influence, to regulate the conduct, as well as to enlighten the understanding; but their ambition in this respect was limited to a small number of disciples—to a sort of intellectual aristocracy.

It was, on the contrary, the special and characteristic design of Christianity to effect a moral reformation, a universal reformation—to govern throughout the world, in the name of its doctrine, the will and the life of men.

As an almost inevitable consequence, among the moral facts which constitute our nature, the chiefs of the Christian society would apply themselves especially to give prominence to those which are more peculiarly calculated to exercise a reforming influence, to bring about with greater promptitude practical effects. Towards these would the attention of the great bishops, of the fathers of the church, be drawn; for from them they derived the means of impelling Christianity onward in its career, and of accomplishing their own mission.

Again, the fulcrum of the moral Christian reformation was religion; it was religious ideas, the relations of man with the

Divinity, of the present with the future life, that constituted her force. Her chiefs accordingly would, among moral facts, prefer and favor those whose tendency is religious which belong to the religious part of our nature, and are, so to speak, placed on the limits of present duties, and of future hopes, of morality and of religion.

The wants of Christianity, and its means of action for effecting moral reform, and governing men, varied necessarily with time and place: it had to address itself in the human soul now to one fact, now to another; to-day, to one condition of things—to-morrow, to another. It is evident, for instance, that at various times, from the first to the fifth century, the task of the chiefs of the religious society was not uniformly the same, and could not be accomplished by the same means. The predominant fact of the first century was the struggle against paganism—the necessary efforts to overthrow an order of things odious to the state of men's souls—the work, in a word, of revolution, of war. There was incessant necessity for appealing to the spirit of liberty, of examination, to the energetic display of the will; this was the moral fact which Christian society of this period invoked and displayed constantly, on all occasions.

In the fifth century things were in a different situation. The war was at an end, or nearly so—the victory achieved. The Christian leaders had now to regulate the religious society, to promulgate its articles of faith, to order its discipline, to constitute it, in a word, on the ruins of that pagan world over which it had triumphed. These vicissitudes are to be met with in all great moral revolutions. I need not give you further instances of it. You perceive that at this period it was no longer the spirit of liberty which it was necessary constantly to invoke. That which was now to be cultivated in its turn, was a disposition in the people favourable to the establishment of rule, of order; to the exercise of power.

Apply these considerations to the natural and moral facts which I have pointed out as the sources of the Pelagian controversy, and you will easily distinguish those whose development the chiefs of the church were more especially called upon to promote in the fifth century.

There was another cause which modified the point of view under which they considered our moral nature. The facts which relate to human liberty, and the problems which arise

out of those facts, are not isolated facts or isolated problems; they are closely connected with other facts, with other problems still more general and complex; for instance, with the question of the origin of good and evil, with the question of the general destiny of man, and its essential relations with the designs of God as to the world. Now, upon these higher questions, there already existed in the church determinate doctrines, fixed propositions, accepted solutions; so that when new questions arose, the chiefs of the religious society had to adapt their ideas to the general ideas, to the established opinions. Hence for them this complicated situation: certain facts, certain moral problems attracted their attention; they might have examined and judged them as philosophers, with all the freedom of their minds, apart from all external considerations, from all but the scientific point of view; but then they were invested with an official power; they were called upon to govern their people, to regulate their actions, and to direct their will. Hence a practical political necessity, which weighed down upon the philosophic operation and turned it aside. Nor was this all; philosophers and politicians, they were at the same time compelled to the functions of pure logicians, to conform implicitly on all occasions to the consequences of certain principles, of certain immutable doctrines. They thus, as it were, played three parts at once, underwent at once three yokes; they had to consult at one and the same time the nature of things, practical necessity, and hope. Whenever a new question arose, whenever they were called upon to take cognizance of moral facts to which they had not as yet applied particular attention, they had to think and to act in this triple character, to fulfil this triple mission.

This, however, was not, in the religious society, the position of all its members; there were many Christians who did not regard themselves as called upon, on the one hand, to direct the moral government of the church, nor as bound, on the other, to follow out, through all its consequences, its system of doctrines. Among the numbers so situated, there could not fail to arise men who assumed the right of observing and of acquiring for themselves such or such moral facts, without taking much heed to their practical influences, or to their place in, and connexion with, a general system; men with minds less capacious, less powerful than those of the great chiefs of the church, but who, having fuller career in a less crowded field, imposing upon themselves a simpler and

more easy task, might very well arrive at more precise and definite knowledge upon particular points. Thus arose the heresiarchs.

Thus arose Pelagianism. You are by this time, I hope, acquainted with the great preliminary, and, as it were, external circumstances which influenced its destiny; you have before you: 1, the principal natural facts upon which the dispute turned; 2, the questions which naturally arose out of those facts; 3, the special point of view under which these facts and these questions were considered in the fifth century by the leaders of the religious society, and by the active and investigating minds which spring up in its bosom. Thus possessed of the guiding thread, the illuminating torch, we may now advantageously proceed to the history of the Pelagian controversy itself.

The controversy arose early in the fifth century. The question of free will, and of the action of God upon the human soul, had, indeed, already occupied the attention of the Christians, as is attested by the letters of St. Paul, and by many other monuments; but the facts brought forward had been either accepted or rejected, as the case might be, almost without discussion. Towards the close of the fourth century, men began to examine them more closely; and some of the chiefs of the church already began to entertain some uneasiness on the subject. "We must not," says St. Augustin himself, "we must not discourse much of grace to men who are not yet Christians, or thoroughly confirmed Christians; for it is a knotty question, and one which may give the faith much trouble."

About the year 405, a British monk, Pelagius (this is the name given him by the Greek and Latin writers; his real name, it appears, was Morgan), was residing at Rome. There has been infinite discussion as to his origin, his moral character, his capacity, his learning; and, under these various heads, much abuse has been lavished upon him; but this abuse would appear to be unfounded, for, judging from the most authoritative testimony, from that of St. Augustin himself, Pelagius was a man of good birth, of excellent education, of pure life. A resident, as I have said, at Rome, and now a man of mature age, without laying down any distinct doctrines, without having written any book on the subject, Pelagius began, about the year I have mentioned, 405, to talk much about free will, to insist urgently upon this moral fact,

to expound it. There is no indication that he attacked any person about the matter, or that he sought controversy; he appears to have acted simply upon the belief that human liberty was not held in sufficient account, had not its due share in the religious doctrines of the period.

These ideas excited no trouble in Rome, scarcely any debate. Pelagius spoke freely; they listened to him quietly. His principal disciple was Celestius, like him a monk, or so it is thought at least, but younger, more confident, of a more daring spirit, and more determined to prosecute the consequences of his opinions to the end.

In 411, Pelagius and Celestius are no longer at Rome; we find them in Africa, at Hippo and at Carthage. In the latter town, Celestius put forth his ideas: a controversy was immediately begun between him and the deacon Paulinus, who accused him of heresy before the bishop. In 412 a council was assembled; Celestius appeared there, and vigorously defended himself; he was excommunicated, and, after having in vain essayed an appeal to the bishop of Rome, passed into Asia, whither Pelagius, it seems, had preceded him.

Their doctrines spread; they found in the islands of the Mediterranean, among others in Sicily and at Rhodes, a favorable reception; they sent to Saint Augustin a small work of Celestius, entitled *Definitiones*, which many people were eager to read. Hilary, a Gaul, wrote to him about it with great uneasiness. The bishop of Hippo began to be alarmed; he saw in these new ideas error and peril.

At first, among the facts relative to the moral activity of man, that of free will was almost the only one with which Pelagius and Celestius seemed to be occupied. Saint Augustin was of the same belief as they, and had more than once proclaimed it; but other facts, in his opinion, ought to occupy a place by the side of this one; for example, the insufficiency of the human will, the necessity for exterior aid, and the moral changes which happen in the soul, without her being able to claim them. Pelagius and Celestius seemed to count these nothing: this was the first cause of the contest between them and the bishop of Hippo, whose greater mind considered moral nature under a greater number of aspects.

Besides, Pelagius, by the almost exclusive importance which he gave to free-will, weakened the religious side of the Christian doctrine, and strengthened, if I may use the expression,

the human side. Liberty is the fact of man: he appears there alone. In the insufficiency of the human will, on the contrary, and in the moral changes which it does not claim, there is a place for Divine intervention. Now, the reforming power of the church was essentially religious; it could not but lose, under the practical point of view, from a theory which placed in the first rank a fact with which religion had nothing to do, and left in the shade those in which its influence found occasion for exercise.

Saint Augustin was the chief of the doctors of the church, called upon more than any other to maintain the general system of her doctrines. Now, the ideas of Pelagius and of Celestius seemed to him in contradiction with some of the fundamental points of the Christian faith, especially with the doctrine of original sin and of redemption. He attacked them, therefore, in a triple relation: as a philosopher, because their knowledge of human nature was, in his eyes, narrow and incomplete; as a practical reformer, and charged with the government of the church, because, according to him, they weakened his most efficacious means of reformation and government; as a logician, because their ideas did not exactly agree with the consequences deduced from the essential principles of the faith.

You see, from that time, what a serious aspect the quarrel took: everything was engaged in it, philosophy, politics, and religion, the opinions of Saint Augustin and his business, his self-love and his duty. He entirely abandoned himself to it, publishing treatises, writing letters, collecting information, which came to him from all parts, prodigal of refutations, and of counsels, and carrying into all his writings, all his proceedings, that mixture of passion and mildness, of authority and of sympathy, extent of mind and logical rigor, which gave him so rare a power.

Pelagius and Celestius, on their side, did not remain inactive; they had found powerful friends in the east. If Saint Jerome fulminated against them at Bethlehem, John, bishop of Jerusalem, zealously protected them: he convoked, on their account, an assembly of the priests of his church. Orosius, the Spaniard, a disciple of Saint Augustin, and who happened to be in Palestine, repaired thither, and stated all that had passed in Africa upon the subject of Pelagius, as well as the errors of which he was accused. On the recommendation of bishop John, Pelagius was called; they asked him if he really

taught what Augustin had refuted. "What is Augustin to me?" answered he. Many present were shocked. Augustin was then the most celebrated and most respected doctor of the church. They desired to expel Pelagius, and even to excommunicate him; but John turned aside the blow, caused Pelagius to be seated, and interrogated him, saying, "It is I who am Augustin here; it is me that thou shalt answer." Pelagius spoke Greek, his accuser Orosius spoke only Latin; the members of the assembly did not understand him; they separated without deciding anything.

A short time afterwards, in the month of December, 415, a council was held in Palestine, at Diospolis, the ancient Lydda, composed of fourteen bishops, and under the presidency of Eulogius, bishop of Cæsarea. Two Gaulish bishops, exiles from their sees, Heros, bishop of Arles, and Lazarus, bishop of Aix, had addressed to him a new accusation against Pelagius. They were not present at the council, alleging illness, and probably informed that he was little favorable to them. Pelagius appeared there, still protected by the bishop of Jerusalem: they interrogated him concerning his opinions; he explained them, modified them, adopted all that the council presented to him as the true doctrine of the church, recounted what he had already suffered, spoke of his relations with many holy bishops, with Augustin himself, who, two years previously, had written him a letter intended to contest some of his ideas, but full of benevolence and mildness. The accusation of Heros and of Lazarus was read, but only in Latin, and by the interposition of an interpreter. The council declared itself satisfied; Pelagius was acquitted and declared orthodox.

The report of this decision soon arrived in Africa, from Africa into Europe, from city to city. As soon as Saint Augustin was informed of the results of the council of Diospolis, although he had not yet received its acts, he put everything in motion to resist their effects.

About the same time an incident occurred in Palestine which threw a gloomy hue over the cause of Pelagius. He remained at Jerusalem, and there had professed his ideas with a greater degree of assurance. A violent commotion broke out at Bethlehem against Saint Jerome and the monasteries which were formed near him: serious excesses were committed, houses were pillaged, burnt, a deacon killed; and Jerome was obliged to seek safety in a tower. The Pelagians, it is said, were the authors of these disorders: nothing proves this, and I am ra-

ther inclined to doubt it; still there was room for suspicion, it was generally believed, and a great clamor arose; Saint Jerome wrote to the bishop of Rome, Innocent I., about it, and Pelagianism was seriously compromised.

Two solemn councils sat this year (416) in Africa, at Carthage and at Milevum; sixty-eight bishops were present at the one, sixty-one at the other. Pelagius and his doctrines were there formally condemned; the two assemblies informed the pope of their decision, and Saint Augustin wrote to him privately, with four other bishops, giving him a more detailed account of the whole affair, and induced him to examine Pelagius in order to proclaim truth and anathematise error.

On the 27th January, 417, Innocent answered the two councils, to the five bishops, and condemned the doctrines of Pelagius.

He did not deem himself beaten; two months afterwards, Innocent died; Zosimus succeeded him; Celestius returned to Rome; he obtained from the new pope a new examination, at which he probably explained his opinion, as Pelagius had at Diospolis; and on the 21st September, 417, Zosimus informed the bishops of Africa, by three letters, that he had scrupulously employed himself in this affair; that he had heard Celestius himself, at a meeting of priests held in the church of Saint Clement; that Pelagius had written to him to justify himself; that he was satisfied with their explanations, and had reinstated them in the communion of the church.

Hardly had these letters arrived in Africa, when a new council met at Carthage (in May, 418); two hundred and three bishops[1] were present at it; in eight express canons it condemned the doctrines of Pelagius, and addressed itself to the emperor Honorius in order to obtain from him, against the heretics, measures which might place the church under shelter from peril.

From 418 to 421, appeared many edicts and letters of the emperors Honorius, Theodosius II., and Constantius, which banished Pelagius, Celestius, and their partisans, from Rome, and all towns where they should attempt to propagate their fatal errors.

Pope Zosimus did not long resist the authority of the councils and of the emperors; he convoked a new assembly, in order

[1] According to others, two hundred and fourteen.

to hear Celestius again; but Celestius had quitted Rome, and Zosimus wrote to the bishops of Africa that he had condemned the Pelagians.

The quarrel continued yet some time; eighteen bishops of Italy refused to subscribe to the condemnation of Pelagius; they were deprived of their sees, and banished into the east. The triple decision of the council, the pope, and the emperor, gave a death-blow to this cause. After the year 418, we discover, in history, no trace of Pelagius. The name of Celestius is sometimes met with until the year 427; it then disappears. These two men once off the scene, their school rapidly declined. The opinion of Saint Augustin, adopted by the councils, by the popes, by the civil authority, became the general doctrine of the church. But the victory had yet to cost her some struggles; Pelagianism dying, left an heir; the semi-Pelagians engaged in the struggle which the Pelagians could not maintain.

In the south of Gaul, in the heart of the monasteries of Saint Lerins and of Saint Victor, where boldness of thought then took refuge, it appeared to some men, among others to Cassienus, the monk of whom I have already spoken, that the fault of Pelagius was in being too exclusive, and not holding sufficient account of all the facts relative to human liberty, and to its relation with the Divine power. The insufficiency of the human will, for example, the necessity for exterior relief, the moral revolutions which operate in the soul, and are not its work, were, he felt, real, important facts, that should neither be disputed nor even neglected. Cassienus admitted them fully, loudly, thus giving to the doctrine of free-will something of the religious character which Pelagius and Celestius had so much weakened. But, at the same time, he disputed, more or less openly, many of the ideas of Saint Augustin; among others, his explanation of the moral reformation and progressive sanctification of man. Saint Augustin attributed them to the direct, immediate, special action of God upon the soul, to grace, properly so called, a grace to which man had not title of himself, and which proceeded from absolutely gratuitous gift, from the free choice of the Divinity.

Cassienus allowed more efficacy to the merits of man himself, and maintained that his moral amelioration was partly the work of his own will, which drew upon him divine support, and produced, by a natural concatenation, although ofter

unseen, the internal changes by which the progress of sanctification made itself known.

Such, between the semi-Pelagians and their redoubtable adversary, was the principal subject of controversy: it commenced about the year 428, upon letters from Prosper of Aquitaine and from Hilary, who had hastened to inform Saint Augustin that Pelagianism was again rising under a new form. The bishop of Hippo immediately wrote a treatise entitled: *De Prædestinatione Sanctorum et de dono perseverantiæ.* Prosper published his poem *Against Ingrates;* and the war of pamphlets and letters regained all its activity.

Saint Augustin died in 430; Saint Prosper and Hilary alone remained charged with prosecuting his work. They went to Rome, and had the semi-Pelagians condemned by pope Celestin. However modified this doctrine was, it was but little favorable in the church; it reproduced a heresy already vanquished; it weakened, although to a less degree, the religious influence of morality and of government; it was in discord with the general course of ideas, which tended to give the greater share to the Divine intervention on every occasion; it would have fallen almost without resistance, if a directly contrary doctrine, that of the predestinarians, had not appeared and lent it a few moments' power and credit.

From the writings of Saint Augustin upon the impotence of human will, the nullity of its merits, and the perfectly free and gratuitous nature of Divine grace, some refractory logicians deduced the predestination of all men, and the irrevocability of the decrees of God as to the eternal lot of every one. The first manifestations of this doctrine in the fifth century are obscure and doubtful; but from the time that it appeared, it shocked the good sense and moral equity of most Christians. Accordingly, the semi-Pelagians took up the combat, and presented their ideas as the natural counterpoise of such an error. Such was especially the characteristic which was labored to be impressed upon semi-Pelagianism, about the year 445, by Faustus, bishop of Riez, whom I have already named, and of whom, at a later period, I shall speak more particularly; he presented himself as a kind of mediator between the Pelagians and the predestinarians. "It is necessary," said he, "in the question of the grace of God and the obedience of man, to keep to the middle path, and incline neither to the right nor to the left." According to him, Pelagius and Saint Augustin were both of them too

exclusive: one allowed too much to human liberty and not enough to the action of God; the other was too forgetful of human liberty. This species of compromise at first obtained much favor in the Gaulish church; two councils met, one at Arles, in 472, the other at Lyons, in 473, formally condemned the predestinarians, and charged Faustus to publish a treatise which he had written against them, entitled, *Of Grace and of the Liberty of the Human Will*, even ordering him to add some further developments. This, however, was but a day's respite for semi-Pelagianism, a glimmer of fortune; it was not long in again falling into discredit.

While still living, Saint Augustin had been accused of advocating the doctrine of predestination, the total abolition of free-will, and he had energetically defended himself from it. He deceived himself, I think, as a logician, in denying a consequence which inevitably resulted from his ideas, on the one hand, concerning the impotence and corruption of the human will—on the other, concerning the nature of the Divine intervention and fore-knowledge.

But the superiority of Saint Augustin's mind saved him, on this occasion, from the errors into which logic had nearly brought it, and he was inconsistent precisely because of his lofty reason. Allow me to dwell a moment on this moral fact, which alone explains the contradictions of so many fine geniuses: I shall take an example near to us all, and one of the most striking. Most of you, of course, have read the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau; the sovereignty of number, of the numerical majority is, as you know, the fundamental principle of the work, and Rousseau, for a long time, follows out the consequences of it with inflexible rigor; a time arrives, however, when he abandons them, and abandons them with great effect; he wishes to give his fundamental laws, his constitution, to the rising society; his high intellect warned him that such a work could not proceed from universal suffrage, from the numerical majority, from the multitude: "A God," said he, "must give laws to men."... It is not magistracy, it is not sovereignty.... It is a particular and superior function, which has nothing in common with the human empire.[1] And hereupon he sets up a sole legislator, a sage; thus violating his principle of the sovereignty of number, in

[1] *Contrat Social*, b. ii., ch. vii.

order to turn to an entirely different principle, to the sovereignty of intellect, to the right of superior reason.

The *Contrat Social*, and almost all the works of Rousseau, abound in similar contradictions, and they are, perhaps, the clearest proof of the great mind of the author.

It was by an inconsistency of the same kind that Saint Augustin resolutely repelled the predestination which had been imputed to him. Others, afterwards, acute dialecticians, unhesitatingly went on to this doctrine and settled to it: for him, when he perceived it, enlightened by his genius, he turned aside, and without entirely retracing his steps, took flight in another direction, in absolutely refusing to abolish liberty. The church acted like Saint Augustin; it had adopted his doctrines concerning grace, and on this score condemned the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians; she likewise condemned the predestinarians, thus taking from Cassienus and Faustus, and from their disciples, the pretext by favor of which they had somewhat regained the ascendant. Semi-Pelagianism from that time did nothing but decline; Saint Cesarius, bishop of Arles, at the commencement of the sixth century, again declared war against it, as Saint Augustin and Saint Prosper had done: in 529, the councils of Orange and Valencia condemned it; in 330, pope Boniface II., in his turn, struck it with a sentence of anathema, and it soon ceased, for a long time at least, to agitate minds. Predestination experienced the same fate.

None of these doctrines gave rise to a sect, properly so called: they were not separated from the church, nor did they constitute a distinct religious society; they had no organization, no worship: they were mere opinions debated between men of mind; more or less accredited, more or less contrary to the official doctrine of the church, but which never threatened her with a schism. Accordingly, of their appearance, and of the debates which they excited, there only remained certain tendencies, certain intellectual dispositions, not sects nor veritable schools. We meet at all epochs in the course of European civilization, 1st, With minds preoccupied especially with what there is of humanity in our moral activity, with the fact of liberty, and which thus attach themselves to the Pelagians. 2d, With minds more especially struck with the power of God over man, with Divine intervention in human activity, and inclined to make human liberty vanish under the hand of God; these hold with the predestinarians.

3d, Between those two tendencies was placed the general doctrine of the church, which strove to take into account all natural facts, human liberty and Divine intervention; denies that God effects all in man, that man can do all without the assistance of God, and thus establishes itself, perhaps with more of reason than of scientific consistency, in the regions of good sense, the true country of the human mind, which always returns there, after having strayed in all directions (*Post longos errores.*)

SIXTH LECTURE.

Object of the lecture—General character of the literature of the middle ages—Of the transition from pagan philosophy to Christian theology—Of the question of the nature of the soul in the Christian church—The ancient priests for the most part pronounced in favor of the system of materialism—Efforts to escape from it—Analogous march of ideas in pagan philosophy—Commencement of the system of spirituality—Saint Augustin, Nemesius, Mamertius Claudienus—Faustus, bishop of Riez—His arguments for the materiality of the soul—Mamertius Claudienus answers him—Importance of Mamertius Claudienus in Gaul—Analysis of, and quotations from his treatise on the nature of the soul—The dialogue of Evagrius between Zacheus the Christian and Apollonius the philosopher—Of the effects of the invasion of the barbarians upon the moral state of Gaul.

Between the question which occupied us in the last lecture, and that with which we shall now occupy ourselves, the difference is very great. Pelagianism was not only a question, but also an event; it gave rise to parties, interests, passions; it put in movement councils, emperors; it influenced the fate of many men. The question of the nature of the soul produced nothing of the kind; it was carried on between a few able men in a corner of the empire. In the last lecture, I had many facts to recount; at present I have to speak of books and of arguments.

I pray you to mark the course of our studies. We commenced by examining the social state, the external and public facts; we then passed to the moral state of Gaul; we sought it first in general facts, in the entirety of society; then in a great religious debate, in a doctrine, an active powerful doctrine, which became an event; we will now study it in a simple philosophical discussion. We shall thus penetrate more and more into the interior of men's minds; we first considered facts, then ideas mingled with facts, and subject to their influences; we will now consider ideas by themselves.

Before entering upon the question, permit me to say a few words upon the general character of the literary writers of this period and of the middle ages in general.

If you compare, on the one hand, ancient literature, Greek and Roman literature, and on the other hand, modern litera-

ture, especially so called, with that of the middle ages, the principal points, which, as I think, will strike you, will be the following:

In ancient literature, the form of the works, the art of their composition, and the language, are admirable; even when its materials are poor, the ideas false or confused, the workmanship is so skilful, that it cannot fail to please; manifesting in the author, a mind at once natural and refined, whose inward development far surpasses its acquired knowledge, which has an exquisite appreciation of the beautiful, and a peculiar aptitude for reproducing it.

In modern literature, since the sixteenth century for instance, the form is very often imperfect; there is frequently a deficiency at once of nature and of art, but the groundwork is in general sound; we meet with less and less of gross ignorance, of wanderings from the question, of confusion; method, common sense, in a word, artistic merit, is the prominent feature; if the mind is not always satisfied, it is at least very seldom shocked; the spectacle is not invariably a fine one, but chaos has disappeared.

The intellectual labors of the middle ages present a different aspect; as a general proposition, they are entirely deficient in artistic merit; the form is rude, fantastic; they are full of divergences, of incoherent ideas; they manifest a state of mind, crude, uncultivated, alike without interior development or acquired knowledge, and accordingly neither our reason nor our taste is satisfied. This is the reason why they have been forgotten, why Greek and Roman literature have survived, and will eternally survive the people among whom it respectively arose. Yet under this so imperfect form, amidst this so strange medley of ideas and of facts, ill understood and ill combined, the books of the middle ages are very remarkable monuments of the activity and wealth of the human mind; we meet in them with many vigorous and original conceptions; important questions are often sounded to their lowest depths, flashes of philosophical truth, of literary beauty, glance at every moment from the darkness; the mineral in this mine is altogether in a rough state, but the metal is plentiful, and well merits our research.

The writings of the fifth and sixth centuries, moreover, have a character and an interest peculiar to themselves. It was the period at which ancient philosophy was giving way before modern theology, in which the one was becoming

transformed into the other; in which certain systems became dogmas, certain schools sects. These periods of transition are of great importance; are, perhaps, in the historical point of view, the most instructive of all. It is at these periods only that we are able to view simultaneously and face to face certain facts, certain states of man and of the world, which are generally only to be seen by themselves, and separated by whole centuries; they are the only periods, therefore, in which it is easy for us to compare these facts and these states, to explain them, connect them together. The human mind is but too prone to walk in but one single path, to see things but under one partial, narrow, exclusive aspect, to place itself in prison; it is, therefore, a very fortunate circumstance for it, when it is compelled, by the very nature of the spectacle placed before its eyes, to look around it in all directions, to embrace a vast horizon, to contemplate a great number of different objects, to study the great problems of the world under all their aspects, and in all their various solutions. It is more especially in the south of Gaul that this character of the fifth century manifests itself. You have seen the activity which prevailed in the religious society, and, among others, in the monasteries of Lerins and Saint-Victor, the focus of so many daring opinions. The whole of this movement of mind did not emanate from Christianity; it was in the same districts, in the Lyonnese, the Viennese, the Narbonnese, Aquitaine, that ancient civilization in its decline concentrated itself. It was here that it still exhibited most life. Spain, Italy herself, were at this period far less active than Gaul, far less rich in literature and in literary men. We must, perhaps, attribute this result to the development which had been assumed in these provinces by Greek civilization, and to the prolonged influence there of its philosophy. In all the great towns of southern Gaul, at Marseilles, at Arles, at Aix, at Vienne, at Lyons itself, the Greek language was understood and spoken. There were regular Greek exercises under Caligula, in the Athanacum, an establishment at Lyons, especially devoted to that purpose; and in the beginning of the sixth century, when Cesarius, bishop of Arles, required the faithful to sing with the clergy previous to the sermon, many of the people sang in Greek. We find among the distinguished Gauls of this period philosophers of all the Greek schools; some are mentioned as Pythagoreans, others as Platonists, others as Epicureans, others as Stoics.

The Gaulish writings of the fourth and fifth century, among others that which I am about to introduce to you, the treatise of Mamertius Claudienus, *On the Nature of the Soul*, quote passages from philosophers whose names even we do not meet with elsewhere. In short, there is every evidence that, in the philosophical as in the religious point of view, Greek and Roman as well as Christian Gaul was at this period the most animated, the most living portion of the empire; of the western empire at all events. It is here, accordingly, that the transition from pagan philosophy to Christian theology, from the ancient world to the modern, is most strongly marked, most clearly observable.

In this movement of mind, it was not likely that the question of the nature of the soul should remain long untouched. From the first century upwards, we find it the subject of discussion amongst the doctors of the church, the majority of whom adopted the material hypothesis; passages to this effect are abundant. I will select two or three, which leave no doubt as to the prevalent opinion on this subject. Tertullian says expressly:

"The corporeality of the soul is perfectly manifest to all who read the gospel. The soul of a man is there represented suffering its punishment in hell; it is placed in the midst of the flame; it feels a tormenting agony in the tongue, and it implores, from the hand of a soul in bliss, a drop of water to cool it. . . There can be nothing of all this without the presence of the body. The incorporeal being is free from every description of restraint, from all pain or from all pleasure, for it is in the body alone that man is punished or rewarded."[1]

"Who does not see," asks Arnobius, "that that which is ethereal, immortal, cannot feel pain."[2]

"We conceive," says St. John of Damascus, "we conceive of incorporeal and of invisible beings, in two ways: by essence and by grace; the former incorporeal by nature, the latter only relatively, and in comparison with the grossness of matter. Thus, God is incorporeal by nature; as to angels, devils, and men's souls, we only call them incorporeal by grace, and comparatively with the grossness of matter."[3]

I might multiply *ad infinitum* similar quotations, all proving

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[1] *De Animâ*, 5, 7.
[2] *Adversus Gentes*, ii.
[3] *De Orthodoxa fide*, ii. 3, 12.

that in the first ages of our era, the materiality of the soul was not only the admitted, but that it was the dominant opinion.

After a while, the church manifested a tendency to quit this opinion. We find the fathers placing before themselves every argument in favor of immateriality. The sentence I have just quoted from St. John of Damascus itself gives a proof of this; you find him laying down a certain distinction between material beings. The philosophical fathers entered upon the same path, and advanced in it with more rapid strides. Origen, for instance, is so astonished at the idea of a material soul having a conception of immaterial things, and arriving at a true knowledge, that he concludes it to possess a certain relative immortality, that is to say, that material in relation with God, the only being truly spiritual, it is not so in relation with earthly things, with visible and sensual bodies.[1]

Such was the course of ideas in the heart of pagan philosophy; in its first essays dominated both the belief in the immateriality of the soul, and at the same time a certain progressive effort to conceive the soul under a more elevated, a more pure aspect. Some made of it a vapor, a breath; others declared it a fire; all wished to purify, to refine, to spiritualize matter, in the hope of arriving at the end to which they aspired. The same desire, the same tendency existed in the Christian church; still the idea of the materiality of the soul was more general among the Christian doctors from the first to the fifth century, than among the pagan philosophers of the same period. It was against the pagan philosophers, and in the name of the religious interest, that certain fathers maintained this doctrine; they wished that the soul should be material in order that it might be recompensed or punished, in order that in passing to another life it might find itself in a state analogous to that in which it had been upon earth; in fine, in order that it should not forget how inferior it is to God, and never be tempted to compare itself with Him.

At the end of the fourth century a kind of revolution concerning this point was wrought in the breast of the church; the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, of the original and essential difference of the two substances, appeared here, if not for the first time, at least far more positively, with far more precision than hitherto. It was professed

[1] Origen, *de Principiis*, l. i., c. 1, l. 2, c. 2.

and maintained—first, in Africa, by Saint Augustin in his treatise *de quantitate Animæ;* secondly, in Asia, by Nemesius, bishop of Emessa, who wrote a very remarkable work *upon the nature of man* (περι φυσεος ἀνθρώπου); thirdly, in Gaul, by Mamertius Claudienus, *de naturâ Animæ*. Confined to the history of Gaulish civilization, this last is the only one with which we have to occupy ourselves.

This is the occasion upon which it was written. A man whom you already know, Faustus, bishop of Riez, exercised a great influence in the Gaulish church; born a Breton, like Pelagius, he came—it is not known why—into the south of Gaul. He became a monk in the abbey of Lerins, and in 433 was made abbot of it. He instituted a great school, where he received the children of rich parents, and brought them up, teaching them all the learning of the age. He often conversed with his monks upon philosophical questions, and, it appears, was remarkable for his talent of improvisation. About 462 he became bishop of Riez. I have spoken of the part taken by him in the semi-Pelagian heresy, and of his book against the predestinarians. He was of an active, independent spirit, rather intermeddling, and always eager to mix in all the quarrels which arose. It is not known what called his attention to the nature of the soul: he treated of it at length in a long philosophical letter addressed to a bishop, and in which many other questions are debated; he declares himself for materiality, and thus sums up his principal arguments:

1. Invisible things are of one kind, incorporeal things of another.

2. Everything created is matter, tangible by the Creator; is corporeal.

3. The soul occupies a place. 1. It is enclosed in a body. 2. It is not to be found wherever its thought is. 3. At all events, it is to be found only where its thought is. 4. It is distinct from its thoughts, which vary, which pass on, while it is permanent and always the same; 5. It quits the body at death, and re-enters it by the resurrection; witness Lazarus; 6. The distinction of hell and heaven, of eternal punishments and rewards, proves that even after death souls occupy a place, and are corporeal.

4. God alone is incorporeal, because he alone is intangible and omnipresent.[1]

[1] I have adopted the text of Faustus, inserted in the edition of the

These propositions, laid down in so unhesitating and distinct a manner, are not elaborated to any extent; and such details as the author does enter into are taken in general from the theology, narratives, and authority of the holy scriptures.

The letter of Faustus, which was circulated anonymously, occasioned considerable excitement; Mamertius Claudienus, brother of St. Mamertius, bishop of Vienne, and himself a priest in that diocese, answered it in his treatise *On the Nature of the Soul*, a work of far higher importance than the one which it refuted. Mamertius Claudienus was in his day the most learned, the most eminent philosopher of southern Gaul; to give you an idea of his reputation, I will read a letter written shortly after the philosopher's death, to his nephew Petreius, by Sidonius Appollinaris, a letter, I may observe, stamped with all the ordinary characteristics of this writer, exhibiting all the puerile elaboration of the professed *bel esprit*, with here and there just perceptions, and curious facts.

"SIDONIUS TO HIS DEAR PETREIUS.[2] HEALTH.[3]

"I am overwhelmed with affliction at the loss which our age has sustained in the recent loss of your uncle Claudienus: we shall never see his like again. He was full of wisdom and judgment, learned, eloquent, ingenious; the most intellectual man of his period, of his country. He remained a philosopher, without giving offence to religion; and though he did not indulge in the fancy of letting his hair and his beard grow, though he laughed at the long cloak and stick of the philosophers, though he sometimes even warmly reprehended these fantastic appendages, it was only in such matters of externals and in faith, that he separated from his friends the Platonists. God of Heaven! what happiness was ours whenever we repaired to him for his counsel. How readily would he give himself wholly to us, without an instant's hesitation, without a word, a glance of anger or disdain, ever holding it his highest pleasure to open the treasures of his learning to those who came to him for the solution of some, by all others inso-

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Treatise of the Nature of the Soul, by Claudienus, published, with notes, by Andrew Schoff and Gaspard Barth, at Zwickau, in 1665.

[2] Son of the sister of Mamertius Claudienus. [3] Lib. iv., ep. ii.

luble, question! Then, when all of us were seated around him, he would direct all to be silent, but him to whom—and it was ever a choice which we ourselves should have made—he accorded the privilege of stating the proposition; the question thus laid before him, he would display the wealth of his learning deliberately, point by point, in perfect order, without the least artifice of gesture, or the slightest flourish of language. When he had concluded his address, we stated our objections syllogistically; he never failed to refute at once any propositions of ours which were not based upon sound reason, and thus nothing was admitted without undergoing mature examination, without being thoroughly demonstrated. But that which inspired us with still higher respect, was that he supported, without the least ill-humor, the dull obstinacy of some amongst us, imputing it to an excusable motive, we all the while admiring his patience, though unable to imitate it. No one could fear to seek the counsel, in difficult cases, of a man who rejected no discussion, and refused to answer no question, even on the part of the most foolish and ignorant persons. Thus much for his learning: enough concerning his studies and his science; but who can worthily and suitably praise the other virtues of that man, who, always remembering the weakness of humanity, assisted the priests with his work, the people with his discourses, the afflicted with his exhortations, the forsaken with his consolations, prisoners with his gold; the hungry received food from him, the naked were clothed by him. It would, I think, be equally superfluous to say any more upon this subject. . . .

"Here is what we wished to have said at first: in honor of the ungrateful ashes, as Virgil says, that is to say, which cannot give us thanks for what we say, we have composed a sad and piteous lamentation, not without much trouble, for having dictated nothing for so long, we found unusual difficulty therein; nevertheless, our mind, naturally indolent, was reanimated by a sorrow which desired to break into tears. This, then, is the purport of the verses:

"'Under this turf reposes Claudienus, the pride and sorrow of his brother Mamertius, honored like a precious stone by all the bishops. In this master flourished a triple science, that of Rome, that of Athens, and that of Christ: and in the vigor of his age, a simple monk, he achieved it completely and in secret. Orator, dialectician, poet, a doctor learned in

the sacred books, geometrician, musician, he excelled in unravelling the most difficult questions, he struck with the sword of words the sects which attacked the Catholic faith. Skilful at setting the psalms and singing, in front of the altars, and to the great gratitude of his brother, he taught men to sound instruments of music. He regulated, for the solemn feasts of the year, what in each case should be read. He was a priest of the second order, and relieved his brother from the weight of the episcopacy; for his brother bore the ensigns, and he all the duty. You, therefore, reader, who afflict yourself as if nothing remained of such a man, whoever you be, cease to sprinkle your cheeks and this marble with tears; the soul and the glory cannot be buried in the tomb.'

"These are the lines I have engraved over the remains of him who was a brother to all . . . ."

It was to Sidonius that Mamertius Claudienus had dedicated his work.

It is divided into three books. The first is the only truly philosophical one; the question is there examined in itself, independently of every special fact, of all authority, and under a purely rational point of view. In the second the author invokes authorities to his aid; first that of the Greek philosophers—then, that of the Roman philosophers—lastly, the sacred writings, Saint Paul, the Evangelists, and the fathers of the church. The special object of the third book is to explain, in the system of the spirituality of the soul, certain events, certain traditions of the Christian religion; for example, the resurrection of Lazarus, the existence of the angels, the apparition of the angel Gabriel to the Virgin Mary; and to show that, so far from contradicting them, or being embarrassed by them, this system admits them and makes at least as much of them as any other.

The classification is not as rigorous as I have made it out: the ideas and arguments are often mixed; philosophical discussions appear here and there in the books which are not devoted to them; still, upon the whole, the work is not wanting in either method or precision.

I shall now place before you the summary of it, as prepared by Mamertius Claudienus himself, in ten theses or fundamental propositions, in the last chapter but one of the third book. I shall then literally translate some passages, which will enable you to understand, on one hand, with what profundity and

with what force of mind the author has penetrated into the question; on the other, what absurd and fantastical conceptions could, at this epoch, be combined with the most elevated and the most just ideas.

"Since many of the things which I have asserted in this discussion," says Mamertius Claudienus, "are scattered, and might not easily be retained, I wish to bring them together, compress them, place them, so to speak, in a single point, under the mind's eyes.

"1st. God is incorporeal; the human soul is the image of God, for man was made in the image and likeness of God. Now a body cannot be the image of an incorporeal being; therefore the human soul, which is the image of God, is incorporeal.

"2d. Everything which does not occupy a determined place is incorporeal. Now the soul is the life of the body; and, living in the body, each part lives as truly as the whole body. There is, therefore, in each part of the body, as much life as in the whole body; and the soul is that life. Thus, that which is as great in the part as in the whole, in a small space as in a large, occupies no space; therefore the soul occupies no place. That which occupies no place is not corporeal; therefore the soul is not corporeal.

"3d. The soul reasons, and the faculty of reasoning is inherent in the substance of the soul. Now the reason is incorporeal, occupies no position in space; therefore the soul is incorporeal.

"4th. The will of the soul is its very substance, and when the soul chooses it is all will. Now will is not a body; therefore the soul is not a body.

"5th. Even so the memory is a capacity which has nothing local; it is not widened in order to remember more of things; it is not contracted when it remembers less of things; it immaterially remembers material things. And when the soul remembers, it remembers entire; it is all recollection. Now, the recollection is not a body; therefore the soul is not a body.

"6th. The body feels the impression of touch in the part touched; the whole soul feels the impression, not by the entire body, but in a part of the body. A sensation of this kind has nothing local; now what has nothing local is incorporeal; therefore the soul is incorporeal.

"7th. The body can neither approach nor absent itself

from God; the soul does approach and does absent itself from them without changing its place; therefore the soul is not a body.

"8th. The body moves through a place, from one place to another; the soul has no similar movement; therefore the soul is not a body.

"9th. The body has length, breadth, and depth; and that which has neither length, breadth, nor depth, is not a body. The soul has nothing of the kind; therefore the soul is not a body.

"10th. There is in all bodies the right hand and the left—the upper part and the lower part, the front and the back; in the soul there is nothing of the kind; therefore the soul is incorporeal."[1]

Here are some of the principal developments in support of these propositions:

"I. You say that the soul is one thing, the thought of the soul another: you ought rather to say, that the things upon which the soul thinks . . . are not the soul; but thought is nothing but the soul itself.

"The soul, you say, is in such profound repose, that it has no thought at all. This is not true; the soul can change its thought, but not be without thought altogether.

"What do our dreams signify if not that, even when the body is fatigued and immersed in sleep, the soul ceases not to think?

"What greatly deceives you concerning the nature of the soul, is that you believe that the soul is one thing, and its faculties another. What the soul thinks is an accident, but that which thinks is the substance of the soul itself.[2]

"II. The soul sees that which is corporeal through the medium of the body; what is incorporeal it sees by itself. Without the intervention of the body, it could see nothing corporeal, colored, or extensive; but it sees truth, and sees it with an immaterial view. If, as you pretend, the soul, corporeal itself, and confined within an external body, can see of itself a corporeal object, surely nothing can be more easy to it than to see the interior of that body in which it is confined. Well, then, to this—apply yourself to this work; direct inward this corporeal view of the soul, as you call it;

[1] Book iii., chap. 14, pp. 201, 202.
[2] Book i., chap. 24, p. 83

tell us how the brain is disposed, where the mass of the liver is situated; where and what is the spleen . . . what are the windings and texture of the veins, the origin of the nerves? . . . How! you deny that you are called upon to answer concerning such things: and wherefore do you denv it? Because the soul cannot see directly and of itself corporeal things. Why can it not, then, that which is never without thinking—that is to say, without seeing? Because it cannot see corporeal objects without the medium of the corporeal view. Now, the soul which sees certain things of itself, but not corporeal things, sees, therefore, with an incorporeal view; now an incorporeal being can alone see with an incorporeal view; therefore the soul is incorporeal.[1]

"III. If the soul is a body, what then is that which the soul calls its body, if not itself? Either the soul is a body, and in that case it is wrong to say *my body*, it ought rather to say *me*, since it is itself; or if the soul is right in saying *my body*, as we suppose, it is not a body.[2]

"IV. It is not without reason that it is said that memory is common to men and to animals; storks and swallows return to their nest, horses to their stable; dogs recognize their master. But as the soul of animals, although they retain the image of places, has no knowledge of its own being, they remain confined to the recollection of corporeal objects which they have seen by the bodily senses; and, deprived of the mind's eye, they are incapable of seeing, not only what is above them, but themselves.[3]

"V. A formidable syllogism, which is thought insolvable, is addressed to us; the soul, it is said, is where it is, and is not where it is not. The anticipation is, that we shall be driven to say, either that it is everywhere, or that it is nowhere: and then it will be rejoined, if it is everywhere, it is God; if it is nowhere, it is non-existent. The soul is not wholly in the whole world, but in the same way that God is wholly in the whole universe, so the soul is wholly in the whole body. God does not fill with the smallest part of himself the smallest part of the world, and with the largest the largest; he is wholly in every part and wholly in the whole; so the soul does not reside in parts in the various parts of the

[1] Book iii., chap. 9, pp. 187, 188. [2] Book i., chap. 16, p 52.
[3] Book i, chap. 21, p. 65.

body. It is not one part of the soul which looks forth through the eye and another which animates the finger; the whole soul lives in the eye and sees by the eye, the whole soul animates the finger and feels by the finger.[1]

"VI. The soul which feels in the body, though it feels by visible organs, feels invisibly. The eye is one thing, seeing another: the ears are one thing, hearing another; the nostrils are one thing, smelling another; the mouth one thing, eating another; the hand one thing, touching another. We distinguish by the touch what is hot and what cold; but we do not touch the sensation of the touch, which in itself is neither hot nor cold; the organ by which we feel is a perfectly different thing from the sensation of which we are sensible."[2]

You will readily admit that these ideas are deficient neither in elevation nor profundity; they would do honor to the philosophers of any period; seldom have the nature of the soul and its unity been investigated more closely or described with greater precision. I might quote many other passages remarkable for the subtlety of perception, or energy of debate, and, at times, for a profound moral emotion, and a genuine eloquence.

I will read to you two extracts from the same book of the same man; Mamertius Claudienus is replying to the argument of Faustus, who maintains that the soul is formed of air, reasoning upon the ancient theory which regarded air, fire, earth, and water, as the four essential elements of nature: "Fire," says he, "is evidently a superior element to air, as well by the place which it occupies as by its intrinsic power. This is proved by the movement of the terrestrial fire, which, with an almost incomprehensible rapidity, and by its own natural impulse, reascends towards heaven as towards its own country. If this proof be not sufficient, here is another: the air is illumined by the presence of the sun, that is to say fire, and falls into darkness in its absence. And a still more powerful reason is, that air undergoes the action of fire and becomes heated, while fire does not undergo the action of air, and is never made cold by it. Air may be inclosed and retained in vases; fire never. The preeminence of fire, then, is clearly incontestable. Now, it is from fire (that is to say, from its light) that we derive the faculty of sight, a faculty

[1] Book iii., chap. 2, p. 164. [2] Book i., chap. 6, p. 31.

common to men and to animals, and in which, indeed, certain irrational animals far surpass man in point of both strength and of delicacy. If, then, which is undeniable, sight proceeds from fire, and if the soul, as you think, is formed of air, it follows that the eye of animals is, as to its substance, superior in dignity to the soul of man."[1]

This learned confusion of material facts and of intellectual facts, this attempt to establish a sort of hierarchy of merit and of rank among the elements, in order to deduce from them philosophical consequences, are curious evidences of the infancy of science and of thought.

I will now quote, in favor of the immateriality of the soul, an argument of as little value in itself, but less fantastic in its outward appearance. "Every incorporeal being is superior, in natural dignity, to a corporeal being; every being not confined within a certain space, to a localized being; every indivisible being to a divisible being. Now, if the Creator, sovereignly powerful and sovereignly good, has not created, as he ought to have done, a substance superior to the body, and similar to himself, it is either that he could not or would not; if he would, and could not, almightiness was wanting to him; if he could and would not (the mere thought is a crime), it could only have been through jealousy. Now, it is impossible that the sovereign power cannot do what it wills, that sovereign goodness can be jealous. It results that he both could and would create the incorporeal being; final result, he did create it."[2]

Was I wrong in speaking just now of the strange combinations, the mixture of high truths and gross errors, of admirable views and ridiculous conceptions, which characterize the writings of this period. Those of Mamertius Claudienus, I may add, present fewer of these contrasts than do those of most of his contemporaries.

You are sufficiently acquainted with this writer to appreciate his character; taken as a whole, his work is rather philosophical than theological, and yet the religious principle is manifestly predominant throughout, for the idea of God is the starting point of every discussion in it. The author does not commence by observing and describing human, special, actual facts, proceeding through them up to the Divinity: God is with him the primitive, universal, evident fact; the

[1] Book i., chap. 9, p. 38 [2] Book i., chap 5, p. 23.

fundamental datum to which all things relate, and with which all things must agree; he invariably descends from God to man, deducing our own from the Divine nature. It is evidently from religion, and not from science, that he borrows this method. But this cardinal point once established, this logical plan once laid down, it is from philosophy that he draws, in general, both his ideas and his manner of expressing them; his language is of the school, not of the church; he appeals to reason, not to faith; we perceive in him, sometimes the academician, sometimes the stoic, more frequently the platonist, but always the philosopher, never the priest, though the Christian is apparent, is manifest in every page.

I have thus exhibited the fact which I indicated in the outset, the fusion of pagan philosophy with Christian theology, the metamorphosis of the one into the other. And it is remarkable, that the reasoning applied to the establishment of the spirituality of the soul is evidently derived from the ancient philosophy rather than from Christianity, and that the author seems more especially to aim at convincing the theologians, by proving to them that the Christian faith has nothing in all this which is not perfectly reconcilable with the results derived from pure reason.

It might be thought that this transition from ancient philosophy to modern theology would be more manifest, more strongly marked in the dialogue of the Christian Zacheus and the philosopher Apollonius, by the monk Evagrius, where the two doctrines, the two societies, are directly confronted and called upon to discuss their respective merits; but the discussion is only in appearance, exists, in fact, only on the title-page. I am not acquainted with any work, with any monument, which proves more clearly the utter indifference with which the popular mind regarded paganism. The philosopher Apollonius opens the dialogue in an arrogant tone, as if about utterly to overwhelm the Christian, and to deliver over to general scorn any arguments which he may adduce.[1] "If you examine the matter with care," says he, "you will see that all other religions and all other sacred rites had rational origins; whereas, your creed is so utterly vain and irrational, that it seems to me none but a madman could entertain it."

[1] Dialogue of Zacheus and Apollonius, in the *Spicilegium* of D'Achery, vol. x., p. 3.

But this arrogance is sterile: throughout the dialogue Apollonius does not advance one single argument, one solitary idea; he proves nothing, he confutes nothing; he does not open his lips except to suggest a topic to Zacheus, who, on his part, takes no notice whatever of paganism nor of the philosophy of his adversary, does not refute them, scarcely makes here and there an allusion to them, and only occupies himself relating history and describing the Christian faith so as to show forth its entirety and authority. Doubtless, the book is the work of a Christian, and the silence which he makes his philosophers preserve does not prove that philosophers were really silent. But such is by no means the character of the first debates of Christianity with the ancient philosophy, when the latter was still living and powerful. Christianity at that time condescended to notice the arguments of its adversaries; it spoke of them, it refuted them; the controversy was a real and an animated one. In the work before us there is no longer any controversy at all; the Christian indoctrinates and catechises the philosopher, and seems to consider that this is all that can be required of him.

Nay, he even makes this a matter of concession, a favor; discussions with pagans had by this time become a sort of superfluity in the eyes of Christians.

"Many persons," says Evagrius, in the preface to his book, "think that we should despise, rather than refute, the objections advanced by the Gentiles, so vain are they, so devoid of true wisdom; but, in my opinion, such scorn were worse than useless. I see two advantages in instructing the Gentiles; in the first place, we prove to all how holy and simple our religion is; and secondly, the heathen thus instructed come at last to believe that which, unknowing, they had despised. . . . Besides, by approaching the candle to the eyes of the blind, if they do not see its light, they at all events feel its warmth." This last phrase appears to me a fine one, full of a sympathetic sentiment.

There is one thing only which appears to me remarkable in this dialogue; it is that here the question is broadly laid down between rationalism and the Christian revelation; not that this subject is more really or more extensively developed than any other: it is only in a few sentences that the idea manifests itself, but from these it is evident that the question was full in the minds of all controversialists, and formed, as it were, the last intrenchment behind which philosophy de-

fended itself. Apollonius, as you have seen, makes it an especial charge against the Christian doctrine that it is irrational; to this Zacheus replies: "It is easy for every one to understand and appreciate God, that is to say, if the Divine Word is compatible with your notion of wisdom . . . for your view is, that the sage believes nothing out of himself, that he is never deceived, but that he of himself knows all things infallibly, not admitting that there is anything whatever either hidden or unknown, or that anything is more possible to the Creator than to the creature. And it is more especially against the Christians that you make use of this mode of reasoning."[1] And elsewhere: "The understanding follows faith, and the human mind knows only through faith the higher things which come near God."[2]

It were a curious study to consider the state of rationalism at this period, the causes of its ruin, and its efforts, its various transformations in order to avert that ruin: but it is an inquiry which would carry us too far, and, besides, it was not in Gaul that the grand struggle between rationalism and Christianity took place.

The second dialogue of Evagrius, between the Christian Theophilus and the Jew Simon, is of no sort of importance; it is a mere commentary, a mere trifling controversy on a few scriptural texts.

I might mention to you, and make extracts from, a great number of other works of the same period and the same class. This, however, were unnecessary, as I have selected from among them the two most remarkable, the most characteristic, the most calculated to convey an accurate idea of the state of mind, and of its activity at this period. That activity was great, though exclusively confined within the limits of the religious society; whatever vigor and life had remained to the ancient philosophy, passed over to the service of the Christians; it was under the religious form, and in the very bosom of Christianity, that were reproduced the ideas, the schools, the whole science of the philosophers; but subject to this condition, they still occupied men's minds, and played an important part in the moral state of the new society.

It was this movement which was arrested by the invasion of the barbarians and the fall of the Roman empire: a hundred

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[1] Page 3. [2] Page 9.

years later we do not find the slightest trace of what I have been describing to you; the discussions, the travels, the correspondence, the pamphlets, the whole intellectual activity of Gaul in the seventh century, all these had disappeared.

Was this loss of any consequence? was the movement thus put a stop to by the invasion of the barbarians an important and fruitful movement? I doubt it very much. You will perhaps remember my observations on the essentially practical character of Christianity; intellectual progress, science, especially so called, was not at all its aim; and although it had a connexion upon several points with the ancient philosophy—though it had been very willing to appropriate the ideas of that philosophy, and to make the most of it, it was by no means anxious for its preservation, nor to replace it by any other philosophy. To change the manners, to govern the life of men, was the predominant idea of its leaders.

Moreover, notwithstanding the freedom of mind which practically existed in the fifth century, in the religious society the principle of liberty made no progress there. It was, on the contrary, the principle of authority, of the official domination over intellect by general and fixed rules, which sought the ascendency. Though still powerful, intellectual liberty was on the decline; authority was rapidly taking its place; every page of the writings of this period proves the fact. It was, indeed, the almost inevitable result of the very nature of the Christian reformation; moral, rather than scientific, it proposed to itself as its leading aim to establish a law, to govern men's will; it was consequently authority that was above all things needful to it; authority in the existing state of manners was its surest, it smost efficacious means of action.

Now, what the invasion of the barbarians, and the fall of the Roman empire more especially arrested, even destroyed, was intellectual movement; what remained of science, of philosophy, of the liberty of mind in the fifth century, disappeared under their blows. But the moral movement, the practical reformation of Christianity, and the official establishment of its authority over nations, were not in any way affected; perhaps even they gained instead of losing: this at least, I think, is what the history of our civilization, in proportion as we advance in its course, will allow us to conjecture.

The invasion of the barbarians, therefore, did not in any way kill what possessed life; at bottom, intellectual activity and liberty were in decay; everything leads us to believe

that they would have stopped of themselves; the barbarians stopped them more rudely and sooner. That, I believe, is al that can be imputed to them.

We have now arrived at the limits to which we should confine ourselves, to the end of the picture of the Roman society in Gaul at the time when it fell: we are acquainted with it, if not completely, at least in its essential features. In order to prepare ourselves to understand the society which followed it, we have now to study the new element which mixed with it, the barbarians. Their state before the invasion, before they came to overthrow the Roman society, and were changed under its influence, will form the subject of our next lecture.

SEVENTH LECTURE.

Object of the lecture—Of the Germanic element in modern civilization—Of the monuments of the ancient social state of the Germans: 1. Of the Roman and Greek historians; 2. Of the barbaric laws; 3. Of national traditions—They relate to very different epochs—They are often made use of promiscuously—Error which results therefrom—The work of Tacitus concerning the manners of the Germans—Opinions of the modern German writers concerning the ancient Germanic state—What kind of life prevailed there? was it the wandering life, or the sedentary life?—Of the institutions—Of the moral state—Comparison between the state of the German tribes and that of other hordes—Fallacy of most of the views of barbarous life—Principal characteristics of the true influence of the Germans upon modern civilization.

We approach successively the various sources of our civilization. We have already studied, on one side, what we call the Roman element, the civil Roman society; on the other, the Christian element, the religious society. Let us now consider the barbaric element, the German society.

Opinions are very various concerning the importance of this element, concerning the part and share of the Germans in modern civilization; the prejudices of nation, of situation, of class, have modified the idea which each has formed of it.

The German historians, the feudal publicists, M. de Boulainvilliers, for example, have in general attributed too extensive an influence to the barbarians; the burgher publicists, as the abbé Dubos, have, on the contrary, too much reduced it, in order to give far too large a part to Roman society; according to the ecclesiastics, it is to the church that modern civilization is the most indebted. Sometimes political doctrines have alone determined the opinion of the writer; the abbé de Mably, all devoted as he was to the popular cause, and despite his antipathy for the feudal system, insists strongly upon the German origins, because he thought to find there more institutions and principles of liberty than anywhere else. I do not wish to treat at present of this question; we shall treat of it, it will be resolved as we advance in the history of French civilization. We shall see from epoch to epoch what part

each of its primitive elements has there played, what each has brought and received in their combination. I shall confine myself to asserting beforehand the two results to which I believe this study will conduct us:—First, that the state of the barbaric element in modern civilization has, in general, been made a great deal too much of. Second, its true share has not been given it: too great an influence upon our society has been attributed to the Germans, to their institutions, to their manners; what they have truly exercised has not been attributed to them; we do not owe to them all that has been done in their name; we do owe to them what seems not to proceed from them.

Until this twofold result shall arise under our eyes, from the progressive development of facts, the first condition, in order to appreciate with accuracy the share of the Germanic element in our civilization, is to correctly understand what the Germans really were at the time when it commenced, when they themselves concurred in its formation; that is to say, before their invasion and their establishment on the Roman territory; when they still inhabited Germany in the third and fourth centuries. By this alone shall we be enabled to form an exact idea of what they brought to the common work, to distinguish what facts are truly of German origin.

This study is difficult. The monuments where we may study the barbarians before the invasion are of three kinds; first, the Greek or Roman writers, who knew and described them from their first appearance in history up to this epoch; that is to say, from Polybius, about one hundred and fifty years before Christ, down to Ammianus Marcellinus, whose work stops at the year of our Lord 378. Between these two eras a crowd of historians, Livy, Cæsar, Strabo, Pomponius Mela, Pliny, Tacitus, Ptolemy, Plutarch, Florus, Pausanias, &c., have left us information, more or less detailed, concerning the German nations; secondly, writings and documents posterior to the German invasion, but which relate or reveal anterior facts; for example, many chronicles, the barbaric laws, Salic, Visigoth, Burgundian, &c.; thirdly, the recollection and national traditions of the Germans themselves concerning their fate and their state in the ages anterior to the invasion, reascending up to the first origin and their most ancient history.

At the mere mention of these documents, it is evident that very various times and states are comprehended in them. The

Roman and Greek writers, for example, embrace a space of five hundred years, during which Germany and her nations were presented to them in the most different points of view. Then came the first expeditions of the wandering Germans, especially that of the Teutones and the Cimbrians. Rather later, dating from Cæsar and Augustus, the Romans, in their turn, penetrated into Germany; their armies passed the Rhine and the Danube, and saw the Germans under a new aspect and in a new state. Lastly, from the third century, the Germans fell upon the Roman empire, which repelling and admitting them alternately, came to know them far more intimately, and in an entirely different situation from what they had done hitherto. Who does not perceive that, during this interval, through so many centuries and events, the barbarians and the writers who described them, the object and the picture, must have prodigiously varied?

The documents of the second class are in the same case: the barbaric laws were drawn up some time after the invasion; the most ancient portion of the law of the Visigoths belonged to the last half of the fifth century; the Salic law may have been written first under Clovis, but the digest which we have of it is of a far posterior epoch; the law of the Burgundians dates from the year 517.

They are all, therefore, in their actual form, much more modern than the barbaric society which we wish to study. There can be no doubt but that they contain many facts, that they often describe a social state anterior to the invasion; there can be no doubt but that the Germans, transported into Gaul, retained much of their ancient customs, their ancient relations. But there can also be no doubt here that, after the invasion, Germanic society was profoundly modified, and that these modifications had passed into laws; the law of the Visigoths and that of the Burgundians are much more Roman than barbarian; three fourths of the provisions concern facts which could not have arisen until after these nations were established upon Roman soil. The Salic law is more primitive, more barbaric; but still, I believe it may be proved that, in many parts—among others, in that concerning property—it is of more recent origin. Like the Roman historians, the German laws evidence very various times and states of society.

According to the documents of the third class, the national traditions of the Germans, the evidence is still more striking:

the subjects of these traditions are almost all facts, so far anterior as probably to have become almost foreign to the state of these nations at the third and fourth centuries; facts which had concurred to produce this state and which may serve to explain it, but which no longer constituted it. Suppose, that, in order to study the state of the highlanders of Scotland fifty years ago, one had collected their still living and popular traditions, and had taken the facts which they express as the real elements of Scotch society in the eighteenth century: assuredly the illusion would be great and fruitful of error. It would be the same and with much greater reason, with regard to the ancient German traditions; they coincide with the primitive history of the Germans, with their origin, their religious filiation, their relations with a multitude of nations in Asia, on the borders of the Black sea, of the Baltic sea; with events, in a word, which, doubtless, had powerfully tended to bring about the social state of the German tribes in the third century, and which we must closely observe, but which were then no longer facts but only causes.

You see that all the monuments that remain to us of the state of the barbarians before the invasion, whatever may be their origin and their nature, Roman or German, traditions, chronicles, or laws, refer to times and facts very far removed from one another, and among which it is very difficult to separate what truly belongs to the third and fourth centuries. The fundamental error, in my opinion, of a great number of German writers, and sometimes of the most distinguished, is not having sufficiently attended to this circumstance: in order to picture German society and manners at this epoch, they have drawn their materials pell-mell from the three sources of documents I have indicated, from the Roman writers, from the barbaric laws, from the national traditions, without troubling themselves with the difference of times and situations, without observing any moral chronology. Hence arises the incoherence of some of these pictures, a singular mixture of mythology, of barbarism, and of rising civilization, of fabulous, heroic, and semi-political ages, without exactitude and without order in the eyes of the more severe critic, without truth for the imagination.

I shall endeavor to avoid this error; it is with the state of the Germans, a little before the invasion, that I desire to occupy you; that is what it imports us to know, for it was that

which was real and powerful at the time of the amalgamation of the nations, that which exercised a true influence upon modern civilization. I shall in no way enter into the examination of the German origins and antiquities; I shall in no way seek to discover what were the relations between the Germans and the nations and religions of Asia; whether their barbarism was the wreck of an ancient civilization, nor what might be, under barbaric forms, the concealed features of this original society. The question is an important one; but it is not ours, and I shall not stop at it. I would wish, too, never to transfer into the state of the Germans, beyond the Rhine and the Danube, facts which belong to the Germans established upon Gaulish soil. The difficulty is extreme. Before having passed the Danube or the Rhine, the barbarians were in relation with Rome; their condition, their manners, their ideas, their laws, had perhaps already submitted to its influence. How separate, amidst notices so incomplete, so confused, these first results of foreign importation? How decide with precision what was truly Germanic, and what already bore a Roman stamp? I shall attempt this task; the truth of history absolutely requires it. The most important document we possess concerning the state of the Germans, between the time when they began to be known in the Roman world, and that in which they conquered it, is incontestably the work of Tacitus. Two things must be here carefully distinguished: on one side, the facts which Tacitus has collected and described; on the other, the reflections which he mixes with them, the color under which he presents them, the judgment which he gives of them. The facts are correct: there are many reasons for believing that the father of Tacitus, and perhaps himself, had been procurator of Belgium; he could thus collect detailed information concerning Germany; he occupied himself carefully in doing so; posterior documents almost all prove the material accuracy of his descriptions. With regard to their moral hue, Tacitus has painted the Germans, as Montaigne and Rousseau the savages, in a fit of ill humor against his country; his book is a satire on Roman manners, the eloquent sally of a philosophical patriot, who is determined to see virtue, wherever he does not happen to find the disgraceful effeminacy and the learned depravation of an old society. Do not suppose, however, that everything is false, morally speaking, in this work of anger—the imagination of Tacitus is essentially vigorous

and true; when he wishes simply to describe German manners, without allusion to the Roman world, without comparison, without deducing any general consequence therefrom, he is admirable, and one may give entire faith, not only to the design, but to the coloring of the picture. Never has the barbaric life been painted with more vigor, more poetical truth. It is only when thoughts of Rome occur to Tacitus, when he speaks of the barbarians with a view to shame his fellow-citizens; it is then only that his imagination loses its independence, its natural sincerity, and that a false color is spread over his pictures.

Doubtless, a great change was brought about in the state of the Germans, between the end of the first century, the epoch in which Tacitus wrote, and the times bordering on the invasion; the frequent communications with Rome could not fail of exercising a great influence upon them, attention to which circumstance has too often been neglected. Still the groundwork of the book of Tacitus was true at the end of the fourth as in the first century. Nothing can be a more decisive proof of it than the accounts of Ammianus Marcellinus, a mere soldier, without imagination, without instruction, who made war against the Germans, and whose brief and simple descriptions coincide almost everywhere with the lively and learned colors of Tacitus. We may, therefore, for the epoch which occupies us, give almost entire confidence to the picture *of the manners of the Germans*.

If we compare this picture with the description of the ancient social state of the Germans, lately given by able German writers, we shall be surprised by the resemblance. Assuredly the sentiment which animates them is different; it is with indignation and sorrow that Tacitus, at corrupted Rome, describes the simple and vigorous manners of the barbarians; it is with pride and complaisance that the modern Germans contemplate it; but from these diverse causes rises a single and identical fact; like Tacitus, nay, far more than Tacitus, the greater part of the Germans paint ancient Germany, her institutions, her manners, in the most vivid colors; if they do not go so far as to represent them as the ideal of society, they at least defend them from all imputation of barbarism. According to them: 1st. the agricultural or sedentary life prevailed there, even before the invasion, over the wandering life; the institutions and ideas which create landed property were already very far advanced; 2d. the guaran-

tees of individual liberty, and even security, were efficacious; 3d. manners were indeed violent and coarse, but at bottom the natural morality of man was developed with simplicity and grandeur; family affections were strong, characters lofty, emotions profound, religious doctrines high and powerful; there was more energy and moral purity than is found under more elegant forms, in the heart of a far more extended intellectual development.

When this cause is maintained by ordinary minds, it abounds in strange assumptions and ridiculous assertions. Heinrich, the author of an esteemed *History of Germany*, will not have it that the ancient Germans were addicted to intoxication;[1] Meiners, in his *History of the Female Sex*, maintains that women have never been so happy nor so virtuous as in Germany, and that before the arrival of the Franks, the Gauls knew not how either to respect or to love them.[2]

I shall not dwell upon these puerilities of learned patriotism; I should not even have touched upon them, if they were not the consequence, and as it were, the excrescence of a system, maintained by very distinguished men, and which, in my opinion, destroys the historical and poetical idea which is formed of the ancient Germans. Considering things at large, and according to mere appearances, the error seems to me evident.

How can it be maintained, for example, that German society was well nigh fixed, and that the agricultural life dominated there, in the presence of the very fact of migrations, of invasions, of that incessant movement which drew the Germanic nations beyond their territory? How can we give credit to the empire of manorial property, and of the ideas and institutions which are connected with it, over men who continually abandoned the soil in order to seek fortune elsewhere? And mark, that it was not only on the frontiers that this movement was accomplished; the same fluctuation reigned in the interior of Germany; tribes incessantly expelled, displaced, succeeded one another: some paragraphs from Tacitus will abundantly prove this:

"The Batavians," says he, "were formerly a tribe of the

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[1] *Reichsgeschichte*, vol i., p. 69

[2] *Geschichte des Weiblichen Geschlects*, vol. i., p. 198

Catti; intestine divisions forced them to retire into the islands of the Rhine, where they formed an alliance with the Romans." (Tacitus, *de Morib. Germanorum*, xxix.)

"In the neighborhood of the Tencteres were formerly the Bructeres; it is said, however, that now the Chamaves and the Angrivarians possess the district, having, in concert with the adjoining tribes, expelled and entirely extirpated the ancient inhabitants." (*ib.* xxxii.)

"The Marcomannians are the most eminent for their strength and military glory; the very territory they occupy is the reward of their valor, they having dispossessed its former owners, the Boians." (*ib.* xlii.)

"Even in time of peace the Cattians retain the same ferocious aspect, never softened with an air of humanity. They have no house to dwell in, no land to cultivate, no domestic cares to employ them. Wherever they chance to be, they live upon the produce they find, and are lavish of their neighbors' substance, till old age incapacitates them for these continuous struggles." (*ib.* xxxi.)

"The tribes deem it an honorable distinction to have their frontiers devastated, to be surrounded with immense deserts. They regard it as the highest proof of valor for their neighbors to abandon their territories out of fear of them; moreover, they have thus an additional security against sudden attacks." (Cæsar, de *Bell. Gall.*, vi. 23.)

Doubtless, since the time of Tacitus, the German tribes more or less, had made some progress; still, assuredly, the fluctuation, the continual displacement had not ceased, since the invasion became daily more general and more pressing.

Hence, if I mistake not, partly proceeds the difference which exists between the point of view of the Germans and our own. There was, in fact, at the fourth century, among many German tribes or confederations, among others with the Franks and Saxons, a commencement of the sedentary, agricultural life; the whole nation was not addicted to the wandering life. Its composition was not simple; it was not an unique race, a single social condition. We may there recognize three classes of men: 1st. freemen, men of honor or nobles, proprietors; 2d. the *lidi*, *liti*, *lasi*, &c., or laborers, men attached to the soil, who cultivated it for masters; 3d. slaves properly so called. The existence of the first two classes evidently indicates a conquest; the class of freemen was the nation of conquerors, who had obliged the ancient

population to cultivate the soil for them. This was an analogous fact to that which, at a later period, in the Roman empire, gave rise to the feudal system. This fact was accomplished at various epochs, and upon various points, in the interior of Germany. Sometimes the proprietors and the laborers—the conquerors and the conquered—were of different races—sometimes it was in the bosom of the same race, between different tribes, that the territorial subjection took place; we see Gaulish or Belgian colonies submit to German colonies, Germans to Slavonians, Slavonians to Germans, Germans to Germans. Conquest was generally effected upon a small scale, and remained exposed to many vicissitudes; but the fact itself cannot be disputed; many passages in Tacitus positively express it:

"The slaves, in general, are not arranged in their several employments in household affairs, as is the practice at Rome. Each has his separate habitation or home. The master considers him as an agrarian dependent, who is obliged to furnish, by way of rent, a certain quantity of grain, of cattle, or of wearing apparel. The slave does this, and there his servitude ends. All domestic matters are managed by the master's own wife and children. To punish a slave with stripes, to load him with chains, or condemn him to hard labor, is unusual." (*Ib.* xxv.)

Who does not recognize in this description, ancient inhabitants of the territory, fallen under the yoke of conquerors?

The conquerors, in the earliest ages at least, did not cultivate. They enjoyed the conquest—sometimes abandoned to a profound idleness, sometimes excited with a profound passion for war, hunting, and adventures. Some distant expedition tempted them; all were not of the same inclination—they did not all go; a party set off under the conduct of some famous chief; others remained, preferring to guard their first conquests, and continued to live upon the labor of the ancient inhabitants. The adventurous party sometimes returned laden with booty, sometimes pursued its course, and went to a distance to conquer some province of the empire, perhaps found some kingdom. It was thus that the Vandals, the Suevi, the Franks, the Saxons, were dispersed; thus we find these nations over-running Gaul, Spain, Africa, Britain, establishing themselves there, beginning states, while the same names are always met with in Germany—where, in fact, the same people still live and act. They were parcelled out: one part

abandoned themselves to the wandering life; another was attached to the sedentary life, perhaps only waiting the occasion or temptation to set out in its turn.

Hence arises the difference between the point of view of the German writers, and that of our own; they more especially were acquainted with that portion of the German tribes which remained upon the soil, and was more and more addicted to the agricultural and sedentary life; we, on the contrary, have been naturally led to consider chiefly the portion which followed the wandering life, and which invaded western Europe. Like the learned Germans, we speak of the Franks, the Saxons, the Suevi, but not of the same Suevi, the same Saxons, the same Franks; our researches, our words, almost always refer to those who passed the Rhine, and it is in the state of wandering bands that we have seen them appear in Gaul, in Spain, in Britain, &c. The assertions of the Germans chiefly allude to the Saxons, the Suevi, the Franks who remained in Germany; and it is in the state of conquering nations, it is true, but fixed, or almost fixed in certain parts of the land, and beginning to lead the life of proprietors, that they are exhibited by almost all the ancient monuments of local history. The error of these scholars, if I mistake not, is in carrying the authority of these monuments too far back—too anterior to the fourth century,—of attributing too remote a date to the sedentary life, and to the fixedness of the social state in Germany; but the error is much more natural and less important than it would be on our part.

With regard to ancient German institutions, I shall speak of them in detail when we treat especially of the barbarian laws, and more especially of the Salic law. I shall confine myself at present to the characterizing, in a few words, their state at the epoch which occupies us.

At that time, we find among the Germans the seeds of the three great systems of institutions which, after the fall of the Roman empire, contested for Europe. We find there: 1st, assemblies of freemen, where they debate upon the common interests, public enterprises, all the important affairs of the nation; 2dly, kings, some by hereditary title, and sometimes invested with a religious character, others by title of election, and especially bearing a warlike character; 3dly, the aristocratical patronage, whether of the warlike chief over his companions, or of the proprietor over his family and laborers. These three systems, these three modes of social organization

and of government may be seen in almost all the German tribes before the invasion; but none of them are real, efficacious. Properly speaking, there are no free institutions, monarchies, or aristocracies, but merely the principle to which they relate, the germ from whence they may arise. Everything is abandoned to the caprice of individual wills. Whenever the assembly of the nation, or the king, or the lord, wished to be obeyed, the individual must either consent, or disorderly brute force obliged him. This is the free development and the contest between individual existences and liberties; there was no public power, no government, no state.

With regard to the moral condition of the Germans at this epoch, it is very difficult to estimate it. It has been made the text of infinite declamation in honor of or against civilization or savage life, of primitive independence or of developed society, of natural simplicity or of scientific enlightenment; but we are without documents enabling us to estimate the true nature of these generalities. There exists, however, one great collection of facts, posterior, it is true, to the epoch of which we are speaking, but which yet presents a sufficiently faithful image of it; this is the *Histoire des Francs*, by Gregory of Tours, unquestionably, of all others, the work which furnishes us with the most information, which throws the clearest light upon the moral state of the barbarians; not that the chronicler made it any part of his plan, but, in the ordinary course of his narrative, he relates an infinite number of private anecdotes, of incidents of domestic life, in which the manners, the social arrangements, the moral state, in a word, the man of his period, are exhibited to us more clearly than in any other work we possess.

It is here that we may contemplate and understand this singular mixture of violence and deceit, of improvidence and calculation, of patience and bursts of passion; this egoism of interest and of passion, mixed with the indestructible empire of certain ideas of duty, of certain disinterested sentiments: in a word, that chaos of our moral nature which constitutes barbarism; a state of things very difficult to describe with precision, for it has no general and fixed feature, no one decided principle; there is no proposition we can make it, which we are not compelled the next instant to modify, or altogether to throw aside. It is humanity, strong and active, but abandoned to the impulse of its reckless propensities, to the incessant mobility of its wayward fancies, to the gross imperfection of its

knowledge, to the incoherence of its ideas, to the infinite variety of the situations and accidents of its life.

It were impossible to penetrate far enough into such a state, and reproduce its image, by the mere aid of a few dry and mutilated chronicles, of a few fragments of old poems, of a few unconnected paragraphs of old laws.

I know but of one way of attaining anything like a correct idea of the social and moral state of the German tribes—it is to compare them with the tribes who, in modern times, in various parts of the globe, in North America, in the interior of Africa, in the north of Asia, are still almost in the same degree of civilization, and lead very nearly the same life. The latter have been observed more nearly, and described in greater detail; fresh accounts of them reach us every day. We have a thousand facilities for regulating and completing our ideas with respect to them; our imagination is constantly excited, and at the same time rectified, by the narratives of travellers. By closely and critically observing these narratives, by comparing and analyzing the various circumstances, they become for us as it were a mirror, in which we raise up and reproduce the image of the ancient Germans. I have gone through this task; I have followed, step by step, the work of Tacitus, seeking throughout my progress, in voyages and travels, in histories, in national poetry, in all the documents which we possess concerning the barbarous tribes in the various parts of the world, facts analogous to those described by the Roman writer. I will lay before you the principal features of this comparison, and you will be astonished at the resemblance between the manners of the Germans and those of the more modern barbarians—a resemblance which sometimes extends into details where one would have had not the slightest idea of finding it.

1.

"To retreat, if you afterwards return to the charge, is considered prudent skill, not cowardice.' — De Moribus Germanorum, vi.

1.

"Our warriors do not pique themselves upon attacking the enemy in front, and while he is on his guard; for this they must be ten to one." Choix de Litt. edif. Missions d'Amerique, vii. 49.

"Savages do not pride themselves upon attacking the enemy in front and by open force. If, despite all their precautions and their address, their movements are discovered, they think the wisest plan is to retire."—Robertson's Hist. of America, ii

2.

"Their wives and mothers accompany them to the field of battle; and when their relatives are wounded, count each honorable gash, and suck the blood. They are even daring enough to mix with the combatants, taking refreshments to them and reanimating their courage."—Ib. vii.

"They have accounts of armies put to the rout, who have been brought to the charge by the women and old men preventing their flight."—Ib. viii.

3.

"There is in their opinion something sacred in the female sex, and even the power of foreseeing future events; the advice of the women, therefore, is frequently sought, and their counsels respected.'—Ib.

4.

"Their attention to auguries, and the practice of divination, is conducted with a degree of superstition not exceeded by any other nation. . . . The branch of a fruit tree is cut into small pieces, which being all distinctly marked, are thrown at random on a white cloth. If a question of public interest be depending, the high priest performs the ceremony; if it be only a private matter, the master of the

The heroes of Homer fly whenever, finding themselves the weaker party, they have the opportunity.

2.

"The Tungusian women in Siberia go to war as well as their husbands; and they have as rough treatment."—Meiners' Hist of the Female Sex, i. 18, 19.

"At the battle of Yermuk, in Syria, in 636, the last line was occupied by the sister of Dezar, with the Arabian women, who were accustomed to wield the bow and the lance. Thrice did the Arabs retreat in disorder, and thrice were they driven back to the charge by the reproaches and blows of the women."—Gibbon's Hist. of the Dec. and Fall of the Roman Empire.

3.

"When a national war breaks out, the priests and diviners are consulted; sometimes, even, they take the advice of the women."—Rob. Hist of America, ii.

"The Hurons, in particular, pay particular respect to women."—Charlevoix, Hist. of Canada.

"The Gauls consulted the women in important affairs; they agreed with Hannibal that if the Carthaginians had to complain of the Gauls, they should carry their complaint before the Gaulish women, who should be the judges of them."—Mem. de l'Académ. des Inscrip. xxiv. 374, Memoire de l'Abbé Fenel.

4.

"This mode of divination, by rod, has some relation with divination by arrow, which was in usage throughout the East. When Turkmans were established in Persia, after the defeat of the Ghaznevides (A. D. 1038), they chose a king by writing upon arrows the names of the different tribes, of the different families of the tribes, taken by lot, and of the different members of the family."—Gibbon, Hist. of the De

family officiates. Having invoked the gods, with his eyes devoutly raised to heaven, he holds up three times each segment of the twig, and as the marks rise in succession, interprets the decrees of fate.

"The practice of consulting the notes and flight of birds is also in use among them."—Ib. x.

5.

"The kings in Germany owe their election to the nobility of their births; the generals are chosen for their valor. The power of the former is not arbitrary or unlimited; the latter command more by warlike example than by their mere orders; to be of a prompt and daring spirit in battle, to appear in the front of the lines, insures the obedience of the soldiers, admirers of valor. The whole nation takes cognizance of important affairs. The princes and chiefs gain attention rather by the force of their arguments than by any authority. If their opinion is unsatisfactory to the warriors, the assembly reject it by a general murmur. If the proposition pleases, they brandish their javelins."—Ib. vii. 11.

6.

"In that consists his dignity; to be surrounded by a band of young men is the source of his power; in peace, his highest ornament—in war, his strongest bulwark. Nor is his fame confined to his own country; it extends to foreign nations, and he is then of the first importance, if he surpasses his rivals in the number and courage of his followers. If, in the course of a long peace, a tribe languishes under indolence, the young men often seek in a body a more active life with another tribe that is engaged in war. The new chief must show his liberality; he must give to one a horse, to another a shield, to another a blood-stained and victorious spear; to all plentiful food and potations. These are their only pay."—Ib. xiii

cline and Fall of the Roman Empire, xi. 224.

"Presages drawn from the song and flight of birds were known among the Romans, among the Greeks, among the greater part of the savages of America, Natchez, Moxes, Chequites, &c."—Lett edif. vii. 255, viii. 141, 264.

5.

"Savages know among themselves neither princes nor kings. They say in Europe that they have republics; but these republics have no approach to stable laws. Each family looks upon itself as absolutely free; each Indian believes himself independent. Still they have learned the necessity of forming among them a kind of society, and of choosing a chief, whom they call *cacique*, that is to say, commander. In order to be raised to this dignity, it is necessary to have given striking proofs of valor"—Lett. edif. viii. 133.

6.

"The most powerful order among the Iroquois is that of warlike chiefs. It is first necessary that they should be successful, and that they should by no means lose sight of those who follow them; that they should deprive themselves of whatever is dear to themselves in favor of their soldiers."—Mém. sur les Iroquois, *in the* Variétés Littéraires, i. 543.

"The influence of the warlike chiefs over the young men is more or less great, according as they give more or less, as they more or less keep open table"—Journal des Campagnes de M. de Bougainville in Canada, *in the* Variétés Littéraires, i. 488.

7.

"When the State has no war on its hands, the men pass their time partly in the chase, partly in sloth and gluttony. The intrepid warrior, who in the field braved every danger, becomes in time of peace a listless sluggard. The management of his house and lands he leaves to the women, to the old men, and to the other weaker portions of his family."—Ib. xv.

8.

"The Germans, it is well known, have no regular cities, nor do they even like their houses to be near each other. They dwell in separate habitations, dispersed up and down, as a grove, a spring, or a meadow happens to invite. They have villages, but not in our fashion, with connected buildings. Every tenement stands detached."—Ib. xvi.

9.

"They are almost the only barbarians who content themselves with one wife. There are, indeed, some cases of polygamy among them, not, however, the effect of licentiousness, but by reason of the rank of the parties."—Ib. xviii.

10.

"It is not the wife who brings a dowry to her husband, but the husband who gives one to his bride; not presents adapted for female vanity, but oxen, a caparisoned horse, a shield and spear and sword."—Ib.[1]

7.

"With the exception of some trifling huntings, the Illinois lead a perfectly indolent life They pass their time in smoking and talking, and that is all. They remain tranquil upon their mats, and pass their time in sleeping or making bows. As to the women, they labor from morning till night like slaves."—Lett. edif. vii. 32, 867. See also Robertson's History of America, ii.

8.

"The villages of the American savages and of the mountaineers of Corsica, are built in the same way; they are formed of houses scattered and distant from one another, so that a village of fifty houses sometimes occupies a quarter of a league square."—Volney, Tableau des Etats Unis d'Amerique, 484—486

9.

"Among the savages of North America, in districts where the means of subsistence were rare, and the difficulties of raising a family very great, the man confined himself to a single wife."—Robertson's History of America.

"Although the Moxes (in Peru) allow polygamy, it is rare for them to have more than one wife; their poverty will not allow of their having more"—Lett. edif. viii. 71.

"Among the Guaranis (in Paraguay) polygamy is not permitted to the people; but the caciques may have two or three wives."—Ib. 261.

10.

This takes place wherever the husband buys his wife, and where the wife becomes the property, the slave of her husband. "Among the Indians of Guiana the women have no dowry on marrying. An Indian, who wishes to marry an

[1] There is no doubt that the Germans bought their wives: a law of

Indian woman, must make considerable presents to the father;—a canoe, bows and arrows, are not sufficient; he must labor a year for his future father-in-law, cook for him, hunt for him, fish for him, &c. Women among the Guanis are true property."—MS. Journal of a Residence in Guiana, by M. de M.

"It is the same among the Natchez, in many Tartar tribes in Mingrelia, in Pegu, among many Negro tribes in Africa."—Lett. edif. vii. 221; Lord Kaimes's Sketches of the History of Man. i 184—186.

11

"Populous as the country is, adultery is rarely heard of; when detected, the punishment is immediate, and inflicted by the husband. He cuts off the hair of his guilty wife, and having assembled her relations, expels her naked from his house, pursuing her with stripes through the village."—Ib. xix.

11.

"It is pretended that adultery was unknown among the Caribbees of the islands, before the establishment of the Europeans."—Lord Kaimes, i. 207.

"Adultery among the savages of North America is generally punished without form or process, by the husband, who sometimes severely beats his wife, sometimes bites off her nose."—Lang's Travels among the different savage nations of North America, 177. See also the History of the American Indians by James Adair (1775), 144; Variétés Littéraires, i. 458

12.

"It is generally late before their young men enjoy the pleasures of love, and consequently they are not exhausted in their youth. Nor

12.

The coldness of wandering savages, in matters of love, has often been remarked: Bruce was struck with it among the Gallas and

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the Burgundians declares—"If any one dismiss his wife without a good reason, he must give her a sum equal to what he paid for her."—Tit. xxxiv. Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths, in giving his niece in marriage to Hermanfried, king of the Thuringians, writes to him, by the hand of Cassiodorus: "We inform you that on the arrival of your envoys, they punctually delivered to us the horses harnessed with the silver trappings, befitting royal marriage horses, the price you, after the custom of the Gentiles, gave us for our niece."—Cassiodorus, Vaor., iv. 1.

Down to a very recent period, the betrothing in Lower Saxony was called *brudkop*, that is to say *brautkauf* [vide purchase].—Adelung. History of the Ancient Germans, 301.

are the virgins married too soon." Ib xv.

Shangallas, on the frontiers of Abyssinia: Levaillant, among the Hottentots. "The Iroquois know and say that the use of women enervates their courage and their strength, and that, wishing to be warlike, they should abstain from using them, or use them with moderation."—Mem. sur les Iroquois, in the Variétés Littéraires, i. 455; see also Volney, Tabl. des Etats-Unis, 448; Malthus's Essays upon the principle of Population, i. 50; Robertson's History of America, ii. 237.

Among the Greenlanders, the girls marry at twenty; it is the same among most of the northern savages.—Meiner's History of the Female Sex, i. 29.

13.

The uncle on the mother's side regards his nephews with an affection nothing inferior to that of their father. With some, this relationship is held to be the strongest tie of consanguinity, insomuch that in demanding hostages, maternal nephews are preferred, as the most endearing objects, and the safest pledges.—Ib.

13.

Among the Natchez "it is not the son of the reigning chief who succeeds to his father; it is the son of his sister. . . . This policy is founded on the knowledge of the licentiousness of their wives; they are sure, say they, that the son of the sister of the great chief is of the blood royal, at least on his mother's side."—Lett. edif. vii. 217.

Among the Iroquois and the Hurons, the dignity of a chief always passes to the children of his aunts, of his sisters, or of his nieces on the maternal side.—Mœurs des Sauvages, by father Lafitau, i. 73, 471.

14.

"To adopt the quarrels as well as the friendships of their parents and relations, is held to be an indispensable duty."—Ib. xxi.

14.

"Every one knows that this feature is found among all nations in the infancy of civilization, where as yet there was no public power to protect or punish. I shall cite but one example of this obstinacy of savages in taking vengeance; it appears to me striking and very analogous to what is recounted of the Germans by Gregory of Tours and other characters.

"An Indian, of a tribe established on the Maroni, a violent and blood-thirsty man, had assassinated one of his neighbors of the same

village; to escape the resentment of the family of his enemy, he fled and established himself at Simapo, at a distance of four leagues from our desert; a brother of the deceased did not delay following the murderer. On his arrival at Simapo, the captain asked him what he came there to do. 'I came,' said he, 'to kill Averani, who has killed my brother.' 'I cannot prevent you,' said the captain to him. But Averani was warned during the night, and fled with his children. His enemy, informed of his departure, and that he had repaired by the interior towards the river Aprouague, resolved to follow him. 'I will kill him,' said he, 'though he flee to the Portuguese.' He immediately set out. We know not whether he attained his end."—Journal Manuscrit d'un séjour à la Guyanne par M. de M.

15.

"Hospitality is nowhere more liberally observed To turn any man from their door was regarded as a crime."—Ib.

15.

"The hospitality of all savage nations is proverbial."—See in the Histoire de l'Académie des Inscriptions, iii. 41, the extract from a memoir of M. Simon, and a number of accounts of travellers.

16.

"A German delights in the gifts which he receives; yet in bestowing, he imputes nothing to you as a favor, and for what he receives, he acknowledges no obligation."—Ib.

16.

"It is the same with the American savages; they give and receive with great pleasure, but they do not think of, nor will they accept, any acknowledgment. 'If you have given me this,' say the Galibis, 'it is because you have no need of it.'"—Aublet, Histoire des Plantes de la Guyanne Française, ii. 16.

17.

"To devote both day and night to deep drinking, is a disgrace to no man"—Ib. xxii.

17.

"The inclination of savage nations for wine and strong liquors is universally known; the Indians of Guiana take long journeys to procure it; one of them, of the colony of Simapo, replied to M. de M——, who asked him where they were going: *to drink*, as our peasantry say: *to the harvest, to the fair.*"—Manuscript Diary of a Re

18.

"They have but one sort of public spectacle; the young men dance naked amidst swords and javelins pointed at their breasts."—Ib. xxiv.

19.

"They yield to gambling with such ardor, that when they have lost everything, they place their own liberty on the hazard of the die."—Ib.

20.

"It was not in order to succeed in love, or to please, that they decked themselves, but in order to give themselves a gigantic and terrible appearance, as they might have decked themselves to go before their enemies."—Ib. c. 38.

21.

From the age of early manhood they allow their hair and beard to grow, until they have killed an enemy.—Ib. c 31.

sidence in Guiana, by M. de M——.

18.

"Love does not enter the least into the dances of the North American savages; they are only warlike dances."—Robertson's History of America, ii. 459–461

19.

"The Americans play for their furs, their domestic utensils, their clothes, their arms, and when all is lost, we often see them risk, at a single blow, their liberty."

20.

"When the Iroquois choose to paint their faces it is to give themselves a terrible air, with which they hope to intimidate their enemies; it is also for this reason that they paint themselves black when they go to war."—Variétés Littéraires, i. 472.

21.

After the Indians are twenty years old, they allow their hair to grow.—Lett. édif. viii. 261.

The custom of scalping, or taking off the hair of their enemies, so common among the Americans, was also practised among the Germans: this is the *decalvare* mentioned in the laws of the Visigoths; the *capillos et cutem detrahere*, still in use among the Franks towards the year 879, according to the annals of Fulda the *hettinan* of the Anglo Saxons, &c.—Adelung, Ancient History of the Germans, 303.

Here are numerous citations; I might extend them much more, and might almost always place, side by side with the most trifling assertion of Tacitus concerning the Germans, an analogous assertion of some modern traveller or historian, concerning some one of the barbarous tribes at present dispersed over the face of the globe.

You see what is the social condition which corresponds to that of ancient Germany: what, then, must we think of those magnificent descriptions which have so often been drawn? Precisely that which we should think of Cooper's romances,

as pictures of the condition and manners of the savages of North America. There is, without doubt, in these romances, and in some of the works in which the Germans have attempted to depict their wild ancestors, a sufficiently vivid and true perception of certain parts and certain periods of barbarous society and life—of its independence, for instance; of the activity and indolence which it combines; of the skilful energy which man therein displays against the obstacles and perils wherewith material nature besieges him; of the monotonous violence of his passions, &c. &c. But the picture is very incomplete—so incomplete that the truth of even wha it represents is often much changed by it. That Cooper, in writing of the Mohicans or the Delawares, and that the German writers, in describing the ancient Germans, should allow themselves to represent all things under their poetic aspect—that, in their descriptions, the sentiments and circumstances of barbarous life should become exalted to their ideal form—is very natural, and I willingly admit, is very legitimate: the ideal is the essence of poetry—history itself is partial to it; and perhaps it is the only form under which times gone by can be duly represented. But the idea must also be true, complete, and harmonious; it does not consist in the arbitrary and fanciful suppression of a large portion of the reality to which it corresponds. Assuredly the songs which bear the name of Homer, form an ideal picture of Greek society; nevertheless that society is therein reproduced in a complete state, with the rusticity and ferocity of its manners, the coarse simplicity of its sentiments, and its good and bad passions, without any design of particularly drawing forth or celebrating such or such of its merits and its advantages, or of leaving in the shade its vices and its evils.

This mixture of good and evil, of strong and weak—this co-existence of ideas and sentiments apparently contradictory—this variety, this incoherence, this unequal development of human nature and human destiny—is precisely the condition which is the most rife with poetry, for through it we see to the bottom of things, it is the truth concerning man and the world: and in the ideal pictures which poetry, romance, and even history, make of it, this so various and yet harmonious whole ought to be found, for without it the true ideal will be wanting, no less than the reality. Now it is into this fault that the writers of whom I speak have always fallen; their pictures of savage man and of savage life are essentially incomplete,

formal, factitious, and wanting in simplicity and harmony. One fancies that one sees melodramatic barbarians and savages, who present themselves to display their independence, their energy, their skill, or such and such a portion of their character and destiny, before the eyes of spectators who, at once greedy of, but worn out with excitement, still take pleasure in qualities and adventures foreign to the life they themselves lead, and to the society by which they are surrounded. I know not whether you are struck, as I am, with the defects of the imagination in our times. Upon the whole, it seems to me that it lacks nature, facility, and extension; it does not take a large and simple view of things in their primitive and real elements; it arranges them theatrically, and mutilates them under pretence of idealizing them. It is true that I find, in the modern descriptions of ancient German manners, some scattered characteristics of barbarism, but I can discover nothing therefrom of what barbarous society was as a whole.

If I were obliged to sum up that which I have now said upon the state of the Germans before the invasion, I confess I should be somewhat embarrassed. We find therein no precise and well defined traits which may be detached and distinctly exhibited; no fact, no idea, no sentiment had as yet attained to its development, or as yet presented itself under a determinate form; it was the infancy of all things, of the social and moral states, of institutions, of relations, of man himself; everything was rough and confused. There are, however, two points to which I think I ought to direct your attention.

1st. At the opening of modern civilization, the Germans influenced it far less by the institutions which they brought with them from Germany, than by their situation itself, amidst the Roman world. They had conquered it: they were, at least upon the spot where they had established themselves, masters of the population and of the territory. The society which formed itself after this conquest, arose rather from this situation, from the new life led by the conquerors in their relations with the conquered, than from the ancient German manners.

2d. That which the Germans especially brought into the Roman world was the spirit of individual liberty, the need, the passion for independence and individuality. To speak properly, no public power, no religious power, existed in

ancient Germany; the only real power in this society, the only power that was strong and active in it, was the will of man; each one did what he chose, at his own risk and peril.

The system of force, that is to say, of personal liberty, was at the bottom of the social state of the Germans. Through this it was that their influence became so powerful upon the modern world. Very general expressions border always so nearly upon inaccuracy, that I do not like to risk them. Nevertheless, were it absolutely necessary to express in few words the predominating characters of the various elements of our civilization, I should say, that the spirit of legality, of regular association, came to us from the Roman world, from the Roman municipalities and laws. It is to Christianity, to the religious society, that we owe the spirit of morality, the sentiment and empire of rule, of a moral law, of the mutual duties of men. The Germans conferred upon us the spirit of liberty, of liberty such as we conceive of, and are acquainted with it, in the present day, as the right and property of each individual, master of himself, of his actions, and of his fate, so long as he injures no other individual. This is a fact of universal importance, for it was unknown to all preceding civilizations: in the ancient republics, the public power disposed all things; the individual was sacrificed to the citizen. In the societies where the religious principle predominated, the believer belonged to his God, not to himself. Thus, man hitherto had always been absorbed in the church or in the state. In modern Europe, alone, has he existed and developed himself on his own account and in his own way, charged, no doubt, charged continually, more and more heavily with toils and duties, but finding in himself his aim and his right. It is to German manners that we must trace this distinguishing characteristic of our civilization. The fundamental idea of liberty, in modern Europe, came to it from its conquerors.

EIGHTH LECTURE.

Object of the lecture—True character of the German invasions—Cause of errors on this subject—Description of the state of Gaul in the last half of the sixth century—Dissolution of Roman society: 1. In rural districts; 2. In towns, though in a lesser degree—Dissolution of German society: 1. Of the colony or tribe; 2. Of the warfaring band—Elements of the new social state: 1. Of commencing royalty; 2. Of commencing feudalism; 3. Of the church, after the invasion—Summary.

We are now in possession of the two primitive and fundamental elements of French civilization; we have studied, on the one hand, Roman civilization, on the other, German society, each in itself, and prior to their apposition. Let us endeavor to ascertain what happened in the moment at which they touched together, and became confounded with one another; that is to say, to describe the condition of Gaul after the great invasion and settlement of the Germans.

I should wish to assign to this description a somewhat precise date, and to inform you, beforehand, to what age and to what territory it especially belongs. The difficulty of doing this is great. Such, at this epoch, was the confusion of things and minds, that the greater part of the facts have been transmitted to us without order and without date; particularly general facts, those connected with institutions, with the relations of the different classes, in a word, with the social condition; facts which, by nature, are the least apparent and the least precise. They are omitted or strangely confused in contemporary monuments; we must, at every step, guess at and restore their chronology. Happily, the accuracy of this chronology is of less importance at this epoch than at any other. No doubt, between the sixth and eighth centuries, the state of Gaul must have changed; relations of men, institutions and manners must have been modified; less, however, than we might be tempted to believe. The chaos was extreme, and chaos is essentially stationary. When all things are disordered and confounded to this degree, they require much time for unravelling and re-arranging them.

selves; much time is needed for each of the elements to return to its place, to re-enter its right path, to place itself again in some measure under the direction and motive force of the special principle which should govern its development. After the settlement of the barbarians upon the Roman soil, events and men revolved for a long time in the same circle, a prey to a movement more violent than progressive. Thus, from the sixth to the eighth century, the state of Gaul changed less, and the strict chronology of general facts is of less importance than we might naturally presume from the length of the interval. Let us, nevertheless, endeavor to determine, within certain limits, the epoch of which we are now to trace the picture.

The true Germanic people who occupied Gaul were the Burgundians, the Visigoths, and the Franks. Many other people, many other single bands of Vandals, Alani, Suevi, Saxons, &c., wandered over its territory; but of these, some only passed over it, and the others were rapidly absorbed by it; these are partial incursions which are without any historical importance. The Burgundians, the Visigoths, and the Franks, alone deserve to be counted among our ancestors. The Burgundians definitively established themselves in Gaul between the years 406 and 413; they occupied the country between the Jura, the Saône, and the Durance; Lyons was the centre of their dominion. The Visigoths, between the years 412 and 450, spread themselves over the provinces bounded by the Rhone, and even over the left bank of the Rhone to the south of the Durance, the Loire, and the Pyrenees: their king resided at Toulouse. The Franks, between the years 481 and 500, advanced in the north of Gaul, and established themselves between the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Loire, without including Brittany and the western portions of Normandy; Clovis had Soissons and Paris for his capitals. Thus, at the end of the fifth century, was accomplished the definitive occupation of the territory of Gaul by the three great German tribes.

The condition of Gaul was not exactly the same in its various parts, and under the dominion of these three nations. There were remarkable differences between them. The Franks were far more foreign, German, and barbarous, than the Burgundians and the Goths. Before their entrance into Gaul, these last had had ancient relations with the Romans; they had lived in the eastern empire, in Italy; they were

familiar with the Roman manners and population. We may say almost as much for the Burgundians. Moreover, the two nations had long been Christians. The Franks, on the contrary, arrived from Germany in the condition of pagans and enemies. Those portions of Gaul which they occupied became deeply sensible of this difference, which is described with truth and vivacity in the seventh of the "Lectures upon the History of France," of M. Augustin Thierry. I am inclined, however, to believe that it was less important than has been commonly supposed. If I do not err, the Roman provinces differed more among themselves than did the nations which had conquered them. You have already seen how much more civilized was southern than northern Gaul, how much more thickly covered with population, towns, monuments, and roads. Had the Visigoths arrived in as barbarous a condition as that of the Franks, their barbarism would yet have been far less visible and less powerful in Gallia Narbonensis and in Aquitania; Roman civilization would much sooner have absorbed and altered them. This, I believe, is what happened; and the different effects which accompanied the three conquests resulted rather from the differences of the conquered than from that of the conquerors.

Besides, this difference, sensible so long as we confine ourselves to a very general view of things, becomes effaced, or at least very difficult to be perceived, when we go farther on with the study of the society. It may be said that the Franks were more barbarous than the Visigoths; but, that being said, we must stop. In what consisted the positive differences between the two peoples, in institutions, ideas, and relations of classes? No precise record contains an answer to this question. Finally, the difference of condition in the provinces of Gaul, that difference, at least, which was referable to their masters, soon disappeared or became greatly lessened. About the year 534, the country of the Burgundians fell under the yoke of the Franks; between the years 507 and 512, that of the Visigoths became subject to nearly the same fate. In the middle of the sixth century, the Frank race had spread itself and obtained dominion throughout Gaul. The Visigoths still possessed a part of Languedoc, and still disputed the possession of some towns at the foot of the Pyrenees; but, properly speaking, Brittany excepted, the whole of Gaul was, if not governed, at least overrun by the Franks.

It is with the Gaul of this epoch that I desire to make you

acquainted; it is the state of Gaul about the last half of the sixth century, and, above all, of Frankish Gaul, that I shall now endeavor to describe. Any attempt to assign a more precise date to this description would be vain and fertile in errors. No doubt there was still, at this epoch, much variety in the condition of the Gaulish provinces; but I shall attempt to estimate it no farther, remaining satisfied with having warned you of its existence.

It seems to me that people commonly form to themselves a very false idea of the invasion of the barbarians, and of the extent and rapidity of its effects. You have, in your reading upon this subject, often met with the words *inundation, earthquake, conflagration.* These are the terms which have been employed to characterize this revolution. I think that they are deceptive, that they in no way represent the manner in which this invasion occurred, nor its immediate results. Exaggeration is natural to human language; words express the impressions which man receives from facts, rather than the facts themselves; it is after having passed through the mind of man, and according to the impressions which they have produced thereupon, that facts are described and named. But the impression is never the complete and faithful image of the fact. In the first place, it is individual, which the fact is not; great events, the invasion of a foreign people, for instance, are related by those who have been personally affected, as victims, actors, or spectators: they relate the event as they have seen it; they characterize it according to what they have known or undergone. He who has seen his house or his village burnt, will, perhaps, call the invasion a conflagration; to the thought of another, it will be found arrayed in the form of a deluge or an earthquake. These images are true, but are of a truth which, if I may so express myself, is full of prejudice and egoism; they re-produce the impressions of some few men; they are not expressions of the fact in its entire extent, nor of the manner in which it impressed the whole of the country.

Such, moreover, is the instinctive poetry of the human mind, that it receives from facts an impression which is livelier and greater than are the facts themselves; it is its tendency to extend and ennoble them; they are for it but matter which it fashions and forms, a theme upon which it exercises itself, and from which it draws, or rather over which it spreads, beauties and effects which were not really there

Thus, a double and contrary cause fills language with illusion; under a material point of view, facts are greater than man, and he perceives and describes of them only that which strikes him personally; under the moral point of view, man is greater than facts; and, in describing them, he lends them something of his own greatness.

This is what we must never forget in studying history, particularly in reading contemporary documents; they are at once incomplete and exaggerated; they omit and amplify: we must always distrust the impression conveyed by them, both as too narrow and as too poetical; we must both add to and take from it. Nowhere does this double error appear more strongly than in the narratives of the Germanic invasion; the words by which it has been described in no way represent it.

The invasion, or rather, the invasions, were events which were essentially partial, local, and momentary. A band arrived, usually far from numerous; the most powerful, those who founded kingdoms, as the band of Clovis, scarcely numbered from 5,000 to 6,000 men; the entire nation of the Burgundians did not exceed 60,000 men. It rapidly over-ran a limited territory; ravaged a district; attacked a city, and sometimes retreated, carrying away its booty, and sometimes settled somewhere, always careful not to disperse itself too much. We know with what facility and promptitude such events accomplish themselves and disappear. Houses are burnt, fields are devastated, crops carried off, men killed or led away prisoners: all this evil over, at the end of a few days the waves close, the ripple subsides, individual sufferings are forgotten, society returns, at least in appearance, to its former state. This was the condition of things in Gaul during the fourth century.

But we also know that the human society, that society which we call a people, is not a simple juxta-position of isolated and fugitive existence: were it nothing more, the invasions of the barbarians would not have produced the impression which the documents of the epoch depict; for a long while the number of places and men that suffered therefrom was far inferior to the number of those who escaped. But the social life of each man is not concentrated in the material space which is its theatre, nor in the passing moment; it extends itself to all the relations which he has contracted upon different points of the land; and not only to those relations

which he has contracted, but also to those which he might contract, or can even conceive the possibility of contracting; it embraces not only the present, but the future; man lives in a thousand spots which he does not inhabit, in a thousand moments which, as yet, are not; and if this development of his life is cut off from him, if he is forced to confine himself to the narrow limits of his material and actual existence, to isolate himself in space and time, social life is mutilated, and society is no more.

And this was the effect of the invasions, of those apparitions of barbarous hordes, short, it is true, and limited, but reviving without cessation, everywhere possible, and always imminent: they destroyed, 1st, all regular, habitual, and easy correspondence between the various parts of the territory; 2d, all security, all sure prospect of the future; they broke the ties which bound together the inhabitants of the same country, the moments of the same life; they isolated men, and the days of each man. In many places, and for many years, the aspect of the country might remain the same; but the social organization was attacked, the members no longer held together, the muscles no longer played, the blood no longer circulated freely or surely in the veins: the disease appeared sometimes at one point, sometimes at another: a town was pillaged, a road rendered impassable, a bridge destroyed; such or such a communication ceased; the culture of the land became impossible in such or such a district: in a word, the organic harmony, the general activity of the social body, were each day fettered and disturbed; each day dissolution and paralysis made some new advance.

Thus was Roman society destroyed in Gaul; not as a valley is ravaged by a torrent, but as the most solid body is disorganized by the continual infiltration of a foreign substance. Between all the members of the state, between all the moments of the life of each man, the barbarians continually intruded themselves. I lately endeavored to paint to you the dismemberment of the Roman empire, the impossibility under which its masters found themselves of holding together the different parts, and how the imperial administration was obliged to retire spontaneously from Britain, from Gaul, incapable of resisting the dissolution of that vast body. What occurred in the Empire occurred equally in each province; as the Empire had suffered disorganization, so did each province; the cantons, the towns detached themselves, and

returned to a local and isolated existence. The invasion operated everywhere in the same manner, and everywhere produced the same effects. All the ties by which Rome had been enabled, after so many efforts, to combine together the different parts of the world; that great system of administration, of imposts, of recruiting, of public works, of roads, had not been able to support itself. There remained of it nothing but what could subsist in an isolated and local condition, that is to say, nothing but the wrecks of the municipal system. The inhabitants shut themselves up in the towns, where they continued to govern themselves nearly as they had done of old, with the same rights, by the same institutions. A thousand circumstances prove this concentration of society in towns; here is one which has been little noticed. Under the Roman administration, it is the governors of provinces, the consuls, the correctors, the presidents who fill the scene, and reappear continually in the laws and history; in the sixth century, their names become much more rare; we, indeed, still meet with dukes and counts, to whom the government of the provinces was confided; the barbarian kings strove to inherit the Roman administration, to preserve the same officers, and to induce their power to flow in the same channels; but they succeeded only very incompletely, and with great disorder; their dukes were rather military chiefs than administrators; it is manifest that the governors of provinces had no longer the same importance, and no longer played the same part; the governors of towns now filled history; the majority of these counts of Chilperic, of Gontran, of Theodebert, whose exactions are related by Gregory of Tours, are counts of towns established within their walls, and by the side of their bishop. I should exaggerate were I to say that the province disappeared, but it became disorganized, and lost all consistency, and almost all reality. The towns, the primitive elements of the Roman world, survived almost alone amidst its ruin. The rural districts became the prey of the barbarians; it was there that they established themselves with their men; it was there that they were about to introduce by degrees totally new institutions, and a new organization, but till then the rural districts will occupy scarcely any place in society; they will be but the theatre of excursions, pillages, and misery.

Even within the towns the ancient society was far from maintaining itself strong and entire. Amidst the movemen

of the invasions, the towns were regarded above all as fortresses; the population shut themselves therein to escape from the hordes which ravaged the country. When the barbarous immigration was somewhat diminished, when the new people had planted themselves upon the territory, the towns still remained fortresses: in place of having to defend themselves against the wandering hordes, they had to defend themselves against their neighbors, against the greedy and turbulent possessors of the surrounding country. There was therefore little security behind those weak ramparts. Towns are unquestionably centres of population and of labor, but under certain conditions; under the condition, on the one hand, that the country population cultivate for them; on the other, that an extended and active commerce consume the products of the citizens' labor. If agriculture and commerce decay, towns must decay; their prosperity and their power cannot be isolated. Now you have just seen into what a condition the rural districts of Gaul had fallen in the sixth century; the towns were able to escape for some time, but from day to day the evil threatened to conquer them. Finally, it did conquer them, and very soon this last wreck of the Empire seemed stricken with the same weakness, and a prey to the same dissolution.

Such, in the sixth century, were the general effects of the invasion and establishment of the barbarians upon Roman society; that was the condition in which they had placed it. Let us now inquire, what was the consequence of these facts, with regard to the second element of modern civilization, the German society itself?

A great mistake lies at the bottom of most of the researches which have been made upon this subject. The institutions of the Germans have been studied in Germany, and then transported just as they were into Gaul, in the train of the Germans. It has been assumed that the German society was in much the same condition after as before the conquest; and persons have reasoned from this postulate in determining the influence of the conquest, and in assigning to it its part in the development of modern civilization. Nothing can be more false and more deceptive. The German society was modified, defaced, dissolved, by the invasion, no less than the Roman society. In this great commotion a wreck was all that remained to each; the social organization of the conquerors perished like that of the conquered.

Two societies—at bottom perhaps more like each other than has been supposed, distinct, nevertheless—subsisted in Germany: first, the society of the colony or tribe, tending to a sedentary condition, and existing upon a limited territory which it cultivated by means of laborers and slaves; second, the society of the warfaring horde, accidentally grouped around some famous chief, and leading a wandering life. This manifestly results from the facts which I have already described to you.

To the first of these two societies, to the tribes, are, in a certain measure, applicable those descriptions of the condition of the ancient Germans by modern Germans, concerning which I have already spoken. When, in fact, a tribe, small in number as were all the tribes, occupied a limited territory; when each head of a family was established upon his domain, in the midst of his people, the social organization which has been described by these writers might well exist, if not completely and effectively, at least in the rough sketch; the assembly of proprietors, of heads of families, decided upon all matters; each horde had its own assembly; justice was dispensed to them by the freemen themselves, under the direction of the aged; a kind of public polity might arise between the confederate hordes; free institutions were then under the form in which we meet them in the infancy of nations.

The organization of the warfaring band was different; another principle presided in it, the principle of the patronage of the chief, of aristocratic clientship, and military subordination. It is with regret that I make use of these last words; they are ill suited to barbarian hordes; yet, however barbarian men may be, a kind of discipline necessarily introduces itself between the chief and his warriors; and in this case there must assuredly exist more arbitrary authority, more forced obedience, than in associations which have not war for their object. The German warfaring band therefore contained a political element that was not possessed by the tribe. At the same time, however, its freedom was great: no man engaged therein against his will; the German was born within his tribe, and thus belonged to a situation which was not one of his choice; the warrior chose his chief and his companions, and undertook nothing but with the consent of his own free will. Besides, in the bosom of the warfaring band, the inequality was not great between the chiefs and their men; there was nothing more than the natural inequality

of strength, skill, or courage; an inequality which afterwards becomes fruitful, and which produces sooner or later immense results, but which, at the outset of society, displays itself only in very narrow limits. Although the chief had the largest share of the booty, although he possessed more horses and more arms, he was not so superior in riches to his companions as to be able to dispose of them without their consent; each warrior entered the association with his strength and his courage, differing very little from the others, and at liberty to leave it whenever he pleased.

Such were the two primitive German societies: what did they become by the fact of the invasion? what change did it necessarily work upon them? By ascertaining this alone it is that we can learn what German society truly was after its transplantation to the Roman soil.

The characteristic fact, the grand result of the invasion, as regards the Germans, was their change to the condition of proprietors, the cessation of the wandering life, and the definitive establishment of the agricultural life.

This fact accomplished itself gradually, slowly, and unequally; the wandering life continued for a long time in Gaul, at least it so continued for a great number of the Germans. Nevertheless, when we have estimated all these delays and disorders, we see that, in the end, the conquerors became proprietors, that they attached themselves to the soil, that landed property was the essential element of the new social state.

What were the consequences of this single fact, as regards the regulation of the warfaring band and of the tribe?

As to the tribe, remember what I have told you of the manner of its territorial establishment in Germany, of the manner in which the villages were constructed and disposed. The population was not condensed therein; each family, each habitation was isolated and surrounded with a plot of cultivated ground. It is thus that nations, who have only arrived at this degree of civilization, arrange themselves, even when they lead a sedentary life.

When the tribe was transplanted to the soil of Gaul, the habitations became yet further dispersed; the chiefs of families established themselves at a much greater distance from one another; they occupied vast domains; their houses afterwards became castles. The villages which formed themselves around them were no longer peopled with men who were free, who were their equals, but with laborers who were attached to

their lands. Thus, in its material relations, the tribe became dissolved by the single fact of its new establishment.

You may easily guess what effect this single change was calculated to exert upon its institutions. The assembly of freemen, wherein all things were debated, was now got together with much greater difficulty. So long as they had lived near to one another, there was no need of any great art, or wise combinations, in order that they might treat in common of their affairs; but when a population is scattered, in order that the principles and forms of free institutions may remain applicable to it, great social development is necessary, riches, intelligence, in short, a thousand things are necessary, which were wanting to the German horde, transported suddenly to a territory far more extensive than that which it had hitherto occupied. The system which regulated its existence in Germany now perished. In looking over the most ancient German laws—those of the Allemanni, Boii, and Franks—we see that, originally, the assembly of freemen in each district was held very frequently, at first, every week, and afterwards, every month. All questions were carried before it; judgments were given there, and not only criminal, but also civil judgments: almost all acts of civil life were done in its presence, as sales, donations, &c. When once the tribe was established in Gaul, the assemblies became rare and difficult; so difficult, that it was necessary to employ force to make the freemen attend: this is the object of many legal decrees. And if you pass suddenly from the fourth to the middle of the eighth century, you find that at this last epoch there were in each county but three assemblies of freemen in the year: and these not regularly kept, as is proved by some of Charlemagne's laws.

If other proofs were necessary, here is one which deserves to be noticed. When the assemblies were frequent, freemen, under the name of *rachimburgi*, *arhimanni*, *boni homines*, and in various forms, decided upon affairs. When they no longer attended, it became necessary, upon urgent occasions, to supply their places; and thus we see, at the end of the eighth century, the freemen replaced in judicial functions by permanent judges. The *scabini*, or sheriffs of Charlemagne, were regular judges. In each county, five, seven, or nine freemen were appointed by the count, or other local magistrate, and charged to present themselves at the assembly of the country to decide upon cases. The primitive institutions

were become impracticable, and the judicial power passed from the people to the magistrates.

Such was the state into which the first element of German society, the colony or tribe, fell after the invasion and under its influence. Politically speaking, it was disorganized, as Roman society had been. As to the warfaring band, facts accomplished themselves in another way, and under a different form, but with the same results.

When a band arrived anywhere, and took possession of the land, or of a portion of it, we must not believe that this occupation took place systematically, or that the territory was divided by lots, and that each warrior received one, proportionate to his importance or his rank. The chiefs of the band, or the different chiefs who were united in it, appropriated to themselves vast domains. The greater part of the warriors who had followed them continued to live around them, with them, and at their table, without possessing any property which belonged especially to them. The band did not dissolve into individuals of whom each became a proprietor; the most considerable warriors entered almost alone into this situation. Had they dispersed themselves, in order that each one might establish himself upon a spot of the territory, their safety amidst the original population would have been compromised; it was necessary that they should remain united in groups. Moreover, it was by the life in common that the pleasures of the barbarians, gaming, the chase, and banquets, could alone subsist. How could they have resigned themselves to isolation? Isolation is only supportable in a laborious condition; man cannot remain idle and alone. Now, the barbarians were essentially idle; they therefore required to live together, and many companions remained about their chief, leading upon his domains pretty nearly the same life which they had led before in his train. But from these circumstances it arose that their relative situation was completely altered. Very soon a prodigious inequality sprang up between them: their inequality no longer consisted in some personal difference of strength or of courage, or in a more or less considerable share of cattle, slaves, or valuable goods. The chief, become a great proprietor, disposed of many of the means of power; the others were always simple warriors; and the more the ideas of property established and extended themselves in men's minds, the more was inequality with its effects, developed. At this period we find

a great number of freemen falling by degrees into a very inferior position. The laws speak constantly of freemen, of Franks, living upon the lands of another, and reduced almost to the situation of the laborers.[1] The band, regarded as a peculiar society, reposed upon two facts—the voluntary association of the warriors in order to lead in common a wandering life, and their equality. These two facts perished in the results of the invasion. On one hand, the wandering life ended—on the other, inequality introduced itself, and increased from day to day, among the sedentary warriors.

The progressive parcelling out of lands, during the three centuries after the invasion, did not change this result. There are none of you who have not heard of the fees that the king, or the great chiefs who occupied a vast territory, distributed to their men, to attach them to their service, or to recompense them for services done. This practice, in proportion as it extended, produced, upon what remained of the warfaring band, effects analogous to those which I have pointed out to you. On one hand, the warrior upon whom the chief had conferred the fee, departed to inhabit it,—a new source of isolation and individuality; on the other, this warrior had usually a certain number of men attached to him; or he sought and found men who would come to live with him upon his domain;—a new source of inequality. Such were the general effects of the invasion upon the two ancient Germanic societies, the tribe and the wandering band. They became equally disorganized, and entered upon totally different situations, upon totally new relations. In order to bind them among themselves anew, in order to form society anew, and to deduce from that society a government, it became necessary to have recourse to other principles, to other institutions. Dissolved, like Roman society, German society, in like manner, furnished to the society which followed it nothing but wrecks.

I hope that these expressions, *society dissolved*, *society which perished*, do not mislead you, and that you understand them in their right sense. A society never dissolves itself, but because a new society is fermenting and forming in its bosom; the concealed work it is there going on which tends to separate its elements, in order to arrange them under new

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[1] Essais sur l'Histoire de France, pp. 109—111

combinations. Such a disorganization shows that facts are changed, that the relations and dispositions of men are no longer the same; that other principles and other forms are ready to assume the predominance. Thus, in affirming that in the sixth century, ancient society, Roman as well as German, was dissolved in Gaul by the results of the invasion, we say that, by the same causes, at the same epoch, and upon the same ground, modern society began.

We have no means of explaining or clearly contemplating this first labor; the original sources, the original creation, is profoundly concealed, and does not manifest itself outwardly until later, when it has already made considerable progress. Nevertheless, it is possible to foresee it; and it is important that you should know, at once, what was fermenting and being formed beneath this general dissolution of the two elements of modern society; I will endeavor to give you an idea of this in few words.

The first fact of which we catch a glimpse at this period, is a certain tendency to the development of royalty. Persons have often praised barbarian at the expense of modern royalty, wrongfully, as I think: in the fourth and in the seventeenth centuries this word expresses two institutions, two powers which are profoundly different from each other. There were, indeed, among the barbarians, some germs of hereditary royalty, some traces of a religious character inherent in certain families descended from the first chiefs of the nations, from heroes become gods. There can, however, be no doubt but that choice, election, was the principal source of royalty, and that the character of warlike chiefs predominates in the barbarous kings.

When they were transplanted to the Roman territory, their situation changed. They found there a place which was empty, namely, that of the emperors. Power, titles, and a machine of government with which the barbarians were acquainted, and of which they admired the splendor and soon appreciated the efficacy, were there; they were, of course, strongly tempted to appropriate these advantages. Such, indeed, was the aim of all their efforts. This fact appears everywhere: Clovis, Childebert, Gontran, Chilperic, Clotaire, labored incessantly to assume the names and to exercise the rights of the Empire; they wished to distribute their dukes and their counts as the emperors had distributed their consuls, their correctors, and their presidents; they tried to re-

establish all that system of taxes, enlistment, and administration, which had fallen into ruin. In a word, barbaric royalty, narrow and crude as it was, endeavored to develope itself, and fill, in some measure, the enormous frame of imperial royalty.

For a long while the course of things was not favorable to it, and its first attempts were attended with little success; nevertheless, we may see, from the beginning, that something of the imperial royalty will remain to it; that the new royalty will by and bye gather a portion of that imperial inheritance, the whole of which it desired to appropriate at the first; immediately after the invasion, it became less warlike, more religious, and more politic than it had hitherto been, that is to say, it assumed more of the character of the imperial royalty. Here, if I mistake not, is the first great fact of that labor which was about to give birth to the new society; that fact is not clearly manifest as yet, but glimpses of it are easily to be caught.

The second great fact is the birth of the territorial aristocracy. Property, for a long time after the settlement of the barbarians, seemed uncertain, fluctuating and confused, passing from one hand to another with surprising rapidity. Nevertheless, it is clear that it prepared to become fixed in the same hands, and to regulate itself. The tendency of fees is to become hereditary; and, in spite of the obstacles which oppose it, the principle of inheritance prevails therein more and more. At the same time there arose between the possessors of the fees that hierarchical organization which afterwards became the feudal system. We must not transport into the sixth and seventh centuries the feudalism of the thirteenth; nothing like it then existed; the disorder of property and personal relations was infinitely greater than under the feudal system; nevertheless all things concurred, on the one hand, to render property fixed; on the other, to constitute the society of the proprietors according to a certain hierarchy. As we have seen royalty dawning from the end of the sixth century, so likewise, we may discover, from that period, the dawn of feudalism.

Finally, a third fact also developed itself at this epoch. I have engaged your attention with the state of the church; you have seen what power it had, and how it was, so to speak, the sole living remnant of Roman society. When the barbarians were established, let us see in what situation the church found itself, or, at least, what that situation soon be-

came. The bishops were, as you know, the natural chiefs of the towns; they governed the people in the interior of each city, they represented them in the presence of the barbarians, they were their magistrates within, and their protectors without. The clergy were therefore deeply rooted in the municipal system, that is to say, in all that remained of Roman society. And they very soon struck root in other directions; the bishops became the counsellors of the barbarous kings; they counselled them upon the conduct which they ought to observe towards the vanquished people, upon the course they ought to take in order to become the heirs of the Roman emperors. They had far more experience and political intelligence than the barbarians, who came fresh from Germany; they had the love of power, they had been accustomed to serve and to profit by it. They were thus the counsellors of the nascent royalty, while they remained the magistrates and patrons of the still surviving municipality.

Behold them connected on the one hand with the people, on the other with thrones. But this was not all; a third position now opened itself to them; they became great proprietors; they entered into that hierarchical organization of manorial property which, as yet, scarcely existed but in tendency; they labored to occupy, and soon succeeded in occupying, a considerable place therein. So that at this epoch, while yet the new society was in its first rudiments, the church was already connected with all its parts, was everywhere in good repute and powerful; a sure sign that it would be the first to attain dominion; as happened.

Such were the three great facts—obscure as yet, but visible—by which the new social order announced itself, at the end of the sixth and the beginning of the seventh century. It is, I believe, impossible to mistake them; but, in recognizing them, we must remember that neither of them had as yet taken the position and the form which it was to retain. All things were still mixed and confused to such a degree, that it must have been impossible for the shrewdest sight to have discerned any of the characteristics of the future. I have already had occasion to say, and in your studies you have had opportunities of becoming convinced, that there exists no modern system, no pretension to power, which has not discovered grounds for its legitimacy in these beginnings of our society. Royalty regards itself as the only heir of the Roman empire. The feudal aristocracy asserts that, at that

time, it possessed the entire country, men and lands; the towns affirm that they succeeded to all the rights of the Roman municipalities; the clergy, that they then shared all power. This singular epoch has lent itself to all the requirements of party spirit, to all the hypotheses of science; it has furnished arguments and arms to nations, to kings, to grandees, to priests, to liberty as well as to aristocracy, to aristocracy as well as to royalty.

The fact is, it carried all things in its bosom, theocracy, monarchy, oligarchy, republics, mixed constitutions; and all things in a state of confusion which has allowed each to see all that it chose to see therein. The obscure and irregular fermentation of the wrecks of former society, German as well as Roman, and the first labors of their transformation into elements of the new society, constituted the true condition of Gaul during the sixth and seventh centuries, and this is the only character we can assign to it.

NINTH LECTURE.

Object of the lecture—False idea of the Salic law—History of the formation of this law—Two hypotheses upon this matter—Eighteen manuscripts—Two texts of the Salic law—M. Wiarda's work upon the history and exposition of the Salic law—Prefaces attached to the manuscripts—Value of national traditions concerning the origin and compilation of the Salic law—Concerning its tendencies—It is essentially a penal code—1st. Of the enumeration and definition of offences in the Salic law; 2d. Of penalties; 3d. Of criminal procedure—Transitory character of this legislation.

We are to occupy ourselves now with the barbarian laws, and especially with the Salic law, upon which I must give certain minute details, indispensable to a knowledge of the true character of this law, and of the social state which is indicated thereby. People have been deeply, and for a long while, deceived upon this point. A greatly exaggerated importance has been attributed to the Salic law. You are acquainted with the reason of this error; you know that at the accession of Philippe-le-Long, and during the struggle of Philippe-de-Valois and Edward III. for the crown of France, the Salic law was invoked in order to prevent the succession of women, and that, from that time, it has been celebrated by a crowd of writers, as the first source of our public law, as a law always in vigor, as the fundamental law of monarchy. Those who have been the most free from this illusion, as, for example, Montesquieu, have yet experienced, to some degree, its influence, and have spoken of the Salic law with a respect which it is assuredly difficult to feel towards it when we attribute to it only the place that it really holds in our history. We might be tempted to believe that the majority of the writers who have spoken of this law had studied neither its history nor its scope; that they were equally ignorant of its source and of its character. These are the two questions which we have now to solve: we must learn, on the one hand, in what manner the Salic law was compiled, when, where, by whom, and for whom; on the other, what the object and plan of its dispositions were.

As regards its history, I pray you to recall that which I have already told you touching the double origin and the incoherence of the barbarous laws; they were, at once, anterior and posterior to the invasion; at once, German, and Germano-Roman: they belonged to two different conditions of society. This character has influenced all the controversies of which the Salic law has been the object; it has given rise to two hypotheses: according to one, this law was compiled in Germany, upon the right bank of the Rhine, long before the conquest, and in the language of the Franks; everything in its provisions which is not suitable to that period, and to ancient German society, according to this hypothesis, was introduced afterwards, in the successive revisions which occurred after the invasion. According to the other hypothesis, the Salic law was, on the contrary, compiled after the conquest, upon the left bank of the Rhine, in Belgium or in Gaul, perhaps in the seventh century, and in Latin.

Nothing is more natural than the conflict of these hypotheses; they necessarily arose from the Salic law itself. A peculiar circumstance tended to provoke them.

In the manuscripts which remain to us, there are two texts of this law: the one unmixedly Latin; the other Latin also, but mixed with a great number of German words, of glosses, and of expositions, in the ancient Frankish tongue, intercalated in the course of the articles. It contains two hundred and fifty-three intercalations of this kind. The second text was published at Basil, in 1557, by the jurisconsult, John Herold, from a manuscript in the Abbey of Fulda. The purely Latin text was published, for the first time, in Paris, without date, or the name of the editor; and, for the second time, by John Dutillet, also in Paris, in 1573. Both texts have since gone through many editions.

Of these two texts there exist eighteen manuscripts[1]—namely, fifteen of the unmixed Latin text, and three of that in which Germanic words appear. Of these manuscripts, fifteen have been found upon the left bank of the Rhine, in France, and only three in Germany. You might be inclined to suppose that the three manuscripts found in Germany, are those which contain the German glosses: but such is not the

[1] If I do not err, M. Pertz has recently discovered two others; but nothing has as yet been published concerning them.

case; of the three manuscripts with the comments, two only come from Germany, the third was found in Paris; of the fifteen others, fourteen were found in France, and one in Germany.

The fifteen manuscripts of the unmixedly Latin texts are pretty nearly alike. There are, indeed, some various readings in the prefaces, the epilogues, and in the arrangement or the compilation of the articles, but these are of little importance. The three manuscripts containing the German comments differ much more widely; they differ in the number of titles and articles, in their arrangement, even in their contents, and still more in their style. Of these manuscripts, two are written in the most barbarous Latin.

Here, then, are two texts of the Salic law which support the two solutions of the problem; the one appears rather of a Roman origin, the other more entirely Germanic. Thus the question assumes this form: of the two texts, which is the most ancient?—to which of them should priority be attributed?

The common opinion, especially in Germany, attributes the highest antiquity to the text which bears the German gloss. There are, indeed, some arguments which seem, at first sight, to support this view. The three manuscripts of this text bear the words, *Lex Salica antiqua, antiquissima, vetustior;* whilst, in those of the unmixedly Latin text, we commonly read: *Lex Salica recentior, emendata, reformata.* If we referred the question to these epigraphs, it would be resolved.

Another circumstance seems to lead us to the same solution. Several manuscripts contain a kind of preface, in which the history of the Salic law is related. The following is the most comprehensive. You will immediately see what consequences are to be deduced from it concerning the antiquity of the law:

"The nation of the Franks, illustrious, founded by God, mighty in arms, firm in treaties of peace, profound in council, noble and healthy in body, of a singular fairness and beauty, bold, active, and fierce in fight; lately converted to the catholic faith, free from heresy; while it was yet under a barbarous belief seeking the key of knowledge by the inspiration of God, desiring justice, and observing piety according to the nature of its qualities: the Salic law was dictated

by the chiefs of their nation, who, at that time, commanded therein.

"Four men were chosen of many—namely, Wisogast, Bodogast, Salogast, and Windogast,[1] in the places called Salagheve, Bodogheve, Windogheve. These men met in three *mâls*,[2] discussed with care all judicial processes, treated of each in particular, and decreed their judgment in the following manner. Afterwards, when, with the help of God, Choldwig the long-haired, the beautiful, the illustrious king of the Franks, had received the first catholic baptism, everything in this covenant that was considered unfitting was amended with perspicuity by the illustrious kings, Choldwig, Childeberg, and Chlotaire; and in this manner was the following decree produced:

"'Honor to Christ who loves the Franks! May he preserve their kingdom, and fill their chiefs with the light of his grace! May he protect their army; may he give them signs which shall bear witness to their faith, awarding unto them joys of peace and an entire felicity! May the Lord Jesus Christ direct in the ways of piety those who govern! For this is the nation which, small in number but valorous and powerful, shook from its head the hard yoke of the Romans, and which, after having recognized the sacredness of baptism, sumptuously adorned with gold and precious stones the bodies of the holy martyrs whom the Romans had burnt with fire, massacred, mutilated with the sword, or delivered to be torn to pieces by wild beasts.

"*Concerning the inventors of laws and their order.*—Moses was the first of all those who expounded, in sacred letters, the divine laws to the Hebrew nation. King Phoroneus was the first to establish laws and judgments among the Greeks; Mercury Trismegistus gave the first laws to the Egyptians; Solon gave the first laws to the Athenians; Lycurgus established the first laws among the Lacedemonians, by the authority of Apollo; Numa Pompilius, who succeeded to Romulus, gave the first laws to the Romans. Afterwards, because the factious people would not tolerate its magistrates, it created decemvirs to write laws, and these placed upon twelve tables

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[1] *Gast* means guest; *gheve* or *gau*, canton, district; *salogast* is the guest inhabiting the canton of Sale; *bodogast*, the guest of the canton of Bode, &c.

[2] *Mallum*, an assembly of free men.

he laws of Solon, translated into Latin. They were: Appius Claudius Sabinus, T. L. Genutius, P. Sestius Vaticanus, T. Veturius Cicurinus, C. Julius Tullius, A. Manilius, P. Sulpicius Camerinus, Sp. Postumius Albus, P. Horatius Pulvillus, T. Romilius Vaticanus. These decemvirs were nominated to write the laws. The consul Pompey was the first to desire that the laws should be written in books; but he did not prosecute his desire from the dread of calumniators. Cæsar afterwards began this work, but he was killed before he completed it. Little by little the ancient laws fell into disuse through age and neglect; but although they were no longer used, it was nevertheless necessary that they should be known. The new laws began to count from Constantine and his successors; they were mixed and without order. Afterwards, the august Theodosius II., in imitation of the Codes of Gregory and of Hermogenes, caused the constitutions given out since Constantine to be collected and arranged under the name of each emperor; and this is called, after himself, the Theodosian Code. Afterwards, each nation selected, according to its customs, the laws which were suited to it; for a long custom passes for a law; law is a written constitution; custom is usage founded upon antiquity, or unwritten law; for the word *law* is derived from the word *legere* (*lex a legendo*), because it is written; custom is a long habit founded solely upon manners; habit is a certain right which is established by manners, and which is regarded as law; law is all that which has already been established by reason, which is agreeable to good discipline and profitable to salvation; but we call that habit which is in common use.

"Theodoric, king of the Franks, when he was at Chalons, selected the wise men of his kingdom, and those who were learned in ancient laws, and dictating to them himself, he commanded them to write the laws of the Franks, of the Allemanni, of the Boii, and of all the nations which were under his power, according to the customs of each. He added what was necessary thereto, and took away what was improper, and amended, according to the laws of the Christians, that which was according to the ancient pagan customs. And of that which king Theodoric was unable to change, on account of the great antiquity of the pagan customs, king Childebert began the correction, which was finished by king Chlotaire. The glorious king Dagobert renewed all these things by means of the illustrious men, Claudius, Chadoin,

Demagne, and Agilof; he caused to be transcribed, with ameliorations, the ancient laws, and gave them written to each nation. Laws are made in order that human wickedness should be restrained by fear, that innocence should be shielded from all danger in the midst of the wicked, that the wicked should dread punishment, and that they should curb their lust for mischief.

"This has been decreed by the king, the chiefs, and all the Christian people who dwell in the country of the Merovingians.

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"In the name of Christ:—

"Here commences the compact of the Salic law.

"Those who have written the Salic law are Wisogast, Aregast, Salogast, Windogast, in Bodham, Saleham, and Widham. . . ."

From this preface, from the words *antiqua*, *vetustior*, inserted in a text, and from some other analogous indications, it has been concluded—1st. That the Salic law was written before the invasion, beyond the Rhine, and in the language of the Franks. 2d. That the manuscript mixed with German words was the most ancient, and that it contained the remains of the primitive text.

The most learned work in which this controversy has been recapitulated is that of M. Wiarda, entitled, "*Histoire et explication de la loi Salique*," and published at Bremen in 1808. I will not carry you through the labyrinth of discussions which he engages in upon the different questions which his work embraces; but merely point out his principal results. They are generally supported by sufficient proofs, and the criticism upon them is very careful.

According to M. Wiarda, the text mixed with German words—in the copies, at least, which we possess of it—is not more ancient than the other; one might be tempted, indeed, to believe it more modern. Two articles especially seem to indicate that this is the case:—1st. Title 61, entitled *De Chrenecruda*,[1] which treats of the cession of property, is found alike in both texts; but the purely Latin text gives it as a rule in vigor, while the text with the German gloss adds: "In

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[1] That is to say, *concerning green herbage*, from ancient German words which answer to the modern words *grün*, green, and *kraut*, herb or plant

present times this no longer applies." 2d. Under title 58, § 1st., the text with the gloss runs thus: "According to the ancient law, whoever disinterred or stripped a dead and buried body, was banished," &c. This law, described here as ancient, exists in the unmixedly Latin text without any observation.

It is impossible to deny that these two passages of the text with the gloss seem to indicate posterior date.

From this comparison of the texts, M. Wiarda passes to an examination of the preface, and easily discovers improbabilities and contradictions therein. Many manuscripts have no preface; in those which have, they vary much. Even that which I have just read to you is composed of incoherent parts; the second part, from the words, *the inventors of laws*, &c. &c., is copied textually in the treatise *Of Etymologies and Origins*, by Isidore of Seville, a writer of the seventh century; the third from these words, *Theodoric, king of the Franks*, is also found at the head of a manuscript of the law of the Bavarians. The names of the first compilers of the law of the Salian Franks are not the same in the preface and in the body of the law itself. From these, and many other circumstances, M. Wiarda concludes that the prefaces are merely additions written at the head of the text, by the copyists, who collected, each in his own fashion, the popular reports, and that therefore no authority is to be attributed to them.

Moreover, none of the ancient documents, none of the first chroniclers who have minutely related the history of the Franks, neither Gregory of Tours, nor Fredegaire, for instance, speak of any compilation of their laws. We must come down to the eighth century in order to find a passage in which such compilation is mentioned, and then it is in one of the most confused and most fabulous chronicles of the time, the *Gesta Francorum*, that we read:

"After a battle with the emperor Valentinian, in which their chief, Priam, fell, the Franks left Sicambria, and came to establish themselves in the regions of Germany, at the extremity of the river Rhine. . . . . There they elected king Pharamond, son of Marcomir, and, elevating him upon their shields, they proclaimed him the long-haired king; and then they began to adopt a law which their ancient gentile councillors, Wisogast, Windogast, Aregast, and Salogast, wrote in the German villages of Bodecheim, Salecheim, and Windecheim."[1]

[1] *Gesta Franc.*, c. 3.)

It is upon this paragraph that all the prefaces, inscriptions, or narratives, placed at the head of manuscripts, are founded; they have no other warrant, and merit no more faith.

After having thus discarded the indirect documents advanced in support of the high antiquity and of the purely German origin of this law, M. Wiarda comes directly to the question, and conceives, 1st. That the Salic law was written for the first time upon the left bank of the Rhine, in Belgium, upon the territory situated between the forest of Ardennes, the Meus, the Lys, and the Scheldt; a country which, for a long time, was occupied by the Salian Franks, whom especially this law governed, and from whom it received its name; 2d. that, in none of the texts actually existing does this law appear to go further back than the seventh century; 3d. that it has never been written except in Latin. This is acknowledged with regard to all other barbarous laws, the Ripuarian, Bavarian, and Allemanic laws; and nothing indicates that the Salic law was an exception. Moreover, the Germanic dialects were not written before the reign of Charlemagne; and Otfried of Weissemburg, the translator of the Gospel, calls the Frankish tongue, even in the ninth century, *linguam indisciplinabilem.*

Such are the general results of the learned labor of M. Wiarda; and, upon the whole, I believe that they are legitimate. He even places too little importance upon a kind of proof, which is, in my opinion, more forcible than the greater portion of those which he has so ingeniously examined—I mean, the contents themselves of the Salic law, and the facts which are clearly deducible therefrom. It seems evident to me, from the dispositions, the ideas, and the tone of their law, that it belongs to a period at which the Franks had for a long time existed amidst a Roman population. It constantly makes mention of the Romans; and not as of inhabitants scattered thinly here and there over the territory, but as of a population numerous, industrious, agricultural, and already reduced, in great part, at least, to the condition of laborers. We also perceive from this law, that Christianity was not of recent date among the Franks, but that it already held an important place in society and men's minds. Churches, bishops, deacons, clerks, are often treated of; and we may recognize, in more than one article, the influence of religion upon moral notions, and the change which it had already wrought upon

barbarous manners. In short, the intrinsic proof, derivable from the law itself, appears to me conclusive in favor of the hypothesis maintained by M. Wiarda.

I believe, however, that the traditions which, through so many contradictions and fables, appear in the prefaces and epilogues annexed to the law, have more importance, and merit more consideration, than he gives them. They indicate that, from the eighth century, it was a general belief, a popular tradition, that the customs of the Salian Franks were anciently collected—they were Christians before, in a territory more German than that which they now occupied. However little their authenticity, and however defective the documents where these traditions are preserved may be, they at least prove that the traditions existed. We are not obliged to believe that the Salic law, such as we have it, is of a very remote date, nor that it was compiled as recounted, nor even that it was ever written in the German language; but that it was connected with customs collected and transmitted from generation to generation, when the Franks lived about the mouth of the Rhine, and modified, extended, explained, reduced into law, at various times, from that epoch down to the end of the eighth century—this, I think, is the reasonable result to which this discussion should lead.

Allow me, before quitting the work of M. Wiarda, to call your attention to two ideas which are developed there, and which contain, in my opinion, a large portion of truth. The Salic law, according to him, is, properly speaking, no law at all, no code; it was not compiled and published by a legal, official authority, whether that of a king, or of an assembly of the people or great men. He has been disposed to see in it a mere enumeration of customs and judicial decisions—a collection made by some learned man, some barbarian priest—a collection analogous to the *Mirror of the Saxons*, to the *Mirror of the Swabians*, and many other ancient monuments of the Germanic legislation, which have evidently only this character. M. Wiarda founds the conjecture upon the example of many other nations at the same degree of civilization, and upon a number of ingenious arguments. One has escaped him—perhaps the most conclusive; this is a text of the Salic law itself. There we read:—

"If any one strips a dead person before he is placed in the earth, let him be condemned to pay 1800 deniers, which make

45 sous; and, according to another decision (*in alia sententia*), 2500 deniers, which make 62 sous and a-half."[1]

This is evidently not a legislative text, for it contains two different penalties for the same crime; and the words *according to another decision*, are exactly those which would be found in the language of jurisprudence, in a collection of decrees.

M. Wiarda thinks, moreover, and this will confirm the preceding opinion, that the Salic law does not contain all the legislation, all the law of the Salian Franks. We find, in fact, in the monuments of the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, a certain number of cases which are called rules *secundum legem salicam*, and of which the text of that law makes no mention. Certain forms of marriage, certain rules of affiancing, are expressly called *secundum legem salicam*, which do not figure there at all. From whence one might conclude that a large number of the customs of the Salian Franks had never been written, and form no part of the text which we possess.

Here are a great many details, and I have suppressed many more; I have given only the result of the controversies of which the history of the Salic law alone has been the object. It is from not having given proper attention to it, from no having scrutinized with care the origins and vicissitudes of this law, that such strange mistakes have been fallen into as to its character. Let us now enter into the examination of the legislation itself, and endeavor to bring to bear upon it a rather close criticism, for here also people have strangely fallen into vagueness and declamation.

The two texts are of unequal extent: the text, mixed with Germanic words, contains 80 titles and 420 articles or paragraphs; the purely Latin text has but 70, 71, 72 titles, according to the different manuscripts, and 406, 407, or 408 articles. One manuscript, that of Wolfenbuttel, a very confused one in its arrangements, contains even a greater number.

At the first aspect it is impossible not to be struck with the apparent utter chaos of the law. It treats of all things—of political law, of civil law, of criminal law, of civil procedure, of criminal procedure, of rural jurisdiction, all mixed up together without any distinction or classification. If we were to write out, each on a separate piece of paper, the various

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[1] *Pact. Leg. Sal.*, ed. Herold, tit xvii. de Expoliationibus, § 1

articles of our various codes, and after having thrown them together into an urn, draw them out as each presented itself, the order, or rather disorder, in which chance would throw them, would differ very little from their arrangement in the Salic law.

When we examine this law more closely, we perceive that it is essentially a penal regulation, that in it the criminal law occupies the first, and, indeed, almost the whole place. The political law makes its appearance quite incidentally and indirectly, and in reference only to institutions, to facts which are regarded as established, and with the foundation or even declaration of which the law looks upon itself as having nothing to do; as to the civil law, it contains some enactments of a more precise and distinct nature, to the preparation of which much attention seems to have been paid. The same is the case with regard to civil procedure. As to criminal procedure, the Salic law appears to consider almost every point established and understood; all that it does under this head, is to supply a few obvious deficiencies, and to lay down in certain cases the duties of judges, of witnesses, &c. Pains and penalties are here entirely dominant; the great aim is to repress crime, and to inflict punishment. It is a penal code. It contains three hundred and forty-three penal articles, and but sixty-five upon all other subjects.

Such, indeed, is the character of all legislations in their infancy; it is by penal laws that nations make the first visible steps—the first written steps, if I may use the expression—out of barbarism. They have no idea of writing the political law; the powers which govern them, and the forms in which those powers are exercised, are clear, certain, understood facts: it is not in this period of their existence that nations discuss constitutions. The civil law exists in like manner as a fact; the mutual relations between men, their covenants and agreements, are left to the rules of natural equity, are conducted according to certain fixed principles, certain generally admitted forms. The legal settlement of this portion of law does not take place until after a much fuller development of the social state. Whether under a religious form, or under one purely secular, the penal law is the first that makes its appearance in the legislative career of nations; their first effort towards the perfecting of civil life consists in raising barriers against, in proclaiming, beforehand, punishments for

excesses of individual liberty. The Salic law belongs to this period of the history of our society.

In order to acquire a true knowledge of this law, apart from the vague assertions and discussions of which it has been made the object, let us endeavor to consider it—first, in the enumeration and definition of crimes; secondly, in its application of punishments; thirdly, in its criminal procedure. These are the three essential elements of all penal legislation.

I. The crimes taken cognisance of in the Salic law are almost all of them classed under two heads: robbery, and violence against the person. Of three hundred and forty-three articles in the penal law, one hundred and fifty have reference to cases of robbery, and of these seventy-four relate to and assign punishments for the stealing of animals—twenty, namely, to pig stealing; sixteen to horse stealing; thirteen to the stealing of bulls, cows, and oxen; seven to sheep and goat stealing; four to dog stealing; seven to bird stealing; and seven to bee stealing. Under these heads the laws enter into the most minute details; the crime and the punishment vary according to the age and sex of the thief, the number of animals stolen, the place and time of the robbery, &c.

Cases of violence against the person furnish matter for 113 articles, of which 30 relate to mutilation in every possible variety, 24 to violence against women, &c.

I need proceed no further in this enumeration of crimes. They exhibit to us in a clear light two marked characteristics of the law: 1st, it belongs to a society in a very low and inartificial state. Open the criminal codes of another period, you find a far greater variety in the classes of crimes, while in each class the specification of cases is infinitely less detailed; we recognize at once more various facts and more general ideas. The crimes set forth here are, for the most part, such only as may be anticipated in a condition of things under which mankind becomes more united, however simple their relations may be, however monotonous their life. 2d, It is also evidently a very coarse and brutal society, in which the confusion of individual wills and forces is carried to an extremity, where there is no kind of public power to prevent their excesses, where the safety of persons and properties is every instant in peril. This absence of all generalization, of all attempt to give a simple and common character to crimes, attests at once the want of intellectual development, and the precipitation of the legislator. It combines nothing; it is

under the influence of a pressing necessity; it takes, so to speak, every action, every case of robbery, of violence in the very fact, in order to immediately inflict a penalty upon them. Rude itself, it had to do with rude men, and had no idea but of adding a new article of law whenever a new crime was committed, however trifling its difference from those it had already contemplated.

II. From the crimes let us pass to the punishments, and let us see what was the character of the Salic law in this respect.

At the first glance, we shall be struck with its mildness. This legislation, which as to crimes reveals such violent and brutal manners, contains no cruel punishments, and not only is it not cruel, but it seems to bear a singular respect towards the person and liberty of men: of free men, that is to say; for whenever slaves or even laborers are in question, cruelty reappears—the law abounds in tortures and in corporeal punishments for them; but for free men, Franks and even Romans, it is extremely moderate. There are but few cases of the punishment of death, and from this criminals could always redeem themselves; no corporeal punishments, no imprisonments. The only punishment put forth in writing in the Salic law, is composition, *wehrgeld*, *widrigeld*[1]—that is, a certain sum which the guilty person was obliged to pay to the offended person, or to his family. To the *wehrgeld* is added, in a great number of cases, what the German laws call the *fred*,[2] a sum paid to the king or to the magistrate, in reparation for the violation of public peace. The penal system of the law reduces itself to this.

Composition is the first step of criminal legislation out of the system of personal vengeance. The right concealed under this penalty, the right which exists at the foundation of the Salic law, and all barbaric laws, is the right of each man to do justice to himself, to revenge himself by force; war between the offender and the offended. Composition is an attempt to substitute a legal system for this war; it is the right of the offender, by paying a certain sum, to protect himself from the vengeance of the offended; it obliges the offended party to renounce the employment of force.

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[1] Prohibition money (from *wheren*, *wharen*, *bewahren*), guarantee See my *Essais sur l'Histoire de France*, p. 197

[2] From *frieden*, peace.

Be careful, however, not to suppose that it had this effec from its origin; the offended party for a long time preserved the privilege of choosing between composition and war, of refusing the *wehrgeld*, and having recourse to vengeance. The chronicles and documents of all kinds leave no doubt on the subject. I am inclined to think that at the eighth century composition was obligatory, and the refusal to be contented therewith was regarded as a violence, not as a right; but assuredly, it had not always been so, and composition was at first only a rather inefficacious attempt to put an end to the disorderly contest of individual force—a kind of legal offer from the offender to the offended.

In Germany, and especially in later times, a far higher idea has been attached to it. Men of learning and of rare minds have been struck, not only with the respect for the power and liberty of man which appears in this kind of penalty, but with many other characteristics which they think are to be recognized in it. I shall arrest your attention but upon one: what, from the time that we consider things under an elevated and moral point of view, what is the radical vice of modern penal legislation? They strike, they punish, without troubling themselves to know whether the guilty party accepts the penalty or not, whether he acknowledges his wrong, whether his will does or does not concur with the will of the law; they act only by constraint, justice cares not to appear to him she condemns, under other features than those of force.

Composition has, so to speak, an entirely different penal physiognomy; it supposes, it involves the avowal of wrong by the offender; it is, in its way, an act of liberty; he may refuse it, and run the risk of the vengeance of the offended; when he submits to it, he acknowledges himself guilty, and offers reparation for the crime. The offended party, on his side, in accepting the composition, reconciles himself with the offender; he solemnly promises to forget, to abandon vengeance: so that composition as a penalty has characteristics much more moral than the punishments of more learned legislations; it gives evidence of a profound feeling of morality and liberty.

I here resume, in bringing them to more precise terms, the ideas of some modern German writers; among others, of a young man lately dead, to the great sorrow of science, M. Rogge, who has set them forth in an *Essay upon the Judicial System of the Germans*, published at Halle, in 1820. Among

many ingenious views, and some probable explanations of the ancient social German state, there is, I think, in this system a universal mistake, a great want of understanding man and barbaric society.

The source of the error, if I mistake not, is the very false idea which is frequently formed of the liberty which seemed to exist in the earliest age of nations. There can be no doubt, but that, at this epoch, the liberty of individuals was, in fact, very great. On the one hand, there existed between men inequalities but little varied, and little powerful; those which arose from wealth, from antiquity of race, and from a multitude of complex causes, could not yet have been developed, or have produced anything more than very transitory effects. On the other hand, there was no longer any, or scarcely any, public power capable of holding in check or restraining individual wills. Men were firmly governed neither by other men nor by society: their liberty was real; each did almost what he wished according to his power, at his own risk and perils. I say according to his power; this co-existence of individual liberties was, in fact, at this epoch a mere contest of powers; that is, warfare between individuals and families, war incessant, capricious, violent, and barbarous as the men who carried it on.

This was not society: and it was not long before they found this out; efforts were made on all sides to escape from such a state, in order to enter upon social order. The evil everywhere sought its remedy. Thus it was ordered by this mysterious life, this secret power which presides over the destinies of the human race.

Two remedies appeared: 1st, inequality between men declared itself; some became rich, others poor; some noble, some obscure; some were patrons, others clients; some masters, others slaves. 2dly. Public power developed itself; a collective force arose, which, in the name and interest of society, proclaimed and executed certain laws. Thus originated, on the one side, aristocracy, and on the other, government—that is to say, two methods of restraining individual will, two means of subduing many men to a will different from their own.

In their turn the remedies became evils; the aristocracy tyrannized, and the public power tyrannized; this oppression led to a disorder, different from the first, but profound and intolerable. Still, in the heart of social life, by the sole effect

of its continuance, and by the concurrence of numerous influences, individuals, the sole real beings, developed, enlightened, and perfected themselves; their reason was less contracted, their will less irregular; they began to perceive that they might live very well in peace without so great an amount of inequality or public power—that is to say, that society could subsist very well without so dear a sacrifice to liberty. At this time, just as there had been an effort for the creation of public power, and for inequality between men, so now there commenced an effort which tended to the attainment of a contrary end, towards the reduction of the aristocracy and the government; that is to say, society tended towards a state which, externally at least, and judging only from that point of view, resembled what it had been in its earliest age, at the free development of individual wills, in that situation in which each man did what he pleased, and at his own risk and peril.

If I have explained myself clearly, you now know where the great mistake lies of the admirers of the barbarous state: Struck, on the one hand, by the slight development, whether of public power, or of inequality, and on the other, by the extent of individual liberty which they met with, they thence concluded that society, despite the rudeness of its forms, was at bottom, in its normal state, under the empire of its legitimate principles, such, in fact, as, after its noblest progressions, it evidently tends again to become. They forgot but one thing; they did not trouble themselves to compare men themselves, in these two terms of social life; they forgot that in the first, coarse, ignorant and violent, governed by passion, and always ready to have recourse to force, they were incapable of living in peace according to reason and justice—that is to say, of living in society, without an external force compelling them. The progress of society consists, above all in a change in man himself, in his being rendered capable of liberty—that is to say, of governing himself according to reason. If liberty perished at the beginning of the social career, it was because man was incapable, while keeping it, of advancing in it; his recovering and exercising it more and more, is the end and perfection of society, but it was by no means the primitive state, the condition of barbarous life. In the barbarous life, liberty was nothing but the empire of force—that is to say, the ruin, or rather the absence, of society. It is thence that so many men of talent have received themselves concerning the barbaric legislations, and

particularly concerning that which now occupies us. They have there seen the principal external conditions of liberty, and in the midst of these conditions they have placed the sentiments, ideas, and men of another age. The theory of composition, I have just stated, has no other source: its incoherence is evident; and instead of attributing so much moral worth to this kind of penalty, it should be regarded only as a first step out of a state of warfare and the barbarous struggle of forces.

III. With regard to criminal procedure, the manner of the prosecution and judgment of offences, the Salic law is very imperfect, and almost silent; it takes the judicial institutions as a fact, and speaks neither of tribunals, judges, nor forms. One meets here and there, as to summoning, the appearance in court, the obligations of witnesses and judges, the proof by hot water, &c., a few special dispositions: but in order to complete them, to reconstruct the system of institutions and manners to which they attach themselves, it is necessary to carry our investigations far beyond the text, and even the object of the law. Among the features of information which they contain concerning criminal procedure, I shall arrest your attention upon two points only, the distinction of fact and law, and the compurgators or *conjuratores*.

When the offender, upon the citation of the offended party, appeared in the *mâl*, or assembly of free men, before the judges, no matter whom, called upon to decide, counts, rachimburgs, ahrimans, &c., the question submitted to them was, what the law commanded as to the alleged fact: people did not come before them to discuss the truth or falsehood of the fact; they fulfilled before them the conditions by which this first point should be decided; then, according to the law under which the parties lived, they were required to determine the rate of composition and all the circumstances of the penalty.

As to the reality of the fact itself, it was established before the judges, in various ways, by recourse to the judgment of God, the test of boiling water, single combat, &c., sometimes by the depositions of witnesses, and most frequently by the oath of the *conjuratores*. The accused came attended by a certain number of men, his relations, neighbors, or friends—six, eight, nine, twelve, fifty, seventy-two, in certain cases even a hundred—who came to make oath that he had not done what was imputed to him. In certain

cases, the offended party also had his *conjuratores*. There was there neither interrogation, nor discussion of evidence, nor, properly speaking, examination of the fact; the *conjuratores* simply attested, under oath, the truth of the assertion of the offended party, or the denial of the offender. This, as regards the discovery of facts, was the great means and general system of the barbarous laws: the *conjuratores* are mentioned less frequently in the law of the Salian Franks than in the other barbarous laws—in that of the Ripuarian Franks, for instance; yet there is no doubt that they were everywhere equally in use, and the foundation of criminal procedure.

This system, like that of composition, has been an object of great admiration to many learned men; they have seen in it two rare merits; the power of the ties of family, friendship, or neighborhood, and the confidence placed by the law in the veracity of man: "The Germans," says Rogge, "have never felt the necessity for a regular system of proofs. What may appear strange in this assertion vanishes, if one is thoroughly impressed, as I am, with a full faith in the nobility of character, and, above all, the unbounded veracity of our ancestors."[1]

It would be amusing to pass from this sentence to Gregory of Tours, the poem of the Niebelungen, and all the poetical or historical monuments of the ancient German manners: to the artifice, deceit, and want of faith, shown there at every step, sometimes with the most dexterous refinement, and sometimes with the coarsest audacity. Can you believe that the Germans were any different when before their tribunals than in common life, and that the registers of their law-suits, if such things as registers then existed, should give the lie to their history?

I do not attach any special reproach to them for these vices; they are the vices of all barbarous nations, in all epochs, and under every zone; American traditions bear witness to it as well as those of Europe, and the Iliad as well as the Niebelungen. I am far, too, from denying that natural morality in man, which abandons him in no age or condition of society, and mixes itself with the most brutal empire of ignorance or passion. But you will readily comprehend, what, in the midst of such manners, the oaths of the *conjuratores* must very frequently have been.

[1] Ueber das gerichtwesen der Germanen, Preface, p. 6.

With regard to the spirit of tribe or family, it is true, it was powerful among the Germans; of this, among many other proofs, the *conjuratores* give one; but it had not all the causes, nor did it produce all the moral consequences which are attributed to it: a man accused was a man attacked; his neighbors followed and surrounded him before the tribunal as at a combat. It was between families that the state of warfare subsisted in the heart of barbarism: can we be surprised that they should group and put themselves in movement when, under such a form, war menaced them?

The true origin of the *conjuratores* was, that all other means of establishing facts were almost impracticable. Think what such an inquiry exacts, what a degree of intellectual development and public power are necessary in order to confront the various kinds of proofs, to collect and contest the evidence, to bring the witnesses before the judges, and to obtain truth from them in the presence of the accusers and the accused. Nothing of this was possible in the society governed by the Salic law; and it was neither from choice nor moral combination that they then had recourse to the judgment of God and the oath of relations, but because they could neither do, nor apprehend anything better.

Such are the principal points of this law which seemed to me to merit your attention. I say nothing of the fragments of political law, civil law, or civil procedure, which are found dispersed through it, nor even of that famous article which orders that "Salic land shall not fall to woman; and that the inheritance shall devolve exclusively on the males." No person is now ignorant of its true meaning. Some dispositions, relative to the forms by which a man may separate himself from his family,[1] the getting free of all obligation of relationship, and entering upon an entire independence, are very curious, and give a great insight into social life; but they hold an unimportant place in the law, and do not determine its end. I repeat, that it is essentially a penal code, and you now comprehend it under this view. Considering it in its whole, it is impossible not to recognize in it a complex, uncertain, and transitory legislation. One feels at every moment the passage from one country into another, from one social state into another social state, from one religion into another religion, and from one language into another language;

[1] Tit. liii. § 1—3

almost every metamorphosis which can take place in the life of a nation is stamped upon it. Its existence also was precarious and brief; from the tenth century, perhaps, it was replaced by a multitude of local customs, to which, of a surety, it had contributed a great deal, but which were likewise drawn from other sources, in the Roman law, the canon law, and the necessities of circumstances; and when, in the fourteenth century, they invoked the Salic law, in order to regulate the succession to the crown, it had certainly been a long time since it had been spoken of, except in remembrance, and upon some great occasion.

Three other barbarian laws ruled over the nations established in Gaul, those of the Ripuarians, the Burgundians, and the Visigoths; these will form the subject of our next lecture.

TENTH LECTURE.

Object of the lecture—Is the transitory character of the Salic law found in the laws of the Ripuarians, the Burgundians, and the Visigoths?—1st, The law of the Ripuarians—The Ripuarian Franks—History of the compilation of their law—Its contents—Difference between it and the Salic law—2d, The law of the Burgundians—History of its compilation—Its contents—Its distinctive character—3d, The law of the Visigoths—It concerns the history of Spain more than that of France—Its general character—Effect of Roman civilization upon the barbarians.

In our last lecture, the character which, on summing up, appeared to us dominant and fundamental in the Salic law, was that of being a transitory legislation, doubtless essentially German, yet distinguished by a Roman stamp; which would have no future; and which showed, on the one hand, the passage from the German into the Roman social state, and on the other, the decay and fusion of the two elements for the good of a new society, to which they both concurred, and which began to appear amidst their wreck.

This result of the examination of the Salic law will be singularly confirmed, if the examination of the other barbarous laws likewise lead us to it; still more, if we find in these various laws, different epochs of transition, different phases of transformation, which may be imperfectly discovered in the other; if we recognize, for example, that the law of the Ripuarians, the law of the Burgundians, and the law of the Visigoths, are in some measure placed in the same career as the Salic law, at unequal distances, and leave us, if the term be permitted, products more or less advanced in the combination of the German and Roman society, and in the formation of the new state which was to be the result.

It is to this, I believe, that the examination of the three laws will, in fact, conduct us, that is to say, of all those which, within the limits of Gaul, exercised any true influence. The distinction between the Ripuarian Franks and the Salian Franks is known to you; these were the two principal tribes, or rather the two principal collections of tribes of the great confederation of the Franks. The Salian Franks probably

took their name from the river Yssel (Ysala), upon the banks of which they were established, after the movement of nations which had driven them into Batavia; their name was therefore of German origin, and we may suppose that it was given them by themselves. The Ripuarian Franks, on the contrary, evidently received theirs from the Romans. They inhabited the banks of the Rhine. As the Salian Franks advanced towards the south-west, into Belgium and Gaul, the Ripuarian Franks spread also towards the west, and occupied the territory between the Rhine and the Meuse, to the forest of Ardennes. The first became, or well nigh, the Franks of Neustria; the last, the Franks of Austrasia. These two names, without exactly corresponding to the primitive distinction, reproduce it faithfully enough.

At the beginning of our history, the two tribes appear for a time re-united in a single nation and under a single empire. I will read to you, upon this subject, the account of Gregory of Tours; always, without his knowing it, the truest painter of the manners and events of this epoch. You will there see what, at that time, was understood by the words union of nations and conquest.

"When Clovis came to battle against Alaric, king of the Goths, he had for an ally the son of Sigebert-Claude (king of the Ripuarian Franks, and who resided at Cologne), named Chloderic. This Sigebert limped, from a blow on the knee which he had received at the battle of Tolbiac, against the Germans. . . . King Clovis, during his sojourn at Paris, sent secretly to the son of Sigebert, saying to him: 'Your father is aged, and he limps with his bad leg: if he should die, his kingdom belongs to you of right, as well as our friendship.' Seduced by this ambition, Chloderic formed the project of killing his father.

"Sigebert had gone out of the town of Cologne, and, having passed the Rhine, was walking in the forest of Buconia; he slept at noon in his tent; his son sent assassins against him and procured his death, in the hope that he should possess his kingdom. But, by the judgment of God, he fell into the very grave which he had maliciously dug for his father. He sent to king Clovis messengers announcing the death of his father, and said to him: 'My father is dead, and I have in my power his treasures and his kingdom. Send to me and I will willingly give you what treasures you please.' Clovis returned for answer: 'I return thee thanks for thy

good will, and pray thee show thy treasures to my deputies, after which thou shalt possess them all.' Chloderic then showed his father's treasures to the deputies. Whilst they examined them, the prince said: 'This is the coffer in which my father was accustomed to amass his gold coin.' They said to him, 'Plunge your hand to the bottom, in order to find all.' Having done this, and while he stooped low, one of the deputies raised his axe and broke his skull. Thus did this unworthy son suffer the same death which he had inflicted on his father. Clovis learning that Sigebert and his son were dead, came to this same town, and having convoked all the people, he said to them: 'Listen to what has happened. While I was sailing upon the river Scheld, Chloderic, my cousin's son, alarmed his father by telling him that I wished to kill him. As Sigebert fled through the forest of Buconia, Chloderic sent murderers after him, who put him to death; he himself was assassinated, I know not by whom, at the moment of his opening his father's treasures. I am no accomplice in these things. I could not shed the blood of my friends, because it is forbidden; but since these things have happened, I have some advice to give you. If it is agreeable to you, follow it. Have recourse to me; put yourselves under my protection.' The people answered these words by plaudits of hand and mouth; and having raised him upon a shield, they created him their king. Clovis then received the kingdom and treasures of Sigebert. Every day God caused his enemies to fall into his hands, and augmented his kingdom, because he walked with an upright heart before the Lord, and did the things that were pleasing in his sight."[1]

This union of the two nations, if such a fact may bear the name, was not of long duration. On the death of Clovis, his son, Theodoric, was king of the eastern Franks; that is to say, of the Ripuarian Franks; he resided at Metz. To him is generally attributed the compilation of their law. This, in fact, is indicated by the preface to the Gallic law, which I have already read, and which is likewise found at the beginning of the Bavarian law. According to this tradition, then, the law of the Ripuarians should be placed between the years 511 and 534. It could not have, like the Salic, the pretension of ascending to the right-hand

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1 Gregory of Tours, in my *Collection des Memoires de l' Histoire de France*, i. pp. 104—107

bank of the Rhine, and to ancient Germany. Still its antiquity must be great. I am inclined to abridge it, in its actual form at least, of nearly a century of existence. The preface, which describes it as digested under Theodoric, attributes to this chief also the law of the Germans; now it is almost certain that this was not digested until the reign of Clotaire II., between the years 613 and 628; this is what the best manuscripts give us reason to suppose. The authority of this preface, therefore, becomes very doubtful with regard to the law of the Ripuarians; and, after an attentive comparison of the evidence, I am inclined to believe that it was only under Dagobert I., between the years 628 and 638, that it took the definite form under which it has reached us.

Let us now pass to the history of its contents. I have submitted it to the same analysis as the Salic law. It contains 89 or 91 titles, and (according to various distributions) 224 or 227 articles; namely, 164 of penal law, and 113 of political or civil law, and civil or criminal procedure. Of the 164 articles of penal law, we reckon 94 for violence against persons, 16 for cases of theft, and 64 for various offences.

At the first glance, according to this simple analysis, the Ripuarian law a good deal resembles the Salic law; it is also an essentially penal legislation, and gives evidence of nearly the same state of manners. Still, when regarded more closely, we discover important differences. I spoke to you at our last meeting of the *conjuratores*, or compurgators, who, without, properly speaking, bearing witness, came to attest by their oath the truth or falsehood of the facts alleged by the offended, or the offender. The *conjuratores* held a specially important place in the law of the Ripuarians. There is mention made of them in fifty-eight articles of this law, and on every occasion it minutely regulates the number of the compurgators, the forms of their appearance, &c. The Salic law speaks much more rarely of them—so rarely, that some persons have doubted whether the system of the *conjuratores* was in force among the Salian Franks. This doubt does not seem well founded. If the Salic law has scarcely spoken of it, it is because it looked upon the system as an established and understood fact, of which there was no need to write. Besides, everything indicates that this fact was real and powerful. What were the reasons for its frequent insertion in the law of the Ripu-

arians? I will presently give the only explanation of this that I can catch a glimpse of.

Another custom is also much more frequently mentioned in the Ripuarian than in the Salic law; I mean judicial combat. There are many traces of it in the Salic law; but the Ripuarian law formally institutes it in six distinct articles. This institution, if such a fact merits the name of institution, played too important a part in the middle ages to allow of our not endeavoring to understand it at the moment that it appears for the first time in laws.

I have endeavored to show how composition—properly speaking, the only punishment of the Salic law—was a first attempt to substitute a legal system in place of the right of war, in place of vengeance, and the contest of physical force. Judicial combat was an attempt of the same kind; its aim was to subdue war itself, individual vengeance, to certain forms and rules. Composition and judicial combat were intimately connected, and simultaneously developed themselves. A crime had been committed, a man offended; it was generally believed that he had a right to revenge himself, to pursue by force the reparation of the wrong to which he had been subjected. But a commencement of law, a shadow of public power interfered, and authorized the offender to offer a certain sum to repair his crime. But, originally, the offended party had the right to refuse the composition, and to say—"I will exercise my right of vengeance, I desire war." Then the legislator, or rather the customs, for we personify, under the name legislator, mere customs which for a long period had no legal authority, the customs then interfered, saying —"If you wish to revenge yourself, and make war upon your enemy, you must do so according to certain terms, and in the presence of certain witnesses."

Thus was judicial combat introduced into the legislation as a regulation of the right of war, a limited arena opened to vengeance. Such was its first and true source; the recourse to the judgment of God, the truth proclaimed by God himself in the issue of the combat, are ideas whose association with it is of later date, when religious creeds and the Christian clergy played an important part in the thought and life of the barbarians. Originally, judicial combat was only a legal form of the right of the strongest—a form much more explicitly recognized in the law of the Ripuarians than in the Salic law.

Judging from the two differences, one would be, for the

moment, inclined to suppose that the first of these two laws was the most ancient. In fact, there can be no doubt that the system of the *conjuratores* and judicial combat belonged to the primitive German society. The Ripuarian, therefore, would seem their most faithful image. It was nothing of the kind. And, first, these two differences, which seemed to give to this law a more barbarous physiognomy, themselves indicate an effort, a first step out of barbarism, for they give evidence of the design, if not to abolish it, at all events to regulate it.

Silence upon this subject leaves all things under the empire of custom—that is to say, of violence and chance: the Ripuarian law attempted in writing, by determining the custom, to convert it into law—that is to say, to render it fixed and general. A certain symptom of a more modern date, and of a society rather more advanced.

Besides, there were other differences between these two laws which incontestably prove this result.

1st, You have seen, by the simple enumeration of the articles, that civil law held a greater place in the Ripuarian than in the Salic law. There penal law always dominated. Still the law is less exclusively a penal code; the procedure, the rule of evidence, the state of persons, property and its various modes of transmission—in a word, all parts of legislation not penal, are, at least, indicated in it, and often with a great deal of precision.

2d, Moreover, and this is an important fact, royalty appeared more in the Ripuarian law than in the other. It appeared but little in a political relation: it was not a question of royal power, nor the manner of exercising it; but it was a question of the king, as of an individual more important in all respects, and with whom the law should specially occupy itself. It regarded him, above all, as a proprietor or patron, as having vast domains, and upon these domains serfs who cultivated them—men engaged in his service or placed under his protection; and by reason of this title they accorded to him, to himself or those belonging to him, numerous and very important privileges. I will give a few examples.

"I. If any one carry off by violence anything belonging to one of the king's men, or to any one attached to the church, he shall pay a composition treble what he would have had to pay had the crime been committed towards any other Ripuarian."—Tit. xi. § 4.

"II. If the crime be committed by a man attached to the church, or to one of the king's domains, he shall pay half the composition which another Frank would have paid. In case of denial, he must appear with thirty-six compurgators."—Tit. xviii. § 5.

"III. A man attached to the domains of the king, Roman or freedman, cannot be the object of a capital accusation."—Tit. lx. § 22.

"IV. If he be summoned to appear in justice, he shall make known his condition by a declaration which he shall affirm upon the altar; after which proceedings with regard to him shall be different from those with regard to the Ripuarians."—Ibid. § 23.

V. Slaves belonging to the king or to a church do not plead by means of a defender; but they defend themselves, and are allowed to justify themselves by oath, without being obliged to answer the summonses which may be addressed to them."—Ibid. § 24.

"VI. If any one shall seek to overthrow a royal charter without being able to produce another repealing the first, he shall answer this attempt with his life."—Tit. lvii. § 7.

"VII. Whoever shall commit treason towards the king shall forfeit his life, and all his goods shall be confiscated."—Tit. lxxi. § 1.

The Salic law says nothing of this kind; here royalty has evidently made an important progress.

3d. The same difference exists between the two laws with regard to the church; the articles which I have just read completely prove it; the church is everywhere assimilated to royalty; the same privileges are accorded to her lands and her laborers.

4th. One discovers, also, in the Ripuarian law, a rather more marked influence of the Roman law; it does not confine itself to mentioning it merely in order to say that the Romans lived under its empire; it accepts some of its provisions. Thus, in regulating the formulæ of enfranchisement, it says:

"We desire that every Ripuarian Frank, or freedman, who, for the good of his soul, or for a sum, wishes to free his slaves in the forms indicated by the Roman law, present himself at the church, before the priests, deacons, and all the clergy and people. . . ." (The formulæ of enfranchisement follow.)—Tit. lx. §1.

This, though a slight, is a real indication of a more advanced society.

5th. Lastly, when we read the Ripuarian law attentively in its whole, we are struck with a character less barbarous than that of the Salic law. The provisions are more precise and extensive; we discover more purpose in them, and purpose more matured and political, and inspired by more universal views. They are not always mere customs which they digest; the legislators say at times, "We establish, we order."[1] In fact, everything indicates that this legislation, if not in its form, at least in the ideas and manners which are its foundation, belongs to a posterior epoch, to a state somewhat less barbarous, and shows a new step in the transition from the German to the Roman society, and from these two societies to a new society arising from their amalgamation.

From the law of the Ripuarians let us pass to that of the Burgundians, and let us see if we shall there find the same fact.

The compilation of the law of the Burgundians fluctuates between the year 467 or 468, the second of the reign of Gondebald, and the year 534, the time of the fall of this kingdom under the arms of the Franks. Three parts, probably of different dates, compose this law. The first, which comprehends the first forty-one titles, evidently belongs to king Gondebald, and appears to have been published before the year 501. From the forty-second title, the character of the legislation changes. The new laws are scarcely anything more than modifications of the old ones; they explain, reform, complete, and announce them definitely. From the consideration of many facts, into the details of which I shall not enter here, one is inclined to believe that this second part was digested and published towards the year 517, by Sigismond, the successor of Gondebald. Lastly, two supplements form a third part, added to the law, under the positive name of *Additamenta*, probably also by Sigismond, who died in 523.

The preface, placed in front of the text, confirms these conjectures; it is evidently composed of two prefaces of different epochs; one by King Gondebald, and the other by King Sigismond. Some manuscripts have attributed the latter also to Gondebald; but those which give it to Sigismond certainly merit the preference.

[1] Tit. lxxvi. §1, lit. xc.

This preface throws light upon questions much more important than the date of the law, and at once clearly distinguishes it from the two laws which have just occupied our attention. It is necessary that I should read it to you throughout.

"The most glorious king of the Burgundians, after having, for the interest and repose of our people, deliberately reflected upon our institutions and those of our ancestors, and upon what, in every matter and every business, is expedient for honesty, regularity, reason, and justice, we have weighed all this in our great assemblies; and as much by our advice as theirs, we have ordered the following statutes to be written, to the end that the laws may remain eternal:—

"By the grace of God, in the second year of the most glorious Lord King Sigismond, the book of ordinances touching the eternal maintenance of the laws past and present, made at Lyons on the 4th day of the calends of April.

"By love of justice, through which God becomes favorable to us, and by which we acquire power upon earth, having first held counsel with our counts and nobles, we have applied ourselves to regulate all things in such a manner that integrity and justice in judgments may dispel all corruption. All those who are in power, counting from this day, must judge between the Burgundian and the Roman according to the tenor of our laws, composed and amended by common accord; in such manner that no person shall hope or dare, in a judgment or law-suit, to receive anything of one of the parties by way of gift or advantage; but that the party having justice on his side shall obtain it, and that to this end the integrity of the judge shall suffice. We think it our duty to impose this duty on ourselves, to the end that no one, in what case soever, shall tempt our integrity by solicitations or presents, thus, from love of justice, repelling far from ourselves, what, throughout our kingdoms, we interdict all judges from doing. Our treasury shall no longer pretend to exact more as penalty than is found established in the laws. Let the nobles, counts, counsellors, domestics, and mayors of our house, the chancellors and counts of cities and districts, both Burgundians and Romans, as well as all deputy judges, even in case of war, know then that they are to receive nothing for causes treated or judged before them; and that they shall ask nothing of the parties by way of promise or recompense. The parties shall not be forced to compound with the judge in such a manner

that he shall receive anything. If any of the said judges allow themselves to be corrupted, and, despite our laws, be convicted of receiving a recompense in a law-suit or judgment, however justly tried, for the example of all, if the crime be proved, let him be punished with death, in such a manner, however, that he who is convicted of venality, having been punished himself, his possessions be not taken from his children or legitimate heirs. With regard to the secretaries of deputy judges, we think that, for their fee in cases, a third of a penny should be allowed them in causes above ten *solidi;* below that sum they must demand less. The crime of venality being interdicted under the same penalties, we order that Romans be judged according to Roman laws, as was done by our ancestors; and let these latter know that they shall receive in writing the form and tenor of the laws according to which they shall be judged; to the end that no person can excuse himself upon the score of ignorance. As regards what may have been ill-judged formerly, the tenor of the ancient law must be preserved. We add this, that if a judge accused of corruption cannot in any way be convicted, the accuser shall be liable to the penalty which we have ordered to be inflicted upon a prevaricating judge.

"If some point be found unprovided for in our laws, we order that it be referred to our judgment, upon that point only. If any judge, whether barbarian or Roman, through simplicity or negligence, judge not a cause upon which our law has determined, and if he be exempt from corruption, let him know that he shall pay thirty Roman *solidi*, and that the parties being interrogated, the cause shall be judged anew. We add that if, after having been summoned three times, the judges decide not; and if he whose cause it is thinks it should be referred to us; and if he prove that he has summoned his judges three times, and has no been heard, the judge shall be condemned to a fine of twelve solidi. But if any person, in any case whatsoever, having neglected to summon the judges three times, as we have prescribed, dares to address himself to us, he shall pay the fine which we have established for a tardy judge. And in order that a cause may not be delayed by the absence of the deputy judges, let no Roman or Burgundian count presume to judge a cause in the absence of the judge before whom it should be tried, to the end that those who have recourse to the law may not be uncertain as to the jurisdiction. It has pleased us to confirm this series

of our ordinances by the signature of the counts, to the end that the rule which has been written by our will, and the will of all, be preserved by posterity, and have the solidity of an eternal compact." (Here follow the signatures of thirty-two counts.)

Without going further, from this preface only the difference of the three laws is evident; this latter is not a mere collection of customs, we know not by whom digested, nor at what epoch, nor with what view; it is a work of legislation, emanating from a regular power, with a view to public order, which offers some truly political characteristics, and gives evidences of a government, or, at least, the design of a government.

Let us now enter into the law itself; it does not belie the preface.

It contains 110 titles, and 354 articles, namely: 142 articles of civil law, 30 of civil or criminal procedure, and 182 of penal law. The penal law is divided into 72 articles for crimes against persons, 62 for crimes against property, and 44 for various crimes.

These are the principal results to which we are conducted by the examination of the provisions thus classified:

I. The condition of the Burgundian and the Roman is the same; all legal difference has vanished: in civil or criminal matters, whether as offended or offenders, they are placed upon a footing of equality. The texts abound in proofs of it. I select some of the most striking:—

1. "Let the Burgundian and the Roman be subjected to the same condition."—Tit. x. § 1.

2. "If a young Roman girl be united to a Burgundian without the consent or knowledge of her parents, let her know that she shall receive none of her parents' possessions."—Tit. xii. § 5.

3. "If any free Burgundian enter into a house for any quarrel, let him pay six *solidi* to the master of the house, and twelve *solidi* as a fine. We wish in this that the same condition be imposed upon the Romans and the Burgundians."—Tit. xv. § 1.

4 "If any man, travelling on his private business, arrive at the house of a Burgundian and demand hospitality of him, and if the Burgundian show him the house of a Roman, and this can be proved, let the Burgundian pay three *solidi* to him

whose house he pointed out, and three *solidi* by way of fine." —Tit. xxxviii. § 6.

These regulations certainly exhibit care to maintain the two people on the same footing. We thus read in Gregory of Tours: "King Gondebald instituted, in the country now named Burgundy, the most mild laws, in order that the Romans might not be oppressed."[1]

II. The penal law of the Burgundians is not the same as that of the Franks. Composition had always existed in it, but it was no longer the sole penalty; corporal penalties appeared; we find also certain moral penalties; the legislator attempted to make use of shame.[2] Already, even, it invented strange punishments, such as are so often found in the legislation of the middle ages. If, for example, a hunting sparrow-hawk was stolen, the robber was condemned to let the sparrow-hawk eat six ounces of flesh from his body, or to pay six *solidi*. This is but a piece of fantastical savageness; but it indicated attempts at punishment very different from the ancient German customs. The difference manifests itself also by other symptoms; crimes are much more various, fewer of them are against persons, and we see some arise which bespeak more regular and complicated social relations.

III. Civil right and procedure also occupy a much greater place in the law of the Burgundians than in the two preceding laws. They form the subject of nearly half the articles; in the law of the Ripuarians they only occupy two-fifths, and only the sixth of the Salic law. One need only open the laws of Gondebald and Sigismund in order to perceive there a multitude of provisions upon successions, testaments, bequests, marriages, contracts, &c.

IV. One even meets there with some positive marks of the Roman law. We could scarcely discover any traces of such a fact in the Ripuarian law; here it is plainly visible, particularly in what concerns civil law; nothing can be more simple; civil law was rare and weak in barbarous laws; from the time that the progress of civil relations furnished the matter, as it were, it was from the Roman legislation that they were obliged to borrow the form.

Here are two provisions where the imitation is certain:

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[1] Tom. i., p 96, of my *Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l'Histoire de France.*

[2] See the first Supplement, tit. x.

1.

"If a Burgundian woman, after the death of her husband, enters, as happens, into a second or a third marriage, and if she has sons by each marriage, let her possess in usufruct, while she lives,[1] the nuptial donation; but after her death, each of her sons shall come into the possession of what his father gave to his mother; and thus the woman has no right to give, sell, or alienate anything that she received as a nuptial donation."—Tit. xxiv. § 1.

2.

"Bequests and testaments made among our people shall be valid when five or seven witnesses have set thereto, as best they can, their seal or signature."—Tit. xliii. § 2.

1.

"Let no person be ignorant that if women, the lawful time being passed, enter into a second marriage, having children by the former marriage, they shall preserve, during their life, the usufruct of what they received[2] at the time of their marriage, the property coming entire to their children, to whom the most sacred laws preserve the right of it after their parents' death."—Cod. Theod., liv iii. tit. viii. l. 3; Ibid. l. 2

2.

"In codicils that are not preceded by a testament, as in wills, the mediation of five or seven witnesses must never be wanting."—Cod Theod. liv. iv., tit. iii. l. 1

I might indicate other apparent analogies.

V. Lastly, the law of the Burgundians clearly shows that royalty had made great progress among that people. Not that it is more in question there than elsewhere; it was not in question at all in a political point of view; the Burgundian law is the least political of the barbarian laws, the one which most exclusively confines itself to penal and civil law, and contains the fewest allusions to general government; but by this law in its whole, by its preface, and by the tone and spirit of its compilation, one is reminded at every step that the king is no longer merely a warrior chief, or merely a great proprietor; and that royalty has left its barbarous condition, in order to become a public power.

You see all this gives evidence of a more developed and better regulated society; the Roman element prevails more and more over the barbarous element; we visibly advance in the transition from one to the other, or rather in the work of fusion which is to combine them together. What the Burgundians appear to have chiefly borrowed from the Roman empire, independently of some traits of civil law, is the idea of public order, of government properly so called; hardly can we catch a glimpse of any trace of the ancient German assem-

[1] *Dum advivit usufructu possideat.*
[2] *Dum advixerit in usufructu possideat* (*Interpret.*)

blies; the influence of the clergy does not appear dominant; it was royalty which prevailed, and strove to reproduce the imperial power.

The Burgundian kings seem to have the most completely followed the emperors and reigned after their model. Perhaps the cause should be sought for in the date of their kingdom, which was one of the earliest founded, while the organization of the empire still existed, or nearly so; perhaps, also, their establishment, enclosed within narrower limits than those of the Visigoths or the Franks, may have promptly invested it with a more regular form. However this may be, the fact is certain, and characterizes the nation and its legislation.

It continued in vigor after the Burgundians had passed under the yoke of the Franks; the formulas of Marculf and the capitularies of Charlemagne prove it.[1] We find it even formally mentioned in the ninth century by the bishops Agobard and Hincmar; but few men, they observe, now live under this law.

III. The destiny of the law of the Visigoths was more important, and of greater duration. It formed a considerable collection, entitled *Forum judicum*, and was successively digested, from the year 466, the epoch of the accession of king Euric, who resided at Toulouse, to the year 701, the time of the death of Egica or Egiza, who resided at Toledo. This statement alone announces that, in this interval, great changes must have taken place in the situation of the people for whom the law was made. The Visigoths were first established in the south of Gaul; it was in 507 that Clovis drove them hence, and took from them all Aquitaine; they only preserved on the north of the Pyrenees a Septimani. The legislation of the Visigoths, therefore, is of no importance in the history of our civilization until this epoch; in later times, Spain is almost solely interested in it.

While he reigned at Toulouse, Euric caused the customs of the Goths to be written; his successor, Alaric, who was killed by Clovis, collected and published the laws of his Roman subjects under the name of *Breviarium*. The Visigoths, then, at the commencement of the sixth century, were in the same situation as the Burgundians and the Franks; the barbarous law and the Roman law were distinct; each nation retained its own.

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[1] *Marculf*, b. i., f. 8; capit. 2 *a* 813. Baluze, 1505

When the Visigoths were driven into Spain, this state was altered; their king, Chindasuinthe (642-652), fused the two laws into one, and formally abolished the Roman law; there was from that time but one code, and one nation. Thus was substituted among the Visigoths the system of real laws, or according to territory, in the place of personal laws, or according to origin or races. This last had prevailed and still prevailed among all barbarous nations, when Chindasuinthe abolished it from among the Visigoths. But it was in Spain that this revolution was completed; it was there that from Chindasuinthe to Egica (642-701) the *Forum judicum* was developed, completed, and took the form under which we now see it. As long as the Visigoths occupied the south of Gaul, the compilation of their ancient customs and the *Breviarium* alone ruled the country. The *Forum judicum* has, therefore, for France, only an indirect interest; still it was for some time in vigor in a small portion of southern Gaul; it occupies a great place in the general history of barbarous laws, and figures there as a very remarkable phenomenon. Let me, therefore, make you acquainted with its character and its whole.

The law of the Visigoths is incomparably more extensive than any of those which have just occupied our attention. It is composed of a title which serves as a preface, and twelve books, divided into 54 titles, in which are comprehended 595 articles, or distinct laws of various origins and date. All the laws enacted or reformed by the Visigoth kings, from Euric to Egica, are contained in this collection.

All legislative matters are there met with; it is not a collection of ancient customs, nor a first attempt at civil reform; it is a universal code, a code of political, civil, and criminal law: a code systematically digested, with the view of providing for all the requisites of society. It is not only a code, a totality of legislative provisions, but it is also a system of philosophy, a doctrine. It is preceded by, and here and there mixed with dissertations upon the origin of society, the nature of power, civil organization, and the composition and publication of laws, and not only is it a system, but also a collection of moral exhortations, menaces, and advice. The *Forum judicum*, in a word, bears at once a legislative, philosophical, and religious character; it partakes of the several properties of a law, a science, and a sermon.

The course is simple enough; the law of the Visigoths was

the work of the clergy; it emanated from the councils of Toledo. The councils of Toledo were the national assemblies of the Spanish monarchy. Spain has this singular characteristic, that, from the earliest period of its history, the clergy played a much greater part in it than elsewhere; what the field of Mars or May was to the Franks, what the Witenagemote to the Anglo-Saxons, and what the general assembly of Pavia was to the Lombards, such were the councils of Toledo to the Visigoths of Spain. It was there that the laws were digested, and all the great national affairs debated. Thus, the clergy was, so to speak, the centre around which grouped royalty, the lay aristocracy, the people and the whole of society. The Visigoth code is evidently the work of the ecclesiastics; it has the vices and the merits of their spirit; it is incomparably more rational, just, mild, and exact; it understands much better the rights of humanity, the duties of government, and the interests of society; and it strives to attain a much more elevated aim than any other of the barbarous legislations. But, at the same time, it leaves society much more devoid of guarantees; it abandons it on one side to the clergy, and on the other to royalty. The Frank, Saxon, Lombard, and even Burgundian laws, respect the guarantees arising from ancient manners, of individual independence, the rights of each proprietor in his domains, the participation, more or less regular, and more or less extensive, of freemen in the affairs of the nation, in judgments, and in the conduct of the acts of civil life. In the *Forum judicum*, almost all these traces of the primitive German society have disappeared; a vast administration, semi-ecclesiastical and semi-imperial, extends over society. I surely need not observe, for your thoughts will have outrun my words, that this is a new and prodigious step in the route on which we proceed. Since we have studied the barbarous laws, we advance more and more towards the same result, the fusion of the two societies becomes more and more general and profound; and in this fusion, in proportion as it was brought about, the Roman element, whether civil or religious, dominated more and more. The Ripuarian law is less German than the Salic; the law of the Burgundians less so than the Ripuarian law; and the law of the Visigoths still less so than that of the Burgundians. It is evidently in this direction that the river flows, towards this aim that the progress of events tends.

Singular spectacle! Just now we were in the last age of

Roman civilization, and found it in full decline, without strength, fertility, or splendor, incapable, as it were, of subsisting; conquered and ruined by barbarians; now all of a sudden it reappears, powerful and fertile; it exercises a prodigious influence over the institutions and manners which associate themselves with it; it gradually impresses on them its character; it dominates over and transforms its conquerors.

Two causes, among many others, produced this result; the power of a civil legislation, strong and closely knit; and the natural ascendency of civilization over barbarism.

In fixing themselves and becoming proprietors, the barbarians contracted, among themselves, and with the Romans, relations much more varied and more durable, than any they had hitherto known; their civil existence became much more extensive and permanent. The Roman law alone could regulate it; that alone was prepared to provide for so many relations. The barbarians, even in preserving their customs, even while remaining masters of the country, found themselves taken, so to speak, in the nets of this learned legislation, and found themselves obliged to submit, in a great measure, doubtless not in a political point of view, but in civil matters, to the new social order. Besides, the mere sight of Roman civilization exercised great influence on their imagination. What now moves ourselves, what we seek with eagerness in history, poems, travels, novels, is the representation of a society foreign to the regularity of our own; it is the savage life, its independence, novelty, and adventures Very different were the impressions of the barbarians; it was civilization which struck them, which seemed to them great and marvellous; the remains of Roman activity, the cities, roads, aqueducts, and amphitheatres, all that society so regular, so provident, and so varied in its fixedness—these were the objects of their astonishment and admiration. Although conquerors, they felt themselves inferior to the conquered; the barbarian might despise the Roman individually, but the Roman empire in its whole appeared to him something superior; and all the great men of the age of conquests, the Alarics, the Ataulphs, the Theodorics, and many others, while destroying and throwing to the ground the Roman Empire, exerted all their power to imitate it.

These are the principal facts which manifested themselves in the epoch which we have just reviewed, and, above all,

in the compilation and successive transformation of the barbaric laws. We shall seek, in our next lecture, what remained of the Roman laws to govern the Romans themselves, while the Germans were applying themselves to writing their own.

ELEVENTH LECTURE.

Perpetuity of the Roman law after the fall of the Empire—Of *the History of the Roman Law in the Middle Ages*, by M. de Savigny—Merits and deficiencies of this work—1. Roman law among the Visigoths—*Breviarium Aniani*, collected by command of Alaric—History and contents of this collection—2. Roman law among the Burgundians—*Papiani Responsorum*—History and contents of this law—3. Roman law among the Franks—No new collection—The perpetuity of Roman law proved by various facts—Recapitulation.

You are now acquainted with the state of German and Roman society before the invasion. You know the general result of their first approximation, that is to say, the state of Gaul immediately after the invasion. We have just studied the barbaric laws; that is, the first labor of the German nations to adapt their ancient customs to their new situation. Let us now study Roman legislation at the same epoch, that is to say, that portion of the Roman law and institutions which survived the invasion and continued to rule the Gallic Romans. This is the subject of a German work, for some years past celebrated in the learned world, *The History of the Roman Law in the Middle Ages*, by M. de Savigny. The design of the author is more extended than ours, because he retraces the history of the Roman law, not only in France, but throughout Europe. He has also treated of what concerns France with more detail than I have been able to give to it here; and, before beginning the subject, I must request your attention a moment while I speak of his work.

The perpetuity of the Roman law, from the fall of the Empire until the regeneration of sciences and letters, is its fundamental idea. The contrary opinion was long and generally spread; it was believed that Roman law had fallen with the Empire, to be resuscitated in the twelfth century by the discovery of a manuscript of the Pandects, found at Amalfi. This is the error that M. de Savigny has wished to dissipate. His first two volumes are wholly taken up by researches into the traces of the Roman law from the fifth to the twelfth century, and in proving, by recovering its history, that it had never ceased to exist.

The demonstration is convincing, and the end fully attained. Still, the work, considered as a whole, and as an historical production, leaves room for some observations.

Every epoch, every historical matter, if I may so speak, may be considered under three different points of view, and imposes a triple task upon the historian. He can, nay, he should first seek the facts themselves; collect and bring to light, without any aim than that of exactitude, all that has happened. The facts once recovered, it is necessary to know the laws that have governed them; how they were connected; what causes have brought about those incidents which are the life of society, and propel it, by certain ways, towards certain ends.

I wish to mark with clearness and precision the difference of the two studies. Facts, properly so called, external and visible events, are the body of history; the members, bones, muscles, organs, and material elements of the past; their knowledge and description form what may be called historical anatomy. But for society, as for the individual, anatomy is not the only science. Not only do facts subsist, but they are connected with one another; they succeed each other, and are engendered by the action of certain forces, which act under the empire of certain laws. There is, in a word, an organization and a life of societies, as well as of the individual. This organization has also its science, the science of the secret laws which preside over the course of events. This is the physiology of history.

Neither historical physiology nor anatomy are complete and veritable history. You have enumerated the facts, you have followed the internal and general laws which produced them. Do you also know their external and living physiognomy? Have you them before your eyes under individual and animate features? This is absolutely necessary, because these facts, now dead, have lived—the past has been the present; and unless it again become so to you, if the dead are not resuscitated, you know them not; you do not know history. Could the anatomist and physiologist surmise man if they had never seen him living?

The research into facts, the study of their organization, the reproduction of their form and motion, these are history such as truth would have it. We may accept but one or other of these tasks; we may consider the past under such or such a point of view, and propose such or such a design;

we may prefer the criticism of facts, or the study of their laws, or the reproduction of the spectacle. These labors may be excellent and honorable; but it must never be forgotten that they are partial and incomplete; that this is not history—that history has a triple problem to resolve; that every great historical work, in order to be placed in its true position, should be considered and judged of under a triple relation.

Under the first, as a research of, and criticism upon, historical material elements, *The History of the Roman Law in the Middle Ages* is a very remarkable book. Not only has M. de Savigny discovered or re-established many unknown or forgotten facts, but (what is much more rare and difficult) he has assigned to them their true relation. When I say their relation, I do not yet speak of the links which unite them in their development, but merely of their disposition, of the place which they occupy in regard to one another, and of their relative importance. Nothing is so common in history, even with the most exact knowledge of facts, as to assign to them a place other than that which they really occupied, of attributing to them an importance which they did not possess. M. de Savigny has not struck on this rock; his enumeration of facts is learned and equal; and he distributes and compares them with like knowledge and discernment; I repeat, that, in all that belongs to the anatomical study of that portion of the past which forms the subject of his work, he has left scarcely anything to be desired.

As a philosophical history, as a study of the general and progressive organization of facts, I cannot say so much for it. It does not appear to me that M. de Savigny has proposed this task to himself, or that he has even thought of it. Not only has he omitted all attempt to place the particular history upon which he occupied himself in relation with the general history of civilization and of human nature, but even within his own subject, he has troubled himself but little with any systematic concatenation of facts; he has not in the least considered them as causes and effects, in their relation of generation. They present themselves in his work, totally isolated, and having between them no other relation than that of dates, a relation which is no true link, and which gives to facts neither meaning nor value.

Nor do we meet, in any greater degree, with poetical truth; facts do not appear to M. de Savigny under their living phy

siognomy. It is true, upon such a subject, he had neither characters nor scenes to reproduce; his personages are texts, and his events publications or abrogations of laws. Still these texts and legislative reforms belonged to a society which had its manners and its life; they are associated with events more suited to strike the imagination—to invasions, foundations of states, &c. There is among these a certain dramatic aspect to seize; in this M. de Savigny has failed; his dissertations are not marked with the hue of the spectacle with which they are connected; he does not reproduce the external and individual traits of history any more than its internal and general laws.

And do not suppose that in this there is no other evil than that of a deficiency, and that this absence of philosophical and poetical truth is without influence upon the criticism of the material elements of history. More than once M. de Savigny, from not properly taking hold of the laws and physiognomy of facts, has been led into error regarding the facts themselves; he has not deceived himself as to texts and dates; he has not omitted or incorrectly reported such or such an event; he has committed a species of error for which the English have a word which is wanting in our tongue, *misrepresentation*, that is to say, he has spread a false hue over facts, arising, not from any inaccuracy in particular details, but from want of verity in the aspect of the whole, in the manner in which the mirror reflects the picture. In treating, for example, of the social state of the Germans before the invasion, M. de Savigny speaks in detail of the free men, of their situation and their share in the national institutions;[1] his knowledge of historical documents is extensive and correct, and the facts alleged by him are true; but he has not rightly considered the mobility of situations among the barbarians, nor the secret contest between those two societies, the tribe and the warlike band, which co-existed among the Germans, nor the influence of the latter in altering the individual equality and independence which served as the foundation of the former, nor the vicissitudes and successive transformations to which the condition of the free men was subjected by this influence. Hence arises, in my opinion, a general mistake in the painting of this condition; he has

[1] T. i., pp. 160—195.

made it too fine, too fixed, and too powerful; he has not, in the least, represented its weakness and approaching fall.

The same fault is seen, although in a less degree, in his history of the Roman law itself, from the fifth to the twelfth century; it is complete and correct, as far as the collection of facts goes; but the facts are all placed there, so to speak, upon the same level; one is not present at their successive modifications, one does not perceive the Roman law transform itself in proportion as the new society is developed. No moral concatenation connects these so learnedly and ingeniously re-established facts. Anatomical dissection, in a word, is the dominant character of the work; internal organization and external life are alike wanting to it.

Reduced to its true nature, as a criticism of material facts, M. de Savigny's book is original and excellent; it ought to serve as the basis of all studies whose subject is this epoch, because it places beyond all doubt the perpetuity of Roman law from the fifth to the twelfth century, and thus fully resolves the problem which the author proposed to himself.

Now that it is resolved, one is surprised that this problem should ever have been raised, and that the permanence of the Roman law, after the fall of the Empire, should ever have been doubted. Not only do the barbaric laws everywhere make mention of the Roman laws, but there is scarcely a single document or act of this epoch which does not, directly or indirectly, attest their daily application. Perhaps the error which M. de Savigny has contested, has not been so general nor so absolute as he appears to suppose, and as it is commonly said to be. It was the *Pandects* which reappeared in the twelfth century; and when people have celebrated the resurrection of the Roman law at this period, it is above all of the legislation of Justinian that they have spoken. On regarding more closely, one will perceive, I think, that the perpetuity of other portions of the Roman law in the west, the Theodosian code, for example, and of all the collections of which it served for the basis, has not been so entirely departed from, as the work of M. de Savigny would give us to believe. But it matters little; more or less extended, the error upon this subject was real, and M. de Savigny, in dissipating it, has given a prodigious progress to knowledge.

I shall now place before you the principal results of his work, but I shall do so in an order contrary to that which we have followed in studying the German laws. We commenced

with the most barbarous, in order to finish with those in which the Roman spirit had penetrated the deepest. We shall now, on the contrary, first study the countries where the Roman law preserved the greatest empire, in order to follow it in the various degrees of its diminution of strength.

It follows that the kingdom of the Visigoths is the first upon which we have to occupy ourselves. It was, you will recall to mind, from the year 466 to 484 that king Euric, who resided at Toulouse, for the first time caused the customs of the Goths to be written. In 506, his successor, Alaric II., caused the laws of his Roman subjects to be collected and published under a new form. We read, at the beginning of some of the manuscripts of this collection, the following preface:—

"In this volume are contained the laws or decisions of equity, selected from the Theodosian code and other books, and explained as has been ordered, the lord king Alaric being in the twenty-second year of his reign, the illustrious count Goiaric presiding at this work. Copy of the decree:—Letter of advice to Timothy, Viscount. With the aid of God, occupied with the interests of our people, we have corrected, after mature deliberation, all that seemed iniquitous in the laws, in such manner that, by the labor of the priests and other noblemen, all obscurity in the Roman and in our own ancient laws is dissipated, and a greater clearness is spread over it, to the end that nothing may remain ambiguous, and offer a subject for lengthened controversies for pleaders. All these laws, then, being explained and re-united in a single book by the choice of wise men, the assent of venerable bishops, and of our provincial subjects, elected with this view, has confirmed the said collection, to which is appended a clear interpretation. Our Clemency, then, has ordered the subscribed book to be entrusted to count Goiaric, for the decision of affairs, to the end that hereafter all processes may be terminated according to its dispositions, and that it be not allowed to any person to put forward any law or rule of equity, unless contained in the present book, subscribed, as we have ordered, by the hand of the honorable man Anianus. It is, therefore, expedient that thou take heed that, in thy jurisdiction no other law or form be alleged or admitted; if, perchance, such a thing should happen, it shall be at the peril of thy head, or at the expense of thy fortune. We order that this prescript be joined to the book that we send thee, to the end that the rule

of our will and the fear of the penalty may restrain all our subjects.

"'I, Anianus, honorable man, according to the order of the very glorious king Alaric, have subscribed and published this volume of Theodosian laws, decisions of equity, and other books, collected at Aire, the twenty-second year of his reign. We have collated them.

"'Given the fourth day of the nones of February, the twenty-second year of the reign of king Alaric, at Toulouse.'"

This preface contains all we know concerning the history of the digestion of this code. I have a few explanations to add to it. Goiaric was the count of the palace, charged with the superintendence of its execution throughout the kingdom; Anianus, in quality of referendary, was to subscribe the various copies of it, and send them to the provincial counts; Timothy is one of these counts. The greater part of the manuscripts being but copies made for private purposes, give neither the preface nor any letter. The collection of Alaric contains: 1st, the Theodosian code (sixteen books); 2d, the books of civil law of the emperor Theodosius, Valentinian, Marcian, Majorian, and Severus; 3d, the Institutes of Gaïus, the jurisconsult; 4th, five books of Paul, the jurisconsult, entitled *Receptæ Sententiæ;* 5th, the Gregorian code (thirteen titles); 6th, the Hermoginian code (2 titles); 7th, and lastly, a passage from the work of Papinian, entitled *Liber Responsorum.*

The Constitutions and Novels of the emperors are called *Leges;* the works of the jurisconsults, including the Gregorian and Hermoginian codes, which did not emanate from any official or public power, bear simply the name of *Jus.* This is the distinction between law and jurisprudence.

The whole collection was called *Lex Romana,* and not *Breviarium;* the latter name was unknown before the sixteenth century.[1] Of the *Breviarium Alaricianum,* there is but one separate edition, published in 1528, at Basle, by Sichard. It has besides this been inserted, sometimes partially and sometimes entire, in the various editions of the Theodosian code.

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[1] In the preceding lecture it is said that Alaric caused the laws of his Roman subjects to be collected and published under the name of *Breviarium.* This is an oversight.

It is divided into two essential parts: 1st, a text or abstract of the sources of the law which I have just enumerated; 2d, an interpretation. The *Institutes* of Gaius is the only work in which the interpretation and the text are fused in one.

The text is merely the reproduction of the original text, it is not always complete; all the imperial constitutions, for example, are not inserted in the *Breviarium;* but those which it did produce are not mutilated. There the ancient law appears in all its purity, independent of the changes which the fall of the Empire must have introduced into it. The *Interpretation*, on the contrary, digested in the time of Alaric by civil or ecclesiastical jurisconsults, whom he had charged with this work, takes cognizance of all these changes; it explains, modifies, and sometimes positively alters the text, in order to adapt it to the new state of the government and of society; it is, therefore, for the study of the institutions and Roman laws of this epoch, more important and curious than the text itself. The mere existence of such a work is the most clear and conclusive proof of the perpetuity of Roman law. One need, indeed, scarcely open it. Should we open it, however, we shall everywhere find the trace of the Roman society, of its institutions and magistrates, as well as of its civil legislation. The municipal system occupies an important place in the *Interpretation* of the Breviarium; the curia and its magistrates, the *duumvirs*, the *defensores*, &c., recur at every step, and attest that the Roman municipality still subsisted and acted. And not only did it subsist, but it acquired more importance and independence. At the fall of the Empire, the governors of the Roman provinces, the *præsides*, the *consulares*, the *correctores*, disappeared; in their place we find the barbarian *counts*. But all the attributes of the Roman governors did not pass to the counts; they made a kind of partition of them; some belonged to the counts; and these, in general, were those in which the central power was interested, such as the levying of taxes, men, &c.; the others, those which only concerned the private life of the citizens, passed to the curiæ and the municipal magistrates. I have not cared to enumerate all these changes; but here are some examples drawn from the *Interpretation*.

1st. That which was formerly done by the prætor (*alibi* the president) shall now be executed by the judges of the city.—Interp. Paul, 1, 7, § 2; Int. C. Th., xi., 4, 2.

2d. Emancipation, which has usually been done before the president, must now be done before the curia.—Gaius 1, 6.

3d. Guardians were nominated at Constantinople by the prefect of the town, ten senators, and the prætor. The *Interpretation* puts in their place "the first of the city with the judge" (probably the duumvir).—Int. C. Th., iii., 17, 3.

5th. Wills must be opened in the curia.—Interp. C. Th., iv., 4, 4.

Cases of this kind are numerous, and do not allow of a doubt, but that, so far from perishing with the Empire, the municipal system acquired long after the invasion, at least in Southern Gaul, more extension and liberty.

A second considerable change is also visible. In the ancient Roman municipality, the superior magistrates, the *duumvir*, the quinquennalis, &c., exercised their jurisdiction as a personal right, not by any means by way of delegation, or in quality of representatives of the curia; it was to themselves, not to the municipal body, that the power appertained. The principal of the municipal system was more aristocratical than democratical. Such was the result of the ancient Roman manners, and especially of the primitive amalgamation of the religious and political powers in the superior magistrates.

In the *Breviarium* the aspect of the municipal system changes; it was no longer in its own name, it was in the name and as the delegate of the curiæ that the defensor exercised his power. The jurisdiction belonged to the curia in a body. The principle of its organization became democratical; and already the transformation was in preparation, which was to make of the Roman municipality the corporation of the middle ages.

These are the principal results of M. de Savigny's work, with regard to the permanence of Roman law under the Visigoths. I hardly know whether he has measured its whole extent and all its consequences in the history of modern society, but he has certainly caught glimpses of it; and in general his ideas are as precise as his learning is correct and extensive. Of all German savans who have occupied themselves on this subject, he is certainly the most exempt from all German prejudices, who least allows himself to be carried away by the desire to enlarge upon the power of the ancient German institutions and manners in modern civilization, and who makes the Roman element constitute the

better part. Sometimes, however, the prepossession of the national spirit, if I may so express myself, has still deceived him, and of this I will cite a single example. He says at the end of the chapter upon the municipal system under the Visigoths:—

"The text of the *Code* orders that at Rome, in order to pronounce upon a criminal accusation against a senator, five senators be appointed by lot: the *Interpretation* renders this rule general, and requires five of the principal citizens *of the same rank as the accused*, that is to say, *decurions* or *plebeian, according to the condition of the accused himself*. . . . May we not here conjecture the influence of the German *Scabini?*"[1]

Thus M. de Savigny supposes that, according to the *Interpretation* of the *Breviarium*, the judges drawn by lot, in criminal matters, were, under the Visigoths in the sixth century, to be of the same condition as the accused, that every man was to be judged by his peers; for it is thus that they commonly digest the principle of the institution of the jury, according to German manners. Here is the Latin sentence upon which this induction is founded.

"*Cum pro objecto crimine, aliquis audiendus est, quinque nobilissimi viri judices, de reliquis sibi similibus, missis sortibus eligantur.*"

That is to say:

"If any one be cited to appear on accusation of crime, let five nobles be appointed by lot, from among co-equals, to be judges"[2]

These words, *de reliquis sibi similibus*, evidently signify that the five judges shall be drawn by lot from the same class, and not from the class of the accused. There is, therefore, no trace in it of the idea that the judges must be of the same rank and condition of the accused. The words *nobilissimi viri* might have convinced M. de Savigny, and prevented his error: how, indeed, can they apply to plebeian judges?

Let us pass from the Visigoths to the Burgundians, and see what was the state of the Roman legislation at the same epoch, among the latter.

The preface to their law contains, as you will recollect, this sentence:

"We order that Romans be judged according to Roman

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[1] Vol. i., p. 265. [2] Interp. Cod. Th., xi, 1, 12

laws, as was done by our ancestors, and that they receive in writing the form and tenor of the laws according to which they shall be judged, to the end that no person can excuse himself upon the score of ignorance."

The Burgundian Sigismond, therefore, intended to do in 517, what Alaric, the Visigoth, had done eleven years before, to collect the Roman laws for his Roman subjects.

In 1566, Cujas found in a manuscript a law work which he published under the title of *Papiani Responsum*, or *Liber Responsorum*, and which has always since borne that name. It is divided into 47 or 48 titles, and offers the following characteristics :

1st. The order and heading of the titles corresponds almost exactly with those of the barbaric law of the Burgundians ; title II. *de homicidiis*, to title II. *de homicidiis ;* title III. *de libertatibus*, to title III. *de libertatibus servorum nostrorum*, and so on. M. de Savigny has drawn up a comparative view of the two laws,[1] and the correlativeness is evident.

2d. We read in title II. of this work, *de homicidiis :*

"And as it is very clear that the Roman law has regulated nothing concerning the value of men killed, our lord has ordered that according to the quality of the slave, the murderer shall pay to his master the following sums, namely :

For an intendant, ...	100 solidi
For a personal servant, ...	60
For a laborer or swineherd, ...	30
For a good gold-worker, ...	100
For a smith, ...	50
For a carpenter, ...	40

"This must be observed according to the order of the king."

The enumeration and the composition, under the corresponding title, are the same in the law of the Burgundians.

3d. Lastly, two titles of the first supplement of this law (tit. I. and XIX.) are textually borrowed from the *Papiani Responsum*, published by Cujas.

It is evident that this work is no other than the law proclaimed by Sigismond to his Roman subjects, at the time that he published the law of his barbaric subjects.

Whence comes the title of this law ? Why is it called

[1] Vol. ii., pp. 13—16.

Papiani Responsum? Is it, in fact, a repetition of a work of Papinianus, often called Papian by the manuscripts? Nothing is less probable. M. de Savigny has very ingeniously resolved this question. He conjectures that Cujas found the manuscript of the Roman law of the Burgundians at the end of a manuscript of the *Breviarium* of Alaric, without marking the separation of the two works; and that the *Breviarium* finishing by a passage of the *Liber Responsorum* of Papinianus, Cujas has inadvertently ascribed this passage and given this title to the work following. The examination of many manuscripts confirms this conjecture, and Cujas himself was doubtful of error.

As the *Breviarium* of Alaric preceded the law of the Roman Burgundians by only a few years, some people have supposed the latter to be merely an abstract of it. This is an error. Much more brief and incomplete than the Breviarium, the Papiani Responsum, since it keeps that name, has still, more than once, drawn from the sources of the Roman law, and furnishes upon this point many important indications.

It probably fell into disuse when the kingdom of the Burgundians fell under the yoke of the Franks. Everything indicates that the *Breviarium* of Alaric, more extensive and better satisfying to the various wants of civil life, progressively replaced it, and became the law of the Romans in all the countries of Gaul that the Burgundians, as well as the Visigoths, had possessed.

The Franks remain to be considered. When they had conquered, or almost conquered the whole of Gaul, the *Breviarium*, and, for some time also, the *Papian*, continued in vigor in the countries where they had formerly prevailed. But in the north and north-east of Gaul, in the first settlements of the Franks, the situation was different. We there find nothing of a new Roman code, no attempt to collect and digest the Roman law for the ancient inhabitants. It is certain, however, that it continued to rule them; here are the principal facts which do not admit of a doubt of this.

1st. The Salic and Ripuarian laws continually repeat that the Romans shall be judged according to the Roman law. Many decrees of the Frank kings—among others, a decree of Clotaire I., in 560, and one of Childebert II., in 595, renew this injunction, and borrow from the Roman law some of its provisions. The legislative monuments of the Franks, therefore, attest its perpetuity.

2d. A different kind of monuments, no less authentic, likewise prove it. Many of you know the formulæ, or models of forms, according to which, from the sixth to the tenth century, the principal acts of civil life, wills, bequests, enfranchisements, sales, &c., were drawn up. The principal collection of formulæ is that published by Marculf the monk, towards the end, as it seems, of the eighth century. Many men of learning—Mabillon, Bignon, Sirmond, and Lindenbrog—have recovered others of them from old manuscripts. A large number of these formulæ reproduced, in the same terms, the ancient forms of Roman law concerning the enfranchisement of slaves, bequests, testaments, prescriptions, &c., and thus prove that it was still of habitual application.

3d. All the monuments of this epoch, in the countries occupied by the Franks, are full of the names of the Roman municipal system—duumvirs, advocates, curia, and curial, and present these institutions as always in vigor.

4th. Many civil acts, in fact, exist, testaments, bequests, sales, &c., which passed according to the Roman law in the curia, and were so inscribed upon the registers.

5th. Lastly, the chroniclers of the time often speak of men versed in the knowledge of the Roman law, and who make an attentive study of it. In the sixth century, the Auvergnat Andarchius "was very learned in the works of Virgil, the books of the Theodosian law, and in the art of calculation."[1] At the end of the seventh century, Saint Bonet, bishop of Clermont, "was imbued with the principles of the grammarians, and learned in the decrees of Theodosius."[2] Saint Didier, bishop of Cahors, from 629 to 654, "applied himself," says his life in manuscript, "to the study of the Roman laws."

Of a surety there were then no *erudits;* there was then no Académie des Inscriptions, and people did not study the Roman law for mere curiosity. There can, then, be no reason for doubting that among the Franks, as well as among the Burgundians and Visigoths, it continued in vigor, particularly in the civil legislation and in the municipal system. Those among you who would seek the proofs in detail, the original texts upon which the results which I have just stated are founded, will find a large number of them in the work of

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[1] Greg of Tours, l. 4, c. 47. [2] *Acta sanc Juana*, c. 1, No. 3.

M. de Savigny (vol. i., p. 267—273; vol. ii., p. 100—118), and still more in the *Histoire du Régime Municipal de France*, published by M. Raynouard—a work replete with curious researches, researches so complete upon certain questions that, in truth, one might almost tax them with superfluity.

You see the fact which I proposed to bring forward is indubitable. Monuments of all kinds show it, doubtless in unequal degrees among different nations, but everywhere real and permanent. Its importance is great, because it proclaimed to Gaul a social state entirely different from that in which it had hitherto lived. It was hardly more than five centuries since it had fallen beneath the power of the Romans, and already scarcely a trace of the ancient Gaulish society remained. Roman civilization had the terrible power of extirpating the national laws, manners, language, and religion—of fully assimilating its conquests to itself. All absolute expressions are exaggerated; still, in considering things in general at the sixth century, we may say, everything in Gaul was Roman. The contrary fact accompanies barbaric conquest: the Germans leave to the conquered population their laws, local institutions, language, and religion. An invincible unity followed in the steps of the Romans: here, on the contrary, diversity was established by the consent and aid of the conquerors. We have seen that the empire of personality and individual independence, the characteristic of modern civilization, was of German origin; we here find its influence; the idea of personality presided in laws as in actions; the individuality of peoples, while subject to the same political domination, was proclaimed like that of man. Centuries must pass before the notion of territory can overcome that of race, before personal legislation can become real, and before a new national unity can result from the slow and laborious fusion of the various elements.

This granted, and the perpetuity of Roman legislation being established, still do not let this word deceive you: there is in it a great deal that is illusory; because it has been seen that the Roman law continued, because the same names and forms have been met with, it has been concluded that the principles, that the spirit of the laws had also remained the same: the Roman law of the tenth century has been spoken of as that of the Empire. This is erroneous language; when Alaric and Sigismond ordered a new collection of the Roman laws for the use of their Roman subjects, they did

exactly what had elsewhere been done by Theodoric and Dagobert, in causing the barbaric laws to be digested for their Frank subjects. As the Salic and Ripuarian laws set forth ancient customs, already ill suited to the new state of the German people, so the *Breviarium* of Alaric and the *Papiani Responsum* collected laws already old, and partly inapplicable. By the fall of the Empire and by the invasion, the whole social order was entirely changed; the relations between men were different, and another system of property commenced; the Roman political institutions could not subsist; facts of all sorts were renewed over the whole face of the land. And what laws were given to this rising society, so disordered and yet so fertile? Two ancient laws: the ancient barbarous customs and the ancient Roman legislation. It is evident that neither could be suitable; both must be modified, must be profoundly metamorphosed, in order to be adapted to the new facts.

When, therefore, we say that at the sixth century the Roman law still lasted, and that the barbarous laws were written; when we find in posterior centuries always the same words, Roman law, and barbaric laws, it must not be supposed that the same laws are spoken of. In perpetuating itself, the Roman law altered; after having been written, the barbaric laws were perverted. Both are among the number of the essential elements of modern society; but as elements entering into a new combination, which will arise after a long fermentation, and in the breast of which they will only appear transformed.

It is this successive transformation that I shall attempt to present to you; historians do not speak of it; unvarying phrases hide it; it is an internal work, a profoundly secret spectacle; and at which one can only arrive by piercing many inclosures, and guarding against the illusion caused by the similitude of forms and names.

We now find ourselves at the end of our researches concerning the state of civil society in Gaul, from the sixth to the middle of the eighth century. In our next lecture, we shall study the changes which happened in the religious society at the same epoch, that is to say, the state and constitution of the church.

TWELFTH LECTURE.

Object of the lecture—State of the church in Gaul, from the sixth to the middle of the eighth century—Analogy between the primitive state of the religious society and the civil society—The unity of the church or the spiritual society—Two elements or conditions of spiritual society; 1st. Unity of truth, that is to say, of absolute reason; 2d. Liberty of minds, or individual reason—State of these two ideas in the Christian church, from the sixth to the eighth century—She adopts one and rejects the other—Unity of the church in legislation—General councils—Difference between the eastern and the western church as regards the persecution of heretics—Relations of the church with the state, from the sixth to the eighth century: 1st, in the eastern empire; 2d, in the west, especially in Frankish Gaul—Interference of the temporal power in the affairs of the church—Of the spiritual power in the affairs of the state—Recapitulation.

We re-enter a route over which we have already gone; we again take up a thread which we have once held: we have to occupy ourselves with the history of the Christian church in Gaul, from the completion of the invasion to the fall of the Merovingian kings, that is to say, from the sixth to the middle of the eighth century.

The determination of this epoch is not arbitrary; the accession of the Carlovingian kings marked a crisis in religious society as well as in civil society. It is a date which constitutes an era, and at which it is advisable to pause.

Recall the picture which I have traced of the state of the religious society in Gaul, before the decisive fall of the Roman empire, that is to say, at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century. We have considered the church under two points of view: 1st, in her external situation, in her relations with the state; 2d, in her internal constitution, in her social and political organization. Around these two fundamental problems we have seen that all the particular questions, all the facts collect.

This two-fold examination has enabled us to see, in the first five centuries of the church, the germ of all the solutions of the two problems, some example of all the forms, and trials of all the combinations. There is no system, whether in re-

gard to the external relations of the church, or her interna. organization, which may not be traced to this epoch, and there find some authority. Independence, obedience, sovereignty, the compromises of the church with the state, presbyterianism or episcopacy, the complete absence of the clergy, or its almost exclusive domination, we have found all these.

We have just examined the state of civil society after the invasion, in the sixth and seventh centuries, and we have arrived at the same result. There, likewise, we have found the germ, the example of all the systems of social organization, and of government: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; the assemblies of free men; the patronage of the chief of the land towards his warriors, of the great proprietor towards the inferior proprietor, royalty, absolute and impotent, elective and hereditary, barbarous, imperial, and religious: all the principles, in a word, which have been developed in the life of modern Europe, at that time simultaneously appeared to us.

There is a remarkable similarity in the origin and primitive state of the two societies: wealth and confusion are alike in them; all things are there; none in its place and proportion; order will come with development; in being developed, the various elements will be disengaged and distinguished; each will display its pretensions and its own powers, first in order to combat, and afterwards to become reconciled. Such will be the progressive work of ages and of man.

It is at this work that we have hereafter to be present; we have seen in the cradle of the two societies all the material elements, and all the rational principles of modern civilization; we are about to follow them in their struggles, negotiations, amalgamations, and in all the vicissitudes both of their special and their common destiny This, properly speaking, is the history of civilization; we have as yet only arrived at the theatre of this history, and named its actors.

You will not be surprised that in entering upon a new era we should first encounter the religious society: it was, as you are aware, the most advanced and the strongest; whether in the Roman municipality, in the palace of the barbarous kings, or in the hierarchy of the conquerors now become proprietors, we have everywhere recognized the presence and influence of the heads of the church. From the fourth to the thirteenth century, it was the church that took the lead in the

career of civilization. It is natural, then, that, during this period, every time that we have made a halt, and again moved forward, it should be with her that we recommence.

We shall study her history from the sixth to the eighth century, under the two points of view already indicated; 1st, in her relations with the state; 2dly, in her peculiar and internal constitution.

But before approaching either of these questions, and the facts which are attached thereto, I must call your attention to a fact which dominates over all, which characterizes the Christian church in general, and has, as it were, decided her destiny.

This fact is the unity of the church, the unity of the Christian society, despite all the diversities of time, place, domination, language, or origin.

Singular phenomenon! It was at the very time that the Roman empire fell to pieces and disappeared, that the Christian church rallied, and definitively formed herself. Political unity perished, religious unity arose. I know not how many nations, of various origins, manners, language, and destiny, are thrown upon the scene; all becomes partial and local; every extended idea, every general institution, every great social combination vanishes; and at this very moment the Christian church proclaims the unity of her doctrine, the universality of her right.

This is a glorious and powerful fact, and one which, from the fifth to the thirteenth century, has rendered immense services to humanity. The mere fact of the unity of the church, maintained some tie between countries and nations that everything else tended to separate; under its influence, some general notions, some sentiments of a vast sympathy continued to be developed; and from the very heart of the most frightful political confusion that the world has ever known, arose perhaps the most extensive and the purest idea that has ever rallied mankind, the idea of spiritual society; for that is the philosophical name of the church, the type which she wished to realize.

What sense did men, at this period, attach to these words, and what progress had they already made in this path? What was actually, in minds and in facts, this spiritual society, the object of their ambition and respect? How was it conceived and practised? These questions must be answered in order to know what is meant when we speak of the unity

of the church, and what ought to be thought of its principles and results.

A common conviction, that is to say, an identical idea, acknowledged and received as true, is the fundamental basis, the secret tie of human society. One may stop at the most confined and the most simple association, or elevate oneself to the most complicated and extensive; we may examine what passes between three or four barbarians united for a hunting expedition, or in the midst of an assembly convoked to treat of the affairs of a great nation; everywhere, and under all circumstances, it is in the adhesion of individuals to the same thought, that the fact of association essentially consists: so long as they do not comprehend one another, they are mere isolated beings, placed by the side of one another, but not holding together. A similar sentiment and doctrine, whatever may be its nature or object, is the first condition of the social state; it is in the midst of truth only, or in what they take for truth, that men become united, and that society takes birth. And in this sense, a modern philosopher[1] was right in saying that there is no society except between intellects; that society only subsists upon points and within limits, where the union of intellects is accomplished; that where intellects have nothing in common, there is no society; in other words, that intellectual society is the only society, the necessary element, and, as it were, the foundation of all external and visible associations.

Now, the essential element of truth, and precisely what is, in fact, the social tie, *par excellence*, is unity. Truth is one, therefore the men who have acknowledged and accepted it are united; a union which has in it nothing accidental nor arbitrary, for truth neither depends upon the accidents of things, nor upon the uncertainties of men; nothing transitory, for truth is eternal; nothing confined, for truth is complete and infinite. As of truth, unity then will be the essential characteristic of the society which shall have truth alone for its object, that is to say, of the purely religious society. There is not, there cannot be, two spiritual societies; it is, from its nature, sole and universal.

Thus did the church take birth: hence that unity which she proclaims as her principle, that universality which has

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[1] M. l'Abbé de Lamennais.

always been her ambition. In degrees more or less evident, and more or less strict, it is the idea which rests at the bottom of all her doctrines, which hovers over all her works. Long before the sixth century, from the very cradle of Christianity, it appears in the writings and acts of its most illustrious interpreters.

But unity of truth in itself is not sufficient for the rise and subsistence of the religious society; it is necessary that it should be evident to minds, and that it should rally them. Union of minds, that is to say, spiritual society, is the consequence of the unity of truth; but so long as this union is not accomplished, the principle wants its consequence, spiritual society does not exist. Now, upon what condition do minds unite themselves in truth? Upon this condition, that they acknowledge and accept its empire: whoever obeys truth without knowing it, from ignorance and not from light, or whoever, having knowledge of the truth, refuses to obey it, is not part of the spiritual society; none form a part of it if they do not see nor wish it; it excludes, on one side, ignorance, and on the other, constraint; it exacts from all its members an intimate and personal adhesion of intellect and liberty.

Now, at the epoch upon which we are occupied, this second principle, this second characteristic of spiritual society, was wanting to the church. It would be unjust to say that it was absolutely unknown to her, and that she believed that spiritual society could exist between men without the consent of their intellect or liberty. Thus put in its simple and naked form, this idea is offensive and necessarily repulsed; besides, the full and vigorous exercise of reason and will was too recent and still too frequent in the church, for her to fall into so entire an oblivion. She did not affirm that truth had a right to employ constraint; on the contrary, she incessantly repeated that spiritual arms were the only arms of which she could and ought to avail herself. But this principle, if I may so express myself, was only upon the surface of minds, and evaporated from day to day. The idea that truth, one and universal, had a right to pursue by force the consequences of its unity and universality, became from day to day the dominant, active, and efficacious idea. Of the two conditions of spiritual society, the rational unity of doctrine, and the actual unity of minds, the first almost solely occu

pied the church; the second was incessantly forgotten or violated.

Many centuries were necessary in order to give to it its place and power, that is to say, to bring out the true nature of spiritual society, its complete nature, and the harmony of its elements. It was long the general error to believe that the empire of truth—that is, of universal reason—could be established without the free exercise of individual reason, without respect to its right. Thus they misunderstood spiritual society, even in announcing it; they exposed it to the risk of being but a lying illusion. The employment of force does far more than stain it, it kills it; in order that its unity may be, not only pure, but real, it is necessary that it shine forth in the midst of the development of all intellects and all liberties.

It will be the honor of our times to have penetrated into the essence of spiritual society much further than the world has ever yet done, to have much more completely known and asserted it. We now know that it has two conditions: 1st, the presence of a general and absolute truth, a rule of doctrines and human action: 2d, the full development of all intellects, in face of this truth, and the free adhesion of souls to its power. Let not one of these conditions ever allow us to forget the other; let not the idea of the liberty of minds weaken in us that of the unity of spiritual society: because individual convictions should be clear and free, let us not be tempted to believe that there is no universal truth which has a right to command; in respecting the reason of each, do not lose sight of the one and sovereign reason. The history of human society has hitherto passed alternately from one to the other of these dispositions. At certain epochs men have been peculiarly struck with the nature and rights of this universal and absolute truth, the legitimate master to whose reign they aspired: they flattered themselves that at last they had encountered and possessed it, and in their foolish confidence they accorded to it the absolute power which soon and inevitably engendered tyranny. After having long submitted to and respected it, man recognized it, he saw the name and rights of truth usurped by ignorant or perverse force; then he was more irritated with the idols than occupied with God himself; the unity of divine reason, if I may be permitted to use the expression, was no longer the object of his habitual contemplation; he above all thought upon the

right of human reason in the relations of men, and often finished by forgetting that, if it is free, the will is not arbitrary; that if there is a right of inquiry for individual reason, it is still subordinate to that general reason which serves for the measure and touchstone of all minds. And even as in the first instance there was tyranny, so in the second there was anarchy, that is to say, the absence of general and powerful belief, the absence of principles in the soul, and of union in society. One may hope that our time is called to avoid each of these sand-banks, for it is, if I may so speak, in possession of the chart which points them both out. The development of civilization must be accomplished hereafter under the simultaneous influence of a two-fold reverence; universal reason will be sought as the supreme law, the final aim; individual reason will be free, and invoked to develope itself as the best means of attaining to universal reason. And if spiritual society be never complete and pure—the imperfection of humanity will not allow it—at least its unity will no longer run the risk of being factitious and fraudulent. You have had a glance at the state of minds concerning this great idea, at the epoch upon which we are occupied: let us pass to the state of facts, and see what practical consequence had already been produced by that unity of the church, of which we have just described the rational characteristics.

It was seen above all in the ecclesiastical legislation, and it was so much the more conspicuous there, from being in contradiction to all that passed elsewhere. We have studied in our last lectures civil legislation from the fifth to the eighth century; and diversity, which gradually increased, has appeared to us its fundamental trait. The tendency of religious society is very different; it aspired to a unity in laws, and attained it. And it is not that she exclusively drew her laws from the primitive monuments of religion, from the sacred books, always and everywhere the same: in proportion as she was developed, new desires were manifested, new laws were necessary, or a new legislator. Who should it be? The east was separated from the west, the west was daily parcelled out into distinct and independent states. Should there be, for the church thus dispersed, many legislators? Shall the councils of Gaul, Spain, or Italy, give them religious laws? No; there shall be an universal and sole legislation for the whole church, superior to all the diversities of national churches and councils, and to all the differences which are

necessarily introduced into discipline, worship, and usages. The decrees of the general councils shall everywhere be obligatory and accepted. From the fourth to the eighth century there were six œcumenical or general councils; they were all held in the east, by the bishops of the east, and under the influence of the eastern emperors; there were scarcely any bishops from the west among them.[1] Yet, despite so many causes for misunderstanding and separation, despite the diversity of languages, governments, and manners, and moreover, despite the rivalry of the patriarchs of Rome, Constantinople, and Alexandria, the legislation of the general councils was everywhere adopted; the west and the east alike yielded to it; a few only of the decrees of the fifth council were for a moment contested. So powerful already was the idea of unity in the church; such was the spiritual tie dominating all things!

With regard to the second principle of spiritual society, liberty of minds, some distinction must be made between the east and the west; the state of facts was not the same in them.

In setting forth the state of the church in the fourth and fifth centuries, I have made you acquainted with the disposition of the legislation, and of minds generally, with regard to heresy. The principle of persecution, you will recollect, was neither clearly established, nor constantly dominant; still it gradually prevailed; in spite of the generous protestations of some bishops, in spite of the variety of cases, the laws of Theodosius, the persecution of the Arians, the Donatists, the Pelagians, and the punishment of the Priscillianists, do not admit a doubt of this.

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[1] *Table of the General Councils from the Fourth to the Eighth Century.*

Date.	*Place.*	*Present.*	*Eastern.*	*Western.*
325	Nicea . . .	318	315	3
381	Constantinople	150	149	1
431	Ephesus . .	68	67	1
451	Chalcedonia .	353	350	3
553	Constantinople	164	158	6
680	Constantinople	56	51	5

Dating from the sixth century, and in the Empire of the east, the true successor and continuator of the Roman empire, events and ideas followed the same course; the principle of persecution was developed; the history of the Monophysites and Monothelites, that of many other heresies, and the legislation of Justinian, give proof of this.

In the west, the invasion and all its consequences for some time delayed its progress; almost all intellectual movement came to a stand still. Amidst the incessant confusion of life, what room could be left for contemplation and study? Heresies were rare; the contest continued between the Arians and the orthodox; but we see but few new doctrines arise, and those which attempted to introduce themselves were scarcely anything more than a weak echo of the heresies of the east. Persecution, therefore, so to speak, wanted matter and occasion. Besides, the bishops did not in any way provoke it; more pressing affairs occupied them; the situation of the church was perilous; she not only was under the necessity of occupying herself about her temporal interests, but her safety, her very existence, was in danger; they cared little for minor varieties of opinion. Fifty-four councils were held in Gaul in the sixth century; two only, that of Orange and that of Valentia, in 529, occupied themselves with dogmas; they condemned the heresy of the semi-Pelagians, which the fifth century had bequeathed to them.

Lastly, the barbaric kings, the new masters of the soil, took but little interest, and rarely any part in such debates. The emperors of the east were theologians as well as bishops; they had been born and bred in theology; they had personal and fixed opinions concerning its problems and quarrels. Justinian and Heraclius willingly engaged upon their own account in the suppression of heresy. Unless impelled by some powerful political motive, neither Gondebald, Chilperic, nor Gontran, troubled themselves in the matter. Numerous actions and words have come down to us of the Burgundian, Gothic, and Frank kings, which prove how little they were disposed to exert their power in such causes. "We cannot command religion," said Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths; "no one can be forced to believe, in spite of himself."[1] . . . "Since the Deity suffers various religions," said King Theo-

[1] *Cassiod. Variar. Ep.* l. xi., ep. 27.

dobat, "we dare not prescribe a single one. We remember having read that God must be sacrificed to willingly, and not under the constraint of a master. Those, therefore, who attempt to do otherwise, evidently oppose themselves to the divine commands."[1]

Doubtless, Cassiodorus here lends to the two Gothic kings the superiority of his reason; but they adopted his language; and in many other cases, whether it be ignorance or good sense, we find the barbaric princes manifesting the same disposition.

In fact, therefore, from the concurrence of various causes, the second condition of spiritual society, liberty of minds, was at this epoch less violated in the west than in the east. It is necessary, however, not to be mistaken in this matter; it was but an accident, the temporary effect of external circumstances; at bottom the principle was equally overlooked, and the general course of things tended equally to bring about the prevalence of persecution.

You see that, in spite of some differences, the unity of the church, with all the consequences attached thereto, was everywhere the dominant fact, alike in the west and in the east; alike in the social state and in minds generally. That was the principle which, in religious society, presided over opinions, laws, and actions, the point from which they always started; the end to which they incessantly tended. From the fourth century, this idea was, as it were, the star under whose influence religious society was developed in Europe, and which it is necessary to keep always in view, in order to follow and to comprehend the vicissitudes of its destiny.

This point agreed upon, and the characteristic fact of this epoch being well established, let us enter upon the particular examination of the state of the church, and seek what were: first, her relations with civil society and its government; secondly, her peculiar and internal organization.

I would pray you to recall what I said when speaking of the church in the fifth century: it appeared to us that her relations with the state might be determined into four different systems: 1st, the complete independence of the church: the unnoticed and unknown church, receiving neither law nor support from the state; 2dly, the sovereignty of the state over

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[1] *Cassiod. Variar. Ep.* l. x., ep. 26

the church: religious society governed, if not completely, at least in its principal elements, by the civil power; 3dly, the sovereignty of the church over the state: the temporal government, if not directly possessed, at least completely dominated by the spiritual power; 4thly, and lastly, the co-existence of the two societies, the two powers, which, though separate, were allied by certain various and variable conditions, which united without confounding them.

We, at the same time, recognized that in the fifth century this latter system prevailed; that the Christian church and the Roman empire both existed, as two distinct societies, each having its government and laws, but adopting and mutually sustaining each other. In the midst of their reliance, we discovered traces still visible of another principle, of an anterior state, the sovereignty of the state over the church, the intervention and decided preponderance of the emperors in her administration; lastly, but only in the distance, we caught a glimpse of the sovereignty of the church over the state, the domination over the temporal government by the spiritual power.

Such appeared to us, in its whole, the situation of the Christian church of the fifteenth century in her relations with the state.

In the sixth century, if we regard the eastern empire, over which it is always necessary to extend our view in order to comprehend properly what happened in the west, and the changes which the barbaric invasion brought about in the course of things, we shall be struck by two simultaneous facts:—

1st. The clergy, especially the episcopacy, unceasingly procured from the emperors new favors and privileges. Justinian gave to the bishops: 1st, the civil jurisdiction over monks and nuns, the same as over clerks;[1] 2d, the inspection of property in cities, and the preponderance in all municipal administration;[2] 3d, the enfranchisement from paternal power;[3] 4th, he forbad the judges calling them as witnesses, and demanding an oath of them.[4] Herodius granted them the criminal jurisdiction over clerks.[5] The influence and

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[1] *Nov. Justin.*, 79, 83; A.D. 535. [2] *Cod. Justin*, i., tit. iv., l 26 *Nov.* 81.
[4] *Nov.* 123, c. 7
[5] Gieseler, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, t. i., p. 602.

immunities of religious society in civil society were ever increasing.

2d. The emperors, however, mixed themselves more and more in the affairs of the church; not only in her relations with the state, but in her internal affairs, constitution, and discipline. And not only did they meddle with her government, but they interfered in her creeds; they gave decrees in favor of such and such a dogma; they regulated the faith.

Upon the whole, the authority of the eastern emperors over religious society was more general, active, frequent, despotic, than it had ever been hitherto; despite the progress of her privileges, the situation of the church with regard to the civil power was weak, inferior, and fallen off from what it was in the ancient Empire.

Two contemporaneous texts will prevent your doubting this.

In the middle of the sixth century, the Franks sent an embassy to Constantinople; the clergy of Italy wrote to the Frank envoys to give them, as to the empire of the east, such information as they believed might be beneficial to the success of their mission:

"The Greek bishops," it said to them, "have great and opulent churches, and they cannot bear being suspended two months from the government of ecclesiastical affairs; so accommodating themselves to the age, and to the will of princes, they consent without contest to all that is demanded of them."[1]

The next is a document which speaks still more emphatically. Maurice, emperor of the east (582—602), had interdicted all persons occupied in civil functions from becoming clerks or entering a monastery; he had sent this law to Rome, to pope Gregory the Great, in order that he might spread it in the west. Rome was only held to the Greek empire by a feeble tie; Gregory had not in reality anything to fear from the emperor; he was ardent and proud; the decree of Maurice offended him; he wished to mark his disapprobation, perhaps even attempt some resistance, he thus terminated his letter:

"I, who say these things to my lords, what am I, but dust or an earth-worm? Still, as I think that this law goes against

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[1] Mansi. Conc., t. ix, p. 153

God, the author of all things, I cannot conceal this thought from my lords; and see what Christ answers to it, in saying to you, through me, the last of his servants and yours: 'From secretary I have made thee count of the guards, from count of the guards, Cæsar, from Cæsar, emperor, and not only emperor, but also father of an emperor; I have confided my priests to thy hands, and thou withdrawest thy soldiers from my service.' I pray thee, most pious lord, say to thy servant, what wilt thou answer at the day of judgment to thy God, who will come and say these things to thee?

"As for me, submitting to thy order, I have sent this law to the various countries of the earth, and I have said to my serene lords, in this paper, whereon I have deposited my reflections, that this law goes against that of the all-powerful God; I have therefore fulfilled my duty upon each side; I have rendered obedience to Cæsar, and I have not been silent as to what appeared to me against God."[1]

Of a surety, from such a man, in such a situation, and with such a design, the tone of this letter is singularly mild and modest. Some centuries later, Gregory would have used a very different language towards even the nearest and most redoubtable sovereign. The language which he adopts here, can have no other cause than the habits of subordination and dependence of the church towards the eastern emperors, amidst the continual extension of her immunities.

The church of the west, after the invasion and under the barbaric kings, offers a different spectacle. Her new masters mixed themselves in no manner with her dogmas; they left her, in matters of faith, to act and govern herself as she pleased. They interfered almost as little in her discipline, properly so called, in the relations of the clergy among themselves. But in all which concerned the relations between the religious and civil societies, in all that could interest temporal power, the church lost independence and privilege; she was less free, and not treated so well as under the Roman emperors. 1st. You have seen that, before the fall of the Empire, the bishops were elected by the clergy and the people. The emperor only interfered in rare cases, in the election for the most considerable towns. It was no longer so in Gaul after the establishment of the barbaric monarchies. The churches

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[1] *Greg. M. Epist*, l. iii., ep. 65, to the emperor Maurice.

were wealthy; the barbaric kings made them a means of recompensing their servants and enriching themselves. In numerous instances, they directly nominated the bishops. The church protested; she claimed the election; she did not always succeed therein; many bishops were retained in the sees where they had been placed by the kings alone. Still the fact was not changed into a matter of right, and continued to pass for an abuse. The kings themselves admit this on many occasions. The church, by degrees, regained the election; but she also gave way in her turn; she granted that after the election the confirmation of the king was necessary. The bishop, who formerly took possession of his see, from the time that he was consecrated by the archbishop, now ascended not his throne until after obtaining the sanction of royalty. Such is not only the fact, but the religious and civil law.

"Let no person be permitted," orders the council of Orleans in 549, "to acquire a see by means of money; but with the consent of the king, let him who shall have been elected by the clergy and the people, be consecrated bishop by the archbishop and his suffragans."

"Upon the death of a bishop," says Clotaire II., in 615, "he who is to be ordained in his place by the archbishop and his suffragans, shall be elected by the clergy and the people, and ordained by the order of the prince."

The contest between election and royal nomination was often reproduced; but in every case the necessity of confirmation was acknowledged.

2d. As under the Roman empire, councils could not be convoked but with the consent of the prince, and he threatened the bishops when they attempted to evade it. "We have learnt from public report," wrote king Sigbert to Didier, bishop of Cahors, in the seventh century, "that you have been convoked by . . . the bishop of Vulfoleud, to hold a council in our kingdom, the 1st of September . . . with the others . . . bishops of your province. . . . Although we desire to maintain the observance of the canons and ecclesiastical rules, as they were preserved by our ancestors, still *because we have not been made acquainted with the convocation of this assembly, we have agreed, with our great men, not to suffer this council to be held without our knowledge in our states;* and that no bishops of our kingdom shall assemble at the approaching calends of September. In future, if we have timely intimation of the object of a council, whether it meets in

order to regulate the discipline of the church, or for the good of the state, or for other affairs, we shall not refuse our consent to its meeting; provided, however, that information is first given us of it. The reason we write you this letter is, to forbid your attending this assembly." The monuments, the very acts of thirteen councils assembled in the sixth and seventh centuries, formally express tha they were convoked by the order, and held with the consent of the king.[1] I do not doubt, however, but in this, the fact was very often contrary to the acknowledged right, and that a number of councils, especially the mere provincial councils, met and regulated their affairs without any authorization.

3d Some writers[2] have thought that the independence of the church also suffered from an institution which was more developed among the Franks than elsewhere; I mean the chapel of the king, and the priest who had the direction of it, under the name of *Archicapellanus, Abbas regii oratorii Apocrisiarius*. At first charged only with the exercise of worship in the interior of the palace, this superior of the chapel assumed gradually more importance, and became, to speak in the language so little applicable of our own times, a kind of minister of ecclesiastical affairs for the whole kingdom; it is supposed these were managed almost entirely by his intermediation, and that by his means royalty exercised a great influence over them. It may be that this influence was real at certain times, under such or such a king, under Charlemagne, for example; but I very much doubt that in general,

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These are:

1.	The	council of	Orleans, in	511.
2.	—	"	Orleans, in	533.
3.	—	"	Clermont, in	535
4.	—	"	Orleans, in	549
5.	—	"	Paris, in	556
6.	—	"	Tours, in	567
7.	—	"	Lyons, in	575.
8.	—	"	Châlons, in	579.
9.	—	"	Mâcon, in	581.
10.	—	"	Valencia, in	584.
11.	—	"	Verdun	——
12.	—	"	Paris, in	615.
13.	—	"	Châlons, in	650

Among others, M. Planck, in his *History of the Constitution of the Christian Church* (in German), a work of rare science and impartiality.—See vol. ii., 147

and of itself, the institution was efficacious; it would serve rather the power of the church over the king, than that of the king in the church.

4th. There was something more real in the restrictions to which, at this epoch, the ecclesiastical privileges were subjected. They were numerous and important. For example, it was forbidden any bishop to ordain a free man as priest without the consent of the king.[1] Priests were exempt from military service; the king did not choose that free men should relieve themselves at will by means of this title. The church, therefore, at this epoch was peopled with slaves; it was especially among her own slaves, among the serfs and laborers of her domains, that she recruited herself; and this circumstance, perhaps, is one of those which have not least contributed to the efforts of the church for ameliorating the condition of the serfs. Many priests were taken from among them; and, independently of religious motives, they knew the miseries of their situation, they bore some sympathy for those who were plunged in it. In criminal matters, the priests in the west had not obtained the privilege which Heraclius had granted to those in the east; they were tried by the ordinary lay judges. In civil matters the clergy judged itself, but only in cases where the cause interested simply priests; if the difference was between a priest and a layman, the layman was not bound to appear before the bishop; on the contrary, he had the priest before his judges. With regard to public charges, there were certain churches whose domains were exempt, and the number of these daily increased; but the immunity was by no means general. Upon the whole, immediately after the invasion, in its principal relations with the temporal power, the clergy of Frankish Gaul seemed less independent, and invested with less privileges, than it was in Roman Gaul.

But means were not wanting both to regain in time advantages, and to assure herself of large compensations. By not in any way interfering in dogmatical points, that is, in the intellectual government of the church, the barbaric kings left to her the most fertile source of power. She knew how to draw largely upon it. In the east, the laity took part in theology and in the influence which it conferred. In the west,

[1] Council of Orleans, in 511, can. 6.

The clergy alone addressed itself to minds, and alone was master of them. It alone spoke to the people, and alone rallied them around certain ideas which became laws. It was by this means especially that it re-acquired power, and repaired the losses to which the invasion had subjected it. Towards the end of the epoch upon which we are occupied, this had already become visible. The church evidently recovered from the shocks which had been given her by the disorder of the times and the brutal avidity of the barbarians. She made her right of asylum acknowledged and consecrated. She acquired a kind of right of superintendence and revision over the lay judges of an inferior order. The consequences of her jurisdiction over all sins were developed. By wills and marriages, she penetrated more and more into the civil order. Ecclesiastical judges were associated with lay judges every time a priest was concerned in the suit. Lastly, the presence of the bishops, whether with the king, in the assembly of great men, or in the hierarchy of proprietors, assured them a powerful participation in the political order; and if the sovereign power meddled in church affairs, the church, in her turn, extended her action and power more and more into the affairs of the world.

This is the dominant character of this epoch, as regards the reciprocal situation of the civil and religious society. The temporal and spiritual powers approached, penetrated, and encroached more and more upon each other. Before the invasion, when the Empire was still erect, although the two societies were already strongly entwined with one another, still there was a profound distinction. The independence of the church was sufficiently complete in what directly concerned her; and in temporal matters, although she had much influence, she had hardly any direct action except upon the municipal system, and in the midst of cities. For the general government of the state, the emperor had his machinery all prepared, his councils, magistrates, and armies; in a word, the political order was complete and regular, apart from the religious society and its government. After the invasion, amidst the dissolution of the political order, and the universal trouble, the limits of the two governments vanished; they lived from day to day without principles, without settled conditions; they encountered everywhere, clashing, confounded, disputing the means of action, struggling together in darkness and by chance. Of this irregular co-existence of temporal

and spiritual power, this fantastical entanglement of their attributes, these reciprocal usurpations, this uncertainty as to their limits, all this chaos of church and state, which has played so great a part in our history, which has brought forth so many events and theories, it is to the epoch which now occupies us that the origin must be assigned; that only is its most striking feature.

In our next lecture we shall occupy ourselves with the internal organization of the church, and the changes which happened in it during the same period.

THIRTEENTH LECTURE.

Of the internal organization and state of the Gallo-Frankish church, from the sixth to the eighth century—Characteristic facts of the Gaulish church at the fifth century—What became of them after the invasion—The exclusive domination of the clergy in the religious society continues—Facts which modify it: 1. Separation of ordination and tenure; priests not ecclesiastics—2. Patronage by laymen of the churches which they founded—3. Oratories, or particular chapels—4. Advocates of the churches—Picture of the general organization of the church—Parishes and their priests—Archpriests and archdeacons—Bishops—Archbishops—Attempts to establish the patriarchates in the west—Fall of the archbishops—Preponderance and despotism of the episcopacy — Struggle of the priests and parishes against the bishops—The bishops triumphant—Despotism corrupts them—Decline of the secular clergy—Necessity for a reformation.

We have seen what were the relations between the church and the state, and their principal modifications, in Frankish Gaul, from the sixth to the eighth century. We shall now examine the peculiar and internal organization of the church at the same epoch; it is curious and full of vicissitudes.

It will be recollected that a religious society may be constituted according to two principal systems. In one, the faithful, the laymen, as well as the priests, take part in the government; the religious society is not under the exclusive empire of the ecclesiastical society. In the other system, power belongs to the clergy alone; laymen are strangers to it; it is the ecclesiastical society which governs the religious society.

This fundamental distinction once established, we have seen that in each of these two great systems, totally various modes of organization might be developed: where religious society governed itself, for example, it might be—1st, that the local associations were united in one general church, under the direction of one or more assemblies, where the ecclesiastics and the laity were together; 2dly, that there should be no general and sole church, that each particular congregation, each local church should govern itself; 3dly, that there should be no clergy, properly so called, no men invested with permanent spiritual power; that the laity should fulfil the religious functions. These three modes of organization have

been realized by the Presbyterians, the Independents, and the Quakers.

If the clergy alone dominates, if the religious society is under subjection to the ecclesiastical society, this latter may be monarchically, aristocratically, or democratically constituted and governed, by the papal power, the episcopacy, or by assemblies of priests, equal among themselves. The example of these various constitutions is likewise met with in history.

In fact, in the Gaulish church of the fifth century, two of these principles had already prevailed: 1st, the separation of the religious society and the ecclesiastical society, of the clergy and the people, was consummated; the clergy alone governed the church—a domination, however, palliated by some remains of the intervention of the faithful in the election of bishops. 2dly, in the bosom of the clergy, the aristocratical system prevailed; episcopacy alone dominated; a domination which was likewise palliated, on one hand by the intervention of the simple priests in the election of bishops, on the other by the influence of councils, a source of liberty in the church, although none but bishops sat in them.

Such were the dominant facts, the characteristic features of the Gaulish church at the time of the invasion: what did they become after the invasion: did they remain or disappear? to what modifications were they subjected from the sixth to the eighth century? These are the questions which must occupy us at present.

I. And, first, there cannot be a doubt but that the separation of the clergy and the people, the exclusive domination of the ecclesiastics over the laity, was kept up. Immediately after the invasion, it appeared to waver for a moment; in the common peril, the clergy and the people were brought together. This fact is nowhere positively written and visible; but it is seen by glimpses, it is everywhere felt: in going over the documents of this epoch, one is struck with I know not what new intimacy between the priests and the faithful; these latter lived in the churches, so to speak: on numberless occasions, the bishops met them, spoke with them, consulted them; the solemnity of the times, the community of sentiments and destinies, obliged the government to establish itself in the midst of the population; it sustained the power which protected it: in sustaining it, it took part therein.

This effect was of short duration. You will recollect the

principal cause to which I have attributed the exclusive domination of the clergy over the people. It appeared to me especially to result from the inferiority of the people, an inferiority of intellect, of energy, of influence. After the invasion, this fact did not alter, it was rather aggravated. The miseries of the time made the Gaulish-Roman population fall still lower. The priests, on their side, when once the conquerors were converted, no longer felt the same want of close union with the conquered; the people, therefore, lost the momentary importance which it seemed to have acquired. The barbarians inherited none of it; they were in no way capable of associating with the government of the church; they had not the least wish so to do; and kings were soon the only laymen who took part in it.

Many facts, however, combated this isolation of the ecclesiastical society in the religious society, and gave influence to the laity in default of power.

1st. The first, which, in my opinion, has been too little marked, and which has had enduring and important consequences, was the separation of ordination and tonsure. Down to the sixth century, the tonsure took place at the time of entering into orders; it was regarded as the sign of ordination, *signum ordinis*. Dating from the sixth century, we find the tonsure conferred without any admission into orders; instead of being *signum ordinis*, it was called *signum destinationis ad ordinem*. The principle of the church had hitherto been, *tonsura ipsa est ordo*, "tonsure is the order itself." She maintained this principle, with this explanation:

Tonsure is the order itself, but in the largest sense of the term, and as a preparation to the divine service. In a word, everything attests that, from that time, tonsure and ordination were distinct; and that many men were tonsured without entering into orders; became clerks without becoming ecclesiastics.[1]

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[1] M. Plank even says that they often gave the tonsure to children; and he refers to the 6th canon of the 10th council of Toledo, held in 656, which forbids its being conferred before the age of ten. But there is some confusion in this: this canon only concerns children brought up in monasteries, and whom the tonsure devoted to a religious life. This fact has no analogy with that which occupies us, and to the support of which M. Plank invokes it.—Hist. de la Constit. de l'Eglise Chrétienne, ii., p. 13, not 8. Labbé, Conc., t. vi., col. 463.

They wished to participate in the immunities of the church; she received them into her ranks in the same way as she opened her temples to the proscribed; she thereby gained an extension of her credit and her forces. But the religious society gained thereby, in its turn, a means of action upon the ecclesiastical society; those who were merely tonsured did not share completely either the interests or the *esprit-de-corps*, or the life of the clergy, properly so called; they preserved, to a certain degree, the habits and feelings of the lay population, and introduced them into the church. More numerous than they are generally supposed, this class of men has played a considerable part in the history of the middle ages. Bound to the church without belonging to her, enjoying her privileges without falling under the yoke of her interests and manners, protected and not enslaved, it was in its breast that that spirit of liberty was developed which we shall see burst forth towards the end of the eleventh century, and of which Abailard was then the most illustrious interpreter. From the eighth century, it mitigated that separation of the clergy and the people which was the dominant characteristic of the epoch, and prevented it from bearing all its fruit.

2dly. A second fact concurred to the same result. From the time that Christianity became powerful, it was, as you know, a frequent custom to found and to endow churches. The founder enjoyed, in the church which owed its origin to him, certain privileges which, at first, were purely honorary; they inscribed his name in the interior of the church, they prayed for him, they even granted him some influence over the choice of the priests charged with the divine offices. It happened that bishops wished to found churches beyond their diocese, whether in their native town, in the midst of some domain, or from some other motive. Their right to choose the priest called to perform the duties was unhesitatingly recognized; many councils occupied themselves in regulating the exercise of this right, and the relations of the bishop who founded the church with the bishop in the diocese where the foundation was situated.

"If a bishop," says the council of Orange, "wishes to build a church in the territory of a city, whether for the interest of his domains, for the benefit of the Church, or for any other reason, after having obtained permission for this, which cannot be denied him without crime, let him not

meddle with its consecration, which is absolutely reserved to the bishop of the see where the new church is situated. But this grace shall be granted to the bishop who founded it, that the bishop of the place shall ordain whatever priests the founder may desire to see in his foundation; or, if they be already ordained, the said bishop of the place shall accept them."[1]

This ecclesiastical patronage soon led to a lay patronage of the same nature. Foundations by the laity became more and more frequent. Their conditions and forms were very various. Sometimes the founder reserved a portion of the revenues with which he endowed his church; he sometimes even went so far as to stipulate that he should enter into a participation of the offerings which the church should require in addition; so that men founded and endowed churches out of speculation, to run the chance of their fortune, and to associate themselves in their future prosperity. The councils took measures against this abuse, but they recognized and consecrated the right of the founders, whether laymen or ecclesiastics, to influence the choice of the official priests.

"Moved by a pious compassion," say the bishops of Spain, met in council at Toledo, "we have decided that as long as the founders of churches shall live they shall be permitted to have the care of them, and they must especially make it their business to present, for the ordination of bishops, worthy priests for these churches; if they do not propose such, then those whom the bishop of the place shall judge pleasing to God shall be consecrated to his worship, and, with the consent of the founders, shall officiate in their church. If, in contempt of the founders, the bishop performs an ordination, it shall be null, and he shall be constrained, to his shame, to ordain for the place suitable persons chosen by the founders."[2]

By this means, therefore, the laity exercised a certain influence in the church, and took some part in her government.

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[1] Council of Orange, in 441, c. 20.

[2] Ninth council of Toledo, held in 655, c. 2. I shall often cite the Spanish councils, because they have committed to writing more explicitly and more clearly facts which took place also in Gaul.

3dly. At the same time, and in proportion as the social state became a little fixed, the custom was introduced among the great proprietors in the country, and even in the towns, of instituting at home, in the interior of their house, an oratory, a chapel, and of having a priest to officiate in it. These chaplains soon became the object of lively solicitude on the part of the bishops. They were placed under the dependence of their lay patron far more than under that of the neighboring bishops; they were likely to participate in the feelings of the house where they lived, and separate more or less from the church. This was, besides, a means for the powerful laity to procure the assistance of religion, and of fulfilling its duties without depending wholly on the bishop of the diocese. We accordingly find the councils of this epoch carefully watching this non-embodied clergy, disseminated in the lay society, and of which they seemed to fear sometimes the serviture, sometimes the independence.

"If any one," orders the council of Agde, "wishes to have an oratory on his own ground, besides the parish church, we allow that in ordinary festivals he shall there cause mass to be said for the accommodation of his own people; but Easter, Christmas, Epiphany, Ascension, Pentecost, the birth of St. John the Baptist, and all the other days which should be held as great festivals, must only be celebrated in certain churches. The priests who, without the order or permission of the bishop, shall, on the above enumerated festivals, say or hear mass in oratories, shall be excluded from the communion."[1]

"If rectories," says the council of Orleans, "are established in the houses of powerful men, and the priests who officiate there, warned by the archdeacon of the city, neglect, in favor of the power of the master of the house, that which, according to the degree of their order, is their duty in the house of the Lord, let them be corrected according to ecclesiastical discipline. And if by the agents of the lords, or by the lords themselves, the said priests are opposed in the performance of any ecclesiastical duty, let the authors of such iniquity be removed from the holy ceremonies until, being amended, they shall re-enter into the peace of the church."[2]

"Many of our brothers and bishops," says likewise the

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[1] Council of Agde, in 506, c 21. [2] Council of Orleans, 541, c. 26

council of Châlons, "have complained to the holy convocation, upon the subject of the oratories, long since constructed in the country houses of the great men of the state. Those to whom these houses belong, dispute with the bishops property which has been given to these oratories, and do not allow that even the priests who officiate in them are under the jurisdiction of the archdeacon; it is important that this should be reformed: accordingly, let the property of the oratories, and the priests who officiate in them, be under the power of the bishop, in order that he may acquit himself of what is due to these oratories and to the divine service; and if any one oppose himself thereto, let him be excommunicated, according to the tenor of the ancient canons."[1]

It was not without reason that the bishops, having an eye to their power, looked upon this domestic clergy with so much mistrust: an example of it is met with in modern times, which shows us its effects. In England, under the reign of Charles I., before the breaking out of the revolution, during the struggle between the English church and the puritan party, the bishops drove from their cures all the ecclesiastics suspected of puritan opinions. What was the consequence?—the gentry, the great proprietors, who shared these opinions, took into their houses, under the name of chaplains, the expelled ministers. A large portion of the clergy who were suspected by the bishops, accordingly, placed themselves under the patronage of the lay society, and there exercised an influence formidable to the official clergy. In vain the English church pursued her adversaries, even into the interior of families; when tyranny is forced to penetrate so deep, it soon becomes enervated, or hastens towards its ruin: the inferior nobility, the high bourgeoisie of England, defended their chaplains with the most persevering energy; they concealed them, they changed them from house to house; they eluded or they braved the episcopal anathemas. The bishops might manœuvre, oppress; they were no longer the only, the necessary clergy; the population harbored in its breast a clergy foreign to the legal church, and more and more at enmity with it. From the sixth to the eighth century, the danger was not the same; the bishops had to fear neither schism nor insurrection. Still the institution of the chaplains had an analogous effect: it

[1] Council of Châlons, in 650, c. 14.

tended to form an inferior clergy, less closely united to the body of the church, nearer to the laity, more disposed to share their manners, in fine, to make common cause with the age and the people. Accordingly, they did not cease attentively to overlook and curb the chaplains. They, however, by no means destroyed them; they dared not attempt it: the development of the feudal system even gave to this institution a fixity which at first was wanting to it: and this was also one of the ways by which the laity regained that influence in the government of the religious society, which its legal and internal constitution refused to it.

4thly. The bishops themselves were constrained to open another way to it. The administration of the temporal affairs and property of the church was often a source of embarrassment and danger to them; they had not only differences to decide, and suits to maintain, but, in the fearful disorder of the time, the property of the church was exposed to continual devastations, engaged and compromised in numerous quarrels, in private wars; and when it was necessary to make a defence, when the church, in behalf of her domains or her rights, had some robbery to repel, some legal proof, perhaps even, in some cases, a judicial combat to maintain, pious menaces, exhortations, excommunications even did not always suffice; she wanted temporal and worldly arms. In order to procure them, she had recourse to an expedient. For some time past certain churches, especially in Africa, had been in the habit of selecting defenders who, under the name of *causidici*, *tutores*, *vice-domini*, were charged with the duty of appearing for them before justice, and of protecting them *adversus potentias divitum*. An analogous necessity, and one far more pressing, led the churches of Frankish-Gaul to seek among their neighboring laity a portion who, under the name of *advocatus*, took their cause in hand and became their man, not only in judicial disputes, where they had need of him, but against any robberies which might threaten them. From the sixth to the eighth century, the *advocates* of the church did not yet appear with the development nor under the forms which they received at a later period, in the feudal system; we do not as yet distinguish the *advocati sagati*, or armed, from the *advocati togati*, charged merely with civil affairs. But the institution was not the less real and efficacious; we find numerous churches choosing *advocates;* they were careful to take powerful and brave men; kings some-

times gave them to churches who as yet had no *advocates*, and the laity were thus called in to participate in the temporal administration of the church, and to exercise an important influence over her affairs.

It was generally by granting them certain privileges, especially in giving them the usufruct of some domain, that the churches thus solicited the support, and paid the services of some powerful neighbor.

We may already see, if I may so express myself, four doors opened to religious society to enter the ecclesiastical society, and there exercise some power; the separation of ordination and tonsure, that is to say, the introduction into the church of many clerks who were not ecclesiastics; the rights attached to the foundation and to the patronage of churches; the institution of private oratories; and lastly, the intervention of advocates in the administration of the temporal interests of the church; such were the principal causes which, at the epoch which occupies us, combated the exclusive domination of ecclesiastical society over religious society, and weakened or retarded its effects. I might point out many others which I omit, because they are less general and less evident. *A priori*, such a fact was easy to presume: this separation of the governing and the governed could not be so absolute as the official institutions of the church at this epoch would lead us to suppose. If it had been so, if the body of the faithful had been strangers to the body of priests to such a degree, and deprived of all influence over its government, the government, in its turn, would have soon found itself a stranger to its people, and deprived of all power. It must not be supposed that servitude is complete wherever the forms or even the principles of tyranny are found. Providence does not permit evil to be developed in all the rigor of its consequences; and human nature, often so weak, so easily vanquished by whomsoever wishes to oppress it, has yet infinite ability and a wonderful power for escaping from the yoke which it seems to accept. There can be no doubt but that, from the sixth to the eighth century, the religious society bore that of the ecclesiastical society, and that the separation of the clergy and the people, already a source of much evil, one day was to cost both of them dearly; but it was much less complete than it appeared; it only took place with a crowd of restrictions and modifications which alone rendered it possible, and alone can explain them.

II. Let us now enter into the bosom of ecclesiastical society itself, and let us see what became of its internal organization from the fifth to the eighth century, especially of that preponderance of the episcopacy which in the fifth century was its dominant characteristic.

The organization of the clergy at this epoch was complete, and almost the same, at least in its essential forms, as it has remained up to modern times. I can therefore place it before you in its *ensemble;* you will so better follow the variations.

The clergy comprehended two orders, the minor orders and the major orders. The first were four in number: the acolytes, the porters, the exorcists, and the readers. They called major orders, the under-deacons, the deacons, and the priests. The inequality was great; the four minor orders were preserved scarcely more than in name, and out of respect for ancient traditions; although they were reckoned as clergy, they did not, truly speaking, form a part of it; they had not imposed upon them, they were not even recommended to celibacy: they were looked upon rather as servants than as members of the clergy. When, therefore, the clergy and the ecclesiastical government of this epoch is spoken of, it is only the major orders that are meant.

Even in the major orders the influence of the first two named, the under-deacons and deacons, was weak; the deacons were occupied rather in administering the property of the church, and the distribution of her alms, than in religious government properly so called. It is to the order of priests, truly speaking, that this government was confined; neither the minor orders, nor the two others of the major orders, really participated in it.

The body of priests were subject, in the first six centuries, to numerous and important vicissitudes. The bishop, in my opinion, ought to be considered as its primitive and fundamental element; not that the same functions, the same rights, have always been indicated by this word; the episcopacy of the second century greatly differed from that of the fourth; it is no less the starting point of ecclesiastical organization. The bishop was, originally, the inspector, the chief of the religious congregation of each town. The Christian church took birth in towns; the bishops were its first magistrates.

When Christianity spread into the rural districts, the municipal bishop no longer sufficed. Then appeared the chorepiscopi, or rural bishops, moving, ambulatory bishops, *epis-*

copi vagi, considered, sometimes as the delegates, sometimes as the equals, the rivals even of the metropolitan bishops, and whom the latter attempted at first to subject to their power, and afterwards to abolish.

They succeeded therein: the rural districts once Christian, the chorepiscopi in their turn no longer sufficed: something more fixed, more regular, was necessary; something less contested by the most influential magistrates of the church, that is to say, the metropolitan bishops. Then parishes were formed; each Christian agglomeration at all considerable became a parish, and had a priest for its religious head, naturally subordinate to the bishop of the neighboring town, from whom he received and held all his powers; for it seems that originally parish priests acted absolutely only as representatives, as delegates of the bishops, and not in virtue of their own right.

The union of all the agglomerated parishes around a town, in a circumscription for a long time vague and variable, formed the diocese.

After a certain time, and in order to bring more regularity and completeness into the relations of the diocesan clergy, they formed a small association of many parishes under the name of the *rural chapter*, and at the head of the rural chapter was placed an archpriest. At a later period many rural chapters were united in a new circumscription under the name of *district*, which was directed by an archdeacon. This last institution had scarcely arisen at the epoch of which we treat: it is true that long before we find archdeacons in the dioceses; but there was but one, and he did not preside over a territorial circumscription; established in an episcopal town, in the same town with the bishop, he took his place, sometimes in the exercise of his jurisdiction, sometimes in the visitation of the diocese. It was only at the end of the seventh, or, at least, at the commencement of the eighth century, that we see many archdeacons in the same diocese, residing at a distance from the bishop, and each placed at the head of a district. We still encounter at this epoch, in Frankish Gaul, some chorepiscopi; but the name and charge were not long in disappearing.

The diocesan organization was then complete and definitive. The bishop, as you see, had been its source, as he remained its centre. He was much changed himself, but it

was around him, and under his influence, that almost all other changes were brought about.

All the dioceses in the civil province formed the ecclesiastical province, under the direction of the metropolitan or archbishop. The quality of the archbishop was but the expression of this fact. The civil metropolis was generally more wealthy, more populous than the other towns of the province; its bishop had more influence; people met around him on all important occasions; his residence became the chief place of the provincial council; he convoked it, and was the president of it; he was moreover charged with the confirmation and consecration of the newly elected bishops of the province; with receiving accusations brought against bishops, and the appeals from their decisions, and with carrying them, after having made a first examination, to the provincial council, which alone had the right of judging them. The archbishops unceasingly attempted to usurp this right, and make a personal power of it. They often succeeded; but, in truth, as to all important circumstances, it was to the provincial council that it appertained; the archbishops were only charged with superintending the execution of it.

In some states finally, especially in the east, the organization of the church extended beyond the archbishops. As they had constituted parishes into the diocese, and the dioceses into the province, they undertook to constitute provinces into national churches, under the direction of a patriarch. The undertaking succeeded in Syria, in Palestine, in Egypt, in the Eastern Empire; there was a patriarch at Antioch, at Jerusalem, at Constantinople; he was, with regard to archbishops, what archbishops were to bishops; and the ecclesiastical organization corresponded in all degrees of the hierarchy with the political organization.

The same attempt took place in the west, not only on the part of the bishops of Rome, who labored at an early period to become the patriarchs of the whole west, but independently of their pretensions, and even against them. There are scarcely any of the states formed after the invasion, which did not attempt, from the sixth to the eighth century, to become a national church, and to have a patriarch. In Spain, the archbishop of Toledo; in England, the archbishop of Canterbury; in Frankish Gaul, the archbishop of Arles, of Vienne, of Lyons, of Bourges, bore the title of primate or patriarch of Gaul, of Great Britain, of Spain, and attempted to ex-

ercise all its rights. But the attempt everywhere failed: the western states had scarcely taken rise; their limits, their government, their very existence were incessantly in question. Gaul, particularly, was divided between many nations, and, in the heart of each nation, between the sons of the kings; the bishops of a kingdom were unwilling to acknowledge the authority of a foreign primate; the civil government was equally opposed to it. Besides, the bishop of Rome, already in possession of great influence, even where his official supremacy was not acknowledged, warmly contested the establishment of the patriarchs; in Gaul, the principle upon which he acted was constantly to transfer the primacy from one metropolitan to another, so as to prevent its remaining too long attached to one particular see; at one time he favored the pretensions to the primacy of the metropolitan of Vienne, then those of the bishop of Arles; at another time those of the bishop of Lyons; and then again those of the bishop of Sens; so as, by this constant fluctuation and uncertainty in the religious and civil order, to prevent the institution from attaining force or fixity.

The same causes which operated against this particular institution, extended their influence beyond it; in the same way that they had prevented the system of the patriarchate from taking root, they weakened and finally broke down the archiepiscopal system. From the sixth to the eighth century, the metropolitan bishops fell from time to time lower and lower; so that, at the accession of the Carlovingians, they could hardly be said to exist at all. The circumstance alone of the parcelling out of Gaul into different states, was calculated to be of fatal consequence to them. The circumscription of the religious society no longer agreed with that of the civil society. Within the province of the archbishop of Lyons, for instance, there were bishops subject to the kingdom of the Visigoths, and to the kingdom of the Franks, and who, on all occasions, eagerly availed themselves of this pretext for evading their spiritual superior's authority, quite certain of being supported by the temporal sovereign. Moreover, as you have seen, the preponderance of the metropolitans was based upon that of the town in which they respectively resided, and upon its former quality as a metropolis. Now, in the general disorder occasioned by the invasion, considerable changes took place in the relative importance of towns; rich, important cities, metropoles, truly so called, became poor and depopulated. Others, on whom fortune

smiled more favorably, acquired a wealth and population previously unknown to them. With the disappearance from a city of its importance, disappeared the cause which had rendered its bishop a metropolitan, and the word metropolitan became, by degrees, a falsehood, a circumstance highly dangerous to the power which it outwardly expressed. Besides, it was in the very nature of the institution to be assailed at once, on the one hand, by the bishops, who were not desirous of having a spiritual superior; on the other by the bishop of Rome, who naturally wished to have no rivals; the result was what might have been expected. The bishops preferring, as their general metropolitan, the bishop of Rome, who lived at a distance, and took care to conciliate them, not having them as yet within his power, adopted the course of supporting the bishop of Rome against their more immediate metropolitans. Thus attacked on both sides, the metropolitans daily declined in influence and power; the bishops ceased to pay any attention to their mandates, or even to their exhortations; the body of the church to have recourse in any way to their intervention; and when, in 744, Pepin-le-Bref consulted pope Zachary on the best means of restoring order to the confused and agitated church, one of his first questions was, what course he should adopt for procuring respect for the metropolitans at the hands of the bishops and parochial priests.

In point of fact, the whole government of the church, at this period, was in the hands of the bishops and of the priests: they were the only members of it who were at all active and powerful. What were their mutual relations? how was power divided between them?

The general manifest fact was, the exclusive domination and, we may say, despotism of the bishops. Let us seek closely for the causes of this: it is the best means of properly understanding the situation of the church

1. And first, the fall of the metropolitans left the bishops without superiors, or very nearly so. With the head of the ecclesiastical province declined the provincial synod, which it was his privilege to assemble and preside over. These synods, heretofore the unquestionable superiors of the bishops, to which appeals were carried from the decisions of the bishops, and which took cognizance of all the causes which the bishops could not of themselves decide, became rare and inactive. In the course of the sixth century, there were held in Gaul fifty-four councils of every description; in the seventh century

only twenty; in the first half of the eighth century only seven, and five of these were held in Belgium, or on the banks of the Rhine.

Table of the Gaulish Councils of the Sixth Century.

Date	*Place.*	*Present.*
506	Agde.....	25 bishops, 8 priests, 2 deacons, representing their bishops
507	Toulouse	
511	Orleans.....	32 bishops
515	St. Maurice.....	4 bishops, 8 counts.
516	Lyons	
517	Place uncertain.....	16 bishops.
517	Epaonense.....	25 bishops.
517	Lyons.....	11 bishops.
524	Arles.....	14 bishops, 4 priests.
527	Carpentras.....	19 bishops.
529	Orange.....	14 bishops, 8 *viri illustres.*
529	Valencia.	
529	Vaison.....	11 or 12 bishops.
530	Angers.....	5 bishops.
533	Orleans.....	26 bishops, 5 priests.
535	Clermont.....	15 bishops.
538	Orleans.....	19 bishops, 7 priests.
540	Orleans	
541	Orleans.....	38 bishops, 11 priests, 1 abbot.
545	Arles.	
549	Orleans.....	5 bishops, 21 priests, archdeacons, or abbots
549	Arles.....	10 bishops.
550	Toul.	
550	Metz.	
554	Arles.....	11 bishops, 8 priests, deacons, or archdeacons.
555	Place uncertain in Brittany.	
555	Paris.....	27 bishops.
557	Paris.....	16 bishops.
563	Saintes.....	
567	Lyons.....	8 bishops, 5 priests, 1 deacon.
567	Tours.....	7 bishops.
573	Paris.....	32 bishops, 1 priest.
575	Lyons.	
577	Paris.	
578	Auxerre.....	The bishop of Auxerre, 7 abbots, 34 priests, 3 deacons, all of the diocese of Auxerre.
579	Châlons.	
579	Saintes.	

Table of the Gaulish Councils of the Sixth Century—continued.

Date.	*Place.*	*Present.*
580	Braines.	
581	Lyons.	
581	Màcon.....	21 bishops.
583	Lyons	8 bishops, 12 delegates of bishops
584	Valencia.	
585	Màcon..... ...	43 bishops, 15 delegates, 16 bishops without sees
587	Andelot.	
588	Clermont.	
588	Place uncertain	
589	Sourcy, near Soi sons.	
589	Châlons.	
589	Narbonne.....	7 bishops.
590	Upon the confines of Auvergne, of Rouergue, and of Givaudan.	
590	Poictiers.	6 bishops
590	Metz.	
591	Nanterre.	
594	Châlons.	

Table of the Councils of Gaul in the Seventh Century.

Date.	*Place.*	*Present.*
603	Châlons.	
615	Paris.	
shortly afterwards	Place uncertain.	
625	Rheims.....	41 bishops.
627	Màcon.	
628	Clichy.....	Bishops and high laymen.
633	Clichy.....	15 bishops, Dagobert, great men.
638	Paris.....	9 bishops, Dagobert, great men.
648	Bourges.	
650 or 645	Orleans.	
650	Châlons	38 bishops, 5 abbots, 1 archdeacon
658	Nantes.	
664	Paris.....	25 bishops.
669	Clichy.....	Bishops and great men.
670	Sens	30 bishops.
670	Autun.	
679	Place uncertain	
684 or 685	In the palace of the king.	
688	Ibid.	
692 or 682	Rouen.....	16 bishops, 4 abbots, 1 legate, 3 archdeacons, many priests and deacons.

Table of the Councils of Gaul in the first half of the Eighth Century

Date.	*Place*	*Present.*
729	Maestricht.	
742	In Germany	
743	Septines.	
744	Soissons.....	23 bishops, many priests and high laymen.
746	In Germany	
748	Ibid.	
752	Vermeric.	

Thus gradually freed from individual superiors, and from assemblies of their equals, the bishops found themselves in an almost entirely independent position. There was a change, too, in the system of episcopal elections. You have seen that the election by the clergy and the people, although still legal and of frequent occurrence at the epoch which occupies us, was still far more uncertain and far less real. A foreign force, royalty, constantly interfered therein, in order to bring trouble and impotence into it: kings unceasingly directly nominated bishops, despite the continual protestations of the church, and, in all cases, the elected required their confirmation. The ties which united the bishops to their priests became accordingly very much weakened; it was almost solely by election that the clergy influenced the episcopacy, and this influence, if it was not destroyed, was at least enervated and disputed.

2dly. There resulted from this another circumstance which still more separated the bishops from their priests: when the clergy elected them, it took them from its own bosom; it selected men already known and accredited in the diocese. When, on the contrary, a crowd of bishops received their title from kings, the greater part arrived strangers, unknown, alike without credit and without affection among the clergy whom they had to govern. Taken even in the diocese, they were there often destitute of consideration; intriguers who had succeeded, by disgraceful means, or even by money, in obtaining the royal preference. Thus were still farther broken the ties which united the bishops to the clergy; thus the episcopal power, which no longer possessed any superior power, was alike released from the influence of its people; as

the clergy was separated from the lay population, so was the episcopacy separated from the clergy.

3dly. This is not all: the clergy itself declined; not only did it lose its power, but its position, and, so to speak, its quality was diminished. You have seen that, at this epoch, a great number of slaves entered into the church, and by what causes. The bishops soon perceived that a clergy thus formed was without principle, without power, far more easy to govern and to conquer, if it attempt to resist. In many dioceses they took care to recruit it from the same source, to aid themselves the natural course of things; this origin of a crowd of priests long contributed to the sovereignty of the episcopacy.

4thly. Here we have a fourth cause, even more powerful and extensive. The bishops were the sole administrators of the property of the church. This property was of two kinds: on one side, foundation property, every day more considerable, for it was under this form that the greater part of donations to churches were made; on the other, the offerings of the faithful in the churches themselves. I shall say a word, in passing, of a third kind of ecclesiastical revenue, which at a later period played an important part, but which, at the seventh century, was not yet well established; I mean the tithe. From the earliest ages, the clergy made continual efforts to bring back or to generalise this Hebrew institution; it preached it, it praised it; it recalled the Jewish traditions and manners. Two Gaulish councils of the sixth century, that of Tours, in 567, and that of Màcon, in 585, made it the subject of formal provisions. But they felt, by their very tone, that these dispositions were rather exhortations than laws: "We urgently caution you," writes the council of Tours to the faithful, "that, following the examples of Abraham, you do not fail to offer to God the tenth of all your property, to the end that you may preserve the rest;"[1] and these exhortations were of but little effect.

It was at a later period, and only under the Carlovingians, that, with the aid of the civil power, the clergy attained its end, and rendered the tithe general and regular. At the epoch of which we treat, the foundation property and the offerings were her only revenues. Now it must not be sup-

[1] Labbe, vol. v., col. 868.

posed that these revenues belonged to a particular church or parish, where the source of them lay: the produce of all the adjacent domains, of all offerings received in the diocese, formed a mass of which the bishop alone had the disposition:

"Let the domains, estates, vineyards, slaves, the peculium, ... which are given to parishes," says the council of Orleans, "remain in the power of the bishop."[1] Charged with the cost of dispensing worship and the maintenance of the priests, in the whole diocese, it was the bishop who determined the part allotted to each parish. Certain rules, it is true, were soon established with regard to this matter: three parts were usually made of the revenues of a parish; one third was appropriated to the priest who performed its duties; another to the expense of worship; and a third returned to the bishop. But in spite of this legal injunction, often repeated by the canons, the centralization of the ecclesiastical revenues continued: the general administration belonged to the bishop, and it was easy to foresee the extension of this means of power.

5th. He disposed of persons almost as of things, and the liberty of the parish priests was scarcely better guaranteed than their revenue. The principle of the servitude of the glebe, if I may so express myself, was introduced into the church: we read in the acts of the councils:

"It is said, in the law concerning the laborers of the field, that each must remain wherever he began to live. The canons likewise order, that the priests who work for the church remain where they commenced."[2]

"Let no bishop raise in degree a strange priest."[3]

"Let no one ordain a priest who does not first promise to remain where he shall be placed."[4]

Never was power over persons more expressly established.

6th. The progress of the political importance of the bishops turned equally to the profit of their religious domination. They entered into the national assemblies; they surrounded and counselled kings. How could the poor priests struggle with any advantage against such superiors? Besides, such was the disorder of the times, and both the difficulty and the

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[1] Council of Orleans, in 611, c. 14, 15.
[2] Council of Seville, in 619, c. 3. [3] Council of Angers, in 453, c. 9
[4] Council of Valencia, in 524, c. 6.

necessity of maintaining some general tie, some unity in the administration of the church, that the course of things agreeing with the passions of men, tended to strengthen the central power. The despotism of the episcopal aristocracy prevailed by the same causes which caused that of the feudal aristocracy to prevail; this was, perhaps, at this epoch, the common and dominant want, the only means of maintaining society.

But it redounds to the honor and safety of human nature, that an evil, although inevitable, is never accomplished without resistance, and that liberty, incessantly protesting and struggling against necessity, prepares the enfranchisement, even at the moment that it submits to the yoke. The bishops strangely abused their immense power: the priests, and the revenues of their diocese, were the prey to violences and exactions of all kinds; the acts of the councils, composed of bishops only, are, in this respect, the most unexceptionable testimony.

"We have learned," says the council of Toledo, "that the bishops treat their parishes, not episcopally, but cruelly; and while it has been written 'neither as being lords over God's heritage, but being ensamples to the flock,' they load their dioceses with loss and exactions. It is for this reason that the things which the bishops appropriate to themselves are to be refused them, with the exception of what the ancient institutions grant them; let the priests, whether parochial or diocesan, who shall be tormented by the bishop, carry their complaints to the metropolitan, and let the metropolitan delay not to repress such excesses."[1]

"Those who have already obtained ecclesiastical degrees, that is to say, the priests," says the council of Braga, "must in no way be subject to receive blows, except for grave and deadly faults. It is not suitable that each bishop should, according to his inclination and when it pleases him, strike with blows and cause his honorable ministers to suffer, for fear he lose the respect which is his due from those who are subject to him."[2]

The priests did not lose all respect for the bishops, nor any more did they accept all their tyranny. An important fact, and one too little remarked, is seen here and there during the

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[1] Council of Toledo, in 589, c. 20. [2] Council of Braga, in 675, c. 7

course of this epoch: this is the contest of the parochial priests against the bishops. Three principal symptoms in the acts of the councils must not be overlooked:

1st. The parochial priests, the inferior clerks, leagued among themselves to resist: they formed *conjuratios* against the bishops similar to those conjuratios, to those fraternities formed at a later period by the burghers against their lords.

"If any priests, as has happened lately in many places, at the instigation of the devil should rebel against authority, unite in a conspiracy, should take a common oath among themselves, or unite in a common bond, let such audacity be concealed under no pretext, and, the thing once known, let the bishops, assembled in synod, punish the guilty according to their rank and quality."[1]

"If any priests, for the purpose of revolt, should combine in a common bond, whether verbal or written, and should cunningly lay snares for their bishop, and once warned to give up these practices should refuse to obey, let them be degraded from their rank."[2]

2d. The priests have constantly recourse against their bishops, to the aid of the laity, probably to that of the lord of the manor, or any other powerful person in the district with whom they are in connexion. We find this injunction repeatedly in the acts of the councils:

"Let not the priests rise up against their bishops by the aid of secular power."[3]

3d. But while repeating this prohibition, while proscribing the *conjurationes* of the priests, the councils themselves endeavored to apply some remedy to the evils combined against: complaints were constantly addressed to them from all quarters, to which they felt themselves compelled to pay attention: a few passages from their acts will be more elucidatory on this point than any comments of ours:

"As some complaints have reached us, of certain bishops having taken possession of things given by the faithful for the use of their parishes, so that little or nothing is left to the churches upon which these gifts were really bestowed, it has

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[1] Council of Orleans, in 538, c. 28.

[2] Council of Rheims in 625, c. 2; see also the council of Narbonne, in 589, c. 5.

[3] Council of Clermont, in 535, c. 4.

appeared to us just and reasonable, and we hereby declare that, if the church of the city wherein the bishop resides is so well provided, that, by the grace of Christ, it wants for nothing, all that remains to the parishes should be distributed among the clerks who officiate in them, or employed in repairing their churches. But if the bishop is involved in much expense, without sufficient revenue to meet it, there shall be given to the richer parishes that which is fitting and reasonable, whether for priests, or for the support of the buildings, and let the bishop appropriate the surplus to his own use, in order that he may provide for his expenses."[1]

"If offerings have been made to the basilicas established in cities, of lands, goods, or any other things whatsoever, let them be at the disposition of the bishop, and let them be free to employ what is suitable, whether in the repair of the basilica, or in the support of priests who officiate in it. With regard to parochial property or basilicas established in boroughs, dependent upon cities, let the custom of each place be observed."[2]

"It has been decided that no bishop, in the visitation of his diocese, shall receive from any church anything beyond what is due to him, as a mark of honor to his see; he shall not take the third of all the offerings of the people in the parish churches, but this third shall remain for the lighting and repairs of the churches; and each year the bishop shall have an account of it. For if the bishop take this third, he robs the church of its light and the support of its roof."[3]

"Avarice is the root of all evil, and this guilty thirst seizes even the hearts of the bishops. Many of the faithful, from love for Christ and the martyrs, raise basilicas in the parishes of the bishops, and deposit offerings therein; but the bishops seize upon them and turn them to their own use. Thence it follows that priests are wanting to perform Divine service, because they do not receive their fees. Dilapidated cathedrals are not repaired because sacerdotal avarice has carried off all the funds. The present orders, therefore, that bishops govern their churches without receiving more than is due to them according to the ancient decrees, that is to say, the third of the offerings and of the parochial revenues; if they take

[1] Council of Carpentras, in 527. Council of Orleans, in 538, c. 5
[2] Council of Braga, in 572, c. 2.

more than this, the council will cause it to be returned on the demand of either the founders of the church themselves if they be living, or of their descendants. Nevertheless, the founders of churches are not to suppose that they retain any power whatever over the property with which they have endowed the said churches, seeing that according to the canons, not only the church itself, but the property with which it is endowed, is under the jurisdiction, duly administered, of the bishop."[1]

"Among the things which it behoves us to regulate by common consent, it is more especially necessary to meet discreetly, the complaints of the parochial priests of the province of Galacia, touching the rapacity of their bishops, which has grown to such a height as to compel the priests to demand public inquiry into them; such inquiry having been made, it has clearly resulted that these bishops overwhelm their parochial churches with their exactions; and that while they themselves wallow in luxury, they have brought many of the churches to the verge of ruin; in order to put a stop to such abuses we order that, according to the regulations of the synod of Braga, each of the bishops of the said province shall receive annually from each of the churches in his diocese the sum of two *solidi*,[2] and no more. And when the bishop visits his diocese, let him be burdensome to no one from the multitude of his attendants, let him have no more than five carriages with him, and let him stay no longer than one day at each church."[3]

The extracts here given are amply sufficient to prove the oppression and the resistance, the evil and the attempt to remedy it;—the resistance was abortive, the remedy ineffectual: episcopal despotism continued to take deeper and wider root. Thus, at the commencement of the eighth century, the church had fallen into a state of disorder almost equal to that prevalent in civil society. Without superiors, without inferiors at all to be dreaded—relieved from the superintendence of the metropolitans and of the councils, rejecting the influence of the priests—a crowd of bishops were seen yielding themselves up to the most scandalous excesses. Masters of the ever increasing wealth of the church, ranking amongst the great

[1] Council of Toledo, in 638, c. 33
[2] About 13*s*
[3] Council of Toledo, in 646, c. 4.

landed proprietors, they adopted their interests and their manners; they relinquished their ecclesiastical character and led a wholly secular life; they kept hounds and falcons, they went from place to place surrounded by an armed retinue, they took part in the national warfare; nay more, they undertook, from time to time, expeditions of violence and rapine against their neighbors on their own account. A crisis was inevitable: everything prepared the necessity for reformation, everything proclaimed it, and you will see that in point of fact, shortly after the accession of the Carlovingians, an attempt at reformation was made by the civil power, but the church herself contained the germ of a remedy: side by side with the secular clergy, there had been rising up another order, influenced by other principles, animated with another spirit, and which seemed destined to prevent that dissolution with which the church was menaced; I speak of the monks. Their history from the sixth to the eighth century will be the object of our next lecture.

FOURTEENTH LECTURE.

History of the regular clergy, or the monks, from the sixth to the eighth century—That the monks were at first laymen—Importance of this fact—Origin and progressive development of the monastic life in the east—First rules—Importation of the monks into the west—They are ill received there—Their first progress—Difference between eastern and western monasteries—Opinion of Saint Jerome, as to the errors of the monastic life—General causes of its extension—State of the monks in the west in the fifth century—Their power and their want of coherence—Saint Benedict—His life—He founds the monastery of Monte Cassino—Analysis and estimate of his rule—It diffuses itself throughout the west, and becomes predominant in almost all the monasteries there.

Since we resumed the history of religious society in Frankish Gaul, we have considered: 1, the general dominant fact which characterized the church from the sixth to the eighth century—that is to say, its unity; 2, its relations with the state; 3, its internal organization, the mutual position of the governors and the governed, the constitution of the government—that is to say, of the clergy.

We have seen that, towards the middle of the eighth century, the government of the church, the clergy, had fallen into a state of great disorder and decay. We have recognized a crisis, the necessity for reformation; I mentioned to you that a principle of reform already existed in the bosom of the clergy itself; I named the regular clergy, the monks; it is with their history of the same period that we are now about to occupy ourselves.

The term, regular clergy, is calculated to produce an illusory effect; it gives one the idea that the monks have always been ecclesiastics, have always essentially formed a part of the clergy, and this is, in point of fact, the general notion which has been applied to them indiscriminately, without regard to time, or place, or to the successive modifications of the institution. And not only are monks regarded as ecclesiastics, but they are by many people considered as, so to speak, the most ecclesiastical of all ecclesiastics, as the most completely of all clerical bodies separated from civil society, as the most estranged from its interests and from its manners.

This, if I mistake not, is the impression which the mere men tion of their name at present, and for a long time past, natu rally arouses in the mind; it is an impression full of error; at their origin, and for at least two centuries afterwards, the monks were not ecclesiastics at all; they were mere laymen, united together indeed by a common religious creed, in a common religious sentiment, and with a common religious object, but altogether apart from the ecclesiastical society, from the clergy, especially so called.

And not only was such the nature of the institution at its origin, but this primitive character, which is so generally unheeded, has prominently influenced its whole history, and alone enables us to comprehend its vicissitudes. I have already made some remarks upon the establishment of monasteries in the west, more especially in the south of Gaul. I will now, in renewing the subject, trace back the facts to their remotest sources, and follow them more closely in their development.

You are all aware it was in the east that the monks took their rise. The form in which they first appeared, was very different from that which they afterwards assumed, and in which the mind is accustomed to view them. In the earlier years of Christianity, a few men of more excitable imaginations than their fellows, imposed upon themselves all sorts of sacrifices and of extraordinary personal austerities; this, however, was no Christian innovation, for we find it, not only in a general tendency of human nature, but in the religious manners of the entire east, and in several Jewish traditions. The *ascetes* (this was the name first given to these pious enthusiasts; ασκησις, *exercises*, *ascetic life*) were the first form of monks. They did not segregate, in the first instance, from civil society; they did not retire into the deserts: they only condemned themselves to fasting, silence, to all sorts of austerities, more especially to celibacy.

Soon afterwards they retired from the world: they went to live far from mankind, absolutely alone, amidst woods and deserts, in the depths of the Thebaïd. The ascetes became hermits, anchorites; this was the second form of the monastic life.

After some time, from causes which have left no traces behind them—yielding, perhaps, to the powerful attraction of some more peculiarly celebrated hermit, of Saint Anthony, for instance, or perhaps simply tired of complete isolation,

the anchorites collected together, built their huts side by side, and while continuing to live each in his own abode, performed their religious exercises together, and began to form a regular community. It was at this time, as it would seem, that they first received the name of monks.[1]

By and bye they made a further step; instead of remaining in separate huts, they collected in one edifice, under one roof: the association was more closely knit, the common life more complete. They became *cenobites*;[2] this was the fourth form of the monastic institution, its definitive from, that to which all its subsequent developments were to adapt themselves.

At about this period we see arising, for the conduct of these houses of cenobites, for these monasteries, a certain discipline mutually agreed upon, certain written rules, directing the exercises of these small societies, and laying down the obligations of their members; among these primitive rules of the eastern monks, the most celebrated are those of Saint Anthony, Saint Macharius, Saint Hilarius, and Saint Pacomus; all these rules are brief and general, directed to a few leading circumstances of life, but without any pretension to govern the whole life; they are precepts, in fact, rather than rules, customs, rather than laws. The ascetes, the hermits, and the other different classes of monks, continued to subsist, concurrently with the cenobites, in all the independence of their first condition.

The spectacle of such a life, of so much rigidity and enthusiasm, of sacrifice and of liberty, strongly excited the imagination of the people. The monks were multiplied with a prodigious rapidity, and varied to infinity. As you may suppose, I shall not enter into the detail of all the forms which, under this name, were taken by the exaltation of the faithful; I shall only indicate the extreme terms, so to speak, of the career which it ran through, and its two effects, at once the most strange and the most various. While, under the name of *Messalians*, or εὐχῖται, numerous bands of fanatics overran Mesopotamia, Armenia, &c., rejecting the legal worship, merely celebrating irregular spontaneous prayer, and abandoning themselves in the towns, upon public places, to all sorts of extravagances; others, in order to separate them-

1 Monachus, μοναχος, from μονος, alone.
2 Cenobitæ, κοινοβιοι, from κοινος, common, and βιος, life

selves more completely from all human intercourse, established themselves, after the example of Saint Simeon of Antioch, on the summit of a column, and under the name of *stylites*, devoted their life to this fantastical isolation; and neither one nor the other were in want of admirers and imitators.[1]

In the last half of the fourth century, the rule of Saint Basil brought some regularity into the new institution. Digested into the form of answers to questions of all kinds,[2] it soon became the general discipline of the monasteries of the west—of all those, at least, which had neither any entirety nor fixity. Such could not fail to be the result of the influence of the secular clergy over the monastic life, of which the most illustrious bishops, Saint Athanasius, Saint Basil, Saint Gregory Nazianzen, and numerous others, then declared themselves the patrons. This patronage could not fail to introduce into it more order and system. Still, the monasteries remained purely lay associations—strangers to the clergy, to its functions, to its rights. For the monks, there was no ordination, no ecclesiastical engagements. Their dominant characteristic was always religious exaltation and liberty. They entered into the association, they went out from it, they chose their own abode, their own austerities; enthusiasm took the form and entered the path which pleased it. The monks, in a word, had nothing in common with the priests, except their doctrines and the respect with which they inspired the population.

Such was the state of the monastic institution in the east at the last half of the fourth century. It was somewhere about this period that it was introduced into the west. Saint Athanasius, driven from his see, retired to Rome;[3] he took there with him some monks, and there celebrated their virtues and glory. His accounts, and the spectacle offered by the first monks, or those who followed their example, were ill received by the western population. Paganism was still very strong in the west, especially in Italy. The superior classes who had abandoned its doctrines wished at least to preserve its manners, and a part of the inferior orders still

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[1] There were stylites in the east down to the twelfth century.
[2] It contained 203 questions, and as many answers
[3] In 341

preserved its prejudices. The monks, at their first appearance, were then an object of contempt and of anger. At the funeral of Blesilla, a young Roman nun, who died, it was said, from excessive fasting, in 384, the people cried: "When will they drive this detestable race of monks from the town? Why do they not stone them? Why don't they throw them into the river?" It is St. Jerome who records these popular ebullitions.[1]

"In the cities of Africa," says Salvienus, "and more especially in Carthage, no sooner did a man in a cloak make his appearance, pale, and with his head shaved, than the miserable infidel populace assailed him with curses and abuse; and if some servant of God, from the monasteries of Egypt, or the holy city of Jerusalem, or the venerable retreat of some hermitage, proceeded to that city to fulfil some pious duty, the people pursued him with odious insults, ridiculing and hissing him.[2]

I have already mentioned Rutilius Numatianus, a Gaulish poet, who resided for a long time at Rome, and has left us a poem, celebrating his return to his native country; in the course of this poem, he says, in reference to the Isle of Gorgona:

"I detest those rocks, scene of the recent shipwreck of one I hold dear: it was there a fellow-townsman of my own descended living into the tomb. He was one of our own nobles, possessor of a splendid fortune, blessed in a happy and dignified marriage; but, impelled by madness, he abandoned God and men, and now, a credulous exile, foolishly takes delight in a foul retreat in this island. Unfortunate man, who seeks celestial food amidst filthy garbage, and, more cruel to himself than are his offended gods, persists in his miserable solitude. This Christian sect, with its delusions, is more fatal than are the poisons of Circe: these only change the body; that perverts the mind."[3]

Rutilius, I admit, was a pagan, but numbers of men in the west were so too, and received the same impressions.

Meantime, the revolution which had filled the east with monks, pursued its course in the west, bringing about gradually the same results. Paganism after awhile disappeared,

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[1] Letters to Paul, Lett. 22, *al.* 25.
[2] *De Gubernatione Dei*, viii., 4.
[3] Itin. i., 517.

and the new creed, the new manners, took possession of society at large; and the monastic life, as in the east, had soon the greatest bishops for patrons, the whole population for admirers. St. Ambrose at Milan, St. Martin at Tours, St. Augustin in Africa, celebrated its praises, and themselves founded monasteries. St. Augustin drew up a sort of rule for the nuns of his diocese, and ere long the institution was in full vigor throughout the west.

It assumed there, however, from the outset, as I have already had occasion to observe, a peculiar character. Undoubtedly the original desire was to imitate what had taken place in the east, and minute inquiries were made into the discipline and manners of the eastern monasteries; a description of these, as you are aware, formed the materials of two books, published at Marseilles by Cassienus; and in the establishment of many of the new monasteries, great pains were taken to conform to them. But the genius of the western character differed far too widely from that of the east for the difference not to be stamped upon the respective regulations. The desire for retirement, for contemplation, for a marked rupture with civil society, was the source and fundamental trait of the eastern monks: in the west, on the contrary, and especially in southern Gaul, where, at the commencement of the fifth century, the principal monasteries were founded, it was in order to live in common, with a view to conversation as well as to religious edification, that the first monks met. The monasteries of Lerens, of Saint Victor, and many others, were especially great schools of theology, the focuses of intellectual movement. It was by no means with solitude or with mortification, but with discussion and activity, that they there concerned themselves.

And not only was this diversity of situation and turn of mind in the east and west real, but contemporaries themselves observed it, paid attention to it; and in laboring to extend the monastic institution in the west, clear-sighted men took care to say that it was not necessary to servilely imitate the east, and to explain the reasons why. In point of fasts and austerities, the rules of the western monasteries were, in general, less rigid. "Much eating," said Sulpicius Severus, "is gormandizing among the Greeks, natural among the Gauls."[1]

[1] Sulp. Sev., Dial. i., 8.

"The rigor of winter," says Cassien also, "does not permit us to be contented with light stockings, nor with a coat without sleeves, nor with a mere tunic; and he who shall present himself clothed in a small cloak, or in a thin mantle of goat's hair, will be laughed at instead of edifying."[1]

Another cause no less contributed to give a new direction to the monastic institution in the west. It was only in the first half of the fifth century that it spread and really established itself there. Now, at this epoch, the monasteries of the east had already taken their full development; all the extravagances of ascetic exaltation had already there given a spectacle to the world. The great bishops of the west, the chiefs of the church and of mind in Europe, whatever their religious ardor, were struck by these excesses of the rising monachism, the acts of folly to which it led, the vices which it often covered. Certainly no native of the west had more religious enthusiasm, a more lively, more oriental imagination, nor a more fiery character, than Saint Jerome. He was, however, by no means blind to the faults and dangers of the monastic life, such as it was offered by the east. I will read some passages in which he expresses his thoughts upon this subject; they are among the number of the most interesting documents of the period, and which give us the best information upon it. "There are monks," says he, "who, from the dampness of the cells, from immoderate fasts, from the weariness of solitude, from excess of reading, fall into melancholy, and have more need of the remedies of Hippocrates, than of our advice . . . I have seen persons of both sexes, in whom the understanding has been affected with too much abstinence, especially among those who live in cold and damp cells; they no longer knew what they did, nor how to conduct themselves, nor when they should speak, nor when keep silence."[2]

And elsewhere :—

"I have seen men who, renouncing the age only in habits and name, have changed nothing of their old way of life. Their fortune is rather increased than diminished. They have the same cohorts of slaves, the same pomp of banquets.

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1 Cassien, *de Instit. cœnob.*, l. ii.

2 Saint Jerome, lett. 95 (*al.* 4), *ad Rusticum*, 97 (*al.* 8), *ad Demetriadem.*

It is gold that they eat upon miserable dishes of delf or clay; and amid the swarms of their servants, they have themselves called solitaries."[1]

"Avoid also men whom thou shalt see loaded with chains, with the beard of a goat, a black cloak, and feet naked in spite of cold . . . They enter into the houses of the nobles: they deceive poor women loaded with sins; they are always learning, and never arrive at the knowledge of truth; they feign sorrow, and, apparently abandoned to long fasts, they make amends at night by secret feasts."[2]

And again :—

"I blush to say it, from the bottom of our cells we condemn the world; while rolling in sackcloth and ashes, we pronounce our sentences upon bishops. What means this pride of a king under the tunic of a penitent? . . . . Pride quickly creeps into solitude: that man has fasted a little; he has seen no one; he already thinks himself a weighty personage; he forgets what he is, whence he came, where he goes; and his heart and language already wander on all sides. Contrary to the will of the apostle, he judges other people's servants; he goes wherever his gluttony leads him; he sleeps as long and as often as he pleases; he respects no one; he does whatever he chooses; he looks down on every one else as inferior from himself; he is oftener out in the town than in his cell, and while he affects retiring modesty amongst his brethren, in the public streets he thrusts himself against any passenger."[3]

Thus, the most impassioned, the most enthusiastic of the fathers of the west was not unacquainted either with the insanity, hypocrisy, or the intolerable pride which from that time the monastic life gave birth to; and characterized them with that indignant good sense, that satirical and passionate eloquence which is his characteristic; and he denounced them loudly, for fear of the contagion.

Many of the most illustrious bishops of the west, Saint Augustin among others, had the same foresight, and wrote in the same strain; they also applied themselves to the preven-

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[1] Saint Jerome, lett. 95 (*al.* 7), *ad Rusticum.*
[2] Saint Jerome, lett. 18 (*al.* 22), *ad Eustochium.*
[3] Saint Jerome, lett. 15 (*al.* 77), *ad Marcum;* 97 (*al.* 4), *ad Rusticum.*

tion of the absurd extravagances into which the monks of the east had fallen. But in attending to this, in marking the insanity or hypocrisy of which the monastic life served as the groundwork, they incessantly labored to propagate it. It was a means for them of drawing away from pagan civil society, always the same in fact, despite its apparent conversation, a portion of the laity. Without entering into the clergy, the monks followed the same path, served the same influence; the patronage of the bishops could not be wanting to them. Had it been wanting to them, their progress probably would not have been diminished. It was not to any ecclesiastical combination, nor even to the movement and the particular direction that Christianity might impress upon men's imaginations, that the monastic life owed its origin. The general state of society at this epoch, was its true source. It was tainted with three vices, idleness, corruption, and unhappiness. Men were unoccupied, perverted, and a prey to all kinds of miseries; this is the reason that we find so many turning monks. A laborious, honest, or happy people, would never have entered into this life. When human nature could not fully and harmoniously display itself, when man could not pursue the true aim of his destiny, it was then that his development became eccentric, and that, rather than accept ruin, he cast himself, at all risks, into the strangest situations. In order to live and act in a regular and reasonable manner, mankind requires that the facts, in the midst of which it lives and acts, should be, to a certain degree, reasonable, regular; that its faculties should find employment, that its condition should not be too austere, that the spectacle of general corruption and abasement should not rebel against, should not desolate strong souls, in which morality cannot be deadened. The weariness, the disgust at an enervated perversity, and the desire to fly from the public miseries, is what made the monks of the east far more than the particular character of Christianity or an access of religious exaltation. These same circumstances existed in the west; Italian, Gaulish, African society, amidst the fall of the Empire, and the devastations of the barbarians, was as unhappy, as depraved, as idle, as that of Asia Minor or Egypt. The true causes of the continual extension of the monastic life were, therefore, the same in both countries, and must have produced in them the same effects.

Despite the diversities which I have remarked, the simili-

tude was also very great, and the counsels of the most illustrious bishops did not prevent the extravagances of the monks of the east from finding imitators in the west. Neither hermits, recluses, nor any of the pious follies of the ascetic life were wanting in Gaul. Saint Senoch, a barbarian by birth, retired into the environs of Tours, inclosed himself within four walls, so close together, that he could make no movement with the lower part of his person, and lived many years in this situation, an object of veneration to the surrounding population.

The recluses, Caluppa in Auvergne, Patroclus in the territory of Langres, Hospitius in Provence, were not quite so admirable; still their celebrity was great, as were their austerities.[1] Even the stylites had competitors in the west; and the account which Gregory of Tours has left us concerning them, paints the manners of the times with so much truth and interest, that I must read it to you entire. Gregory gives an account of his own conversation with the monk Wulfilaïch, doubtless a barbarian, as his name indicates, and who was the first in the west to attempt setting up as a rival for Saint Simeon of Antioch.

"I went into the territory of Treves," says Wulfilaïch to Gregory; "'I there constructed, with my own hands, upon this mountain, the little dwelling which you see. I found there an image of Diana, which the people of the place, still infidels, adored as a divinity. I raised a column upon which I remained with great suffering, and without any kind of shoes or stockings; and when the winter season arrived, I was so affected with the rigors of the frost, that very often the nails have fallen from my feet, and frozen water has hung from my beard in the form of candles; for this country has the reputation of often having very severe winters.' We earnestly asked him to say what was his nourishment and drink, and how he had overthrown the idol of the mountain; he said—'My food was a little bread and herbs, and a small quantity of water. But a large number of people from the neighboring villages began to flock towards me; I continually preached to them that Diana did not exist; that the idol and the other objects to which they thought it their duty to address worship, were absolutely nothing. I also repeated to

[1] See Gregory of Tours, vol. i., p. 231, 312, in my *Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l' Histoire de France.*

them that those canticles which they usually sang while drinking, and amidst their debaucheries, were unworthy of the Divinity, and that it would be far better if they offered the sacrifices of their praises to the all-powerful God who made heaven and earth; I also often prayed the Lord to deign to overthrow the idol, and draw these people from their errors. The mercy of the Lord worked upon those gross minds, and disposed them, lending an ear to my words, to quit their idols, and follow the Lord. I assembled some of them, in order that I might, with their help, thrown down the immense image which I could not destroy by my own strength. I had already broken the other idols, which was more easy. Many assembled around the statue of Diana; they threw cords around it, and began to pull; but all their efforts could not break it. I then went to the cathedral, threw myself upon the ground, and with tears implored the Divine mercy to destroy by the powers of Heaven, what earthly efforts did not suffice to throw down. After my prayer I left the cathedral, and immediately returned to the laborers; I took the cord, and we immediately recommenced pulling. At the first effort the idol fell to the ground; it was afterwards broken, and reduced to powder by iron mallets. . . . . I felt disposed to return to my ordinary way of life; but the bishops, who wished to strengthen me, in order that I might continue more perfectly the work which I had commenced, came to me and said:—'The way that you have chosen is not the right way; you are unworthy, and cannot be compared with Saint Simeon of Antioch, who lived upon his column. Besides, the situation of the place does not permit of a like amount of suffering; descend rather, and live with the brothers that you have assembled.' At these words, that I might not be accused of disobedience towards the bishop, I descended, and I went with them, and also took some repast with them. One day, the bishop having despatched me to some distance from the village, sent laborers with hatchets, chisels, and hammers, and threw down the column on which I used to live. When I returned the next day, I found all destroyed; I wept bitterly; but I did not wish to re-establish what was destroyed, for fear of being accused of going against the orders of the bishops; and from that time I have remained here, and contented myself with living with my brothers.'"[1]

[1] Greg. of Tours, vol. i., p. 440—444.

All is equally remarkable in this account, both the energetic devotion and the inward enthusiasm of the hermit, and the good sense, perhaps with a touch of jealousy, of the bishops; we meet in it at once the influence of the east, and the peculiar character of the west. And as the bishop of Treves repressed the insanity of the stylites, so Saint Augustin assailed hypocrisy wandering under the monkish cloak.

"The subtle enemy of mankind," says he, "has everywhere dispersed hypocrites under the features of monks; they overrun the provinces, where no one has sent them, wandering in every direction, not establishing themselves, staying nowhere. Some go about selling relics of martyrs; that is to say, if they be relics of martyrs; others show their robes and their phylacteries!"[1]

I might cite many other examples in which this two-fold fact, the resemblance and the difference of the east and the west, is likewise marked. Amidst these eccentricities, through these alternations of folly and wisdom, the progress of the monastic institution continued; the number of monks went on increasing; they wandered or became fixed, they excited the nation by their preachings, or edified it by the spectacle of their life. From day to day they received greater admiration and respect; the idea became established that this was the perfection of Christian conduct. They were proposed as models for the clergy; already some of them had been ordained, in order to make them priests or even bishops; and yet they were still laity, preserving a great degree of liberty, contracting no kind of religious engagement, always distinct from the clergy, often even purposely separating from it.

"It is the ancient advice of the fathers," says Cassien, "advice which endures, that a monk, at any cost, must fly bishops and women, for neither women nor bishops allow a monk who has once become familiar with them, to rest in peace in his cell, nor to fix his eyes on pure and celestial doctrine, contemplating holy things."[2]

So much liberty and power, so strong an influence over the people and such an absence of general forms, of regular organization, could not fail to give rise to great disorder. The

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[1] Saint Augustin, *de Opere Monac.* c. 28.
[2] Cassien, *de Instit. cœnob.*, xi. 17.

necessity of putting an end to it, of assembling these missionaries, these solitaries, these recluses, these cenobites, who every day became more numerous, and were neither of the people nor the clergy, under a common government, under one discipline, was strongly felt.

Towards the end of the fifth century, in 480, there was born in Italy, at Nursia, in the duchy of Spoleto, of a wealthy and considerable family, the man destined to resolve this problem, to give to the monks of the west the general rule for which they waited; I speak of Saint Benedict. At the age of twelve years he was sent to Rome to prosecute his studies. This was the time of the fall of the Empire, and the great troubles of Italy; the Heruli and the Ostrogoths disputed for its possession; Theodoric drove out Odoacer; Rome was incessantly taken, re-taken, threatened. In 494, Benedict, scarcely twelve years of age, left it with Cyrilla, his nurse; and a short time afterwards, we find him a hermit in the depths of a cavern, at Subiaco, in the Campagna di Roma.

As to why this child retired there, how he lived, nothing is known; for his legend, our only account, places at every step a moral wonder, or a miracle, properly so called. However this may have been, at the end of a certain period, the life of Benedict, his youth and his austerities, attracted the shepherds of the neighborhood; he preached to them; and the power of his word and the authority of his example, the always numerous concourse of auditors, soon rendered him celebrated. In 510, the neighboring monks of Vicovaro wished to have him for their chief; he at first refused, telling the monks that their conduct was disorderly, that they abandoned themselves in their house to all kinds of excesses, that they should undertake reformation and submit themselves to a very severe rule. They persisted, and Benedict became abbot of Vicovaro.

He, in effect, undertook with invincible energy the reformation which he had spoken of; as he had foreseen, the monks were soon tired of a reformer. The struggle between them and him became so violent that they attempted to poison him in the chalice. He perceived it by a miracle, says the legend; quitted the monastery, and retook to his hermit life at Subiaco.

His renown spread far; not only the shepherds, but laymen of every condition, and wandering monks, assembled to live near him. Equitius and Tertullus, noble Romans, sent their

sons, Maurus and Placidus to him; Maurus at the age of twelve, Placidus quite an infant. He founded monasteries around his cavern. In 520, it appears that he had founded twelve, each composed of twelve monks, in which he began to try the ideas and institutions by which, in his opinion, the monastic life should be regulated.

But the same spirit of insubordination and jealousy which had driven him from the monastery of Vicovaro was soon manifested in those which he had himself just founded. A monk named Florentius raised up enemies against him, laid snares for him. Benedict was irritated, and a second time renounced the struggle, and, taking some of his disciples, among others, Maurus and Placidus, he retired, in 528, to the frontiers of the Abruzzi and the Terra di Lavoro, near Cassino.

He there found what the hermit Wulfilaïch, whose history I have just mentioned, found near Treves, paganism still in existence, and the temple and statue of Apollo standing on Mount Cassino, a hill which overlooks the town. Benedict overthrew the temple and the statue, extirpated paganism, collected numerous disciples, and founded a new monastery.

It was here, where he remained and ruled to the end of his life, that he entirely applied himself to, and published, his Rules of Monastic Life. It soon became, as every one knows, the general, and almost only law of the monks of the west. It was by this rule of Saint Benedict that the western monastical institution was reformed, and received its definitive form. Let us stop here, then, and examine with some care this small code of a society which has played so important a part in the history of Europe.

The author commences by explaining the state of the western monks at this epoch; that is to say, at the beginning of the sixth century:

"It is well known," says he, "that there are four kinds of monks; firstly, the *cœnobites*, those who live in a monastery, under a ruler or abbot. The second kind is that of the anchorites, that is to say, hermits; those who, not from the fervor of a novice, but by long proof of the monastic life have already learned, to the great profit of many people, to combat against the devil, and who, well prepared, go out alone from the army of their brothers to engage in a single combat. . . . . The third kind of monks is that of the *sarabaites*, who, not being tried by any rule, nor by any

lessons of experience, as gold is tried in the furnace, and similar rather to the soft nature of lead, by their works keep fealty to the age, and lie to God by their tonsure. We meet these to the number of two, three, or more, without pastor, not caring about the sheep of the Lord, but merely their own particular flock; their law is their desire; what they think or prefer, that they call holy; what does not please them they say is not permitted. The fourth kind is that of the monks who are called *gyrovagi*, who, during their whole life, inhabit various cells for three or four days, in various provinces, always wandering—never settled, obeying the bent of their luxuries and the debaucheries of gormandizing, and in every respect worse than the sarabaites. It is much better to hold our peace than to speak of their miserable way of life: passing them in silence, let us, with God's aid, regulate the strong association of the cenobites."

The facts thus established, the rule of Saint Benedict is divided into seventy-three chapters, namely:

Nine chapters concerning the moral and general duties of the brothers;

Thirteen concerning religious duties and offices;

Twenty-nine concerning discipline, faults, penalties, &c.;

Ten concerning the internal government and administration;

Twelve concerning various subjects, as guests, brothers travelling, &c.;

That is,—1. nine chapters on the moral code; 2. thirteen on the religious; 3. twenty-nine of the penal code or discipline; 4. ten of the political code; 5. twelve upon various subjects.

Let us take each of these small codes, and see what principles dominate in them, what was the meaning and compass of the reformation which their author brought about.

1. With regard to the moral and general duties of monks, the points upon which the whole rule of Saint Benedict rests are, self-denial, obedience, and labor. Some of the monks of the west had often endeavored to introduce labor into their life; but the attempt had never become general, was never followed up. This was the great revolution which Saint Benedict made in the monastic institution; he especially introduced manual and agricultural labor into it. The Benedictine monks were the agriculturists of Europe; they cleared it on a large scale, associating agriculture with

preaching. A colony, a swarm of monks, not very numerous at first, transported themselves into uncultivated places, or almost so, often into the midst of a still pagan population, into Germany, for example, or Brittany ; and there, at once missionaries and laborers, they accomplished their two-fold task, often attended with as much danger as fatigue. This is how Saint Benedict regulated the employment of the day in his monasteries ; you will see that labor there occupied a great place :

' Laziness is the enemy of the soul, and consequently the brothers should, at certain times, occupy themselves in manual labor ; at others, in holy reading. We think that this should be thus regulated. From Easter to the month of October, after the first prime, they should work, nearly to the fourth hour, at whatever may be necessary : from the fourth hour, nearly to the sixth, they shall apply themselves to reading. After the sixth hour, on leaving the table, they shall repose quietly in their beds : or if any one wishes to read, let him read, but in such a manner as not to disturb others : and let nones be said at the middle of the eighth hour. Let them work till vespers at whatever there may be to do ; and if the poverty of the place, necessity, or the harvest keep them constantly employed, let them not mind that, for they are truly monks if they live by manual labor, as our brothers the apostles did ; but let everything be done with moderation, for the sake of the weak.

" From the month of October, until the beginning of Lent, let them be occupied in reading until the second hour ; at the second let them sing tierce, and until nones let all work at what is enjoined them ; at the first stroke of nones let them quit work, and be ready the moment the second stroke shall sound. After repast, let them read or recite the psalms.

" During Lent, let them read from the morning until the third hour, and let them then work as they shall be ordered, until the tenth hour. During Lent, all shall receive books from the library, which they shall read one after another all through. These books shall be given at the commencement of Lent. Especially let one or two ancients be chosen to go through the monastery at the hours when the brothers are occupied in reading, and let them see if they find any negligent brother who abandons himself to repose, or to conversation, who in no way applies himself to reading, who is not

only useless to himself, but who distracts the others. If one of the kind is found, let him be reprimanded once or twice; if he do not amend, let him be subjected to the regulated correction, in order to intimidate the others. On Sunday let all be occupied in reading, except those who are selected for various functions. If any one be negligent or lazy, so that he neither wishes nor is able to meditate or read, let some labor be enjoined upon him, so that he may not remain doing nothing. As regards infirm or delicate brothers, let some work or employment be imposed, so that they may neither be lazy nor loaded with the severity of the work. . . . . Their weakness should be taken into consideration by the abbot."[1]

Together with labor, Saint Benedict prescribes passive obedience of the monks to their superiors: a rule less new, and which prevailed also among the monks of the east, but which he laid down in a much more express manner, and more vigorously developing its consequences. It is impossible, in studying the history of European civilization, not to be astonished at the part which is there played by this idea, and not curiously to seek its origin. Of a surety, Europe received it neither from Greece, ancient Rome, the Germans, nor from Christianity, properly so called. It began to appear under the Roman empire, and arose out of the worship of the imperial majesty. But it was in the monastic institution that it was truly aggrandized and developed; it is from thence that it set out to spread itself into modern civilization. That is the fatal present that the monks made to Europe, and which so long altered or enervated its virtues. This principle is incessantly repeated in the rule of St. Benedict. Many chapters, entitled, *De obedientia, de humilitate, &c.*, announce and comment upon it in detail. Here are two which will show to what a point the rigor of application was pressed. Chapter sixty-eight, entitled, *If a brother is ordered to anything impossible*, is thus expressed:

"If by chance anything difficult or impossible be imposed upon a brother, let him receive with all mildness and obedience the command which is imposed upon him. If he sees that the thing entirely surpasses the extent of his power, let him explain fitly and patiently to his superior the reason of the impossibility, not inflamed with pride, not resisting, not

[1] Reg. S. Bened., c 48.

contradicting. If, after his observation, the prior persists in his opinion and his command, let the disciple know that it ought to be so, and, confiding in the aid of God, let him obey."

Chapter sixty-nine is entitled, *That in a monastery no one must defend another*, and goes on to say :—

"It is necessary to be very careful that, upon no pretext, a monk dare in the monastery defend another, or, so to speak, protect him, even when he shall be related by the ties of blood; let this in no manner be dared by the monks, because it might lead to grave and scandalous occurrences. If any one transgress in this, let him be severely reprimanded."

Self-denial is the natural consequence of passive obedience. Whoever is bound to obey absolutely, and on every occasion, exists not; all personality is torn from him. The rule of Saint Benedict formally establishes the interdiction of all property as well as all personal will.

"It is especially necessary to extirpate from the monastery, and unto the very root, the vice of any one possessing anything in particular. Let no person dare to give or receive without the order of the abbot, nor have anything of his own peculiar property, not a book, nor tablets, nor a pen, nor anything whatsoever; for it is not permitted them even to have their body and their will under their own power."[1]

Can individuality be more completely abolished?

2. I shall not detain you with the thirteen chapters which regulate worship and the religious offices; they do not give rise to any important observation.

3. Those which treat of discipline and penalties, on the contrary, require our best attention. It is here that perhaps the most considerable of the changes brought about by Saint Benedict into the monastic institution appears, the introduction of solemn and perpetual vows. Hitherto, although the entering into the monastery gave reason to presume the intention of remaining there, although the monk contracted a kind of moral obligation which daily tended to take great fixity, still no vow, no formal engagement, was yet pronounced. It was Saint Benedict who introduced them, and made them the basis of the monastic life, of which the primitive charac-

[1] Reg. S. Bened., c. 33.

ter thus entirely disappeared. This character was exaltation and liberty; perpetual vows, which could not long delay being placed under the care of the public power, substituted a law, an institution.

"Let him who is to be received," says the rule of Saint Benedict, "promise in the oratory, before God and his Saints, the perpetuity of his stay, the reformation of his manners and obedience. Let a deed be made of this promise, in the name of the saints whose relics are deposited there, and in presence of the abbot. Let him write this deed with his own hand, or, if he cannot write, let another, at his request, write it for him, and let the novice put a cross to it, and with his own hand deposit the deed upon the altar."[1]

The word *novice* reveals another innovation to us; a noviciate was, in fact, the natural consequence of the perpetuity of vows, and Saint Benedict, who, to an exalted imagination and an ardent character, joined much good sense, and practical sagacity, failed not to prescribe it. Its duration was more than a year. They read by degrees the whole rule to the novice, saying to him: "Here is the law under which you wish to strive; if you can observe it, enter; if you cannot, go freely." Upon the whole, the conditions and forms of trial are evidently conceived in a spirit of sincerity, and with the intention of being well assured that the will of the candidate was real and strong.

4. As regards the political code, the government itself of the monasteries, the rule of Saint Benedict offers a singular mixture of despotism and liberty. Passive obedience, as you have just seen, is its fundamental principle; at the same time the government is elective; the abbot is always chosen by the brothers. When once this choice is made, they lose all liberty, they fall under the absolute dominion of their superior, but of the superior whom they have elected, and of no other.

Moreover, in imposing obedience on the monks, the rule orders that the abbot consult them. Chapter III., entitled *That the advice of the brothers must be taken*, expressly says:

"Whenever anything of importance is to take place in the monastery, let the abbot convoke the whole congregation, and say what the question is, and after having heard the

[1] Reg. S. Bened., c. 58

advice of the brothers, he shall think of it apart, and shall do as appears to him most suitable. We say call all the brothers to the council, because God often reveals by the youngest what is most valuable. Let the brothers give their advice in all submission, and let them not venture to defend it obstinately; let the affair depend upon the will of the abbot, and let all obey what he thinks beneficial. But as it is suitable that the disciple should obey the master, so it is desirable that the latter should regulate all things with prudence and justice. Let the rule be followed in everything, and let no one dare to break it.

"If trifling things are to be done in the interior of the monastery, let them take the advice of the ancients alone."

Thus in this singular government, election, deliberation, and absolute power were coexistent.

5. The chapters which treat of various subjects have nothing remarkable, except a character of good sense and mildness, which is also seen in many other parts of the rule and with which it is impossible not to be struck. The moral thought and general discipline of it are severe; but, in the details of life, it is humane and moderate; more humane, more moderate than the Roman law, than the barbaric laws, than the general manners of the times. I do not doubt but that the brothers, confined within a monastery, were governed by an authority upon the whole more reasonable, and in a manner less severe, than they would have been in civil society.

Saint Benedict was so impressed with the necessity for a mild and moderate rule, that the preface which he has annexed to it finishes with these words:

"We wish thus to institute a school for the service of the Lord, and we hope we have not put into this institution anything harsh or painful; but if, after the council of equity, anything for the correction of vice, or maintenance of charity, is found in it which is rather too harsh, do not, alarmed at that, flee the path of salvation; at its commencement it is always narrow; but by the progress of a regular life, and faith, the heart dilates, and runs with an ineffable sweetness into the way of God's commandments."

It was in 528 that Saint Benedict gave forth his rule: in 543, the time of his death, it had already spread into all parts of Europe. Saint Placidus carried it into Sicily, others into Spain. Saint Maurus, the cherished disciple of Saint Bene-

dict, introduced it into France. At the request of Innocent, bishop of Mans, he set out from Mount Cassino at the end of the year 542, while Saint Benedict still lived. When he arrived at Orleans, in 543, Saint Benedict no longer lived, but the institution did not the less pursue its course. The first monastery founded by Saint Maur was that of Glanfeuil, in Anjou, or Saint Maur-sur-Loire. At the end of the sixth century, the greater part of the French monasteries had adopted the same rule; it had become the general system of the monastic order, so that towards the end of the eighth century, Charlemagne caused it to be asked in the various parts of his empire, if there existed any other kind of monks than those of the order of Saint Benedict?

We have as yet not studied more than half, so to speak, of the revolutions of the monastic institutions at this epoch, their internal revolutions, the changes in the regime and legislation of monasteries, their relations on the one hand with the state, on the other with the clergy, their situation in civil society, and in ecclesiastical society. This will form the subject of our next lecture.

FIFTEENTH LECTURE.

The relations of the monks with the clergy, from the fourth to the eighth century—Their primitive independence—Causes of its decline—1. In proportion as the number and the power of the monks were augmented, the bishops extended their jurisdiction over them—Canons of the councils—2. The monks demand and obtain privileges—3. They aspire to enter into the clergy—Differences and contests among the monks themselves upon this subject—The bishops at first repulse their pretensions—They give way to them—In entering into the clergy the monks lose their independence—Tyranny of the bishops over the monasteries—Resistance of the monks—Charters granted by the bishops to some monasteries—The monks have recourse to the protection of the kings, to that of the popes—Character and limits of the intervention—Similarity between the struggle of the monasteries against the bishops and that of the commons against the feudal lords.

We have studied the internal system of monasteries from the fourth to the eighth century; at present let us occupy ourselves with their external condition in the church in general, with their relations with the clergy.

As people have been deceived as to the internal state and system of monasteries, by forgetting the primitive character of monks, who were at first laymen and not ecclesiastics, so have they been greatly deceived concerning their situation in the church, by forgetting their equally primitive character, which was liberty, independence.

The foundation of a great number of monasteries belonged to an epoch, when the monks were already, and for a long time had been, incorporated with the clergy; many were founded by a patron, lay or ecclesiastical, sometimes a bishop, sometimes a king, or a great nobleman; and we see them, from their very origin, subject to an authority to which they owed their existence.

It is supposed that it had always been thus, that all the monasteries had been the creation of some will foreign and superior to that of the congregation itself, and which, more or less, had retained its influence. This is entirely to overlook the primitive situation of these establishments, and the true mode of their formation.

The first monasteries were not founded by any one,—they

founded themselves. They were not, as at a later period, the pious work of some rich and powerful man who was desirous of building an edifice, joining a church to it, endowing it, and calling other men to it, in order that they might there lead a religious life. The monastical associations formed themselves spontaneously, among equals, by the impulsive movement of soul, and without any other aim than that of satisfying it. The monks preceded the monastery, its edifices, its church, its endowment; they united, each of his own will, and on his own account, without depending upon any one beyond, as free as they were disinterested.

In meeting, they naturally found themselves, in all that related to manners, to doctrines, to religious practices, placed under the inspection of the bishops. The secular clergy existed before the monasteries; it was organized; it had rights, a recognized authority; the monks were subject to it, like other Christians. The moral and religious life of the faithful was the object of episcopal inspection and censure; that of the monks was in the same case: the bishop was not invested with any jurisdiction with regard to them, with any particular authority; they were in the general condition of the laity—living, however, in great independence, electing their superiors, administering the property which they possessed in common, without any obligation to any one, without any burden upon any one, governing themselves, in a word, as they chose.

Their independence, and the analogy between their situation and the rest of the laity was such, that they had no particular church, for instance, no church attached to their monastery, no priest who celebrated Divine service for them especially; they went to the church of the neighboring city or parish, like all the faithful, united to the mass of the population.

This was the primitive state of the monasteries, the starting point of their relations with the clergy. They did not long remain there: many causes soon concurred to change their independence, and unite them more intimately with the ecclesiastical corporation. Let us attempt to recognize them, and to mark the various degrees of their transition.

The number and power of the monks continually increased. When I say power, I speak of their influence, their moral action on the public: for power, properly so called, legal, constituted power, the monks were entirely without: but their

influence was daily more visible and more strong. For this reason alone, they attracted a more assiduous and attentive inspection on the part of the bishops. The clergy very quickly understood that it had in them, either formidable rivals, or useful instruments. They applied themselves, therefore, at an early period, to confine them, and to make use of them. The ecclesiastical history of the fifth century attests the continual efforts of the bishops to extend and to confirm their jurisdiction over the monks. The general inspection which they had a right to exercise over all the faithful, furnished them with a thousand occasions and means. The very liberty enjoyed by the monks lent them aid, for it gave rise to many disorders; and the episcopal authority was, of all others, most naturally called upon to interfere for their repression. It interposed, therefore, and the acts of the councils of the fifth century abound in canons, whose only object is to confirm and establish the jurisdiction of the bishops over monasteries. The most fundamental is a canon of the œcumenical council held at Chalcedonia, in 451, and which enacts:

"Those who have sincerely and really embraced the solitary life shall be suitably honored; but as some, under the appearance and name of monks, disturb civil and ecclesiastical affairs, overrunning towns, and attempting even to institute monasteries for themselves, it has pleased us to order that no one build or found a monastery without the consent of the bishop.

"Monks, in every city or district, shall be subject to the bishop, remain tranquil, only apply themselves to fastings and prayer, and remain in the place where they have renounced the world. Let them not meddle with ecclesiastical and civil affairs, and interfere in nothing out of doors, and not quit their monasteries, unless, for some necessary work, it be so ordered by the bishop of the city."[1]

This text proves that, hitherto, the greater part of the monasteries were freely founded by the monks themselves; but this fact was already considered as an abuse, and the authority of the bishop was formally required. Its necessity, in fact, became a law, and we read in the canons of the council of Agde, held in 506:

"We forbid that new monasteries be founded without the consent of the bishop."[2]

In 511, the council of Orleans orders:

[1] Council of Chalcedonia, in 451, c 4. [2] Ib., c. 58

"Let the abbots, according to the humility which is suitable to the religious life, be subject to the power of the bishops; and if they do anything against the rule, let them be reprimanded by the bishops; and being convoked, they shall meet once a year in the place chosen by the bishop."[1]

Here the bishop goes further, he makes himself the ruling minister even in the interior of monasteries; it was not from him that they held it; he was not the monastical legislative power; but he took the right of surveying the execution of the law there.

The same council adds: "Let no monk, abandoning, through ambition or vanity, the congregation of the monastery, dare to construct a separate cell without the permission of the bishop, or the consent of the abbot."[2]

New progress of the episcopal authority: hermits, anchorites, recluses, attracted more admiration and popular favor than the cenobites; the most zealous monks were always disposed to quit the interior of the monasteries in order to give themselves up to these proud austerities. For some time no authority interfered to prevent it, not even that of the abbot; you now see the repressive power sanctioned, not only that of the abbot, but of the bishop; he, too, charged both with keeping the monks within the interior of the house, and with repressing the external effects of exaltation.

In 352, a new council of Orleans decrees:

"Let abbots who slight the orders of the bishops, not be admitted, unless they humbly retract this rebellion."[3]

And a year afterwards:

"Let the monastery and the discipline of monks be under the authority of the bishop of the district in which they are situated.

"Let it not be permitted to abbots to go far from their monastery without the permission of the bishop. If they do so, let them be regularly corrected by their bishop, according to the ancient canons.

"Let the bishops take under their care nunneries established in their city; and let them not allow any abbess to do aught against the rule of her monastery."[4]

When all these rules were proclaimed, although they did

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[1] Coun. of Chalcedonia, in 451, c. 19. Ib., c. 22

[2] Coun. of Orleans, c. 22.

[4] Ib., in 554, c. 1, 2, 3, 5

not contain anything very precise, although, as you see, the jurisdiction of the bishops was not exactly determined, still it was established; it interfered in the principal points of the existence of the monks, in the foundation of monasteries, in the observation of their discipline, in the duties of the abbots, and, recognized in principle, although often repulsed in fact, it strengthened itself by exercise.

The monks themselves concurred to its progression. When they had acquired more importance, they claimed a separate existence. They complained of being assimilated with the simple laity, and confounded with the mass of the faithful; they desired to be established as a distinct corporation, a positive institution. Independence and influence were not sufficient for them—privilege was necessary. Now, from whom could they obtain it, except from the clergy? The authority of the bishops could alone constitute them separate from the religious society in general, and privilege them in its bosom. They demanded these privileges, and obtained them, but by paying for them. There was one, for instance, very simple, that of not going to the church of the parish, of constructing one in the interior of the monastery, and there celebrating divine service. They granted it to them without difficulty; but it was necessary that priests should do duty in these churches; now the monks were not priests, and had not the right of doing duty. They gave them priests, and the external clergy from that time had a place in the interior of monasteries; men were there sent from it as delegates, inspectors. By this fact alone, the independence of the monks already endured a serious blow: they saw, and attempted to remedy, the evil; they demanded that instead of priests sent from without, the bishop should ordain some monks priests. The clergy consented to it, and under the name of *hieromonachi*, the monasteries had priests chosen from out of their own body. They were rather less strangers than those who came from without, but still they belonged to the secular clergy, took its spirit, associated themselves with its interests, separated themselves more or less from their brothers; and by this simple distinction, established between the simple monks and the priests, between those who were present at the service, and those who performed it, the monastic institution already lost part of its independence and of its homogeneity.

The loss was so real that more than one superior of a mo-

nastery, more than one abbot perceived it, and attempted to repair it, at least to limit it. The rules of many monastic orders speak of priests established in the monastery with distrust, and apply themselves sometimes to restrain their number, sometimes the influence of them.

Saint Benedict, in his, formally inserted two chapters on this subject:

"If an abbot," says he, "wishes to have a priest or a deacon ordained for him, let him select from among his people one who is worthy to perform the sacerdotal functions. But let him who is ordained guard against all pride, and let him not contend against anything which shall be enjoined him by the abbot; let him know that he is even more subject to the regular discipline than any other; that the priesthood is not a reason for him to forget obedience and rule; but let him more and more advance in God, and always keep to the functions by which he entered into the monastery, except the duties of the altar, when even, by choice of the congregation, and the will of the abbot, he shall be, by reason of the merits of his life, raised to a more elevated rank. Let him know that he must observe the rule established by the deans and priors; that if he dare to act otherwise, he shall not be judged as a priest but as a rebel. And if, after having been frequently warned, he does not correct himself, let the bishop himself be called as witness. If he do not amend, and his faults be glaring, let him be driven from the monastery, in case he will not still submit, nor obey the rule."[1]

"If any one of the order of priests ask to be received into the monastery, let it not be immediately consented to; if he persist in his request, let him know that he shall submit to the whole discipline and rule, and that nothing shall be abated him."[2]

This rather jealous fear, this vigilance to repress the arrogance of priests, to subject them to the life of monks, was also manifested elsewhere, and by other symptoms; they only the better prove the progress of the external clergy in the interior of monasteries, and the danger in which it placed their ancient independence.

It had to submit to an entirely different check. Not content with being separated from the lay society, and being

[1] Reg. S. Bened., c. 62.

[2] Ib., c. 60

raised above it by their privileges, the monks conceived the ambition of entering fully into the ecclesiastical society, of participating in the privileges and power of the clergy. This ambition was shown in the monastical institution at a very early period. It was not approved of by all. The exalted and austere monks, those whose imagination was strongly filled with the holiness of the monastic life, and aspired to all its glories, were averse to receiving the sacred orders. Some regarded the clerical as a worldly life, which deterred them from the contemplation of divine things; the others thought themselves unworthy of the priesthood, and did not find themselves in a sufficiently perfect state to celebrate divine service. Hence arose some singular incidents in the relations between the monks and the clergy. In the fourth century, while Saint Epiphanus was bishop in the island of Cyprus, there was a monk in the island named Paulinianus, celebrated for his virtues, and in great reputation for sanctity. They frequently proposed making him a priest; he always declined, saying that he was not worthy of it; but Saint Epiphanus positively insisted upon consecrating him. He proceeded in the following manner: it is himself who gives the account:

"When they celebrated mass in the church of a village near our monastery, without his being aware of it, or in the least expecting it, we had him seized by a number of deacons, and had his mouth held, for fear that, wishing to escape, he should adjure us in the name of Christ. We at first ordained him deacon, and summoned him, by the fear he had for God, to fulfil the office. He strongly resisted, maintaining that he was unworthy. It was almost necessary to force him, for we had great difficulty in persuading him by testimonies of the Writings, and in citing the commands of God. And when he had performed the duties of deacon in the holy sacrifice, we again had his mouth held, with great difficulty; we ordained him priest, and for the same reasons which we had already impressed upon him, we decided him to take a place among the priests."[1]

They rarely came to such violent extremities; but I might cite many other examples of monks who were sincerely repugnant to becoming priests, and obstinately refused.

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[1] Saint Epiphanus, lett. to John, bishop of Jerusalem, vol. ii., p. 312.

Such, however, was far from being their general character. The greater part were very anxious to enter into orders, for the clergy was the superior body: to be received into its bosom was to be raised. "If the desire to become a priest excite you," says Saint Jerome to a monk, "learn, that you may be able to teach; pretend not to be a soldier without having been a militiaman, and a master before having been a disciple."[1] In fact, the desire to become priests so keenly excited the monks, that Cassienus ranks it among the temptations with which the demon pursued them, and especially among those which he attributes to the demon of vain-glory.

"Sometimes," says he, "the demon of vain-glory inspires a monk with a desire for the degrees of the clergy, the priesthood, or the deaconship. According to him, if he be invested with it, despite himself, he will fill the duties with so much rigor, that he might offer examples of holiness even to other priests, and might gain many people over to the church, not only by his admirable way of living, but by his doctrine and discourses."[2] And he relates the following anecdote upon this subject—a singular proof, truly, of the passion with which certain monks aspired to become priests, and of the empire which this desire possessed over their imagination:—

"I remember," says he, "that during my stay in the solitude of Scythia, an old man told me, that going one day to the cell of a certain brother, to visit him, as he approached the door, he heard him within pronouncing certain words; he stopped a little, wishing to know what he read of the Scripture, or else what he repeated from memory, according to usage. And as this pious spy curiously listened, with his ear at the door, he perceived that the spirit of vain-glory tempted the brother, for he spoke as if he addressed a sermon to the people in the church. The old man still stopped, and he heard that the brother, after having finished his sermon, changed his office, and did the duties of deacon at the mass of the catechumens. He at last knocked at the door, and the brother came to meet him with his accustomed veneration, and introduced him into his cell. Then, rather troubled in his conscience at the thoughts which had occupied him, he asked him how long he had been there, fearing, without doubt, that

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[1] Saint Jerome, lett. 4, *ad Rusticum*.
[2] Cassienus, *de Cœnob. inst.*, xi., 14.

he had insulted him by keeping him waiting at the door; and the old man answered, smiling: 'I arrived just as you celebrated the mass of the catechumens.' "[1]

Of a surety men preoccupied to such a degree by such a desire, would unhesitatingly have sacrificed their independence to it. Let us see how they attained their end, and what result this success had for them.

The clergy at first looked upon the ambition of the monks with a good deal of jealousy and distrust. At the fourth century, some bishops, more vigorous and discerning than others, or with some particular end in view, received them favorably. Saint Athanasius, for example, bishop of Alexandria, engaged in his great contest against the Arians, visited the monasteries of Egypt, loaded the monks with distinction, and selected many to ordain as priests, and even to make bishops of. The monks were orthodox, eager, popular. Athanasius saw that in them he should have powerful and devoted allies. His example was followed by some bishops in the west, especially by Saint Ambrose at Milan, and by Eusebius, bishop of Verceil. But the episcopacy in general behaved differently: it continued to treat the pretensions of the monks coldly, scornfully, and to combat them underhand. Proofs of it are in writing down to the seventh century. At the end of the fourth, for example, the bishop of Rome, Saint Siricius (384—398), allowed holy orders to be conferred upon them, but with many stipulations, lest too large a number of monks should penetrate into the clergy. In the middle of the following century, Saint Leo (440—460) engaged Maximus, patriarch of Antioch, not too easily to allow permission to preach to the monks of his diocese, even to the most holy, because their preaching might have serious consequences for the influence of the clergy. At the end of the sixth century, Saint Gregory the Great recommended the bishops to ordain monks as parish-priests but rarely, and to employ them with reserve. Upon the whole, amidst even the favors which it exhibits towards them, the episcopacy always shows itself jealous of the monks, and inclined to separate them from the clergy.

But the progress of their popularity surmounted this secret resistance. It was soon acknowledged that theirs, of all lives, was the Christian life; that it surpassed in merit that

[1] Cassienus, *de Cœnob. inst.*, xi., 15

of the external clergy, who could not do better than imitate them; and that a priest, or even a bishop, in becoming a monk, advanced in the paths of holiness and salvation. The councils themselves, composed of bishops, proclaimed these maxims:—

"If priests," says a council of Toledo, "desiring to follow a better life, wish to embrace the rule of the monks, let the bishop give them free access into the monasteries, and in no way obstruct the design of those who wish to give themselves up to contemplation."[1]

When they were generally recognized, there was no longer any means of resisting the invasion of the monks, nor of parsimoniously granting them the priesthood and episcopacy. At the commencement of the seventh century, Boniface IV. proclaims that they are *plus quam idonei*, more than fitted for all the functions of the clergy; and gradually events and minds progressed in this direction; the monks found themselves incorporated in the clergy; and, while preserving a distinct existence, associated on every occasion with its privileges and power. It is impossible to determine exactly the date of this admission; it was progressive and, for a long time, incomplete; even in the eighth century, the monks were at times still called laymen, and considered as such. Still it may be said that, about the end of the sixth and at the beginning of the seventh century, the revolution for which they had labored from the end of the fourth century was consummated. Let us see what were the results of it, as regards their external condition—what was the condition of the monks in the clergy when they decidedly formed a part of it.

It is evident that they must have lost there a great deal of independence, and that the authority of the bishops over monasteries was necessarily extended and confirmed. You know what the power of the episcopacy was over parish priests from the seventh to the eighth century. The fortune of monks was no better. Those little associations which we have just seen so independent, over which the bishops had scarcely a moral jurisdiction, which they labored with so much care to draw beneath their empire, see how they were treated at the seventh century. I shall leave the councils to speak for themselves:—

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[1] Council of Toledo, in 633, c. 60.

"It has been given out at the present council that monks, by order of the bishops, are subject to servile labors, and that, against the canonical orders, the rights of monasteries are usurped with an illegitimate audacity; so that a monastery becomes almost a domain, and that illustrious part of the body of Christ is almost reduced to ignominy and servitude. We therefore warn the chiefs of the churches that they no longer commit anything of the kind; and that the bishops do nothing in monasteries except what the canons direct them; that is, exhort the monks to a holy life, appoint the abbots and other officers, and reform such things as shall be against rule."[1]

"As regards presents that are made to a monastery, let not the bishops touch them."[2]

"A most deplorable thing there is, which we are forced to extirpate by a severe censure. We have learnt that certain bishops unjustly establish as prelates in certain monasteries some of their relations or favorites, and procure them iniquitous advantages, to the end that they may receive, through them, both what is in fact regularly due to the bishop of the diocese, and all that the violence of the exactor whom they have sent can seize from the monasteries."[3]

I might greatly multiply these quotations: all would equally attest that, at this epoch, the monasteries were subjected to an odious tyranny on the part of the bishops.

They, however, had means of resistance, and they made use of them. In order to explain the nature of these means satisfactorily, allow me to leave the monks for a moment, and call your attention to an analogous fact, and one much better known.

Every one is aware that, from the eighth to the tenth century, the cities, large or small, which still existed in Gaul, were induced to enter into the feudal society, to assume the characteristics of the new system, to take a place in its hierarchy, to contract its obligations in order to possess its rights, to live under the patronage of a lord. This patronage was harsh, oppressive, and the cities impatiently supported its weight. At a very early period, when they first engaged in

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[1] Council of Toledo, in 633, c. 51
[2] Coun. of Lerida, in 524, c. 3.
[3] Coun. of Toledo, in 655, c 3.

feudalism, they attempted to shake it off, to regain some independence. What were their means? In the boroughs there was the wreck of the ancient municipal system: in their miserable condition, they still selected some obscure magistrates: some property remained to them; they administered this property themselves: in a word, they preserved, in some respects, an existence distinct from that which they had assumed in entering the feudal society, an existence which was connected with institutions, with principles, and with a social state, all of them entirely different. These remains of their ancient existence, these wrecks of the municipal system, became the fulcrum by the aid of which the boroughs struggled against the feudal master who had invaded them, and progressively regained some degree of liberty.

An analogous fact was brought about in the history of monasteries, and of their relations with the clergy. You have just seen the monks entering into the ecclesiastical society, and falling under the authority of the bishops, as the commons entered at a later period into the feudal society, and fell under the authority of the lords. But the monks also retained some of their primitive existence, of their original independence; for example, they had had domains given them: these domains were not confounded with those of the bishop in whose diocese the monastery was situated; they were not lost in the mass of church property of which the bishop had the sole administration; they remained the distinct and personal property of each establishment. The monks accordingly continued to exercise some of their rights; the election of their abbot and other monastic affairs, the interior administration of the monastery, &c. In the same way, therefore, as the boroughs retain some wreck of the municipal system, and of their property, and made use of them in order to struggle against feudal tyranny, so did the monks preserve some remnants of their internal constitution and of their property, and made use of them in struggling against episcopal tyranny. So that the boroughs followed the route and in the steps of the monasteries; not that they imitated them, but because the same situation led to the same results.

Let us follow in its vicissitudes the resistance of the monks against the bishops; we shall see this analogy developed more and more.

The contest was at first limited to complaints, to protestations, carried either before the bishop himself, or before the

councils. Sometimes the councils received them, and issued canons to put a stop to the evil: I have just read to you texts which prove it. But a written remedy is of little efficacy. The monks felt the necessity of recurring to some other means. They openly resisted their bishop; they refused to obey his injunctions, to receive him in the monastery; more than once they repulsed his envoys by force of arms. Still their resistance weighed heavily upon them; the bishop excommunicated them, interdicted their priests: the struggle was grievous for all. They treated. The monks promised to resume order, to make presents to the bishop, to cede to him some part of the domain, if he was willing to promise to respect the monastery thenceforward, not to pillage their property, to leave them in peaceful enjoyment of their rights. The bishop consented, and gave a charter to the monastery. They are regular charters, these immunities, these privileges conferred upon monasteries by their bishop, the use of which became so frequent that we find an official compilation of them in the *Formula* of Marculf. I will read it: you will be struck with the character of these acts:

"To the holy lord and brother in Christ, the abbot of——— or to the whole congregation of——— monastery, built at——— by———, in honor of Saint———, bishop, ———. The love which we bear you has impelled us, by Divine inspiration, to regulate for your repose things which assure us eternal recompense, and, without turning us from the right road, or overstepping any limit, to establish rules which may obtain by the aid of the Lord an eternal duration, for we do not insure the least recompense from God in applying ourselves to what must come to pass in future times, without giving succor to the poor in the present time. . . . We think it our duty to insert in this sheet what you and your successors should do with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, or rather that to which the bishop of the holy church himself is bound: namely, that those of your congregation who are to exercise the holy services in your monastery, when they shall be presented by the abbot and all the congregation, receive from us or our successors the sacred orders, without making any gift for this honor; that the said bishop, out of respect for the place, and without receiving any recompense, consecrate the altar of the monastery, and grant, if it be demanded of him, the holy oil each year; and when, by Divine will, one abbot shall pass from the monastery to God, let the bishop of the

place, without expecting recompense, elevate to the rank of abbot, the monk most remarkable for the merits of his life, whom he shall find selected by the brethren. And let them take nothing which has been offered by God-fearing men to the abbey. And unless requested by the congregation or the abbot, to go there for the sake of prayer, let none of us enter into the interior of a monastery, nor overstep its enclosure. And if, after having been begged so to do by the monks, the bishop come for the purposes of prayer, or to be useful to them in anything, after the celebration of the holy mysteries, and after having received simple and brief thanks, let him set about regaining his dwelling without being required so to do by any one, so that the monks who are accounted solitaries may, with the help of God, pass the time in perfect tranquillity, and that, living under a holy rule, and imitating the holy fathers, they may the more perfectly implore God for the good of the church, and the salvation of the country. And if any monks of this order conduct themselves with indifference, and not as they should, if it is necessary let them be corrected according to rule by their abbot; if not, the bishop of the town must restrain them, in order that the canonical authority be deprived of nothing which tends to the repose of the servants of the faith. If any of our successors (which God forbid), full of perfidy, and impelled by cupidity, desire, in a spirit of audacity, to violate the things herein contained, overwhelmed by the blow of divine vengeance, let him be anathematized and excluded from the communion of the brotherhood for three years, and let this privilege be not the less eternally immovable for his conduct. In order that this constitution may remain always in vigor, we and our brothers, the lords bishops, have confirmed it with our signatures.

"Done, this —— day of —— the year of our Lord ——."[1]

When we come to the history of the commons, you will see that many of the charters which they wrested from their lords, seem to have been framed upon this model.

It happened to the monasteries as it was afterwards to happen to the commons: their privileges were constantly violated or altogether abolished. They were obliged to have recourse to a higher guarantee, and they invoked that of the king: a natural pretext presented itself; the kings themselves founded

[1] Marculf, b. i. f. 1.

monasteries, and in founding them took some precautions for shielding them from the tyranny of the bishops; they retained them under their especial protection, and prohibited any usurpation of the property or rights of the monks on the part of the bishops. Thus originated the intervention of royalty between the monasteries and the clergy. By and bye, monasteries which had not been founded by kings had recourse to their protection, and attained it for money or some other consideration. The kings in no way interfered with the jurisdiction of the bishops, they disputed none of their religious rights; the protection accorded by them had exclusive reference to monastic property; as this protection was more or less efficacious, the bishops used every effort to elude it; they refused to recognize the letters of protection and immunity granted by the king; sometimes they falsified them by the assistance of some treacherous brother, or even wholly abstracted them from the archives of the monastery. After a while, in order more fully to possess themselves of the constantly augmenting wealth of these establishments, they thought of another plan: they procured their own nomination as abbots of the more valuable monasteries: an opening to this encroachment presented itself; many monks had become bishops, and for the most part, bishops of the diocese in which their own monastery was situated; in this monastery they had taken care to keep up friends, partizans; and the post of abbot becoming vacant, frequently found no difficulty in securing it for themselves. Thus, at once bishops and abbots, they gave themselves up without restraint to the most monstrous abuses. The monasteries in every direction were sorely oppressed, were recklessly despoiled by their heads; the monks looked around for a new protector, they addressed themselves to the pope. The papal power had keen long strengthening and extending itself, and it eagerly availed itself of every opportunity of still further extending itself; it interposed as royalty had interposed, keeping, at all events for a long time, within the same limits, making no attempt to narrow the spiritual jurisdiction of the bishops, and abridging them of no spiritual right; applying itself only to repress their aggressions upon property and persons, and to maintain inviolate the established monastic rule. The privileges granted by the popes to certain monasteries of Frankish-Gaul previously to the commencement of the eighth century kept strictly within its limits, in no case removing them from the

episcopal to the papal jurisdiction. The monastery of Fulda presents us with the first instance of such a transfer, and this took place by the consent of the bishop of the diocese, Saint Boniface, who himself placed the monastery under the direct authority of the holy see. This is the first instance of such a proceeding that we meet with; neither popes nor kings had ever before interfered, except for the purpose of keeping the bishops within the just limits of their authority.

Such were the changes through which, in the interval I have described, the monastic associations passed, in their relations with the clergy. Their original condition was that of independence; this independence was lessened the moment that they obtained from the clergy some of the privileges which they had solicited from that body. The privileges so obtained, only served to augment their ambition: they became bent upon entering the ecclesiastical corporation: they did enter it, after a while, and found themselves thenceforward subject, like the priests, to the ill-defined, the unlimited authority of the bishops. The bishops abused their authority, the monasteries resisted, and in virtue of what still remained to them of their original independence, procured guarantees, charters. The charters being slighted, the monks had recourse to the civil authority, to royalty, and royalty confirmed the charters, and took the monks under its protection. This protection proving inadequate, the monks next addressed themselves to the pope, who interposed by another title, but without any more decisive success. It is in this struggle of royal and papal protection against episcopal tyranny, that we leave the monasteries in the middle of the eighth century. Under the Carlovingian race, they had to experience still more terrible shocks, assaults which it required their utmost efforts to overcome. We will speak of these at the proper time; at present, the analogy between the history of the monasteries and that of the commons, which manifested itself two centuries later, is the fact which most peculiarly calls for an observation.

We have now completed the history of social civilization, from the sixth to the middle of the eighth century. We have gone through the revolutions of civil and of religious society,—viewed each of them in their various elements. We have still to study the history, during the same period, of purely intellectual and moral civilization; of the ideas which then

occupied men's minds, the works which these ideas gave birth to—in a word, the philosophical and literary history of France at this epoch. We will enter upon this study in our next lecture.

SIXTEENTH LECTURE.

From the sixth to the eighth century all profane literature disappeared; sacred literature alone remained—This is evident in the schools and writings of this epoch—1. Of the schools in Gaul from the sixth to the eighth century—Cathedral schools—Rural schools—Monastic schools—What they taught there—2. Of the writings of the day—General character of literature—It ceased to be speculative, and to seek more especially science and intellectual enjoyments; it became practical; knowledge, eloquence, writings, were made means of action—Influence of this characteristic upon the idea formed of the intellectual state at this epoch—It produced scarcely any works, it has no literature properly so called; still minds were active—Its literature consists in sermons and legends—Bishops and missionaries—1st. Of Saint Cesaire, bishop of Arles—Of his sermons—2d. Of Saint Columban, missionary, and abbot of Luxeuil—Character of sacred eloquence at this epoch.

In studying the state of Gaul at the fourth and fifth centuries,[1] we found two literatures, the one sacred, the other profane. The distinction was marked in persons and in things; the laity and the ecclesiastics studied, meditated, wrote; and they studied, they wrote, they meditated, upon lay subjects, and upon religious subjects. Sacred literature dominated more and more, but it was not alone, profane literature still existed.

From the fourth to the eighth century, there is no longer any profane literature; sacred literature stands alone; priests only study or write; and they only study, they only write, save some rare exceptions, upon religious subjects. The general character of the epoch is the concentration of intellectual development in the religious sphere. The fact is evident, whether we regard the state of the schools which still existed, or the works which have come down to us.

The fourth and fifth centuries, you will remember, were in no want of civil schools, of civil professors, instituted by the temporal power, and teaching the profane sciences. All those great schools of Gaul, the organization and names of

[1] Lecture 4th, pp. 84—103.

which I have mentioned to you, were of this description. I have even pointed out to you, that as yet there were no ecclesiastical schools, and that religious doctrines, which daily became more powerful over minds, were not regularly taught, had no legal and official organ. Towards the end of the sixth century, everything is changed: there are no longer civil schools; ecclesiastical schools alone subsist. Those great municipal schools of Trèves, of Poictiers, of Vienne, of Bordeaux, &c., have disappeared; in their place have arisen schools called cathedral or episcopal schools, because each episcopal see had its own. The cathedral school was not always alone; we find in certain dioceses other schools, of an uncertain nature and origin, wrecks, perhaps, of some ancient civil school, which, in becoming metamorphosed, had perpetuated itself. In the diocese of Reims, for example, there existed the school of Mouzon, some distance from the chief place of the diocese, and in high credit, although Reims had a cathedral school. The clergy began also, about the same epoch, to create other schools in the country, also ecclesiastical, destined to form young readers who should one day become priests. In 529, the council of Vaison strongly recommended the propagation of country schools; they were, indeed, multiplied very irregularly, numerous in some dioceses, scarcely any in others. Finally, there were schools in the great monasteries: the intellectual exercises were of two kinds; some of the most distinguished monks gave direct instruction to the members of the congregation, and to the young people who were being brought up at the monastery; it was, moreover, the custom, in a large number of monasteries, that after the lectures at which the monks were bound to attend, they should have conferences among themselves upon whatever had been made the subject of the lecture; and these conferences became a powerful means of intellectual development and instruction.

The most flourishing of the episcopal schools from the sixth to the middle of the eighth century were those of:

1. *Poictiers.* There were many schools in the monasteries of the diocese, at Poictiers itself, at Ligugé, at Ansion, &c.
2. *Paris.*
3. *Le Mans.*
4. *Bourges.*
5. *Clermont.* There was another school in the town where

hey taught the Theodosian code ; a remarkable circumstance, which I do not find elsewhere.

6. *Vienne.*
7. *Châlons-sur-Saone.*
8. *Arles.*
9. *Gap.*

The most flourishing of the monastic schools of the same epoch were those of:

1. *Luxeuil*, in Franche-Comté.
2. *Fontenelle*, or Saint *Vandrille*, in Normandy ; in which were about 300 students.
3. *Sithiu*, in Normandy.
4. *Saint Médard*, at Soissons.
5. *Lerens.*

It were easy to extend this list ; but the prosperity of monastic schools was subject to great vicissitudes ; they flourished under a distinguished abbot, and declined under his successor.

Even in nunneries, study was not neglected ; that which Saint Cesaire founded at Arles contained, at the commencement of the sixth century, two hundred nuns, for the most part occupied in copying books, sometimes religious books, sometimes, probably, even the works of the ancients.

The metamorphosis of civil schools into ecclesiastical schools was complete. Let us see what was taught in them. We shall often find in them the names of sciences formerly professed in the civil schools, rhetoric, logic, grammar, geometry, astrology, &c. ; but these were evidently no longer taught except in their relations to theology. This is the foundation of the instruction : all was turned into commentary of the Scriptures, historical, philosophical, allegorical, moral, commentary. They desired only to form priests ; all studies, whatsoever their nature, were directed towards this result.

"Sometimes they went even further : they rejected the profane sciences themselves, whatever might be the use made of them. At the end of the sixth century, Saint Dizier, bishop of Vienne, taught grammar in his cathedral school. Saint Gregory the Great sharply blamed him for it. "It is not fit," he writes to him, "that a mouth sacred to the praises of God, should be opened for those of Jupiter." I do not know exactly what the praises of God or of Jupiter had to do with grammar ; but what is evident, is the crying down of the profane studies, although cultivated by the priests.

The same fact is visible, and far more plainly, in the written literature. No more philosophical meditations, no more learned jurisprudence, no more literary criticism; save some chronicles, some occasional poems, of which I shall speak at a later period, we have nothing belonging to this time except religious works. Intellectual activity appears only under this form, displays itself only in this direction.

A still more important revolution, and less perceived, is manifested: not only did literature become entirely religious, but, religious, it ceased to be literary; there was no longer any literature, properly so called. In the finest times of Greece and Rome, and in Gaul, up to the fall of the Roman empire, people studied, they wrote, for the mere pleasure of studying, of knowing, in order to procure for themselves and for others intellectual enjoyment. The influence of letters over society, over real life, was only indirect; it was not the immediate end of the writers; in a word, science and literature were essentially disinterested, devoted to the research for the true and the beautiful, satisfied with finding them, with enjoying them, and pretending to nothing more.

At the epoch which now occupies us it was otherwise; people no longer studied in order to know; they no longer wrote for the sake of writing. Writings and studies took a practical character and aim. Whoever abandoned himself thereto, aspired to immediate action upon men, to regulate their actions, to govern their life, to convert those who did not believe, to reform those who believed and did not practise. Science and eloquence were means of action, of government. There is no longer a disinterested literature, no longer any true literature. The purely speculative character of philosophy, of poetry, of letters, of the arts, has vanished; it is no longer the beautiful that men seek; when they meet with it, it no longer serves merely for enjoyment; positive application, influence over men, authority is now the end, the triumph of all works of mind, of all intellectual development.

It is from not having taken proper heed to this characteristic of the epoch upon which we are occupied, that, in my opinion, a false idea has been formed of it. We find there scarcely any works, no literature, properly so called, no disinterested intellectual activity distinct from positive life. It has been thence concluded, and you have surely heard it said, you may everywhere read, that this was a time of apathy and moral sterility, a time abandoned to the disorderly struggle of

material forces, in which intellect was without development and without power.

It was not so. Doubtless nothing remains belonging to this age, either of philosophy, poetry, or literature, properly speaking; but it does not follow that there was no intellectual activity. It was in an eminent degree otherwise; only it was not produced under the same forms as at other epochs; it did not lead to the same results. It was an activity entirely of application, of circumstance, which did not address itself to the future, which had no design to bequeath literary monuments to it, calculated to charm or to instruct; the present, its wants, its destinies, contemporaneous interests and life, that was the circle to which it confined itself, wherein the literature of this epoch spent itself. It produced few books, and yet it was fertile and powerful over minds.

One is therefore highly astonished when, after having heard it said, and having oneself thought that this time was sterile and without intellectual activity, we find in it, upon looking nearer, a world, as it were, of writings, not very considerable, it is true, and often little remarkable, but which, from their number and the ardor which reigns in them, attest a rare movement of mind and fertility. They are sermons, instructions, exhortations, homilies, and conferences upon religious matters. Never has any political revolution, never has the liberty of the press, produced more pamphlets. Three-fourths, nay, perhaps ninety-nine in a hundred, of these little works have been lost: destined to act at the very moment, almost all improvised, rarely collected by their authors or by others, they have not come down to us; and yet an immense number remains to us; they form a true and rich literature.

The sermons, homilies, instructions, &c., of this epoch, may be ranged under four classes. The one class consists of explanations, of commentaries upon the Scriptures. A passionate interest was attached to these monuments of the common faith; men saw everywhere among them purposes, allusions, lessons, examples; they sought in them hidden meanings, moral meanings, will or allegory. The most elevated, the most subtle mind incessantly found there something to exercise itself upon; and the people received with avidity these applications of books, which had all their respect, the actual interests of their conduct and life.

The sermons of the second class relate to the primitive history of Christianity, to the festivals and solemnities which

celebrate its great events, such as the birth of Jesus Christ, his passion, his resurrection, &c.

The third class comprehends sermons for the festivals of the saints and martyrs; a kind of religious panegyrics, sometimes purely historical, sometimes turned into moral exhortations.

Finally, the fourth class is that of the sermons destined to apply religious doctrines to the practice of life; that is to say, sermons upon religious morality.

I have no intention to detain you long upon this literature. To really understand it, to estimate the degree of development taken by the human mind, and to appreciate the influence which it has exercised over mankind, a lengthened study is necessary, often tedious, although full of results. The number of these compositions passes all conception: of Saint Augustin alone there remain three hundred and ninety-four sermons; and he preached many others, of which we only have fragments, and again many others which are entirely lost. I shall confine myself to the selecting two of the men who may be considered as the most faithful representatives of this epoch, and to the placing before you some fragments of their eloquence.

There were two classes of preachers—the bishops and the missionaries. The bishops in their cathedral town, where they almost constantly resided, preached several times a week, some even every day. The missionaries, who were chiefly monks, perambulating the country, preaching both in churches and in public places, in the midst of the assembled people.

The most illustrious of the bishops of the epoch which occupies us was Saint Cesaire, bishop of Arles; the most illustrious of the missionaries was Saint Colomban, abbot of Luxeuil. I will endeavor to give you an idea of their life and preaching.

Saint Cesaire was born at the end of the fifth century, in 470, at Châlons-sur-Saône, of a considerable family, and already celebrated for its piety. In his infancy, his tendencies, both intellectual and religious, attracted the attention of the bishop of Châlons, Saint Silvestre, who tonsured him in 488, and devoted him to an ecclesiastical life. He made his first appearance in the abbey of Lerens, where he passed many years, abandoning himself to great austerities, and often charged with preaching and teaching in the interior of the monastery. His health suffered from it; the abbot of Lerens sent him to Arles to get re-established, and in 501, amid the

unanimous acclamations of the people, he became bishop of that place.

He occupied the see of Arles for forty-one years, from 501 to 542, during the whole of which period he was one of the most illustrious and influential of the bishops of southern Gaul. He presided at, and directed the principal councils of this epoch, the councils of Agde in 506, of Arles in 524, of Carpentras in 527, of Orange in 529, all the councils in which the great questions concerning the doctrine and discipline of the time were treated of, among others, that of semi-Pelagianism. It appears even that his activity was no stranger to politics. He was twice exiled from his diocese; in 505, by Alaric, king of the Visigoths, and in 513, by Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths, because, they said, he wished to abandon Provence, and especially the city of Arles, to the king of the Burgundians, under whose empire he was born. Whether the accusation was or was not well founded, Saint Cesaire was quickly restored to his diocese, which passionately recalled him.

His preaching there was powerful, and one of the principal sources of his celebrity. About a hundred and thirty of his sermons have reached us, a number far inferior to that which he preached. They may be distributed into the four classes which I have just pointed out; and, by a circumstance which reflects honor on Saint Cesaire, the sermons on doctrine or religious morality are more numerous than mystical allegories, or panegyrics of the saints. It is from among the former that I shall take some passages calculated to make you acquainted with this kind of literature and eloquence.[1]

In a sermon, entitled *Advice to the faithful that they read the divine writings* Saint Cesaire urges them not to devote themselves exclusively to their temporal affairs, to watch their souls, to be occupied solicitously with them.

"The care of our soul, my dear brothers," says he, "strongly resembles the cultivation of the earth: as in the earth, we pluck up some things in order to sow others which shall be good, so should it be for our soul; what is evil should be rooted up, what is good should be planted; let pride be plucked away,

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[1] The greater part of the sermons of Saint Cesaire were inserted in the appendix to the sermons of Saint Augustin, at the end of vol. v of his works, fol. 1683.

and humility take its place; let avarice be rejected, and mercy cultivated. . . . No one can plant good things in his ground, until he has cleared it of evil things; accordingly thou canst not plant the holy germs of virtue in thy soul, unless thou first pluck out the thorns and thistles of vice. Tell me, I pray thee, thou who saidst even now that thou couldst not accomplish the commandments of God because thou canst not read, tell me, who has taught thee to dress thy vine, at what time to plant a new one? who has taught it thee? Hast thou read it, or hast thou heard speak of it, or hast thou asked it of able cultivators? Since thou art so occupied with thy vine, why art thou not so with thy soul? Give heed, my brother, I pray you, there are too kinds of fields, one of God, the other of man; the domain of God is thy soul; is it, then, just to cultivate thy domain, and to neglect that of God? When thou seest the earth in a good state thou rejoicest; wherefore, then, dost thou not weep at seeing thy soul lie fallow? We have but few days to live in this world upon the fruits of our earth; let us turn, therefore, our greatest attention towards our souls. . . . let us labor with all our power, with the aid of God, to the end that when he shall come to his field, which is our soul, he may find it cultivated, arranged in good order; let him find crops, not thorns; wine, not vinegar, and more wheat than tares."[1]

Comparisons borrowed from common life, familiar antitheses, singularly strike the imagination of the people; and Saint Cesaire makes great use of them. He recommends the faithful to conduct themselves properly at church, to avoid all distraction, to pray with attention:—

"Although in many respects, my dear brothers," says he, "we have often to rejoice at your progress in the way of salvation, still there are some things of which we must caution you, and I pray you to receive our observations willingly, according to your custom. I rejoice, and I return thanks to God for that I see you flock faithfully to the church to hear the divine lectures; but if you wish to complete your success and our joy, come here earlier: you see tailors, goldsmiths, blacksmiths, rise early in order to provide for the wants of the body; and we, we cannot go before day to church to solicit pardon for our sins. . . . Come then, at an early hour, I pray

[1] *S. Aug. Op* vol. v., col 509-510

you; and once arrived, try, with the aid of God, to prevent any foreign thought from gliding amidst our prayers, for fear of our having one thing upon our lips, and another in our hearts, and that while our language is addressed to God, our minds go astray upon all sorts of subjects. . . . If thou wished to urge any affair important to thyself with some powerful man, and suddenly turning thyself from him, and interrupting the conversation, thou wert to occupy thyself with all sorts of trifles, what an insult wouldst thou not be guilty of towards him? what would his anger not be towards thee? If, then, when we are occupied with a man, we employ all our care not to think of anything else for fear of offending him, ought we not to be ashamed, when we are occupied with God in prayer, when we have to defend ourselves to his Holy Majesty for miserable sins, should we not be ashamed to allow our mind to wander here and there, and to turn from his divine countenance? Every man, my brothers, takes for his God that which absorbs his thought at the moment of prayer, and seems to adore it as his Lord. . . . This one, while praying, thinks of the public place—it is the public place that he adores; another has before his eyes the house which he is constructing or repairing; he adores what he has before his eyes; another thinks of his vine, another of his garden. . . . What will it be if the thought which occupies be an ill thought, an illegitimate thought? if, in the midst of our prayers, we allow our mind to run upon cupidity, rage, hate, luxury, adultery? . . . I implore you, therefore, my cherished brothers, if you wish entirely to avoid these distractions of the soul, let us endeavor, with the aid of God, not to yield to them."[1]

Even in treating of the most elevated subjects, in addressing the gravest counsel to his people, the tone of St. Cesaire's preaching is always simple, practical, foreign to all literary pretension, only destined to act upon the soul of his auditors. He wishes to excite in them that ardor for good works, that active zeal, which incessantly pursues good.

"Many people, my dear brothers," says he, "think that it is sufficient for eternal life, if they have done no evil; if, perchance, any one has deceived himself by this false tranquillity, let him know, positively, that it is not sufficient for a

[1] *S. Aug Op.*, vol v., col 471—473.

Christian merely to have avoided evil, if he has not accomplished, as far as in him lies, things which are good; for He who said, *Depart from evil*,—also said to us, *Do good*.

"He who thinks that it is sufficient not to have done evil, although he has done no good, let him tell me if he would desire from his servant what he does to his Lord. Is there any one who would wish that his servant should do neither good nor evil? We all require that our servants should not only not do the evil which we interdict them, but that they should acquit themselves of the labors that we impose upon them. Thy servant would be more seriously guilty if he should rob thee of thy cattle, but he would not be exempt from fault if he neglected to guard it. It is not just that we should be towards God as we would not wish our servants to be towards us. . . .

"Those who think that it is sufficient that they do no evil, are accustomed to say: 'May it please God that I should merit being found, at the hour of death, the same as when I left the sacrament of baptism.' Doubtless, it is good for each to be found free from faults at the day of judgment, but it is a grave one not to have progressed in good. To him alone who left the world as soon as he received baptism, may it suffice to be the same as when leaving baptism; he had not time to exercise good works; but he who has had time to live, and is arrived at the age to do good, it will not suffice him to be exempt from faults, if he wishes also to be exempt from good works. I wish that he who desires to be found the same at death as he was when he received the sacrament of baptism would tell me, if, when he plants a new vine, he wishes that at the end of ten years it should be the same as the day when he planted it. If he grafts an olive plant, would it suit him that it should be the same after many years as on the day when he grafted it? If a son be born to him, let him consider whether he would wish, that after five years he should be of the same age and the same size as at the day of his birth. Since, then, there is no one to whom this would be agreeable for the things which belong to him, in the same way that he would be sorrowful if his vine, his olive plant, or his son, should make no progress, so let him sorrow if he find that he himself has made no progress from the moment he was born in Christ."[1]

[1] *S. Aug. Op.*, vol. v., col. 431, 432.

And elsewhere in a sermon upon charity :—

"It is not without reason, you must suppose, that I so often discourse with you upon truth and perfect charity. I do it because I know no remedy so wholesome, or so efficacious for the wounds of sin. Let us add that, however powerful may be this remedy, there is no one who may not procure it, with the aid of God. For other good works omitted, one may find some excuse; there is none for omitting the duty of charity. One may say to me, 'I cannot fast;' 'I cannot love.' They may say, 'From the weakness of my body, I cannot abstain from meat and wine;' but who can say to me, 'I cannot love my enemies, nor pardon those who have offended me?' Let no one deceive himself, for no one can deceive God. . . . There are many things which we cannot draw from our granary or our cellar, but it would be disgraceful to say that there is something which we cannot draw from the treasure of our heart; for here our feet have not to run, our eyes to look, our ears to listen, nor our hands to work. We can allege no fatigue as an excuse; men do not say to us: 'Go to the east to seek charity; sail to the east, and thence bring back affection.' It is into ourselves and into our hearts that they order us to enter; it is there that we shall find everything. . .

"But, says some one, I cannot, in any way, love my enemies. God tells thee in the scriptures that thou canst; and thou answerest that thou canst not. Now, look; should we believe God or thee? . . How then? So many men, so many women, so many children, so many delicate young girls have supported with a firm heart, for the love of Christ, the flames, the sword, wild beasts; and we cannot support the insults of some foolish persons! and for some petty ills which the wickedness of men has done us, we pursue against them to their death the vengeance of our injuries. Truly, I know not with what face and with what conscience we dare ask to share eternal beatitude with the saints, we who cannot follow their example even in the slightest things."[1]

This is not devoid of energy; the feeling of it is lively, the turns picturesque; it almost amounts to eloquence.

Here is a passage which is even more touching. It is doubtful whether the sermon from which I borrow it is by Saint Cesaire. It contains some almost verbal imitations from

[1] *S. Aug Op.*, vol. v., col. 451, 452.

the eastern fathers, especially Eusebius and Saint Gregory. but this matters little; it is certainly by some preacher of the time, and characterizes it as well as that which I have just cited. It was preached on Easter-day; it celebrates Christ's descent into hell, and his resurrection:

"Behold," says the preacher, "you have heard what was done of his own free will by our Saviour, the Lord of Vengeance. When, like a conqueror, burning and terrible, he reached the countries of the kingdom of darkness, at the sight of him the impious legions of hell, affrighted and trembling, began to ask each other, saying:—'What is this terrible figure resplendent with the whiteness of snow? Never has our Tartarus received his like; never has the world cast into our caverns any one resembling him; this is an invader, not a debtor; he exacts, he does not ask; we see a judge, not a suppliant; he comes to command, not to succumb; to take away, not to remain. Did our porters sleep when this triumpher attacked our gates? If he was a sinner, he would not be so powerful; if any fault sullied him, he would not illuminate our Tartarus with such brilliancy. If he is God, wherefore has he come? if he is man, how has he dared? If he is God, what does he in the sepulchre? if he is man, why does he deliver sinners? whence comes he, so dazzling, so powerful, so radiant, so terrible? . . . Who is he, that with so much intrepidity he oversteps our frontiers, and that not only he does not bear our punishments, but that he delivers others from our chains? Should not this be he by whose death our prince lately said we should gain the empire over the whole universe? But if this be he, the hope of our prince has deceived him; where he thought to conquer, he has been conquered and thrown down. O, our prince, what hast thou done, what hast thou wished to do? Behold him who, by his splendor, has dissipated thy darkness; he has overthrown thy dungeons, broken thy chains, delivered thy captives, and changed their sorrow into joy. Behold those who were accustomed to groan under our torments insult us because of the salvation which they have received; and not only do they not fear us, but they even menace us. Have any seen hitherto the dead become proud, the captives rejoice? Why hast thou desired to lead hither him whose coming has called back joy to those who late were in despair? We no longer hear their accustomed cries, none of their groans resound.'"[1]

[1] *S. Aug. Op.*, vol. v., col. 283, 284.

Surely, even were you to find such a passage in *Paradise Lost*, you would not be astonished, for this discourse is not unworthy of the hell of Milton.

It is not, however (and this is a good reason for not attributing it to him), in the general tone of the preaching of Saint Cesaire. This is in general more simple, less ardent; it addresses itself to the common incidents of life, to the natural feelings of the soul. There reigns in it a mild kindness towards a genuine intimacy with the population to whom the preacher addresses himself; he not only speaks a language suited to his auditors, the language which he believes best calculated to act upon them; but he pays attention to the effect of his words; he wishes to take from them anything which they may possess likely to wound,—all bitterness; he in a manner claims indulgence for his severity.

"When I make those reflections, I fear that some will rather be irritated against us than against themselves; our discourse is offered to your charity as a mirror; and as a matron, when she regards herself in her mirror, corrects what she sees defective in her person, and does not break the mirror; so, when any one shall recognize his deformity in a discourse, it is just that he should rather correct himself than be irritated against the preacher as against a mirror. Those who receive a wound are more disposed to nurse it than to irritate themselves against the remedies; let no persons irritate themselves against spiritual remedies; let each receive, not only patiently, but with a good heart, what is said to him with a good heart. It is well known that he who receives in a good spirit a salutary correction, already avoids evil; he who is displeased with his faults, begins to have an inclination for what is good, and in proportion as he departs from vice, he approaches virtue."[1]

He pushes his solicitude so far as to desire that his auditors should interrogate him, and enter into conversation with him.

"It was a cause of great joy to him," say his biographers, "when men induced him to explain any obscure point; and he himself frequently excited us to it, by saying to us—'I know that you do not understand all that we say; why do you not interrogate us, to the end that you may be able to comprehend? The cows do not always run to the calves—

[1] *S. Aug. Op.*, vol. v., col. 480.

often, even the calves run to the cows, that they may appease their hunger at the dugs of their mother. You should act in precisely the same manner, so that by interrogating us, you may seek the means of extracting the spiritual honey for yourselves.' "[1]

One can scarcely suppose but that such language would exercise great influence over the mass of the people; that of Saint Cesaire was great indeed, and everything attests that few bishops possessed the soul of their auditors as he did.

I pass to a preaching of another kind, less regular, less wise, but not less powerful—to that of the missionaries. I have named Saint Colomban as the type of this class of men. He was born in 540, not in Gaul, but in Ireland, in the province of Leinster; he prosecuted his ecclesiastical studies, and became a monk in the monastery of Benchor, situated in the North of Ireland, in Ulster. What he had to do as a common monk, and in Ireland, did not satisfy his activity; and in 585, already forty-five years of age, he passed into France with twelve monks of his monastery, with the sole aim of visiting it and preaching there. He preached, indeed, while travelling from west to east, with enormous success, attracting everywhere the concourse of the people, and the attention of the great. A short time after his arrival in Burgundy, the king, Gontran, implored him to remain there. He established himself amidst the mountains of Vosges, and there founded a monastery. At the end of a very short period, in 590, the increasing number of his disciples, and the affluence of people, obliged him to seek a more extensive and more accessible place; he descended to the foot of the mountains, and there founded the monastery of Luxeuil, which soon became very considerable. The successes of Saint Colomban were less peaceable than that of Saint Cesaire—they were accompanied by resistance and trouble; he preached the reformation of manners, the zeal of faith, without caring for any consideration or circumstance, falling out with princes, with bishops, casting the divine fire on all sides, without troubling himself about the conflagration. Accordingly, his influence, which he exercised with a good intention, was uncertain, unequal, and incessantly disturbed. In 602, he got

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[1] *Vita S. Cæsarii*, c. 30; *dans les Acta sanct. ord. S. Bened.*, vol. I., p. 637.

into a quarrel with the neighboring bishops, about the day of the celebration of Easter, and not choosing to yield anything to the local customs, he made enemies of them. About 609, a violent storm was raised against him at the court of the king of Burgundy, Theodoric II., and, with his accustomed energy, he preferred to abandon his monastery rather than yield for an instant. Fredégaire has accurately preserved the account of this contest; I will read it entire: the character and the situation of the missionary are strongly shown in it:—

"The fourth year of the reign of Theodoric, the reputation of Saint Colomban increased in the cities and in all the provinces of Gaul and Germany. He was so much celebrated and venerated by all, that king Theodoric often visited him at Luxeuil, to ask with humility the favor of his prayers. As he went there very often, the man of God began to rebuke him, asking him why he gave himself up to adultery with concubines, rather than enjoying the sweetness of a legitimate marriage, so that the royal race might proceed from an honorable queen, and not from an evil place. As already the king obeyed the word of the man of God, and promised to abstain from all illicit things, the old serpent glided into the soul of his grandmother Brunehault, who was a second Jezebel, and excited her against the saint of God with the sting of pride. Seeing Theodoric obey the man of God, she feared that if her son, slighting the concubines, put a queen at the head of the court, she would see herself, by this event, retrenched of a part of her dignity and honors. It happened one day that Colomban visited the court of Brunehault, which was then in the domain of Bourcheresse.[1] The queen having seen him enter the court, led to him the sons that Theodoric had had by his adulteries. Having looked at them, the saint asked what they wanted with him. Brunehault said to him—'These are the sons of the king—give them the favor of thy benediction.' Colomban said to her—'Know that they will never bear the royal sceptre, for they have come from an ill place.' She, in a fury, ordered the children to retire. The man of God having left the court of the queen, at the moment that he passed the threshold a terrible noise from above was heard, but did not repress the fury of this

[1] Between Châlons and Autun.

miserable woman, who prepared to set snares for him. . . . Colomban, seeing the royal anger raised against him, promptly repaired to the court, to repress by his admonitions this unworthy rancor. The king was then at Epoisse, his country house. Colomban arrived as the sun went down; they announced to the king that the man of God was there, and that he was not willing to enter into the house of the king. Then Theodoric said, that he had rather properly honor the man of God than provoke the anger of the Lord by offending one of his servants; he therefore ordered his people to prepare everything with royal pomp, and to go to the servant of God. They ran, therefore, and according to the order of the king offered their presents. Colomban, seeing that they presented him dishes and cups with royal splendor, asked what they wanted. They said to him—'This is what the king sends thee.' But, driving them back with malediction, he answered —'It is written, the Most High rejecteth the gifts of the wicked; it is not fit that the lips of the servants of God should be soiled with his meat—of his who interdicts their entry, not only into his dwelling, but that of others.' At these words, the vases fell to pieces, the wine and the beer ran over the ground, and everything was scattered about. Some servants, terrified, went to tell the king what had happened. He, seized with fright, repaired at break of day with his grandmother to the man of God; they implored him to pardon them for what they had done, and promised to correct themselves in future. Colomban was appeased, and returned to the monastery. But they did not long observe their promises; their miserable sins recommenced, and the king gave himself up to his usual adulteries. At the news of this, Colomban sent him a letter full of reproaches, menacing him with excommunication if he would not correct himself. Brunehault, again enraged, excited the mind of the king against Colomban, and strove to deprive him of all his power; she prayed all the lords and great men of the court to animate the king against the man of God; she also dared to solicit the bishops, in order that they might raise suspicions concerning his religion, and blame the rule which he imposed upon his monks. The courtiers, obeying the discourse of this miserable queen, excited the mind of the king against the saint of God, and persuaded him to cause him to come and prove his religion. The king hurried away, sought the man of God at Luxeuil, and asked him why he deviated from the customs

of other bishops, and also why the interior of the monastery was not open to all Christians. Colomban, with a haughty soul and full of courage, answered the king that it was not customary to open the entrance of the dwelling-place of the servants of God to secular men and strangers to religion, but that he had places prepared and destined to receive all guests. The king said to him—'If thou desire to acquire the gifts of our bounty and the help of our protection, thou must allow every one to enter into all parts of thy monastery.' The man of God answered—'If thou wouldst violate what has hitherto been subject to the rigor of our rules, and if thou art come here to destroy the retreats of the servants of God, and overthrow the rules of discipline, know that thy empire shall crumble to the ground, and that thou shalt perish with all thy royal race;' which the event afterwards confirmed. Already, with a rash step, the king had penetrated into the refectory; terrified at these words, he quickly returned. He was then assailed with the warm reproaches of the man of God, to whom Theodoric said: 'Thou hopest I shall give thee the crown of a martyr; know that I am not sufficiently foolish to commit so great a crime. Return to a view of things which will be far more profitable for thee, and let him who has renounced the manners of secular men resume the path he has quitted.' The courtiers all cried, with one voice, that they could not tolerate in that place a man who would not associate with all. But Colomban said that he would not go beyond the boundary of the monastery, unless taken away by force. The king then departed, leaving a certain lord named Bandulf, who immediately drove the saint of God from the monastery, and conducted him in exile to the town of Besançon, until the king should decide upon the sentence which it might please him to pass."

The struggle was prolonged for some time; the missionary was finally obliged to quit Burgundy. Theodoric had him conducted to Nantes, where he attempted to embark in order to return to Ireland; an unknown circumstance, of which his biographers have made a miracle, prevented him crossing the sea; he resumed the route of the countries of the east, and established himself in the states of Teodebert, brother of Theodoric, in Switzerland, on the borders of the lake of Zurich; then on the lake of Constance, and finally on the lake of Geneva. New troubles drove him from this abode; he passed into Italy, and there founded, in 612, the monastery

of Bobbio, where he died on the 21st of November, 615, an object of veneration to all the people among whom he had brought his tempestuous activity.

It is shown in his eloquence: few monuments of it remain to us; such preaching was far more improvised, far more fugitive, than that of a bishop. Belonging to Saint Colomban we have only the rule which he instituted for his monastery, some letters, some poetical fragments, and sixteen *Directions*, which are really sermons, preached either during some mission, or in the interior of his monastery. The character of them is entirely different from that of the sermons of Saint Cesaire; there is much less mind and reason in them; a less fine and varied knowledge of human nature and the different situations of life, less care taken to model the religious instruction upon the wants and capacities of the auditors. But on the other hand, the flights of imagination, the pious transports, the rigorous application of principles, the warfare declared against all vain or hypocritical compromise, give to the words of the orator that passionate authority which does not always and surely reform the soul of his auditors, but which dominates over them, and, for some time at least, sovereignly disposes of their conduct and their life. I shall cite but one passage from them, so much the more remarkable, as being what one would least expect to find there. It was the age when fasts, mortifications, austerities of all kinds were multiplied in the interior of monasteries, and Saint Colomban recommends them, like others; but, in the sincerity of his enthusiasm, he soon perceived that neither sanctity nor faith existed therein, and he attacked the errors of the monastical rigors, in the same way that he had attacked the baseness of worldly effeminacy:

"Do not suppose," says he, "that it suffices for us to fatigue the dust of our body with fasts and vigils, if we do not also reform our manners. . . . To mortify the flesh, if the soul fructifies not, is to labor incessantly at the earth without making it produce any harvest; it is to construct a statue of gold outside, and of mud within. To what purpose were it to go far abroad to make war, if the interior be left a prey to ruin? What would be said of the man who should dig all round his vineyard and leave it inside full of brambles and bushes?. . . . A religion consisting merely of gestures and movements of the body is vain; the suffering of the body alone is vain; the care which a man takes of his exterior is vain, if

ne does not also watch and take care of his soul. True piety resides in the humility, not of the body, but of the heart. To what purpose are those combats, which are fought with the passions by the servant, when these live in peace with the master? . . . . . It does not suffice any more to hear speak of the virtues, or to read of them. . . . . Is it by words alone that a man cleanses his house of filth? Is it without labor and without sweat that a daily work can be accomplished? . . . . Therefore strengthen yourself, and cease not to combat; no one obtains the crown, unless he has courageously fought."[1]

We do not find many passages in the Instructions of Saint Colomban, so simple as this. The transports of imagination are there always mixed with subtlety of mind; still the foundation is often energetic and original.

Compare this sacred eloquence of the sixth century with the eloquence of the modern pulpit, even in its finest period; at the seventeenth century, for example. I said but now that from the sixth to the eighth century, the characteristic of literature was that of ceasing to be literature, that it had become an action, a power; that in writing, in speaking, men only concerned themselves with positive and immediate results; that they sought neither science nor intellectual pleasures, and that, for this reason, the epoch produced scarcely anything but sermons, or works analogous to them. This fact, which is shown in the general literature, is imprinted on the sermons themselves. Open those of modern times, they have evidently a character more literary than practical; the orator aspires far more to beauty of language, to the intellectual satisfaction of his auditors, than to influence them to the bottom of their souls, to produce real effects, true reformation, efficacious conversion. There is nothing of this kind, nothing literary, in the sermons which I have just spoken of; no anxiety about speaking well, about artistically combining images, ideas; the orator goes to the facts; he desires to act: he turns and returns in the same circle; he fears not repetitions, familiarity, or even vulgarity; he speaks briefly, but he begins again each morning. It is not sacred eloquence, it is religious power.

There was at this epoch a literature which has not been

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[1] *S. Colomban. Inst.* 2, *Bibl. patr.*, vol. xii., p. 10.

remarkable, a veritable literature, essentially disinterested, which had scarcely any other end in view but that of procuring intellectual, moral pleasure to the public; I mean the lives of the saints, the legends. They have not been introduced into the literary history of this epoch: they are, however, its true, its only literature, for they are the only works which had the pleasures of the imagination for their object. After the battle of Troy, almost every town in Greece had poets who collected the traditions and adventures of the heroes, and made a diversion of them for the public, a national diversion. At the epoch which occupies us, the lives of the saints played the same part for the Christians. There were men who occupied themselves in collecting them, writing them, and recounting them for the edification, no doubt, but more especially for the intellectual pleasure of the Christians. That is the literature of the time, properly so called. In our next lecture, I shall lay some of those before you, as well as some monuments of profane literature, which we likewise meet there.

SEVENTEENTH LECTURE.

Preface of the *Old Mortality* of Walter Scott—Robert Patterson—Preface of the *Vie de Saint Marcellin*, bishop of Embrun, written at the commencement of the sixth century—Saint Ceran, bishop of Paris—Eagerness of the Christians of these times to collect the traditions and monuments of the life of the saints and martyrs—Statistics of this branch of sacred literature—Collection of the Bollandists—Cause of the number and popularity of legends—They almost alone satisfy at this epoch—1. The wants of the moral nature of man—Examples: Life of Saint Bavon, of Saint Wandregisilus, of Saint Valery—2. The wants of physical nature—Examples: Life of St. Germain of Paris, of Saint Wandregisilus, of Saint Rusticulus, of Saint Sulpicius of Bourges—3. The wants of the imagination—Examples: Life of Saint Seine, of Saint Austregesilus—Literary defects and merits of legends.

Heading the *Puritans* of Walter Scott is a preface which the French translators have omitted, I know not why, and from which I take the following details:

"The tombs of the puritan martyrs, scattered in large numbers, especially in some counties of Scotland, are still objects for the respect and devotion of their partisans. It is sixty years ago that a man living in the county of Dumfries, named Robert Patterson, a descendant, it was supposed, of one of the victims of the persecution, quitted his house and small inheritance, in order to devote himself to the task of keeping these modest tombs in repair. . . . He contrived to discover them in the most secret places, in the mountains and rocks where the insurgent puritans had taken refuge, and where, often surprised by troops, they perished sword in hand, or were shot after the combat. He freed the funeral stone from the moss which covered it, he renewed the half effaced inscription where the pious friends of the dead had expressed, in scriptural style, both the celestial joys which awaited him, and the malediction which should for ever pursue his murderers. Every year he visited all the tombs: no season stopped him; he begged not, nor had he any need so to do; hospitality was always assured him in the families of the martyrs or zealots of the sect. For nearly thirty years he continued this painful pilgrimage; and it is scarcely more than

twenty-five years since he was found exhausted with fatigue and breathing his last sigh upon the high road, near Lockerby; by his side was his old white horse, the companion of his labors. In many parts of Scotland, Robert Patterson is still remembered, and the people, ignorant of his real name, designated him, from the employment to which he devoted his life, by that of *Old Mortality* (man of the dead of olden times)."

I go back from the eighteenth to the sixth century, and I read at the head of the *Life of Saint Marcellin*, bishop of Embrun, this little prologue:

"By the bounty of Christ, the combats of the illustrious martyrs, and the praises of the blessed confessors, have filled the world to such a degree, that almost every town may boast of having as patrons martyrs born within its bosom. Hence it happens, that the more they write and propagate the inestimable recompense which they received for their virtues, the more will the gratitude of the faithful increase. Accordingly, I find my pleasure in seeking everywhere the palms of these glorious champions; and while travelling with this view, I arrived at the city of Embrun. There I found that a man, long since sleeping with the Lord, still performs signal miracles. . . . . - I asked, curiously, what had been the kind of life of this holy man from his infancy, what was his country, by what proofs and by what marvels of virtue he had been raised to the sublime charge of pontiff; and all declared with one voice what I have here committed to writing. Men even whose age has been prolonged to a very late period, and some of whom have attained ninety, and even a hundred years, have given me unanimous answers concerning the holy pontiff. . . . I wish, therefore, to transmit his memory to future ages, although I feel my weakness succumb under such a burden."[1]

Behold the Robert Patterson of the sixth century: this unknown man performed the same travels, and fulfilled almost the same office for the Christian heroes of this epoch, as *Old Mortality* did for the martyrs of Scotch puritanism. It was a taste, a general need of the age, that of seeking all the traditions, all the monuments of the martyrs and saints, and trans-

[1] *Vie de Saint Marcellin*, in the *Acta Sanctorum* of the Bollandists, 20th April, vol. ii., p. 751.

mitting them to posterity. Saint Ceraune, or Ceran, bishop of Paris at the beginning of the seventh century, likewise devoted his life to this task. He wrote to all the priests whom he thought learned in the pious traditions of their country, praying them to collect such for him: we know, among others, that he addressed himself to a priest of the diocese of Langres, called Warnacher, and that this latter sent him the acts of three sainted brothers of one birth, Speusippius, Eleusippius, and Meleusippius, martyrized in that diocese shortly after the middle of the second century; and of Saint Didier, bishop of Langres, who underwent the same fate about one hundred years later. It would be easy to find many analogous facts in the history of Christianity, from the fourth to the tenth century.

Thus were amassed the materials of the collection commenced in 1643 by Bolland, a Jesuit of Belgium, since continued by many other scholars, and known under the name of *Recueil des Bollandistes*. All monuments relative to the life of the saints are there collected and classed by month and day. The enterprise was interrupted in 1794 by the Belgian revolution; so the work is finished only for the first nine months of the year, and the first fourteen days of the month of October. The end of October, and the months of November and December are wanting; but the materials for them were prepared: they have been found, and it is said that no time will be lost in publishing them.

In its actual state, this collection contains 53 volumes folio, of which the following is the distribution:—

	Vols.		Vols.
January	2	July	7
February	3	August	6
March	3	September	8
April	3	October (up to the fourteenth day)	6
May	8		
June	7		

Would you have an idea of the number of lives of the saints, long or succinct, contemporaneous or not, which fill these 53 volumes? Here is the list, day by day, of those of the month of April:—

	Saints.		Saints.
April 1.	40	April 17.	42
2.	41	18.	46
3.	26	19.	38
4.	26	20.	57
5.	20	21.	24
6.	55	22.	62
7.	35	23.	42
8.	25	24.	74
9.	39	25.	30
10.	30	26.	48
11.	39	27.	56
12.	141	28.	45
13.	39	29.	58
14.	46	30.	126
15.	41		
16.	81		1472

I have not made the calculation for the fifty-three volumes; but according to this amount of one month, and judging by approximation, they contain more than 25,000 lives of saints. I must add that many, doubtless, have been lost, and that many others still remain unpublished in the libraries. This simple statistic shows you the extent of this literature, and what prodigious activity of mind it presupposes in the sphere of which it is the object.

Such an activity, such a fertility, surely did not proceed from the mere fancy of the authors; there were general and powerful causes for it. It is customary to see them only in the religious doctrines of this epoch, in the zeal which they inspired: assuredly, they conspired thereto; and nothing of the kind was done without their influence; still they did not do all. In other times, also, these doctrines were diffused, were energetic without producing the same result. It was not merely to faith and to religious exaltation: it was also, and perhaps more especially, to the moral state of society and of man, from the fifth to the tenth century, that the literature of legends owes its richness and popularity.

You know the character of the epoch which we have just studied: it was a time of misery and extreme disorder, one of those times which weigh, in some measure, in all directions upon mankind, checking and destroying it. But however bad the times may be, whatever may be the external circum-

stances which oppress human nature, there is an energy, an elasticity in it, which resists their empire; it has faculties, wants which make their way through all obstacles; a thousand causes may curb them, turn them from their natural direction, suspend or divert their development for a greater or less length of time; nothing can abolish them, reduce them to a state of complete impotence: they seek and always find some issue, some satisfaction.

It was the merit of the pious legends to give to some of those powerful instincts, those invincible wants of the human soul, that issue, that satisfaction, which all elsewhere refused them.

And first you know to what a deplorable state Frankish-Gaul had arrived, what depravation or what brutality reigned there. The view of the daily recurring events revolted or suppressed all the moral instincts of man; everything was abandoned to chance or to force; we scarcely meet, in the interior world, with that empire of idea of duty, that respect for right, which is the foundation of the security of life and the repose of the soul. They were found in the legends. Whoever will cast a glance, on the one hand, upon the chronicles of civil society, on the other, upon the lives of the saints,—whoever, in the History of Gregory of Tours alone will compare the civil traditions and the religious traditions, will be struck with their difference; in the one, morality only appears, so to speak, in spite of mankind and without their knowledge; interest and passions alone reign: people are plunged into their chaos and darkness, in the others, amidst a deluge of absurd fables, morality bursts forth with an immense influence; it is seen, it is felt; this sun of intellect shines upon the world in the bosom of which it lives. I might refer you almost indifferently to all the legends; you would everywhere meet with the fact I point out. Two or three examples will make it fully evident.

Saint Bavon, or Bav, hermit and patron of the town of Ghent, who died in the middle of the seventh century, had at first led a worldly life; I read in his history, written by a contemporary:

"One day he saw a man come to him, whom formerly, and while he still led a worldly life, he had himself sold. At this sight, he fell into a violent fit of despair for having committed so great a crime towards this man; and, turning towards him, he fell upon his knees, saying, 'It is I by whom thou wast sold, tied with thongs; remember not, I implore thee, the

evil that I have done to thee, and grant me one prayer. Strike my body with rods, shave my head as thou wouldst that of a robber, and cast me in prison as I deserve, with my feet and hands tied; may be, if thou dost this, the Divine mercy will grant me his pardon.' The man . . . . says that he dare not do such a thing to his master; but the holy man, who spoke eloquently, strove to induce him to do what he asked. Finally, constrained, and despite himself, the other, overcome by his prayers, did as he required him; he tied the hands of the godly man, shaved his head, tied his feet to a stick, and conducted him to the public prison; and the holy man remained there many days, deploring day and night those acts of a worldly life, which he had always before his mind's eye, as a heavy burden."[1]

The exaggeration of these details is of little importance; even the material truth of the history is of little importance: it was written at the beginning of the seventh century, to those men of the seventh century who incessantly had under their observation servitude, the sale of slaves, and all the iniquities, all the sufferings, which ensued from their condition. You can understand what a charm this simple recital possessed for them. It was a real moral relief, a protest against odious and powerful facts, a weak but precious echo of the rights of liberty.

Here is a fact of another nature: I take it from the *Life of Saint Wandregisilus, Abbot of Fontenelle*, who died in 667, and who, before embracing the monastic life, had been count of the palace of king Dagobert:—

"While he still led a lay life, as he was travelling one day accompanied by his people, he arrived at a certain place on his road; the people in insurrection abandoned themselves to all the transports of fury against the holy man: impelled by a barbarous and insensate rage, and fallen into the condition of beasts, a crowd of people rushed towards him, and much blood would have been shed, if his intervention and the power of Christ had not provided a remedy. He implored the succor of Him to whom it is said: 'Thou art my refuge against tribulations;' and trusting to words instead of his sword, he placed himself under the shield of Divine mercy. Divine

[1] In 653 or 657. Life of Saint Bavon, § 10, *Acta Sanct. Ord. S Ben.*, vol. ii., p. 400.

help did not fail him, when human help was wanting; this crowd of madmen stood immoveable. The discourse of the holy man then dispersed and saved them at the same time; they came in fury, and they retired in quiet."[1]

Would you suppose that at this epoch it would have occurred to any barbarian, to any man a stranger to religious ideas, thus to manage the multitude, to employ only persuasion and words, in order to appease a disturbance? It is very probable that he would have had immediate recourse to force. The rash employment of force was repugnant to a pious man, preoccupied with the idea that he had to do with souls; instead of physical force, he invoked moral force; before massacre, he tried a sermon.

I now take an example in which the relations of men shall be nothing, in which no attempt shall be made to substitute moral for physical force, nor to protest against social iniquity; in which there is no question concerning anything but individual, private sentiments, of the internal life of man. I read in the life of Saint Valery, who died in 622, abbot of Saint Valery, in Picardy:

"As this godly man returned on foot from a certain place," says Cayeux, "to his monastery, in the winter season, it happened, by reason of the excessive rigor of the cold, that he stopped to warm himself in the dwelling of a certain priest. This latter and his companions, who should have treated such a guest with great respect, began, on the contrary, boldly to hold unsuitable and ill discourse with the judge of the place. Faithful to his custom always to put the salutary remedy of the Divine word upon corrupted and frightful wounds, he attempted to check them, saying: 'My sons, have you not seen in the Evangelist that at the day of judgment you will have to account for every idle word?' But they, scorning his admonition, abandoned themselves more and more to gross and obscene discourse, for the mouth speaks from the overflowing of the heart. As for him, he said: 'I desired, by reason of the cold, to warm my fatigued body a little at your fire; but your guilty discourse forces me to depart, all frozen as I am.' And he left the house."[2]

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[1] Life of Saint Wandregisilus, § 4, in the *Acta Sanct. Ord. S. Ben.* vol. ii., p. 535.

[2] Life of Saint Valery, § 25, in the *Acta Sanct. Ord. S Ben.*, vol ii., p. 86.

Of a surety the manners and language of the men of this age were very coarse, disorderly, impure; still, doubtless, respect, a taste even for gravity, for purity, both in thought and word, was not abolished; and when they found an occasion, many among them certainly took pleasure in satisfying that taste. The legends alone furnished them with the means. There was presented the image of a moral state, highly superior, in every respect, to that of the external society, of common life; the human mind might there repose, relieved from the view of crimes and vices which assailed it on all sides. Perhaps it scarcely itself sought this relief; I doubt if it ever made account of it; but, when it came upon it, it eagerly enjoyed it; and this, no doubt, was the first and most powerful cause of the popularity of this literature.

This was not all: it also answered to other wants of our nature, to those wants of affection, of sympathy, which proceed, if not from morality, properly so called, at least from moral sensibility, and which exercise so much influence over the soul. The sensible faculties had much to suffer at the epoch which occupies us; men were hard, and were treated harshly; the most natural sentiments, kindness, pity, friendship, both of family and of choice, took but a weak or painful development. And yet they were not dead in the heart of man: they often sought to display themselves; and the sight of their presence, of their power, charmed a population condemned to so little enjoyment of them in real life. The legends gave them this spectacle; although by a very false idea, in my opinion, and one which has produced deplorable extravagances, the religion of the time often commanded the sacrifice, even the contempt of the most legitimate feelings, still it did not stifle, it did not interdict the development of human sensibility; while very often ill directing its application, it favored rather than suppressed its exercise. We find, in the lives of the saints, more benevolence, more tenderness of heart, a larger part given to the affections, than in any other monument of this epoch. I will place before you some instances; I am convinced you will be struck with the development of our sensible nature, which breaks forth amidst the theory of sacrifice and self-denial.

The ardent zeal of Saint Germain, bishop of Paris in the ast half of the sixth century,[1] for the redemption of slaves, is

[1] Died in 576

known by every one; many pictures have perpetuated it, but the touching details of it must be read in his life:

"Were even the voices of all united in one, you could not say how prodigal were his alms; often contenting himself with a tunic, he covered some poor naked object with the rest of his clothes, so that while the beggar was warm, the benefactor was cold. It is impossible to enumerate in how many places, or in what number, he redeemed captives. The neighboring nations, the Spaniards, the Scotch, the Britons the Gascons, the Saxons, the Burgundians, may attest in what way recourse was had, on all sides, to the name of the Saint, in order to be delivered from the yoke of slavery. When he had nothing more left, he remained seated, sorrowful and restless, with a more grave visage, and a more solemn conversation. If by chance any one then invited him to a repast, he excited the guests, or his own servants, to concert the manner of delivering a captive, and the soul of the bishop escaped a little from its despondency. If the Lord, in any way, sent means to the saint, immediately, seeking in his mind, he was accustomed to say: 'Let us return thanks to the Divine clemency, for the means of effecting redemption has arrived,' and at once, without hesitation, the effect followed the words. When, therefore, he had thus received anything, the wrinkles on his forehead disappeared, his countenance was more serene, he walked with a lighter step, his discourse was more copious and lively; so much so that one would have thought that, in redeeming others, this man delivered himself from the yoke of slavery."[1]

Never has the passion of goodness been painted with a more simple and a truer energy.

In the life of Saint Wandregisilus, abbot of Fontenelle, of whom I have just spoken, I find this anecdote:

"As he repaired one day to king Dagobert, just as he approached the palace, there was a poor man whose cart had been overthrown before the very gate of the king: many people passed in and out, and not only they did not lend him any aid, but many passed over him, and trod him under foot. The man of God, when he arrived, saw the impiety which these children of insolence committed, and immediately descending

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1 Life of Saint Germain, bishop of Paris, § 74, in the *Acta Sanct Ord S. Ben.*, vol. i., p. 244.

from his horse, he held his hand out to the poor man, and both together, they raised the cart. Many of those present, seeing him all soiled with mud, mocked and insulted him; but he cared not, following with humility the humble example of his Master; for the Lord himself has said in the Gospel: 'If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more shall they call them of his household?'"[1]

Here is another taken from the Life of Saint Sulpicius the Pious, bishop of Bourges, in which breathes, amidst the most puerile credulity, a benevolence and a mildness certainly very foreign to the general manners of the epoch.

"One night, a ruffian, doubtless poor, introduced himself violently into the pantry of the holy man: he soon seized upon what, in his criminal heart, he proposed stealing, and hastens to get out; but he finds no opening, he is imprisoned within the surrounding walls, and confined on all sides. The night slipt away fruitlessly to this man who had entered so easily, and who could not see the slightest outlet. However, the light of day began to light the world; the man of God called one of his guards, ordered him to take a comrade, and to bring to him the man they should find in the office, plunged in crime, and as if bound.

"The servant went without delay to seek a companion, and repaired to the office: there they found the guilty man, and seized him to carry him off; the knave escaped from their hands; and seeing himself loaded with crimes, surrounded with people, preferring a speedy death to the punishment of his long transgressions, he rushed into a well nearly eighty cubits deep, which he saw near him; but at the moment when he fell into the abyss, he implored the prayers of the blessed bishop. The man of God ran quickly, and ordered one of his servants to descend into the well by means of a cord, enjoining him expressly immediately to draw up the criminal who had thrown himself in. All exclaimed that any one whom such an abyss had swallowed could not live, and that surely he was dead already; but the holy man ordered his servant to obey him without delay. The latter waited no longer, and, strengthened with the benediction of the saint, he found him whom they believed dead sound and safe.

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[1] Life of Saint Wandregisilus, § 7, in the *Acta Sanct. Ord. S. Ben.*, vol ii., p. 528.

Having surrounded him with cords, he drew him captive on to his native soil. The walls could not contain the crowd; almost the whole town had hastened to such a spectacle, and all made a great noise with their cries and plaudits. The criminal, as if shaking off a profound stupor, threw himself at the feet of the saint, and implored his pardon. The latter, full of charity, immediately granted it to him, and even gave him what he had need of, recommending him to ask, for the future, instead of taking, and saying that he would rather make him presents than be robbed by him. Who can express the perfect humility of this man, the prompt mercy, the holy simplicity, patience, and forbearance!"[1]

If we desire examples of the development of sensibility alone, without any precise application, without any beneficial or direct result, the life of Saint Rusticula, abbess of the monastery that Saint Cesaire had founded at Arles, will furnish us with two which seem to me to have a lively interest. Saint Rusticula was born in Provence, in the territory of Vaison: her parents had already one son.

"One night, when her mother Clemence was asleep, she saw herself, in a dream, nursing, with great affection, two small doves, one as white as snow, the other of a mixed color. As she occupied herself about them with much pleasure and tenderness, she thought that her servants came to tell her that Saint Cesaire, bishop of Arles, was at her gate. Hearing this, and delighted at the arrival of the saint, she ran joyfully to him, and eagerly saluting him, humbly prayed him to grant to her house the blessing of his presence. He entered, and blessed her. After having done him the due honors, she prayed him to take some nourishment, but he answered—'My daughter, I only desire thee to give me this dove, which I have seen thee rearing so carefully.' Hesitating within herself, she thought whence he could know that she had this dove; and she denied that she possessed anything of the kind. He then answered—'Before God, I tell thee I will not leave this place till thou grant me my request.' She could no longer excuse herself; she showed her doves, and offered them to the holy man. He joyfully took that which was of a brilliant white, and, congratulating himself, put it into his

[1] Life of Saint Sulpicius, § 28 and 29, in the *Acta Sanct. Ord. S Ben.*, vol. ii., p. 175

bosom; and after taking leave of her, he departed. When she awoke, she reflected upon what all this signified, and she sought in her soul why he who was no more had appeared to her. She knew not that Christ had chosen her daughter in marriage, he who has said, 'A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid. Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick, and it giveth light unto all that are in the house.' "[1]

There is certainly nothing remarkable in the incidents of this account; the foundation is little conformable to natural sentiments, since it is concerning a daughter being taken from her mother; and yet there reigns in it a general tinge of sensibility, of sweet and lively tenderness, which penetrates even into the allegory by which this sacrifice is asked of the mother, and sheds much charm and grace over it.

Saint Rusticula governed her abbey with great success, and especially inspired a deep affection in her nuns: in 632 she was ill, and near to death:

"It happened one Friday, that after having, according to her custom, sung the vespers with her daughters, and feeling fatigued, she went beyond her powers in giving her accustomed reading: she knew that she only went quicker to the Lord. The Saturday morning she was rather cold, and had lost all strength in her limbs. Then lying down in her little bed, she was seized with a severe fever: she, however, did not cease to praise God, and, fixing her eyes on heaven, she recommended to his care her daughters, whom she left orphans, and, with a firm voice, consoled those who wept around her. On the Sunday she found herself worse; and as it was customary to make her bed only once a year, the servants of God asked her to allow herself a rather softer couch, in order to spare her body so rough a fatigue; but she would not consent thereto. On Monday, the day of Saint Lawrence the martyr, she still lost strength, and her chest made a great noise. To this sight the sorrowful virgins of Christ answered with tears and sighs. As it was the third hour of the day, and as, in its affliction, the nuns read the psalms in silence, the holy mother asked why she did not hear the psalms: the nuns answered they could not sing by reason of their sorrow: 'Sing still

[1] Life of Saint Rusticula, § 3, in the *Acta Sanct. Ord. S. Ben.*, vol. ii., p. 140

ouder,' said she, 'that I may receive the help of it, for it is very sweet to me.' The following day, when her body was almost without motion, her eyes, which preserved their vigor, still shone like stars, and looking on all sides, and being unable to speak, she imposed silence with her hand, on those who wept, and gave them consolation. When one of the sisters touched her feet to see if they were warm or cold, she said: 'It is not yet the hour.' But shortly after, at the sixth hour of the day, with a serene countenance, with eyes shining, and as if she smiled, this glorious, blest soul, passed to heaven, and associated with the innumerable choirs of saints."[1]

I know not if any of you have ever opened a collection, entitled *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Port Royal*,[2] which contains the account of the life and death of the principal nuns of that celebrated abbey; among others, of the two Angelique Arnaulds, who successively governed it. Port-Royal, the branch for women as well as that for men, was, as you know, the asylum for the most ardent, the most independent souls, as well as for the most elevated minds, that honored the age of Louis XIV. Perhaps human sensibility is nowhere displayed with more richness and energy than in the moral history of these pious women, of whom many shared at once the intellectual development of Nicolle and of Pascal. Well; the recital of their last moments a good deal resembles what I have just read: we find there the same emotions of piety and friendship, almost the same language; and the sensible nature of mankind appears to us, in the seventh century, almost as lively, and as developed, as that of the seventeenth amidst the most passionate characters of the age.

I might greatly multiply these examples; but we must proceed. I have some to present to you of another kind.

Independently of the satisfaction which they gave to morality and human sensibility, the condition of which in the external world was so bad, the legends also corresponded to other faculties, to other wants. Much is at present said concerning the interest, the movement which, in the course of what is vaguely called the middle ages, animated the life of

[1] Life of Saint Rusticula, § 31, p. 14.
[2] Three vols., 12mo. Utrecht, 1742.

nations. It seems that great adventures, spectacles and recitals incessantly excited the imagination; that society was a thousand times more varied and amusing than it is among us. It may have been so for some men placed in the superior ranks, or thrown into peculiar situations; but for the mass of the population, life was, on the contrary, prodigiously monotonous, insipid, wearisome; its destiny went on in the same place, the same scenes were produced before the eyes; there was scarcely any external movement, still less movement of mind; its pleasures were as few as its blessings, and the condition of its intellect was not more agreeable than its physical existence. It nowhere so much as in the lives of the saints, found nourishment for this activity of imagination, this inclination for novelty, for adventures, which exercises so much influence over men. The legends were to the Christians of this age (let me be allowed this purely literary comparison), what those long accounts, those brilliant and varied histories, of which the *Thousand and One Nights* gives us a specimen, were to the Orientals. It was there that the popular imagination wandered freely in an unknown, marvellous world, full of movement and poetry. It is difficult for us, in the present day, to share the pleasure which was taken in them twelve centuries since; the habits of mind have changed; distractions beset us: but we may at least understand that there was therein a source of powerful interest for this literature. In the immense number of adventures and scenes with which it charmed the Christian people, I have selected two which will perhaps give you some idea of the kind of attraction which they had for it. The first is taken from the life of Saint Seine (Saint Sequanus), the founder in the sixth century of the abbey in Burgundy, which took his name, and it describes the incident which induced him to select its site:

"When Seine found himself—thanks to his laudable zeal—well instructed in the dogmas of the divine scriptures, and learned in monastical rules, he sought a place suited for building a monastery; as he went over all the neighboring places, and communicated his project to all his friends, one of his relations, Thiolaif, said to him: 'Since thou interrogatest me, I will point out a certain place where thou mayest establish thyself, if what thou desirest to do is inspired by the love of God. There is an estate which, if I do not deceive myself, belongs to me by hereditary right; but the people around feed themselves, like ferocious beasts, with human blood and

flesh; this renders it difficult to go among them, unless one pays a troop of armed men.' The blessed Seine answered him: 'Show me the place, to the end that if my desires have been conceived by a divine instinct, all the ferocity of these men may be changed into the mildness of the dove.' Having, therefore, taken his companions, he arrived at the place of which they had spoken. It was a forest, the trees of which almost touched the clouds, and whose solitude had not for a long time been interrupted: they asked themselves how they could penetrate into it, when they saw a winding foot-path, so narrow, and full of briars, that they could scarcely place their feet upon the same line, and from the thickness of the branches, it was with difficulty that one foot followed the other. However with much labor, and having their clothes torn, they got into the depths of this rough forest; then, bending towards the ground, they began to watch the profound darkness with an attentive eye.

"Having for some time looked with attention, they perceived very narrow openings to a cavern, obstructed by stones and plants; besides which, the interlaced branches of the trees rendered the cavern so dark, that wild beasts themselves would have hesitated to enter it. This was the cavern of the robbers, and the resort of unclean spirits. When they approached it, Seine, agreeable to God, bent his knees at the entry, and extending his body over the bushes, addressed a prayer to God, mixed with tears, saying—'Lord, who hast made Heaven and earth, which thou givest to the wishes of him who implores thee, and who originatest all good, and without whom all the weak efforts of humanity are useless, if thou orderest me to live in this solitude, make the same known unto me, and lead to good the beginnings which thou hast granted to my devotion.' When he had finished his prayer, he arose, and raised his hands towards heaven, and his eyes, which were moist with tears. Knowing then that it was under the conduct of the Saviour that he had repaired into this dark forest, after having blessed the place, he immediately set about placing the foundations of a cell where he had kneeled to pray. The report of his arrival came to the ears of the neighboring inhabitants, who, each exhorting the other, and impelled by a divine movement, repaired near him. When they had seen him, from wolves they became lambs, so that those who were formerly a source of terror were henceforth ministers of help; and, from that time, this place,

which was the resort for divers cruel demons and robbers, became the abode of innocents."[1]

Should we not suppose that we were reading the accoun of the establishment of some colonists in the heart of the most distant forests of America, or of some pious missionaries amidst the most savage hordes ?

Here is an account of a different character, but which is no less full of movement and interest.

Still young, and before entering into the ecclesiastical order, Saint Austregesilus, bishop of Bourges, at the commencement of the seventh century, manifested a lively desire to forsake the world, and not to marry.

"Hearing him speak thus, his parents began to press him earnestly to obey them in this respect. He, in order that he might not see them discontented, whom he desired to see satisfied, promised to do as they asked him, if such was the will of God.

"When, therefore, he was occupied in the king's service, he began to return to this business, and to seek what would best befit him to do. He recollected three men of the same nation, and of equal fortune. He wrote their names upon three tablets, and put them under the cover of the altar in the cathedral of Saint John, near the town of Châlons, and made a vow to pass three nights in prayer without sleeping. After the three nights, he was to put his hands upon the altar, taking the tablet which the Lord should deign to make him find first, and demand in marriage the daughter of the man whose name should be upon the tablet. After having passed one night without sleep, the next night he found himself overcome by it, and towards the middle of the night, unable to resist any longer, his limbs gave way, and he fell asleep upon a seat. Two old men presented themselves to his view. One said to the other: 'Whose daughter is Austregesilus to marry?' The other answered: 'Art thou ignorant that he is already married?' 'To whom?' 'To the daughter of judge Just.' Austregesilus then awoke, and applied himself to finding out who this Just was, of what place he was judge, and if he had a virgin daughter. As he could not find him, he repaired, according to custom, to the king's palace. He

[1] Life of Saint Seine, § 7 and 8. *Acta Sanct. Ord. S. Ben.*, vol 1, p 264

arrived in a village where there was an inn. Some travellers were assembled there, among others, a poor veteran with his wife. When this woman saw Austregesilus, she said to him:

"'Stranger, stop an instant, and I will tell thee what I have lately seen concerning thee in a dream; it appeared as if I heard a great noise, like that of the singing of psalms, and I said to my host: "Man, what is this that I hear? what festival is now being celebrated by the priests, that they make this procession?" He answered: "Our guest Austregesilus is being married." Full of joy, I was eager to see the young bride, and to view her face and form. When the priests, clothed in white, carrying crosses, and singing psalms in the usual manner, were passed, thou camest out, and all the people followed behind; for me, I looked with curiosity, and I saw no woman, not even the girl whom thou wert to marry; I said to thy host: "Where is the virgin whom Austregesilus is to marry?" he answered: "Do you not see her in his hands?" I looked, and I only saw in thy hands the book of the gospel.' Then the saint understood by his vision and the dream of this woman, that the voice of God called him to the priesthood."[1]

There is here no miracle, properly so called; all is confined to dreams; but you see what movement of imagination is connected with all the sentiment, with all the incidents of a religious life, and with what eagerness the people received them.

These are the true sources of this literature; it gave to the moral, physical, and poetical nature of man, a nourishment, a satisfaction which it found nowhere else; it elevated and agitated his soul; it animated his life. Hence its fertility and its credit.

If it were our purpose to consider it under a purely literary point of view, we should find its merits neither very brilliant nor very varied. Truth of sentiment and *naiveté* of tone are not wanting to it; it is devoid of affectation and pedantry. The narrative is not only interesting, but it is often conceived under a rather dramatic form. In the eastern countries, where the charm of narration is great, the dramatic form is rare; we

[1] Life of Saint Austregesilus, § 2, in the *Acta Sanct Ord. S. Ben*, vol. ii., p. 95.

there meet with few conversations, few dialogues, with little getting up, properly speaking. There is much more of this in the legends; dialogue is there habitual, and often progresses with nature and vivacity. But we should in vain seek a little order in them, any art of composition; even for the least exacting minds, the confusion is extreme, the monotony great; credulity continually descends to the ridiculous, and the language has arrived at a degree of imperfection, of corruption, of coarseness, which, in the present day, pains and wearies the reader.

I wish to say a few words also on a portion (very inconsiderable, it is true, but which, however, I ought not to omit) of the literature of this period, that is, its profane literature. I have observed that, dating from the sixth century, sacred literature was alone, that all profane literature had disappeared; there were, however, some remains of it; certain chronicles, certain occasional poems which belonged not to religious society, and which merit a moment's attention. In our next lecture, I shall present to you, on some of those monuments so little known in the present day, developments which appear to me not uninteresting.

EIGHTEENTH LECTURE.

Some wrecks of profane literature from the sixth to the eighth century —Of their true character—1st, Prose writers—Gregory of Tours—His life—His *Ecclesiastical History of the Franks*—The influence of the ancient Latin literature unites with that of the Christian doctrines—Mixture of civil and religious history—Frédégaire—His *Chronicle*—2dly, Poets—Saint Avitus, bishop of Vienne—His life—His poems on the Creation—Original sin—The condemnation of man —The Deluge—The passage of the Red Sea—The praise of virginity —Comparison of the three first with the *Paradise Lost* of Milton—Fortunatus, bishop of Poictiers—His life—His relations with Saint Radegonde—His poems—Their character—First origin of French literature.

I MENTIONED in our last lecture that we should now occupy ourselves with the wrecks of profane literature, scattered here and there, from the sixth to the eighth century, amidst sermons, legends, theological dissertations, and escaping from the universal triumph of sacred literature. I shall, perhaps, be a little embarrassed with my promise, and with this word *profane*, which I have applied to the works of which I mean to speak. It seems to say, in fact, that their authors or their subjects are of a lay character, that they belong not to the religious sphere. Yet, see the names of the writings, and of the authors. There are two prose writers, and two poets: the prose writers are Gregory of Tours, and Frédégaire; the poets, Saint Avitus, and Fortunatus. Of these four men, three were bishops: Gregory at Tours, Saint Avitus at Vienne, and Fortunatus at Poictiers; all three were canonized; the fourth, Frédégaire, was probably a monk. With regard to the persons, there can scarcely be anything less profane; assuredly they belong to sacred literature. As regards the works themselves, that of Gregory of Tours bears the title of *Ecclesiastical History of the Franks;* that of Frédégaire is a simple chronicle; the poems of Saint Avitus turn upon the Creation, Original Sin, the Expulsion from Paradise, the Deluge, the Passage of the Red Sea, the Praise of Virginity; and although in those of Fortunatus many treat of the incidents of a worldly life, as the marriage of Sigebert and Brunehault, the departure of

queen Galsuinthe, &c., still the greater part relate to religious events or interests, as the dedications of cathedrals, the praise of saints or bishops, the feasts of the church, &c., so that, to judge by appearances, the subjects as well as the authors enter into sacred literature, and it seems that there is nothing to which the name of profane can be suitable.

I might easily allege that some of these writers were not always ecclesiastics; that Fortunatus, for example, for a long time lived a layman; that many of his poems date from this period of his life. It is not certain that Frédégaire was a monk. Gregory of Tours formally expressed his intention of mixing the sacred and the profane in his history. But these would be poor reasons. I had far rather admit that, in some respects, the works I intend to speak of at present belong to sacred literature; and still I maintain what I have said; they belong to profane literature; they bore its character in more than one respect, and they should bear its name. And here is the reason:

I have just passed before you the two principal kinds of the sacred literature of this epoch, on one hand sermons, on the other, legends. Nothing of this kind had existed in antiquity; neither the Greek nor Latin literature furnished a model of similar compositions. They took their rise from Christianity —from the religious doctrines of the age; they were original; they constituted a new and truly religious literature, for it had no impress of ancient literature, of the profane world, neither in form nor groundwork.

The works of which I am about to speak are of another nature: the authors and the subjects are religious, but the character of the compositions, the manner in which they are conceived and executed, belong not to the new religious literature; the influence of pagan antiquity is clearly shown in them; we incessantly find there the imitation of the Greek or Latin writers; it is visible in the turn of the imagination; in the forms of the language; it is sometimes direct and avowed. This is nothing like that truly new Christian mind, foreign, even hostile, to all ancient recollections, which is visible in the sermons and legends; here, on the contrary, and even in the most religious subjects, one feels the traditions, the intellectual customs of the pagan world, a certain desire to be connected with profane literature, to preserve and reproduce its merits. It is hence that the name is applied correctly to the works of which I speak, and that they form in the literature from the

sixth to the eighth century a separate class, which, in a measure, unites the two epochs, the two societies, and claims especial inquiry.

Let us pass in review the four writers I have just named. we shall recognize this characteristic in their writings.

I begin by the prose writers, and by Gregory of Tours, incontestably the most celebrated.

You will recollect whether historical compositions had fallen in the Roman empire: high history, the poetical, political, philosophical history, that of Livy, that of Polybius, and that of Tacitus, had equally vanished; they could only keep a register, more or less exact, more or less complete, of events and men, without retracing their concatenation or moral character, without uniting them to the life of the state, without seeking therein the emotions of the drama, or of the true epopee. History, in a word, was no more than a chronicle. The last Latin historians, Lampridius, Vopiscus, Eutropius, Ammianus Marcellinus himself, are all mere chroniclers. The chronicle is the last form under which history presents itself in the profane literature of antiquity.

It is likewise under this form that it re-appears in the rising Christian literature; the first Christian chroniclers, Gregory of Tours among others, did nothing but imitate and perpetuate their pagan predecessors.

George Florentius, who took the name of Gregory from his great grandfather, bishop of Langres, was born on the 3d of November, 539, in Auvergne, in the bosom of one of those families which called themselves senatorial, and which formed the decaying aristocracy of the country. The one to which he belonged was noble in the civil and the religious order: he had many illustrious bishops for ancestors and relations, and he was descended from a senator of Bourges, Vettius Epagatus, one of the first and most glorious martyrs of Christianity in Gaul. It appears (and this fact is so commonly met with in the history of celebrated men, that it becomes matter of suspicion), it appears that from his infancy, his intellectual and pious tendencies, he attracted the attention of all around him, and that he was brought up with particular care as the hope of his family and of the church, among others, by his uncle, Saint Nizier, bishop of Lyons, Saint Gal, bishop of Clermont, and Saint Avitus, his successor. He had very ill health, and, already ordained deacon, he made a journey to Tours, in the hope of being cured at the tomb of Saint Martin. He was

actually cured, and he returned to his country. We find him, in 573, at the court of Sigebert I., king of Austrasia, to whom Auvergne belonged. He received news that the clergy and people of Tours, doubtless struck with his merits during the sojourn which he had made among them, had just elected him bishop. After some hesitation, he consented, was consecrated on the 22d of August by the bishop of Reims, and immediately repaired to Tours, where he passed the rest of his life.

He, however, often left it; and even on affairs foreign to those of the church. Gontran, king of Burgundy, and Childebert II. king of Austrasia, employed him as a negotiator in their long quarrels; we find him in 585 and in 588, travelling from one court to another to reconcile the two kings. He appeared likewise at the council of Paris, held in 577, to judge Pretextat, archbishop of Rouen, whom Chilperic and Frédégonde wished to expel, and whom in fact they did expel from his diocese.

In his various missions, and especially at the council of Paris, Gregory of Tours conducted himself with more independence, good sense, and equity, than was evinced by many other bishops. Doubtless, he was credulous, superstitious, devoted to the interests of the clergy: still few ecclesiastics of his time had a devotion, I will not say as enlightened, but less blind, and kept to so reasonable a line of conduct in what concerned the church.

In 592, according to his biographer, Odo of Cluny, who wrote his life in the tenth century, he made a journey to Rome to see pope Gregory the Great. The fact is doubtful, and of little interest: still the account of Odo of Cluny contains a rather piquant anecdote, and one which proves what a high estimation Gregory and his contemporary were held in at the tenth century. He was, as I have said, remarkably weak and puny.

"Arrived in the presence of the pontiff," says his biographers, "he kneeled and prayed. The pontiff, who was of a wise and deep mind, admired within himself the secret dispensations of God, who had placed so many divine graces in so small and puny a body. The bishop, internally advised, by the will on high, of the thought of the pontiff, arose, and regarding him with a tranquil air, said to him: 'It is the Lord who makes us, and not ourselves; it is the same with the great and with the small.' The holy pope seeing that he thus answered to his thought, conceived a great veneration

for him, and took so much to heart the dignifying of the see of Tours, that he presented a chair of gold to it, which is still preserved in that church."[1]

Close upon his return from his journey to Rome, if it is true that he made one, Gregory died at Tours, the 17th of November, 593, very much regretted in his diocese, and celebrated throughout western Christendom, where his works were already spread. That which interests us most in the present day was certainly not at that time the most ardently sought for. He composed, 1st, a treatise of the *Glory of the Martyrs*, a collection of legends, in one hundred and seven chapters, devoted to the recital of the miracles of martyrs; 2. A treatise on the *Glory of the Confessors*, in one hundred and twelve chapters; 3. A collection, entitled, *Lives of the Fathers*, in twenty chapters, and which contains the history of twenty-two saints, of both sexes, of the Gaulish church; 4. A treatise on the *Miracles of Saint Julianus*, bishop of Brioude, in fifty chapters; 5. A treatise on the *Miracles of Saint Martin of Tours*, in four books; 6. A treatise on the *Miracles of Saint Andrew*. These were the writings which rendered his name so popular. They have no distinguishing merit amid the crowd of legends, and nothing which requires us to stop at them.

The great work of the bishop of Tours, that which has brought his name down to us, is his *Ecclesiastical History of the Franks*. The mere title of the book is remarkable, for it points out its character to be at once civil and religious; the author did not wish to write a history of the church merely, nor of the Franks alone; he thought that the destinies of the laity and those of the clergy should not be separated.

He says, "I shall indiscriminately combine, and without any other order than that of time, the virtues of the saints and the disasters of the people. I am not of opinion that it should be regarded as unreasonable to mix the felicities of the blessed with the calamities of the miserable in the account, not for the convenience of the writer, but in order to conform with the progress of events . . . . Eusebius, Severus, Jerome, and Orosius, have mixed up in like manner in their chronicles, the wars of kings and the virtues of martyrs."[2]

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[1] *Vita S. Gregorii*, &c., by Odo, abbot of Cluny, § 24.

[2] Gregory of Tours, vol. i., p. 39, in my *Collection des Mémoires sur l'Histoire de France.*

I shall have recourse to no other testimony than that of Gregory of Tours himself, for distinguishing in his work that influence of ancient literature, that mixture of profane and sacred letters, which I pointed out at the beginning. He protests his contempt for all pagan traditions; he eagerly repudiates all heritage of the world in which they reigned.

"I no not occupy myself," he says, "with the flight of Saturn, nor the rage of Juno, nor the adulteries of Jupiter; I despise all such things which go to ruin, and apply myself far rather to Divine things, to the miracles of the gospel."[1]

And elsewhere, in the *Preface* of his history, we read:—

"The cultivation of letters and the liberal sciences were declining, were perishing in the cities of Gaul, amidst the good and evil actions which were then committed; while the barbarians abandoned themselves to their ferocity, and the kings to their fury, while the churches were alternately enriched by pious men, and robbed by the infidels, we find no grammarian able in the art of logic, who undertook to describe these things either in prose or verse. Many men accordingly groan, saying: 'Unhappy are we! the study of letters perishes among us, and we find no person who can describe in his writings present facts.' Seeing this, I have thought it advisable to preserve, although in an uncultivated language, the memory of past things, in order that future men may know them."[2]

What does the writer lament? the fall of the liberal studies, of the liberal sciences, of grammar, of logic. There is nothing Christian there; the Christian never thought of them. On the contrary, when the mere Christian spirit dominated, men scorned what Gregory calls the liberal studies; they called them profane studies.

It is the ancient literature which the bishop regrets, and which he wishes to imitate as far as his weak talent will allow him; it is that which he admires, and which he flatters himself with the hope of continuing.

You see here the profane character breaks through. Nothing is wanting to this work to place it in sacred literature: it bears the name of *Ecclesiastical History*, it is full of the religious doctrines, traditions, the affairs of the Church. And

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[1] *Article upon Greg. of Tours*, vol. i., p. 22, in my *Collection*.
[2] *Art. on Greg. of Tours*, vol. i., p. 23, in my *Collection*.

still civil affairs likewise find a place in it, and it is a chronicle very like the last of the pagan chronicles; and respect and regret for pagan literature, as formally expressed in it, with the design of imitating it.

Independently of the narrative, the book is very curious from the double character which unites it to the two societies, and marks the transition from one to the other. As to the rest, there is no art of composition, no order; even the chronological order, which Gregory promises to follow, is incessantly forgotten and interrupted. It is merely the work of a man who has collected all he has heard said, all that passed in his time, traditions and events of every kind, and has inserted them, good and bad, in a single narration. The same enterprise was executed, and in the same spirit, at the end of the eleventh century, by a Norman monk, Orderic Vital. Like Gregory of Tours, Orderic collected all the recollections, all facts, both lay and religious, which came within his knowledge, and inserted them promiscuously, connected by a small thread, and, to complete the resemblance, he also gave his work the title of *Ecclesiastical History of Normandy*. I shall speak minutely of it when we arrive at the civilization of the eleventh century; I merely wished here to point out the analogy. The work of the bishop of Tours, precisely by reason of this shadow of ancient literature, which we may catch a glimpse of in the distance, is superior to that of the Norman monk. Although the Latin is very corrupt, the composition very defective, and the style undignified, it has still some merit in the narration, some movement, some truth of imagination, and a rather acute knowledge of men. It is, upon the whole, the most instructive and amusing chronicle of the three centuries. It begins at the year 377, at the death of Saint Martin, and stops in 591.

Frédégaire continued it. He was a Burgundian, probably a monk, and lived in the middle of the eighth century. This is all that is known of him, and even his name is doubtful. His work is very inferior to that of Gregory of Tours; it is a general chronicle, divided into five books, and commences at the creation of the world. The fifth book only is curious; it is there that the narration of Gregory of Tours is taken up, and continued up to 641. This continuation is of no value except for the information which it contains, and because it is almost the only work there is upon the same epoch. For

the rest, it has no literary merit, and, except two passages, contains no picture the least detailed, nor does it cast any light upon society and manners. Frédégaire himself was struck, I will not say with the mediocrity of his work, but with the intellectual decay of his time.

"We can only draw with trouble," says he, "from a source which does not still run. Now the world ages, and the force of mind deadens in us: no man in the present age is equal to the orators of past times, and no one dare even pretend to emulate them."[1]

The distance between Gregory of Tours and Frédégaire is, in fact, great. In the one, we still feel the influence, and, as it were, the breath of Latin literature; we recognize some traces, some tinges of a taste for science and elegance in mind and manners. In Frédégaire all recollection of the Roman world has vanished; he is a barbarous, ignorant, and coarse monk, whose thought, like his life, is inclosed within the walls of his monastery.

From the prose writers let us pass to the poets; they are worthy of our attention.

I just now called to your recollection what had been the last state, the last form of history, in Latin literature, from the third to the fifth century. Without falling quite so low, the decay of poetry was profound. All great poetry had disappeared, that is, all epic, dramatic, or lyrical poetry; the epopee, the drama, and the ode, those glories of Greece and Rome, were not even aimed at. The only kinds still slightly cultivated, were: 1, didactic poetry, sometimes taking that philosophic tone, of which Lucretius gave the model, and more frequently directed towards some material object, the chase, fishing, &c.; 2, descriptive poetry, the school of which Ausonius is the master, and in which are found numerous narrow but elegant minds; 3, lastly, occasional poetry, epigrams, epitaphs, madrigals, epithalamiums, inscriptions, all that kind of versification, sometimes in mockery, sometimes in praise, whose only object is to draw some momentary amusement from passing events. This was all that remained of the poetry of antiquity.

The same kinds, the same characteristics, appear in the semi-profane, and the semi-Christian poetry of this epoch.

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[1] *Preface* to Frédégaire, vol. ii., p. 164, of my *Collection*

In my opinion, the most distinguished of all the Christian poets from the sixth to the eighth century, although he may not be the most talked of, is Saint Avitus, bishop of Vienne. He was born about the middle of the fifth century, like Gregory of Tours, of a senatorial family in Auvergne. Episcopacy was there a kind of inheritance, for he was the fourth generation of bishops; his father Isique preceded him in the see of Vienne. Alcimus Eedicius Avitus mounted it in 490, and occupied it until the 5th of February, 525, the time of his death. During all that period, he played an important part in the Gaulish church, intervened in events of some importance, presided at many councils, among others, at that of Epaone in 517, and especially took a very active part in the struggle between the Arians and the orthodox. He was the chief of the orthodox bishops of the east and south of Gaul. As Vienne belonged to the Burgundian Arians, Saint Avitus had often to struggle in favor of orthodoxy, not only against his theological adversaries, but also against the civil power; he got out of it happily and wisely, respecting and managing the masters of the country without ever abandoning his opinion. The conference which he had at Lyons, in 499, with some Arian bishops in presence of king Gondebald, proved his firmness and his prudence. It is to him that the return of king Sigismond to the bosom of orthodoxy is attributed. However this may be, it is as a writer, and not as a bishop, that we have to consider him at present.

Although much of what he wrote is lost, a large number of his works remains; a hundred letters on the events of his times, some homilies, some fragments of theological treatises, and lastly, his poems. Of these there are six, all in hexameter verses. 1. Upon the Creation, in 325 verses; 2. Upon Original Sin, in 423 verses; 3. On the Judgment of God and the Expulsion from Paradise, 435 verses; 4. Upon the Deluge, 658 verses; 5. On the Passage of the Red Sea, 719 verses; 6. In praise of Virginity, 666 verses. The first three, The Creation, Original Sin, and The Judgment of God, together form a triad, and may be considered as three parts of one poem, that one might—indeed, that one ought to call, to speak correctly, Paradise Lost. It is not by the subject alone this work recalls to mind that of Milton; the resemblance in some parts of the general conception, and in some of the more important details, is striking. It does not follow that Milton was acquainted with the poems of Saint Avitus;

doubtless, nothing proves the contrary; they were published at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and the classical and theological learning of Milton was very great, but it is of little importance to his glory whether or not he was acquainted with them. He was one of those who imitate when they please, for they invent when they choose, and they invent even while imitating. However it may be, the analogy of the two poems is a rather curious literary fact, and that of Saint Avitus deserves the honor of being closely compared with that of Milton.

The first part, entitled, *Of the Creation*, is essentially descriptive; the descriptive poetry of the sixth century appears there in all its development. It singularly resembles the descriptive poetry of our time, the school, of which the abbé Delille is the chief, that we have seen so flourishing, and which at present scarcely counts a few languishing inheritors. The essential characteristic of this kind is to excel in conquering difficulties which are not worth being conquered, to describe what has no need of being described, and thus to arrive at a rather rare literary merit, without it resulting in any truly poetical effect. There are some objects which it is sufficient to name, occasions in which it is sufficient to name the objects, in order that poetry may take rise, and the imagination be struck; a word, a comparison, an epithet, place them vividly before one's eyes. Descriptive poetry, such as we know it, is not content with this result: it is scientific more than picturesque; it troubles itself less with making objects seen, than with making them known; it minutely observes, and surveys them as a designer, as an anatomist, is intent upon enumerating them, upon displaying every part of them; and this being the fact, that which, simply named or designated by a single stroke, by a general image, would be real and visible to the imagination, appears only decomposed, cut up, dissected, destroyed. This is the radical vice of modern descriptive poetry, and the trace of it is imprinted in its happiest works. It is found in that of the sixth century; the greater part of the descriptions of Saint Avitus have the same fault, the same character.

God works at the creation of man: "He places the head on the most elevated place, and adapts the countenance, pierced with seven outlets, to the wants of the intellect. From thence are exercised the senses of smell, hearing, sight, and taste: that of touch is the only sense which feels and judges

by the whole body, and whose energy is spread through all its members. The flexible tongue is attached to the roof of the mouth, so that the voice, driven into this cavity as if struck by a bow, resounds with various modulations through the moved air. From the humid chest, placed before the body, extend the robust arms with the ramifications of the hands. After the stomach comes the belly, which upon each side surrounds the vital organs with a soft envelopment. Below, the body is divided into two thighs, in order to walk more easily by an alternate movement. Behind, and below the occiput, descends the nape of the neck, which everywhere distributes its innumerable nerves. Lower and on the inside are placed the lungs, which must be separated by a light air, and which, by a strong breath, alternately receive and return it."[1]

Are we not in the workshop of a mechanic? are we not present at that slow and successive labor which announces science and excludes life? In this description, there is great accuracy of facts, the structure of the human body and the agency of the various organs are very faithfully explained everything is there, except man and the creation.

It would be easy to find, in modern descriptive poetry, perfectly analogous passages.

Do not suppose, however, that there is nothing but things of this kind, and that, even in this description of poetry, Saint Avitus has always executed as badly as this. This book contains many of the most happy descriptions, many most poetical, those especially which trace the general beauties of nature, a subject far more within the reach of descriptive poetry, much better adapted to its means. I will quote, for an example, the description of Paradise, of the garden of Eden, and I will at the same time place before you that of Milton, universally celebrated.

"Beyond India, where the world commences, where it is said that the confines of heaven and earth meet, is an elevated retreat, inaccessible to mortals, and closed with eternal barriers, ever since the author of the first crime was driven out after his fall, and the guilty saw themselves justly expelled their happy dwelling. . . . No changes of season there bring back frost; there the summer sun is not succeeded by the ice

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1 Poems of Avitus, l, i., *De Initio Mundi*, v. 82—107

of winter; while elsewhere the circle of the year brings us stifling heat, or fields whitened by frost, the kindness of Heaven there maintains an eternal spring; the tumultuous South wind penetrates not there; the clouds forsake an air always pure, and a heaven always serene. The soil has no need of rains to refresh it, and the plants prosper by virtue of their own dew. The earth is always verdant, and its surface, animated by a sweet warmth, resplendent with beauty. Herbs never abandon the hills, the trees never lose their leaves; and although constantly covered with flowers, they quickly repair their strength by means of their own sap. Fruits, which we have but once in the year, there ripen every month; there the sun does not wither the splendor of the lily; no touch stains the violet; the rose always preserves its color and graceful form. . . . Odoriferous balm continually runs from fertile branches. If, by chance, a slight wind arises, the beautiful forest, skimmed by its breath, with a sweet murmur agitates its leaves and flowers, from which escape and spread afar the sweetest perfumes. A clear fountain runs from a source of which the eye with care penetrates to the bottom; the most polished gold has no such splendor; a crystal of frozen water attracts not so much light. Emeralds glitter on its shores; every precious stone which the vain world extols, are there scattered like pebbles, adorn the fields with the most varied colors, and deck them as with a natural diadem."

Now see that of Milton; it is cut into numerous shreds, and scattered throughout the fourth book of his poem; but I choose the passage which best corresponds to that which I have just quoted from the bishop of Vienne:

"Thus was this place
A happy rural seat of various view;
Groves whose rich trees wept odorous gums and balm;
Others whose fruit, burnished with golden rind,
Hung amiaole, Hesperian fables true,
If true, here only, and of delicious taste:
Betwixt them lawns, or level downs, and flocks
Grazing the tender herb, were interpos'd,
Or palmy hillock; or the flowery lap
Of some irriguous valley, 'spread her store,
Flowers of all hue, and without thorn the rose;

[1] L. 1., *De Initio Mundi*, v. 211—257.

Another side, umbrageous grots and caves
Of cool recess, o'er which the mantling vine
Lays forth her purple grape, and gently creeps
Luxuriant; meanwhile, murmuring waters fall
Down the slope hills, dispers'd, or in a lake,
That to the fringed bank with myrtle crown'd,
Her crystal mirror holds, unite their streams.
The birds their quire apply; airs, vernal airs,
Breathing the smell of field and grove, attune
The trembling leaves, while universal Pan
Knit with the graces and the hours in dance,
Led on the eternal spring."[1]

The description of Saint Avitus is certainly rather superior than inferior to that of Milton; although the first is much nearer to paganism, he mixes far fewer mythological recollections in his pictures: the imitation of antiquity is perhaps less visible, and the description of the beauties of nature appears to me at once more varied and more simple.

In the same book I find a description of the overflowing of the Nile, which also deserves quotation. You know that, in all religious traditions, the Nile is one of the four rivers of Paradise; it is for this reason that the poet names it, and describes its annual inundations.

"Whenever the river, by swelling, extends over its banks and covers the plains with its black slime, its waters become fertile, heaven is calm, and a terrestrial rain spreads on all sides. Then Memphis is surrounded with water, is seen in the midst of a large gulf, and the navigator is seen upon his fields, which are no longer visible. There is no longer any limit; boundaries disappear by the decree of the river, which equalizes all and suspends the labors of the year; the shepherd joyfully sees the fields which he frequents swallowed up; and the fish, swimming in foreign seas, frequent the places where the herds fed upon the verdant grass. At last, when the water has espoused the altered earth and has impregnated all its germs, the Nile recedes, and re-collects its scattered waters: the lake disappears; it becomes a river, returns to its bed, and encloses its floods in the ancient dyke of its banks."[2]

Many features of this description are marked with faults of style; we find many of those labored comparisons, those artificial antitheses, which he takes for poetry: "*the terrestrial*

[1] Milton, Paradise Lost, iv., 246—68. [2] Avitus, l i., v. 266—281

rain," for example, "*the water espouses the sea*," &c.; still the picture is not devoid of truth and effect. In his poem upon *The Deluge*, Saint Avitus has described an analogous phenomenon, but far more vast and terrible, the fall of the waters of Heaven, and the simultaneous overflow of all the waters of the earth, with much vigor and effect; but the length of the passage forbids my quoting it to you.

In the second book, entitled, *Of the Original Sin*, the poet follows, step by step, the sacred traditions; but they do not subdue his imagination, and he sometimes even elevates himself to poetical ideas, in which he quits them without positively contradicting them. Every one knows the character with which Milton has invested Satan, and the originality of that conception which has preserved in the demon the grandeur of the angel, carrying down to the pit of evil the glorious traces of goodness, and thus shedding, over the enemy of God and man, an interest, which, however, has nothing illegitimate or perverse. Something of this idea, or rather of this intention, is found in the poem of Saint Avitus: his Satan is by no means the demon of mere religious traditions, odious, hideous, wicked, a stranger to all elevated or affectionate feeling. He has preserved in him some traits of his first state, a certain moral grandeur; the instinct of the poet has overcome the doctrine of the bishop; and although his conception of the character of Satan is far inferior to that of Milton, although he could not bring forth in it those combats of the soul, those fierce contrasts which render the work of the English poet so admirable, still his is not devoid of originality and energy. Like Milton, he has painted Satan at the time when he enters Paradise and perceives Adam and Eve for the first time.

"When he saw," says he, "the new creatures in a peaceful dwelling, leading a happy and cloudless life, under the law which they had received from the Lord, with the empire of the universe, and enjoying, amidst delicious tranquillity, all which was subjected to them, the flash of jealousy raised a sudden vapor in his soul, and his burning rage soon became a terrible fire. It was then not long since he had fallen from Heaven, and had hurried away with him, into the low pit, the troop attached to his fate. At this thought, and reviewing his recent disgrace in his heart, it seemed that he had lost more, since he saw another possessed of such happiness; and shame mixing itself with envy, he poured out his angry regrets in these words:

"'O sorrow! this work of earth is suddenly raised before us, and our ruin has given birth to this odious race! I, Virtue! I possessed heaven, and I am now expelled it, and dust has succeeded to the honor of angels! A little clay, arranged under a pitiful form, will here reign, and the power torn from us is transferred to him! But we have not entirely lost it; the greatest portion thereof remains; we can and we know to injure. Let us not delay then; this combat pleases me; I will engage them at their first appearance, while their simplicity, which has as yet experienced no deceit, is ignorant of everything, and offers itself to every blow. It will be easier to mislead them while they are alone, before they have thrown a fruitful posterity into the eternity of ages. Let us not allow anything immortal to come out of the earth; let us destroy the race at its commencement: O that the defeat of its chief may become the seed of death; that the principle of life may give rise to the pangs of death; that all may be struck in one; the root cut, the tree will never raise itself. These are the consolations which remain to me in my fall. If I cannot again mount to the heavens, they will at least be closed for these creatures: it seems to me less harsh to be fallen, if the new creatures are lost by a similar fall; if, the accomplices of my ruin, they become companions of my punishment, and share with us the fire which I now catch a glimpse of. But, in order to attract them without difficulty, it is needful that I myself, who have fallen so low, should show them the route which I myself travelled over; that the same pride which drove me from the celestial kingdom, may chase men from the boundaries of Paradise.' He thus spoke, and, heaving a sigh, became silent."[1]

Now for the Satan of Milton, at the same time, and in the same situation:

"O hell, what do mine eyes with grief behold!
Into our room of bliss, thus high advanc'd,
Creatures of other mouldy earth, born, perhaps,
Not spirits, yet to heavenly spirits bright
Little inferior; whom my thoughts pursue
With wonder, and could love, so lively shines
In them Divine resemblance, and such grace
The hand that form'd them on their shape hath pour'd.

[1] Avitus, l. ii., v. 60—117.

Ah, gentle pair, ye little think how nigh
Your change approaches, when all these delights
Will vanish, and deliver ye to woe;
More woe, the more your taste is now of joy;
Happy, but for so happy, ill secur'd
Long to continue, and this high seat your Heav'n,
Ill fenc'd for Heaven to keep out such a foe
As now is enter'd; yet no purpos'd foe
To you, whom I could pity thus forlorn,
Though I unpitied: league with you I seek,
And mutual amity so strait, so close,
That I with you must dwell, or you with me
Henceforth; my dwelling haply may not please,
Like this fair Paradise, your sense; yet such
Accept your Maker's work; he gave it me,
Which I as freely give: Hell shall unfold,
To entertain you two, her widest gates,
And send forth all her kings; there will be room,
Not like these narrow limits, to receive
Your numerous offspring; if no better place,
Thank him who puts me loath to this revenge
On you, who wrong me not, for him who wrong'd.
And should I at your harmless innocence
Melt as I do, yet public reason just,
Honor and empire with revenge enlarg'd
By conquering this new world, compels me now
To do what else, though damn'd, I should abhor."[1]

Here the superiority of Milton is great. He gives to Satan far more elevated, more impassioned, more complex feelings —perhaps even too complex—and his words are far more eloquent. Still there is a remarkable analogy between the two passages; and the simple energy, the menacing unity of the Satan of Saint Avitus, seems to me to be very effective.

The third book describes the despair of Adam and Eve after their fall, the coming of God, his judgment, and their expulsion from Paradise. You will surely remember that famous passage of Milton, after the judgment of God, when Adam sees everything overthrown around him, and expects to be driven out of Paradise; he abandons himself to the harshest rage against the woman:

"Whom thus afflicted when sad Eve beheld,
Desolate where she sat, approaching nigh,
Soft words to his fierce passion she assay'd:
But her with stern regard he thus repell'd:

[1] Milton, Paradise Lost, iv., 358—392

"Out of my sight, thou serpent! that name best
Befits thee with him leagued, thyself as false
And hateful; nothing wants, but that thy shape,
Like his, and color serpentine, may show
Thy inward fraud, to warn all creatures from thee
Henceforth; least that too heavenly form pretended
To hellish falsehood, snare them. But for thee
I had persisted happy; had not thy pride
And wandering vanity, when least was safe,
Rejected my forewarning, and disdained,
Not to be trusted; longing to be seen,
Though by the devil himself: him overweening
To overreach; but with the serpent meeting,
Fool'd and beguil'd; by him, thou, I by thee,
To trust thee from my side, imagin'd wise,
Constant, mature, proof against all assaults;
And understood not all was but a show,
Rather than solid virtue; all but a rib
Crooked by nature, bent, as now appears,
More to the part sinister, from me drawn;
Will if thrown out as supernumerary,
To my just number found. O! why did God,
Creator wise, that peopled highest Heaven
With spirits masculine, create at last
This novelty on earth, this fair defect
Of nature, and not fill the world at once
With men and angels, without feminine;
Or find some other way to generate
Mankind? This mischief had not then befall'n,
And more that shall befall; innumerable
Disturbances on earth through female snares,
And strait conjunction with this sex."[1]

The same idea occurred to Saint Avitus; only that it is to God himself, not to Eve, that Adam addresses the explosion of his rage:

"When thus he saw himself condemned, and that the most just inquiry had made evident all his fault, he did not humbly ask his pardon and pray; he answered not with shrieks and tears; he sought not to deter, with suppliant confession, the deserved punishment; already miserable, he invoked no pity. He erected himself, he irritated himself, and his pride broke out into insensate clamors: 'It was then to bring my ruin that this woman was united to my fate? That which, by thy first law, thou hast given for a dwelling: it is she who, overcome herself, has conquered me with her sinister coun-

[1] Milton. Paradise Lost, x., 863—897.

sels; it is she who has persuaded me to take that fruit which she herself already knew. She is the source of evil; from her came crime. I was credulous; but thou, Lord, taught me to believe her by giving her to me in marriage, in joining me to her by sweet knots. Happy if my life, at first solitary, had always so run on, if I had never known the ties of such an union, and the yoke of this fatal companion!'

"At this outburst of irritated Adam, the Creator addressed these severe words to desolate Eve: 'Why, in falling, hast drawn down thy unhappy spouse? Deceitful woman, why, instead of remaining alone in thy fall, hast thou dethroned the superior reason of the man?' She, full of shame, her cheeks covered with a sorrowful blush, said that the serpent had persuaded her to touch the forbidden fruit."[1]

Does not this passage appear at least equal to that of Milton? It is even free from the subtle details which disfigure the latter, and diminish the progress of the sentiment.

The book terminates with the prediction of the advent of Christ, who shall triumph over Satan. But with this conclusion the poet describes the very leaving of Paradise, and these last verses are, perhaps, the most beautiful in the poem:

"At these words, the Lord clothes them both with the skins of beasts, and drives them from the happy retreat of Paradise. They fall together to the earth; they enter upon the desert world, and wander about with rapid steps. The world is covered with trees and turf: it has green meadows, and fountains and rivers; and yet its face appears hideous to them after thine, O Paradise! and they are horror-struck with it; and, according to the nature of men, they love better what they have lost. The earth is narrow to them; they do not see its limits, and yet they feel confined, and they groan. Even the day is dark to their eyes, and under the clear sun, they complain that the light has disappeared."[2]

The three other poems of Saint Avitus, *the Deluge*, *the Passage of the Red Sea*, and *the Praise of Virginity*, are very inferior to what I have just quoted; still some remarkable fragments may be found in them, and certainly we have reason to be astonished that a work which contains such beauties should remain so obscure. But the age of Saint Avitus

[1] Avitus, l. iii., v. 96—112. [2] Ibid., v. 195—207.

is all obscure, and he has fallen under the general decay in the midst of which he lived.

I named a second poet, Fortunatus, bishop of Poictiers. He was not of Gaulish origin; he was born in 530, beyond the Alps, near Ceneda, in the Trevisan; and about 565, a little before the great invasion of the Lombards, and the desolation of the north of Italy, he passed into Gaul, and stopped in Austrasia at the time of the marriage of Sigebert and Brunehault, daughter of Athanagilde, king of Spain. It appears that he remained there one or two years, making epithalamiums, laments, a court poet there, devoted to the celebration of its adventures and pleasures. We then find him at Tours, paying his devotions to Saint Martin; he was then a layman. Saint Radegonde, wife of Clotaire I., had just retired, and founded a monastery of nuns. Fortunatus connected himself with her in close friendship, entered into orders, and soon became her chaplain, and almoner of the monastery. From this period, no remarkable incident of his life is known. Seven or eight years after the death of Saint Radegonde, he was made bishop of Poictiers, and there died at the beginning of the seventh century, after having long celebrated with his verses all the great men of his age, and having been in assiduous correspondence with all the great bishops.

Independently of seven lives of saints, of some letters or theological treatises in prose, of four books of hexameters on the life of Saint Martin of Tours, which are merely a poetical version of the life of the same saint by Sulpicius Severus, and some trifling works which are lost, there remain of him two hundred and forty-nine pieces of verse in all kinds of metres, of which two hundred and forty-six were collected by himself in eleven books, and three are separate. Of these two hundred and forty-nine pieces, there are fifteen in honor of certain churches, cathedrals, oratories, &c., composed at the time of their construction or dedication; thirty epitaphs; twenty-nine pieces to Gregory of Tours, or concerning him; twenty-seven to Saint Radegonde, or to sister Agnes, abbess of the monastery of Poictiers, and one hundred and forty-eight other pieces to all sorts of persons, and upon all sorts of subjects.

The pieces addressed to Saint Radegonde, or to the abbess Agnes, are incontestably those which best make known and

characterize the turn of mind, and the kind of poetry, of Fortunatus. On these only I shall dwell.

One is naturally led to attach to the relations of such persons the most serious ideas, and it is, in fact, under a grave aspect that they have been described: it has been mistakenly; do not suppose that I have here to relate some strange anecdote, or that his history is subject to the embarrassment of some scandal. There is nothing scandalous, nothing equivocal, nothing which lends the slightest malignant conjecture, to be met with in the relation between the bishop and the nuns of Poictiers; but they are of a futility, of a puerility which it is impossible to overlook, for even the poems of Fortunatus are a monument of them.

These are the titles of sixteen of the twenty-seven pieces addressed to Saint Radegonde, or to Saint Agnes:

Book VIII., piece 8, to Saint Radegonde upon violets.
" 9, upon flowers put on the altar.
" 10, upon flowers which he sent her.
Book XI., piece 4, to Saint Radegonde for her to drink wine.
" 11, to the abbess upon flowers.
" 13, upon chestnuts.
" 14, upon milk.
" 15, *idem*.
" 16, upon a repast.
" 18, upon sloes.
" 19, upon milk and other dainties.
" 20, upon eggs and plums.
" 22, upon a repast.
" 23, *idem*.
" 24, *idem*.
" 25, *idem*.

Now see some samples of the pieces themselves; they prove that the titles do not deceive us.

"In the midst of my fasting," writes he to Saint Radegonde, "thou sendest me various meats, and at the sight of them thou painest my mind. My eyes contemplate what the doctor forbids me to use, and his hand interdicts what my mouth desires. Still when thy goodness gratifies us with this milk, thy gifts surpass those of kings. Rejoice, therefore, I pray thee, like

a good sister with our pious mother, for at this momen I have the sweet pleasure of being at table."[1]

And elsewhere, after having a repast: "Surrounded by various delicacies, and all kinds of ragouts, sometimes I sleep, sometimes I eat; I open my mouth, then I close my eyes, and I again eat of everything; my mind was confused, believe it, most dear ones, and I could not easily either speak with liberty, or write verses. A drunken man has an uncertain hand; wine produced the same effect upon me as upon other drinkers; methinks I see the table swimming in pure wine. However, as well as I am able, I have traced in soft language this little song for my mother and my sister, and although sleep sharply presses me, the affection which I bear for them has inspired what the hand is scarcely in a state to write."[2]

It is not by way of amusement that I insert these singular quotations, which it would be easy for me to multiply; I desire, on the one hand, to place before your eyes a view of the manners of this epoch, which are but little known; and on the other, to enable you to see, and, so to speak, to touch with your finger, the origin of a kind of poetry which has held rather an important place in our literature, of that light and mocking poetry which, beginning with our old fabliaux, down to *Ver-vert*, has been pitilessly exercised upon the weakness and ridiculous points of the interior of monasteries. Fortunatus, to be sure, did not mean to jest; actor and poet at the same time, he spoke and wrote very seriously to Saint Radegonde and the abbess Agnes; but the very manners which this kind of poetry took for a text, and which so long provoked French fancy, that puerility, that laziness, that gluttony, associated with the gravest relations,—you see them begin here with the sixth century, and under exactly the same traits with those which Marot or Gresset lent to them ten or twelve centuries later.

However, the poems of Fortunatus have not all of them this character. Independently of some beautiful sacred hymns, one of which, the *Vexilla Regis*, was officially adopted by the church, there is in many of these small lay and religious poems a good deal of imagination, of intellect, and

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[1] *Tertun Carm.*, l. xi., No. 19; Bib. Pat., vol v., p. 596.
[2] Ibid., No. 24; ibid.

animation. I shall only quote a passage from an elegiac poem of three hundred and seventy-one verses, about the departure of Galsuinthe, sister of Brunehault, from Spain, her arrival in France, her marriage with Chilperic, and her deplorable end; I select the lamentations of Galsuinthe, her mother, wife of Athanagilde; she sees her daughter about to quit her, embraces her, looks at her, embraces her again, and cries:

"Spain, so full of inhabitants, and too confined for a mother, land of the sun, become a prison to me, although thou extendest from the country of Zephyr to that of the burning Eous, from Tyrhenia to the ocean—although thou sufficest for numerous nations, since my daughter is not longer here, thou art too narrow for me. Without thee, my daughter, I shall be here as a foreigner and wanderer, and, in my native country, at once a citizen and an exile. I ask, what shall these eyes look at which everywhere seek my daughter? . . . Whatever infant plays with me will be a punishment; thou wilt weigh upon my heart in the embraces of another: let another run, step, seat herself, weep, enter, go out, thy dear image will always be before my eyes. When thou shalt have quitted me, I shall hasten to strange caresses, and, groaning, I shall press another face to my withered breast; I shall dry with my kisses the tears of another child; I shall drink of them; and may it please God that I may thus find some refreshment for my devouring thirst! Whatever I do, I shall be tormented, no remedy can console me; I perish, O Galsuinthe, by the wound which comes to me from thee! I ask what dear hand will dress, will ornament thy hair? Who, when I shall not be there, will cover thy soft cheeks with kisses? Who will warm thee in her bosom, who carry thee on her knees, surround thee with her arms? Alas! when thou shalt be without me, thou wilt have no mother. For the rest, my sad heart charges thee at the time of thy departure; be happy, I implore thee; but leave me: go: farewell: send through the air some consolation to thy impatient mother; and, if the wind bears me any news, let it it be favorable."[1]

The subtlety and affectation of bad rhetoric are to be found in this passage; but its emotion is sincere, and the expression ingenious and vivid. Many pieces of Fortunatus have the same merits.

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[1] *Fortun. Carm.*, l. vi., No 7; Bib. Pat,, vol x., p. 562

I shal. prosecute this inquiry no further; I think I have fully justified what I said in commencing: sacred literature is not there; the habits, and even the metrical forms of the dying pagan literature, are clearly stamped upon them. Ausonius is more elegant, more correct, more licentious than Fortunatus; but, speaking literally, the bishop is a continuation of the consul; Latin tradition was not dead; it had passed into the Christian society; and here commences that imitation which, amid the universal overthrow, unites the modern to the ancient world, and, at a later period, will play so considerable a part in all literature.

We must pause: we have just studied the intellectual state of Frankish Gaul from the sixth to the eighth century. This study completes for us that of the development of our civilization during the same period, that is, under the empire of the Merovingian kings. Another epoch, stamped with the same character, began with the revolution which raised the family of the Pepins to the throne of the Franks. In our next lecture I shall attempt to describe the revolution itself; and we shall then enter into the new paths which it forced France to take

NINETEENTH LECTURE.

The causes and the character of the revolution which substituted the Carlovingians for the Merovingians—Recapitulation of the history of civilization in France under the Merovingian kings—The Frankish state in its relations with the neighboring nations—The Frankish state in its internal organization—The aristocratical element prevailed in it, but without entirety or regularity—The state of the Frankish church—Episcopacy prevails in it, but is itself thrown into decay—Two new powers arise—1st. The Austrasian Franks—Mayors of the palace—The family of the Pepins—2. Papacy—Circumstances favorable to its progress—Causes which drew and united the Austrasian Franks to the popes—The conversion of the Germans beyond the Rhine—Relations of the Anglo-Saxon missionaries, on the one hand with the popes, on the other, with the mayors of the palace of Austrasia—Saint Boniface—The popes have need of the Austrasian Franks against the Lombards—Pepin le-Bref has need of the pope to make himself king—Their alliance and the new direction which it impressed upon civilization—Conclusion of the first part of the course.

We have arrived at the eve of a great event, of the revolution which threw the last of the Merovingians into a cloister, and carried the Carlovingians to the throne of the Franks. It was consummated in the month of March, 752, in the semi-lay and semi-ecclesiastical assembly held at Soissons, where Pepin was proclaimed king, and consecrated by Boniface, archbishop of Mayence. Never was a revolution brought about with less effort and noise; Pepin possessed the power: the fact was converted into right; no resistance was offered him; no protest of sufficient importance to leave a trace in history. Everything seemed to remain the same; a title, merely, was changed. Yet there can be no doubt but that a great event was thus accomplished; there can be no doubt but that this change was the indication of the end of a particular social state, of the commencement of a new state, a crisis, a veritable epoch in the history of French civilization.

It is the crisis that I wish to bring before you at present. I wish to recapitulate the history of civilization under the Merovingians, to indicate how it came to end in such a result, and to represent the new character, the new direction which

it was obliged to take under the Carlovingians, by plainly setting forth the transition and its causes.

Civil society and religious society are evidently the two-fold subject of this recapitulation. We have studied them separately, and in their relations; we shall so study them in the period upon which we are about to enter. It is necessary that we should know exactly at what point they had each arrived at the crisis which now occupies us, and what was their reciprocal situation.

I commence with civil society. From the opening of this course, we have been speaking of the foundation of modern states, and in particular of the Frank state. We marked its origin at the reign of Clovis; it is even by concession that we are permitted not to go farther back, not to go to Pharamond. Let it be understood, however, that even in the epoch at which we have arrived, at the end of the Merovingian race, there was nothing established which the Franko-Gaulish society had, nothing invested with a somewhat stable and general form, that no principle prevailed in it so completely as to regulate it; that neither within nor without did the Frankish state exist; that in Gaul there was no state at all.

What do we mean by a State? a certain extent of territory having a determinate centre, fixed limits, inhabited by men who have a common name, and live involved, in certain respects, in the same destiny. Nothing like this existed in the middle of the eighth century, in what we now call France.

You know how many kingdoms had there alternately appeared and disappeared. The kingdoms of Metz, Soissons, Orleans, Paris, had given place to the kingdoms of Neustria, Austrasia, Burgundy, Aquitaine, incessantly changing masters, frontiers, extent, and importance; reduced at length to two, the kingdoms of Austrasia and Neustria, even these two had nothing stable or regular, their chiefs and their limits continually varied; the kings and the provinces continually passed from one to the other; so that even in the interior of the territory occupied by the Frankish population, no political association had any consistency or firmness.

The external frontiers were still more uncertain. On the east and north the movement of the invasion of the German nations continued. The Thuringians, the Bavarians, the Allemandi, the Frisons, the Saxons, incessantly made efforts to pass the Rhine, and take their share of the territory which the Franks occupied. In order to resist them, the Franks

crossed the Rhine · they ravaged, at several times, the countries of the Thuringians, the Allemandi, and the Bavarians, and reduced these nations to a subordinate condition, doubtless very precarious, and incapable of exact definition. But the Frisons and Saxons escaped this semi-defeat, and the Austrasian Franks were forced to maintain an incessant warfare against them, which prevented their frontiers from gaining the least regularity on this side.

On the west, the Britons and all the tribes established in the peninsula known under the name of Armorica, kept the frontiers of the Neustrian Franks in the same state of uncertainty.

In the south, in Provence, Narbonnese, and Aquitaine, it was no longer from the movement of the barbarous and half wandering colonies that the fluctuation proceeded; but there was fluctuation. The ancient Roman population incessantly labored to regain its independence. The Franks had conquered, but did not fully possess these countries. When their great incursions ceased, the towns and country districts rebelled, and confederated in order to shake off the yoke. A new cause of agitation and instability was joined to their efforts. Mohammedanism dates its rise from the 16th of July, 622; and at the end of the same century, or at least at the commencement of the eighth, it inundated the south of Italy, nearly the whole of Spain, the south of Gaul, and made on this side a still more impetuous effort than that of the German nations on the borders of the Rhine. Thus, on all points, on the north, the east, the west, and the south, the Frankish territory was incessantly invaded, its frontiers changed at the mercy of incessantly repeated incursions. Upon the whole, there can be no doubt but that, in this vast extent of country, the Frankish population dominated; it was the strongest, the most numerous, the most established; but still it was without territorial consistency, without political unity; as distinct frontier nations, and under the point of view of the law of nations, the state, properly so called, did not exist.

Let us enter into the interior of the Gaulo-Frankish society; we shall not find it any more advanced; it will offer us no greater degree of entirety or fixedness.

You will recollect that, in examining the institutions of the German nations before the invasion, I showed that they could not be transplanted into the Gaulish territory, and that the free

institutions, in particular the government of public affairs by assemblies of free men, become inapplicable to the new situation of the conquerors, had almost entirely perished. Even the class of free men, that condition of which individual independence and equality were the essential characteristics, continually diminished in number and importance; it was evidently not this class, nor the system of institutions and influences analogous to its nature, that was to prevail in the Gaulo-Frankish society, and govern it. Liberty was then a cause of disorder, not a principle of organization.

In the first periods following the invasion, royalty, as you have seen, made some progress; it collected some wreck of the inheritance of the empire; religious ideas gave it some power: but this progress soon stopped; the time of the centralization of power was still far distant; all means of gaining obedience were wanting; obstacles arose on all sides. The speedy and irremediable humiliation of the Merovingian royalty proves how little capable the monarchical principle was of possessing and regulating the Gaulo-Frankish society. It was nearly as impotent as the principle of free institutions.

The aristocratical principle prevailed: it was to the great proprietors, each on his domain, to the companions of the king, the antrustions, leudes, *fideles*, that the power actually belonged. But the aristocratical principle itself was incapable of giving any stable or general organization to society; it prevailed in it, but with as much disorder as would have flowed from any other system, without conferring any more simple or regular form. Consult all modern historians who have attempted to describe and explain this epoch. Some have sought its key in the struggle of the free men against the leudes, that is, the conquering nation against that which was to become the nobility of the court; others adhere to the diversity of races, and will speak of the struggle of the Germans against the Gauls; others, again, attach great importance to the struggle of the clergy against the laity, the bishops against the great barbarian proprietors, and there see the secret of most of the events. Others, again, especially insist upon the struggle of the kings themselves against their companions, their leudes, who aspired to the rendering themselves independent, and annulling and invading the royal power. All, in some measure, have a different word for the enigma which the social state of this epoch presents: a great reason for presuming that no word can explain it. All these struggles,

in fact, existed; all these forces contested without any of them gaining enough of the ascendency to dominate with any regularity. The aristocratic tendency, which must have arisen later than the feudal system, was certainly dominant; but no institution, no permanent organization, could yet arise from it.

Thus, within and without, whether we consider the social order or the political order, everything was restless, incessantly brought into question; nothing appeared destined to a long or powerful development.

From civil society let us pass to religious society; the recapitulation, if I mistake not, will show it to be in the same state.

The idea of the unity of the church was general and dominant in minds; but in facts it was far from having the same extension, the same power. No general principle, no government, properly so called, reigned in the Gaulo-Frankish church; it was, like civil society, an entire chaos.

And first, the remains of the free institutions which had presided at the first development of Christianity, had almost entirely disappeared. You have seen them gradually reduced to the participation of the clergy in the election of bishops, to the influence of councils in the general administration of the church. You have seen the election of bishops, and the influence of councils decline, and almost vanish in their turn. At the commencement of the eighth century, a mere vain shadow remained of them; the bishops, for the most part, owed their elevation to the orders of kings, or of the mayors of the palace, or to some such form of violence. Councils scarcely ever met. No legal, constituted liberty preserved any real power in the religious society.

We have seen the dawn of universal monarchy; we have seen papacy take a marked ascendency in the west. Do not suppose, however, that at the epoch which occupies us, and in Gaul especially, this ascendency resembled a real authority a form of government. Nay, at the end of the seventh century it was in a rapid decay. When the Franks were established in Gaul, the popes tried to preserve with these new masters the credit which they had enjoyed under the Roman empire. At the fifth century, the bishop of Rome possessed considerable domains in southern Gaul, especially in the diocese of Arles, a powerful means of relation and influence with those countries. They remained to him under the Visigoth

Burgundian, or Frank kings, and the bishop of Arles continued to be habitually his vicar, as much for his personal interests as for the general affairs of the church. Thus the relations of the popes with the Frank kings were frequent in the sixth and at the beginning of the seventh century; numerous monuments of them have come down to us; among others, a letter from Gregory the Great to Brunehault; and, upon some occasions, the Franks themselves had recourse to the intervention of papacy. But in the course of the seventh century, by a multitude of rather complex causes, this intervention almost entirely ceased. We find from Gregory the Great to Gregory II. (from the year 604 to the year 715) scarcely a single letter, a single document, which proves any correspondence between the masters of Frankish Gaul and the papacy.

The prodigious disorder which then reigned in Gaul, the instability of all kingdoms, and of all kings, doubtless contributed to it; no one had any time to think of contracting or keeping up relations so distant; everything was decided at once upon the spot, and on direct and immediate motives. Beyond the Alps almost equal disorder reigned; the Lombards invaded Italy, and menaced Rome; a personal and pressing danger retained the attention of the papacy within the circle of its own peculiar interests. Besides, the composition of the episcopacy of the Gauls was no longer the same; many barbarians had entered into it, strangers to all the recollections, all the customs which had so long united the Gaulish bishops to the bishop of Rome. All circumstances concurred to make null the religious relations between Rome and Gaul; so that at the end of the seventh century, the Gaulo-Frankish church was no more governed by the principle of universal monarchy than by that of common deliberation; papacy was scarcely more powerful than liberty.

There, as elsewhere, in religious society, as in civil society, the aristocratical principle had prevailed. It was to episcopacy that the government of the Gaulo-Frankish church belonged. It was administered during the fifth and sixth centuries, with a good deal of regularity and continuity; but in the course of the seventh, from the causes which I have already spoken of, the episcopal aristocracy fell into the same corruption, the same anarchy which seized upon the civil aristocracy; the metropolitans lost all authority; mere priests lost all influence; many bishops reckoned more on their influ

ence as proprietors, than on their mission as chiefs of the church. Many of the laity received or usurped the bishoprics as private domains. Each occupied himself with his temporal or diocesan interests; all unity vanished in the government of the secular clergy. The monastic order presented a similar aspect; the rule of Saint Benedict was commonly adopted in it, but no general administration connected the various establishments among themselves; each monastery ruled and governed itself apart; so that, at the end of the seventh century, the aristocratical system which dominated alike in church and state, was here almost as disordered, almost as incapable of giving rise to any approach to a general and regular government.

Nothing, therefore, was established at this epoch, in either one or other of the two societies from which modern society has arisen. The absence of rule and public authority was, perhaps, more complete than immediately after the fall of the empire; then, at all events, the wrecks of Roman and German institutions still subsisted, and maintained some kind of social order amidst the most agitated events. When the fall of the Merovingian race approached, even these wrecks had fallen into ruin, and no new edifice had as yet arisen; there was scarcely a trace of the imperial administration, or of the *mals* or assemblies of the free men of Germany, and the feudal organization was not seen. Perhaps at no epoch has the chaos been so great, or the State had so little existence.

Still, under this general dissolution, two new forces, two principles of organization and government, were being prepared in civil and religious society, destined to approach each other and to unite, in order, at last, to make an attempt to put an end to the chaos, and to give to church and state the entirety and fixity which they wanted.

Whoever will observe, attentively, the distribution of the Franks over the Gaulish territory, from the sixth to the eighth century, will be struck with a considerable difference between the Franks of Austrasia, situated on the borders of the Rhine, the Moselle, and the Meuse, and that of the Franks of Neustria, transplanted into the centre, the west and the south of Gaul. The first were probably more numerous, and certainly less dispersed. They still kept to that soil whence the Germans drew their power and fertility, so to speak, as Antæus did from the earth. The Rhine alone separated them from ancient Germany; they lived in continual relation,

hostile or pacific, with the German and partly Frankish colonies who inhabited the right bank. Still they were well established in their new country, and wished firmly to guard it. They were also less separated from the manners of the ancient German society than were the Neustrian Franks, and, at the same time, having become proprietors, they daily more and more contracted the wants and habits of their new situation, and of the social organization which might be adapted to it. Two facts, apparently contradictory, bring out into bold relief this particular characteristic of the Austrasian Franks. It was more especially from Austrasia that those bands of warriors set out whom we see, in the course of the sixth and seventh centuries, still spreading over Italy and the south of Gaul, and there abandoning themselves to a life of incursion and pillage; and yet it is in Austrasia that the most remarkable monuments of the passage of the Franks into the condition of proprietors are seen; upon the borders of the Rhine, the Moselle, and the Meuse, are the strongest of those habitations of theirs which became castles, so that Austrasian society is the most complete and faithful image of the ancient manners and the new situation of the Franks; it is there that one least meets with Roman or heterogeneous elements; it is there that the spirit of conquest and the territorial spirit, the instincts of the proprietor and those of the warrior are allied, and display themselves with the greatest energy.

A fact so important could not fail to become evident, and to exercise a great influence over the course of events; the Austrasian society could not but give rise to some institution, some power, which expressed and developed its character. This was the part taken of its mayors of the palace, and in particular by the family of the Pepins.

The mayor of the palace is met with in all the Frankish kingdoms. I shall not enter here into a long history of the institution, I shall confine myself to remarking its character and general vicissitudes. The mayors were at first merely the first superintendents, the first administrators of the interior of the palace of the king; the chiefs whom he put at the head of his companions, of his leudes, still united around him. It was their duty to maintain order among the king's men, to administer justice, to look to all the affairs, to all the wants, of that great domestic society. They were the men of the king with the leudes; this was their first character, their first state.

Now for the second. After having exercised the power of the king over his leudes, his mayors of the palace usurped it to their own profit. The leudes, by grants of public charges and fiefs, were not long before they became great proprietors. This new situation was superior to that of companions of the king; they detached themselves from him, and united in order to defend their common interests. According as their fortune dictated, the mayors of the palace sometimes resisted them, more often united with them, and, at first servants of the king, they at last became the chiefs of an aristocracy, against whom royalty could do nothing.

These are the two principal phases of this institution: it gained more extension and fixedness in Austrasia, in the family of the Pepins, who possessed it almost a century and a half, than anywhere else. At once great proprietors, usufructuaries of the royal power, and warlike chiefs, Pepin-le-Vieux, Pepin l'Heristal, Charles Martel, and Pepin-le-Bref, by turns defended these various interests, appropriated their power to themselves, and thus found themselves the representatives of the aristocracy, of royalty, and of that mind, at once territorial and conquering, which animated the Franks of Austrasia, and secured to them the preponderance. There resided the principle of life and organization which was to take hold of civil society, and draw it, at least for some time, from the state of anarchy and impotence into which it was plunged. The Pepins were the depositories of its power, the instrument of its action.

In the religious society, but out of the Frank territory, a power was also developed capable of introducing, or at least of attempting to introduce, order and reformation into it: this was papacy.

I shall not repeat here what I have already said of the first origin of papacy, and of the religious causes to which it owed the progressive extension of its power. Independently of these causes, and in a purely temporal point of view, the bishop of Rome found himself placed in the most favorable situation. Three circumstances, you will recollect, especially contributed to establish the power of the bishops in general: 1st, their vast domains, which caused them to take a place in the hierarchy of great proprietors to which European society had belonged for so long a period; 2d, their intervention in the municipal system, and the preponderance which they exercised in cities, by being directly or indirectly receiving

the inheritance of the ancient magistracies; 3d, their quality as councillors of the temporal power; they surrounded the new kings, and directed them in their attempts at government. Upon this triple base the episcopal power raised itself in the rising states. The bishop of Rome was, more than any other, prepared to profit by it. Like others, he was a great proprietor. At a very early period he possessed considerable domains in the Campagna di Roma, in the south of Italy, and upon the borders of the Adriatic sea. Considered as a councillor of the temporal power, no one had so good a chance: instead, like the Frank, Spanish, Anglo-Saxon, bishops, of being the servant of a king present, he was the representative, the vicar of a king absent; he depended on the emperor of the east, a sovereign who rarely cramped his administration, and never eclipsed it. The empire, it is true, had other representatives than the pope in Italy; the exarch of Ravenna, and a duke who resided at Rome, were the real delegates with regard to the civil administration; but, in the interior of Rome, the attributes of the bishop in civil matters, and in default of attributes, his influence in other respects, conferred almost all the power upon him. The emperors neglected nothing to retain him in their dependence; they carefully preserved the right of confirming his election; he paid them certain tributes, and constantly maintained at Constantinople, under the name of Apocrisiary, an agent charged to manage all his affairs there, and to answer for his fidelity. But if these precautions retarded the complete and external emancipation of the popes, it did not prevent their independence being great, nor, under the title of delegates of the emperor, their daily approaching nearer to becoming its successors.

As municipal magistrates, as chiefs of the people within the walls of Rome, their situation was not less advantageous. You have seen that in the remainder of the west, particularly in Gaul, and as the inevitable effect of the disasters of the invasion, the municipal system was declining; there certainly remained its wrecks, and the bishop almost alone disposed of them; but they were only wrecks; the importance of the municipal magistrates was daily lowered under the violent blows of counts, or other barbarous chiefs. It was far from being thus in Rome: there the municipal system, instead of being weakened, was fortified. Rome in no way remained in the possession of the barbarians; they only pillaged it in

passing; the imperial power was too distant to be real; the municipal system soon became the only government; the influence of the Roman people in its affairs was much more active, much more efficacious, at the sixth and seventh centuries, than it had been in preceding ages. The municipal magistrates became political magistrates; and the bishop, who, under forms more or less fixed, by means more or less direct, was in some measure their chief, took the first lead in this general and unperceived elevation towards a kind of sovereignty, while elsewhere the episcopal power arose not beyond the limits of a narrow and doubtful administration.

Thus, as proprietors, councillors of sovereign, and as popular magistrates, the bishops of Rome had the best chances; and while religious circumstances tended to increase their power, political circumstances had the same result, and impelled them in the same paths. Thus, in the course of the sixth and seventh centuries, papacy gained a degree of importance in Italy, which it had formerly been very far from possessing; and although at the end of this epoch it was a stranger to Frankish Gaul, although its relations both with the kings and with the Frank clergy had become rare, yet, such was its general progress, that in setting foot again in the monarchy of the Frankish church, it did not fail to appear there with a force and credit superior to all rivalry.

Here, then, we see two new powers which were formed and confirmed amidst the general dissolution; in the Frank state, the mayors of the palace of Austrasia; in the Christian church, the popes; here are two active, energetic principles, which seem disposed to take possession, the one of civil society, the other of religious society, and capable of attempting some work of organization, of establishing some government therein.

It was, in fact, by the influence of these two principles, and of their alliance, that, in the middle of the eighth century, the great crisis of which we seek the character shone forth.

After the fifth century, papacy took the lead in the conversion of the pagans; the clergy of the various states of the west, occupied both in its religious local duties, and in its temporal duties, had almost abandoned this great enterprise: the monks alone, more interested and less indolent, continued to occupy themselves arduously in it. The bishop of Rome undertook to direct them, and they in general accepted him for a chief. At the end of the sixth century, Gregory the

Great accomplished the most important of these conversions, that of the Anglo-Saxons established in Britain. By his orders, Roman monks set out to undertake it. They began with the county of Kent, and Augustin, one among them, was the first archbishop of Canterbury. The Anglo-Saxon church was thus, at the seventh century, the only one in the west which owed its origin to the Romish church. Italy, Spain, and Gaul, had become Christian without the help of papacy; their churches were not bound to that of Rome by a filial power; they were her sisters, not her daughters. Britain, on the contrary, received her faith and her first preachers from Rome. She was, therefore, at this epoch, far more than any other church in the west, in habitual correspondence with the popes, devoted to their interests, docile to their authority. By a natural consequence, and also by reason of the similitude of idioms, it was more especially with the Anglo-Saxon monks that the popes undertook the conversion of the other pagan nations of Europe, among others, of Germany. One need only glance over the lives of the saints of the seventh and eighth centuries to be convinced that the greater part of the missionaries sent to the Bavarians, the Frisons, the Saxons, Willibrod, Rupert Willibald, Winfried, came from Britain. They could not labor at this work without entering into frequent relations with the Austrasian Franks, and their chiefs. The Austrasians on all sides bordered the nations beyond the Rhine, and were incessantly struggling to prevent them from again inundating the west. The missionaries were obliged to traverse their territory, and to obtain their support, in order to penetrate into the barbarous countries. They therefore failed not to claim that support. Gregory the Great even ordered the monks whom he sent into Britain to pass through Austrasia, and recommended them to the two kings, Theodoric and Theodebert, who then reigned at Châlons and at Metz. The recommendation was far more necessary and pressing when the matter in hand was to convert the German colonies. The Austrasian chiefs on their side, Arnoul, Pepin l'Herital, and Charles Martel, were not long in foreseeing what advantages such labors might have for them. In becoming Christians, these troublesome colonies were obliged to become fixed, to submit to some regular influence, at least to enter into the path of civilization. Besides, the missionaries were excellent explorers of those countries with which communication

was so difficult of accomplishment; by their mediation could be procured information and advice. Where could be found such skilful agents, such useful allies? Accordingly, the alliance was soon concluded. It was in Austrasia that the missionaries who were spread over Germany found their principal fulcrum; it was from thence that they set out, to it that they returned; it was to the kingdom of Austrasia that they annexed their spiritual conquests; it was with the masters of Austrasia on the one hand, and with the popes on the other, that they were in intimate and constant correspondence. Glance at the life, follow the works of the most illustrious and most powerful among them, namely, Saint Boniface, and you will recognize all the facts of which I have just spoken.

Saint Boniface was an Anglo-Saxon, born about 680, at Crediton, in the county of Devon, and called Winfried. A monk in the monastery of Exeter at a very early period, and later, in that of Nutsell, it is not known whence came his design of devoting himself to the conversion of the German nations; perhaps he merely followed the example of many of his compatriots. However this may be, from the year 715, we find him preaching amidst the Frisons; incessantly renewed warfare between them and the Austrasian Franks drove him from their country; he returned to his own, and re-entered the monastery of Nutsell. In 718, we encounter him at Rome, receiving from pope Gregory II. a formal mission, and instructions for the conversion of the Germans. He goes from Rome into Austrasia, corresponds with Charles Martel, passes the Rhine, and pursues his enormous enterprise with indefatigable perseverance among the Frisons, the Thuringians, the Bavarians, the Catti, and the Saxons. His entire life was devoted to it, and it was always with Rome that were connected his works. In 723, Gregory II. nominated him bishop; in 732, Gregory III. conferred upon him the titles of archbishop and apostolic vicar; in 738, Winfried, who no longer bore the name of Boniface, made a new journey to Rome, in order to regulate definitively the relations of the Christian church which he had just founded, with Christianity in general; and for him Rome is the centre, the pope is the chief of Christianity. It was to the profit of papacy that he sent in all directions the missionaries placed under his orders, erected bishoprics, conquered nations. Here is the oath which he took when the pope nominated him archbishop of Mayence,

and metropolitan of the bishoprics which he should found in Germany.

"I, Boniface, bishop by the grace of God, I promise to thee, blessed Peter, prince of the apostles, and to thy vicar, the holy Gregory, and to his successors, by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the holy and indivisible Trinity, and by thy sacred body, here present, always to keep a perfect fidelity to the holy catholic faith; to remain, with the aid of God, in the unity of that faith, upon which, without doubt, depends the whole salvation of Christians; not to lend myself, upon the instigation of any one, to anything which can be against the universal church, and to prove, in all things, my fidelity, the pureness of my faith, and my entire devotion to thee, to the interests of thy church, who hast received from God the power to tie and to untie, to thy said vicar, and to his successors: and if I learn that the bishops are against the ancient rule of the holy fathers, I promise to have no alliance nor communion with them, any more than to repress them if I am able; if not, I will at once inform my apostolic lord. And if (which God forbid!) I ever, whether by will or occasion, do anything against these my promises, let me be found guilty at the eternal judgment—let me incur the chastisement of Ananias and of Sapphira, who dared to lie unto you, and despoil you of part of their property. I, Boniface, an humble bishop, have with my own hand written this attestation of oath, and depositing it on the most sacred body of the sacred Peter, I have, as it is prescribed, taking God to judge and witness, made the oath, which I promise to keep."[1]

To this oath I add the statement which Boniface himself has transmitted to us of the decrees of the first German council held under his presidence in 742:

"In our synodal meeting, we have declared and decreed that to the end of our life we desire to hold the catholic faith and unity, and submission to the Roman church, Saint Peter, and his vicar; that we will every year assemble the synod; that the metropolitans shall demand the *pallium* from the see of Rome, and that we will canonically follow all the precepts of Peter, to the end that we may be reckoned among the number of his sheep, and we have consented and subscribed

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[1] *S. Bonif. Epist.*, ep. 118; *Bib. Pat.*, vol. xiii., p. 119; ed of Lyons.

to this profession. I have sent it to the body of Saint Peter prince of the apostles, and the clergy and the pontiff have joyfully received it.

"If any bishop can correct or reform anything in his diocese, let him propose the reformation in the synod before the archbishops and all there present, even as we ourselves have promised with oath to the Roman church. Should we see the priests and people breaking the law of God, and we are unable to correct them, we will faithfully inform the apostolic see, and the vicar of Saint Peter, in order to accomplish the said reform. It is thus, if I do not deceive myself, that all bishops should render an account to the metropolitan, and he to the pontiff of Rome, of that which they do not succeed in reforming among the people, and thus they will not have the blood of lost souls upon their heads."[1]

Of a surety, it is impossible more formally to submit the new church, the new Christian nations to the papal power.

A scruple, which I must express, impedes my progress: I fear that you are tempted to see more especially in this conduct of Saint Boniface the influence of temporal motives, of ambitious and interested combinations: it is a good deal the disposition of our time; and we are even a little inclined to boast of it, as a proof of our liberty of mind and our good sense. Most certainly led us judge all things in full liberty of mind; let the severest good sense preside at our judgments; but let us feel that, wherever we meet with great things and great men, there are other motives than ambitious combinations and personal interests. Let it be known that the thought of man can be elevated, that its horizon can be extended only when he becomes detached from the world and from himself; and that, if egoism plays a great part in history, that of disinterested and moral activity is, in the eyes of the most rigorous critic, infinitely superior to it. Boniface proves it as well as others. All devoted as he was to the court of Rome, he could, when need was, speak truth to it, reproach it with its evil, and urge it to take heed to itself. He learned that it granted certain indulgences, that it permitted certain licences which scandalized severe consciences. He wrote to the pope Zachary:

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[1] Labbé, *Counc.*, vol. xi., col. 1544–45

"These carnal men, these simple Germans, or Bavarians, or Franks, if they see things done at Rome which we forbid, suppose that it has been permitted and authorized by the priests, and turn it against us in derision, and take advantage of it for the scandal of their life. Thus, they say that every year, in the calends of January, they have seen, at Rome, both day and night, near the church, dancers overrunning the public places, according to the custom of the pagans, and raising clamors, after their fashion, and singing sacrilegious songs; and this day, they say, and till night-time, the tables are loaded with meats, and no one will lend to his neighbor either fire or iron, or anything in his house. They say also, that they have seen women carry phylacteries, and fillets attached to their legs and arms, and offer all sorts of things for sale to the passers by; and all these things seen by carnal men, and those but little instructed, are subjects of derision, and an obstacle to our preaching, and to the faith. . . . If your paternity interdict these pagan customs in Rome, it will acquire a great reputation, and will assure us a great progress in the doctrine of the church."[1]

I might cite many other letters, written with as much freedom, and which prove the same sincerity. But a fact speaks louder than all the letters in the world. After having founded new bishopries and many monasteries, at the highest point of his success and glory, in 753, that is at seventy-three years of age, the Saxon missionary demanded and obtained authority to quit his bishopric of Mayence, and to place therein his favorite disciple Lullus, and to again prosecute the works of his youth among the still pagan Frisons. He in fact went amid woods, morasses, and barbarians, and was massacred in 755, with many of his companions.

At his death, the bringing over of Germany to Christianity was accomplished, and accomplished to the profit of papacy. But it was also to the profit of the Franks of Austrasia, to the good of their safety and their power. It follows that it was for them as much as for Rome, that Boniface had labored; it was upon the soil of Germany, in the enterprise of converting its tribes by Saxon missionaries, that the two new powers, which were to prevail, the one in the civil society,

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[1] *S. Bonif. Ep. ad Zacharium*, ep 132; *Bib. Pat.*, vol. xiii., p 25, ed. of Lyons

the other in the religious society, encountered each other, the mayors of the palace of Austrasia, and the popes. In order to consummate their alliance, and to make it bear all its fruits, an occasion was only wanting on either side; it was not long in presenting itself.

I have already spoken of the situation of the bishop of Rome with regard to the Lombards, and of their incessant efforts to invade a territory, which daily became more positively his domain. Another real, although less pressing danger, also approached him. As the Franks of Austrasia, with the Pepins at their head, had on the north to combat the Frisons and the Saxons, and on the south the Saracens, so the popes were pressed by the Saracens and the Lombards. Their situation was analogous; but the Franks achieved victory under Charles Martel; the papacy, not in a condition to defend herself, everywhere sought soldiers. She tried to obtain them from the emperor of the east; he had none to send her. In 739, Gregory III. had recourse to Charles Martel. Boniface took charge of the negotiation; it was without result: Charles Martel had too much to do on his own account; he cared not to involve himself in a new war; but the idea was established at Rome that the Franks alone could defend the church against the Lombards, and that sooner or later they would cross the Alps for her good.

Some years after, the chief of Austrasia, Pepin, son of Charles Martel, in his turn, had need of the pope. He wished to get himself declared king of the Franks, and, however well his power might be established, he wanted a sanction to it. I have many times remarked, and am not tired of repeating it, that power does not suffice to itself; it wants something more than success, it wants to be converted into right; it demands that characteristic, sometimes of the free assent of men, sometimes of religious consecration. Pepin invoked both. More than one ecclesiastic, perhaps Boniface, suggested to him the idea of getting his new title of king of the Franks sanctioned by the papacy. I shall not enter into the details of the negotiation undertaken upon this subject; it offers some rather embarrassing questions and chronological difficulties: it is not the less certain that it took place, and that Boniface conducted it, as his letters to the pope often show; we see him, among others, charge his disciple Lullus to inform the pope of certain important affairs which he would rather not commit to writing. Lastly, in 751,

Burchard, bishop of Wurtzburg, and Fulrad, a chaplain priest, were sent to Rome to pope Zachary, in order to consult the pontiff touching the kings who were then in France, and who had merely the name without any power. The pope answered by a messenger, that he thought that he who already possessed the power of the king, was the king; and giving his full assent, he enjoined that Pepin should be made king. .... Pepin was then proclaimed king of the Franks, and anointed for this high dignity with the sacred unction by the holy hand of Boniface, archbishop and martyr of happy memory, and raised upon the throne, according to custom of the Franks, in the town of Soissons. With regard to Childeric, who invested himself with the false name of king, Pepin had him shaved and put in a monastery."[1]

Such was the progressive march of the revolution; such were the indirect and true causes of it. It has been represented in later times[2] (and I myself have contributed to propagate this idea[3]) as a new German invasion, as a recent conquest of Gaul by the Franks of Austrasia, more barbarians, more Germans, than Franks of Neustria, who had gradually amalgamated with the Romans. Such was in fact the result, and, so to speak, the external character of the event; but its character does not suffice to explain it; it had far more distant and more profound causes than the continuation or renewal of the great German invasion. I have just placed them before you. The civil Gallo-Frankish society was in a complete dissolution; no system, no power had come to establish itself in it, and to found it in ruling it. The religious society had fallen almost into the same state. Two principles of regeneration were gradually developed; the mayor of the palace among the Franks of Austrasia; and the papacy at Rome. These new powers were naturally drawn together by the mediation of the conversion of the German tribes, in which they had a common interest. The missionaries, and especially the Anglo-Saxon missionaries, were the agents of this junction. Two particular circumstances, the perils in which the Lombards involved the pa-

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[1] Annales d'Eginhard, vol. iii, p. 4, in my *Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l'Histoire de France.*

[2] *Histoire des Français*, by M. de Sismondi, vol. ii., p. 168—171.

[3] See my *Essais sur l'Histoire de France*, third *Essai*, pp 67–85

pacy, and the need which Pepin had of the pope in order to get his title of king sanctioned, made it a close alliance. It raised up a new race of sovereigns in Gaul, destroyed the kingdom of the Lombards in Italy, and impelled civil and religious Gallo-Frankish society in a route which tended to make royalty prevail in the civil order, and papacy in the religious order. Such will appear to you the character of the attempts at civilization made in France by the Carlovingians, that is to say, by Charlemagne, the true representative of that new direction, although it failed in its designs, and did nothing but throw, as it were, a bridge between barbarism and feudalism. This second epoch, the history of civilization in France under the Carlovingians, in its various phases, will be the subject of the following lectures.

TWENTIETH LECTURE.

Reign of Charlemagne—Greatness of his name—Is it true that he settled nothing? that all that he did has perished with him?—Of the action of great men—They play a double part—That which they do, in virtue of the first, is durable; that which they attempt, under the second, passes away with them—Example of Napoleon—Necessity of being thoroughly acquainted with the history of events under Charlemagne, in order to understand that of civilization—How the events may be recapitulated in tables—1. Charlemagne as a warrior and conqueror; Table of his principal expeditions—Their meaning and results—2. Charlemagne as an administrator and legislator—Of the government of the provinces—Of the central government—Table of national assemblies under his reign—Table of his capitularies—Table of the acts and documents which remain of this epoch—3. Charlemagne as a protector of intellectual development: Table of the celebrated cotemporaneous men—Estimation of the general results, and of the character of his reign.

We enter into a second great epoch of the history of French civilization, and as we enter, at the first step, we encounter a great man. Charlemagne was neither the first of his race, nor the author of its elevation. He received an already established power from his father Pepin. I have attempted to make you understand the causes of this revolution and its true character. When Charlemagne became king of the Franks, it was accomplished; he had no need even to defend it. He, however, has given his name to the second dynasty; and the instant one speaks of it, the instant one thinks of it, it is Charlemagne who presents himself before the mind as its founder and chief. Glorious privilege of a great man! No one disputes that Charlemagne had a right to give name to his race and age. The homage paid to him is often blind and undistinguishing; his genius and glory are extolled without discrimination or measure; yet, at the same time, persons repeat, one after another, that he founded nothing, accomplished nothing; that his empire, his laws, all his works, perished with him. And this historical common-place introduces a crowd of moral common-places on the ineffectualness and uselessness of great men, the vanity of their projects, the little trace which they leave in the world, after having troubled it in all directions.

Is this true? Is it the destiny of great men to be merely a burden and a useless wonder to mankind? Their activity so strong, so brilliant, can it have no lasting result? It costs very dear to be present at the spectacle; the curtain fallen, will nothing of it remain? Should we regard these powerful and glorious chiefs of a century and a people, merely as a sterile scourge, or at very best, as a burdensome luxury? Charlemagne, in particular, should he be nothing more?

At the first glance, the common-place might be supposed to be a truth. The victories, conquests, institutions, reforms, projects, all the greatness and glory of Charlemagne, vanished with him; he seemed a meteor suddenly emerging from the darkness of barbarism, to be as suddenly lost and extinguished in that of feudality. There are other such examples in history. The world has more than once seen, we ourselves have seen an empire like it, one which took pleasure in being compared to that of Charlemagne, and had a right so to be compared; we have likewise seen it fall away with a man.

But we must beware of trusting these appearances. To understand the meaning of great events, and measure the agency and influence of great men, we need to look far deeper into the matter.

The activity of a great man is of two kinds; he performs two parts; two epochs may generally be distinguished in his career. First, he understands better than other people the wants of his time; its real, present exigencies; what, in the age he lives in, society needs, to enable it to subsist and attain its natural development. He understands these wants better than any other person of his time, and knows better than any other how to wield the powers of society, and direct them skilfully towards the realization of this end. Hence proceed his power and glory; it is in virtue of this, that as soon as he appears, he is understood, accepted, followed; that all give their willing aid to the work which he is performing for the benefit of all.

But he does not stop here. When the real wants of his time are in some degree satisfied, the ideas and the will of the great man proceed further. He quits the region of present facts and exigencies; he gives himself up to views in some measure personal to himself; he indulges in combinations more or less vast and spacious, but which are not, like his previous labors, founded on the actual state, the common in

stincts, the determined wishes of society, but are remote and arbitrary. He aspires to extend his activity and influence indefinitely, and to possess the future as he has possessed the present. Here egoism and illusion commence. For some time, on the faith of what he has already done, the great man is followed in his new career; he is believed in and obeyed; men lend themselves to his fancies; his flatterers and his dupes even admire and vaunt them as his sublimest conceptions. The public, however, in whom a mere delusion is never of any long continuance, soon discovers that it is impelled in a direction in which it has no desire to move At first the great man had enlisted his high intelligence and powerful will in the service of the general feeling and wish; he now seeks to employ the public force in the service of his individual ideas and desires; he is attempting things which he alone wishes or understands. Hence disquietude first, and then uneasiness; for a time he is still followed, but sluggishly and reluctantly; next he is censured and complained of; finally, he is abandoned and falls; and all which he alone had planned and desired, all the merely personal and arbitrary part of his work, perishes with him.

I shall avoid no opportunity of borrowing from our age the torch which it offers, in this instance, in order to enlighten a time so distant and obscure. The fate and name of Napoleon at present belong to history. I shall not feel the least embarrassed in speaking of it, and speaking of it freely.

Every one knows that at the time when he seized the power in France, the dominant, imperious want of our country was security—without, national independence; inwardly, civil life. In the revolutionary troubles, the external and internal destiny, the state and society, were equally compromised. To replace the new France in the European confederation, to make her avowed and accepted by the other states, and to constitute her within in a peaceable and regular manner,—to put her, in a word, into the possession of independence and order, the only pledges of a long future, this was the desire, the general thought of the country. Napoleon understood and accomplished it.

This finished, or nearly so, Napoleon proposed to himself a thousand others: potent in combinations, and of an ardent imagination, egoistical and thoughtful, machinator and poet, he, as it were, poured out his activity in arbitrary and gigantic projects, children of his own,—solitary foreign to the real

wants of our time, and of our France. She followed him for some time, and at great cost, in this path which she had not selected; a day came when she would follow no further, and the emperor found himself alone, and the empire vanished, and all things returned to their proper condition, to their natural tendency.

It is an analogous fact which the reign of Charlemagne offers us at the ninth century. Despite the immense difference of time, situation, form, even groundwork, the general phenomenon is similar: these two parts of a great man, these two epochs of his career, are found in Charlemagne as in Napoleon. Let us endeavor to state them.

Here I encounter a difficulty which has long pre-occupied me, and which I do not hope to have completely surmounted. At the commencement of the course, I engaged to read you a general history of France. I have not recounted events to you; I have sought only general results, the concatenation of causes and effects, the progress of civilization, concealed under the external scenes of history; as regards the scenes themselves, I had taken it for granted that you know them. Hitherto I have cared little to know if you had taken this precaution; under the Merovingian race, events, properly so called, are of rare occurrence—so monotonous, that it is less necessary to regard them nearly: general facts only are important, and they may, up to a certain point, be brought to light and understood without an exact knowledge of the details. Under the reign of Charlemagne, it is entirely different: wars, political vicissitudes of all kinds, are numerous and brilliant; they occupy an important place, and general facts are concealed far behind the special facts which occupy the front of the scene. History, properly so called, envelopes and covers the history of civilization. The latter will not be clear to you unless the former is presented to you; I cannot give you an account of events, and yet you require to know them.

I have attempted to sum them up in tables, to present under that form the special facts of this epoch; those, at least, which approach nearly to general facts, and immediately concern the history of civilization. Statistical tables are looked upon in the present day, and with good reason, as one of the best means of studying the state of a society, under certain relations; why should not the same method be applied to the past? it does not produce them with vividness and animation, like

recital; but it raises their frame-work, so to speak, and prevents general ideas from floating in vagueness and at chance. In proportion as we advance in the course of civilization, we shall often be obliged to employ it.

Three essential characteristics appear in Charlemagne: he may be considered under three principal points of view: 1st, as a warrior and a conqueror; 2d, as an administrator and legislator; 3d, as a protector of sciences, letters, arts, of intellectual development in general. He exercised a great power, outwardly by force, inwardly by government and laws; he desired to act, and in fact did act, upon mankind itself, upon the human mind as upon society. I shall endeavor to make you understand him in these three respects, by presenting to you, in tables, the facts which relate to him, and from which the history of civilization may be deduced.

I commence with the wars of Charlemagne, of which the following are the most essential facts:

Table of the principal Expeditions of Charlemagne.

	Date.	*Enemies.*	*Observations.*
1	769	Against the Aquitani.	He goes to the Dordogne.
2	772	" the Saxons.	He goes beyond the Weser.
3	773	" the Lombards.	He goes to Pavia and Verona.
4	774	" Idem	He takes Pavia, and goes to Rome.
5	774	" the Saxons.	
6	775	" Idem.	
7	776	" the Lombards.	He goes to Treviso.
8	776	" the Saxons.	He goes to the sources of the Lippe.
9	778	" the Arabs of Spain.	He goes to Saragossa.
10	778	" the Saxons.	
11	779	" Idem.	He goes to the country of Osnabruck.
12	780	" Idem.	He goes to the Elbe.
13	783	" Idem.	He goes to the conflux of the Weser and the Aller.
14	783	" Idem.	He goes to the Elbe.
15	784	" Idem.	He goes to the Sale and the Elbe.
16	785	" Idem.	He goes to the Elbe.
17	785	" the Thuringians.	He does not go in person.
18	786	" the Bretons	Idem.
19	787	" the Lombards of Benevento.	He goes to Capua.
20	787	" the Bavarians	He goes to Augsburg

	Date.	Enemies.	Observations.
21	788	Against the Huns or Avares	He goes to Ratisbon.
22	789	" the Slavonian Wiltzes.	He goes between the Lower Elbe and the Oder.
23	791	" the Huns or Avares.	He goes to the conflux of the Danube and the Raab.
24	794	" the Saxons	
25	795	Idem.	
26	796	Idem.	
27	796	" the Huns or Avares	Under the orders of his son Louis, king of Italy.
28	796	" the Arabs.	Under the orders of his son Pepin, king of Aquitaine.
29	797	" the Saxons.	He goes to the Lower Weser and the Lower Elbe.
30	797	" the Arabs.	By his son Louis.
31	798	" the Saxons.	He goes beyond the Elbe.
32	801	" the Lombards of Benevento.	By his son Pepin to Chieti.
33	801	" the Arabs of Spain.	By his son Louis to Barcelona.
34	802	" the Saxons.	By his sons beyond the Elbe.
35	804	Idem.	He goes between the Elbe and the Oder. He transplants tribes of Saxons into Gaul and Italy.
36	805	" the Slavonians of Bohemia.	By his eldest son Charles
37	806	Idem.	By his son Charles.
38	806	" the Saracens of Corsica.	By his son Pepin.
39	806	" the Arabs of Spain.	By his son Louis
40	807	" the Saracens of Corsica.	By Generals.
41	807	" the Arabs of Spain.	Idem.
42	808	" the Danes and Normans.	
43	809	" the Greeks.	In Dalmatia, by his son Pepin.
44	809	" the Arabs of Spain.	
45	810	" the Greeks.	Idem.
46	810	" the Saracens in Corsica and Sardinia.	
47	810	" the Danes.	He goes in person to the conflux of the Weser and the Aller.
48	811	Idem.	
49	811	" the Avares.	
50	811	" the Bretons.	
51	812	" the Slavonian Wiltzes.	He goes between the Elbe and the Oder.
52	812	" the Saracens in Corsica.	
53	813	Idem.	

That is, in all, fifty-three expeditions, namely:

1	against the	Aquitani.
18	—	Saxons.
5	—	Lombards.
7	—	Arabs of Spain.
1	—	Thuringians.
4	—	Avares.
2	—	Bretons.
1	—	Bavarians.
4	—	Slavonians beyond the Elbe.
5	—	Saracens in Italy.
3	—	Danes.
2	—	Greeks.

Without counting numerous other small expeditions, of which no distinct and positive monuments are left.

From this table alone it is clearly seen that these wars did not the least resemble those of the first race; they are not the dissensions of tribe against tribe, of chief against chief; expeditions undertaken with a view of establishment or pillage; they are systematic and political wars, inspired by an intention of government, commanded by a certain necessity.

What is this system? What is the meaning of these expeditions?

You have seen various German nations—Goths, Burgundians, Franks, Lombards, &c.—established upon the Roman territory. Of all these tribes or confederations, the Franks were the strongest, and occupied the central position in the new establishment. They were not united among themselves by any political tie; they incessantly make war. Still, in some respects, and whether they knew it or not, their situation was similar, and their interests common.

You have seen that, from the beginning of the eighth century, these new masters of western Europe, the Roman-Germans, were pressed on the north-east, along the Rhine and the Danube, by new German, Slavonian, and other tribes proceeding to the same territory; on the south by the Arabs spread on all the coasts of the Mediterranean; and that thus a two-fold movement of invasion menaced with an approaching fall the states but just rising out of the ruins of the Roman empire.

Now let us see what was the work of Charlemagne in this situation; he rallied against this two-fold invasion, against the new assailants who crowded upon the various frontiers of the

empire, all the recently-established inhabitants of his territory, ancient or modern, Romans or Germans. Follow the course of his wars. He begins by definitively subduing, on one side, the Roman population, who still attempted to free themselves from the barbarian yoke, as the Aquitani in the south of Gaul; on the other, the later-arrived German population, the establishment of whom was not consummated, as the Lombards in Italy, &c. He snatched them from the various impulsions which animated them, united them all under the domination of the Franks, and turned them against the two-fold invasion, which, on the north-east and south, menaced all alike. Seek a dominant fact which shall be common to all the wars of Charlemagne; reduce them all to their simple expression; you will see that their true meaning is, that they are the struggle of the inhabitants of the ancient empire, conquering or conquered, Romans or Germans, against the new invaders.

They are, therefore, essentially defensive wars, brought about by a triple interest of territory, race, and religion. It was the interest of territory which especially broke out against the nations of the right bank of the Rhine, for the Saxons and Danes were Germans, like the Franks and the Lombards: there were Frankish tribes among them, and some learned men think that many pretended Saxons may have been only Franks, established in Germany. There was, therefore, no diversity of race; it was merely in defence of the territory that war took place. The interest of territory and the interest of race were united against the wandering nations beyond the Elbe, or on the banks of the Danube, against the Slavonians and the Avares. Against the Arabs who inundated the south of Gaul, there was interest of territory, of race, and of religion, all together. Thus did the various causes of war variously combine; but, whatever might be the combinations, it was always the German Christians and Romans, who defended their nationality, their territory, and their religion, against nations of another origin or creed, who sought a soil to conquer. All their wars have this character—all are derived from this triple necessity.

Charlemagne had in no way reduced this necessity into a general idea or theory; but he understood and faced it: great men rarely do otherwise. He faced it by conquest; defensive war took the offensive form; he carried the struggle into the territory of nations who wished to invade his own; he labored

to reduce the foreign races, to extirpate the hostile creeds. Hence arose his mode of government, and the foundation of his empire; offensive war and conquest required this vast and formidable unity.

At the death of Charlemagne, the conquests cease, the unity disappears, the empire is dismembered and falls to pieces; but is it true that nothing remained, that the warlike exploits of Charlemagne were absolutely sterile, that he achieved nothing, founded nothing? There is but one way to resolve this question; it is, to ask ourselves if, after Charlemagne, the countries which he had governed found themselves in the same situation as before; if the two-fold invasions which, on the north and on the south, menaced their territory, their religion, and their race, recommenced after being thus suspended; if the Saxons, Slavonians, Avares, Arabs, still kept the possessors of the Roman soil in perpetual disturbance and anxiety. Evidently it was not so; true, the empire of Charlemagne was broken up, but into separate states, which arose as so many barriers at all points where there was still danger. Up to the time of Charlemagne, the frontiers of Germany, Spain, and Italy were in continual fluctuation; no constituted public force had attained a permanent shape; he was compelled to be constantly transporting himself from one end to the other of his dominions, in order to oppose to the invaders the moveable and temporary force of his armies. After him, the scene is changed; real political barriers, states more or less organized, but real and durable, arose; the kingdoms of Lorraine, of Germany, Italy, the two Burgundies, Navarre, date from that time; and, in spite of the vicissitudes of their destiny, they subsist, and suffice to oppose effectual resistance to the invading movement. Accordingly, that movement ceases, or continues only in the form of maritime expeditions, most desolating at the points which they reach, but which cannot be made with great masses of men, nor produce great results.

Although, therefore, the vast domination of Charlemagne disappeared with him, it is not true that he founded nothing; he founded all the states which sprung from the dismemberment of his empire. His conquests entered into new combinations, but his wars attained their end: the foundation of the work subsisted, although its form was changed. It is thus that the action of great men is in general exercised. Charlemagne, as an administrator and legislator, appears to us under the same aspect.

His government is more difficult to sum up than his wars. Much has been said of the order which he introduced into his states, of the great system of administration which he attempted to found I indeed believe he attempted it, but he was very far from succeeding in his attempt: despite the unity, despite the activity of his thought and of his power, the disorder around him was immense and invincible; he repressed it for a moment on one point, but the evil reigned wherever his terrible will did not come; and when it had passed, recommenced the moment it was at a distance. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived by words. Open, in the present day, the *Almanac Royal;* you may read the system of the administration of France: all the powers, all the functionaries, from the last step to the most elevated, are there indicated and classed according to their relations. And there is no illusion—the things pass, in fact, as they are written; the book is a faithful image of the reality. It would be easy to construct a similar administrative chart for the empire of Charlemagne, to place in it dukes, counts, vicars, centeniers, sheriffs (*scabini*), and to distribute them, hierarchically organized, over the territory. But this would only be a vast fiction; more frequently, in most places, these magistrates were powerless, or themselves disorderly. The effort of Charlemagne to institute them and to make them act was continual, but as incessantly failed. Now that you are warned, and on your guard against the systematic appearances of this government, I may sketch the features—you will not conclude too much from them.

The local government must be distinguished from the central government.

In the provinces, the power of the emperor was exercised by two classes of agents—one local and permanent, the other sent to a distance, and transitory.

In the first class were included—first, dukes, counts, vicars of courts, centeniers, *scabini*, all resident magistrates nominated by the emperor himself or by his delegates, and charged in his name to raise forces, to render justice, to maintain order, to receive tribute; second, beneficiaries, or vassals of the king, who held from him, sometimes hereditarily, more frequently for life, still more frequently without any stipulation or rule, estates or domains, throughout the extent of which they exercised, mostly in their own name, partly in that of the emperor, a certain jurisdiction, and almost all the rights of sovereignty.

Nothing was well determined or very clear with regard to the situation of beneficiaries, and the nature of their power; they were at once delegates and independent, proprietors and usufructuaries; and one or other of these characters prevailed in them alternately. But however that may be, they were, without doubt, in habitual relation with Charlemagne, who made use of them everywhere in order to convey and execute his will.

Above the local and resident agents, magistrates, or beneficiaries, were the *missi dominici*, temporary ambassadors, charged, in the name of the emperor, to inspect the provinces, authorized to penetrate into conceded domains, as well as into free lands, invested with the right of reforming certain abuses, and called upon to render an account of everything to their master. The *missi dominici* were for Charlemagne, at least in the provinces, the principal medium of order and administration.

With regard to the central government, putting aside for a moment the action of Charlemagne himself, and of his personal counsellors, that is to say, with regard to the true government, the national assemblies, to judge from appearances, and if we may believe almost all modern historians, occupied an important place. They were, indeed, frequent and active under his reign. The following is a table of those which are expressly mentioned by the chroniclers of the time:

	Date.	Place.
1	770	Worms.
2	771	Valenciennes.
3	772	Worms.
4	773	Geneva.
5	775	Duren.
6	776	Worms.
7	777	Paderborn.
8	779	Duren.
9	780	Ehresburg.
10	781	Worms.
11	782	At the source of the Lippe.
12	785	Paderborn.
13	786	Worms.
14	787	Ibid.
15	788	Ingelheim.
16	789	Aix-la-Chapelle.
17	790	Worms.
18	792	Ratisbon.

	Date.	Place.
19	793	Ibid.
20	794	Frankfort.
21	795	Kuffenstein.
22	797	Aix-la-Chapelle.
23	799	Lippenheim.
24	800	Mayence.
25	803	Ibid.
26	804	At the source of the Lippe.
27	805	Thionville.
28	806	Nimeguen.
29	807	Coblentz.
30	809	Aix-la-Chapelle.
31	810	Verden.
32	811	Ibid.
33	812	Boulogne.
34	812	Aix-la-Chapelle.
35	813	Ibid.

To know the number and periodical regularity of these great meetings, doubtless, is something; but what passed within their breast, and what was the character of their political intervention? this is an important point.

A very curious monument remains upon this subject; one of the cotemporaries and counsellors of Charlemagne, his cousin-german, Adalhard, abbot of Corbie, wrote a treatise entitled *De Ordine Palatii*, destined to make known the internal government of Charlemagne, and more especially the general assemblies. This treatise is lost; but, towards the end of the ninth[1] century, Hincmar, archbishop of Reims, reproduced it almost complete in a letter of instruction written at the request of some great men of the kingdom, who had had recourse to his counsel for the government of Carloman, one of the sons of Louis-le-Begue. Certainly, no document merits more confidence. Here we read—

"It was the custom of the time to hold two councils every year. . . . . in both of them, and in order that they might not appear convoked without motive,[2] they submitted to the

[1] In 882.

[2] *Ne quasi sine causa convocari viderentur.* This phrase indicates that most of the members of those assemblies looked upon the obligation of repairing thither as a burden; that they had but little desire to share in the legislative power, and that Charlemagne wished to legitimate their convocation by giving them something to do, far rather than that he subjected himself to the necessity of obtaining their adhesion.

examination and deliberation of the nobles . . . . and, in virtue of the orders of the king, the articles of the law named *capitula*, which the king himself had drawn up by the inspiration of God, or the necessity of which had been made manifest to him in the interval between the meetings."

The proposition of the capitularies, or, to speak in modern phraseology, the initiative, therefore, emanated from the emperor. It must have been so: the initiative is naturally exercised by him who wishes to regulate, to reform, and it was Charlemagne who had conceived this design. Still I do not doubt any the more that the members of assembly might have made any propositions which appeared desirable to them; the constitutional mistrusts and artifices of our times were, certainly, unknown to Charlemagne, too sure of his power to fear the liberty of deliberations, and who saw in these assemblies a means of government far more than a barrier to his authority. I resume the text of Hincmar:

"After having received these communications, they deliberated upon them one, two, three, or even a greater number of days, according to the importance of the matter. Messengers from the palace, going and coming, received their questions and reported the answers; and no stranger approached the place of their meeting, until the result of their deliberations had been put before the eyes of the great prince, who then, with the wisdom which he received from God, adopted a resolution to which all obeyed."

The definitive resolution always depended therefore on Charlemagne alone; the assembly only gave him information and counsel. Hincmar continues:

"The things, accordingly, went on thus for one, two, or more capitularies, until, with the aid of God, all the necessities of the times were provided for.

"While his affairs were treated of in this manner out of the presence of the king, the prince himself, amidst the multitude which generally came to the general councils, was occupied in receiving presents, saluting the most considerable men, discoursing with those whom he rarely saw, testifying an affectionate interest in the more aged, making merry with the younger; and doing these and similar things alike for ecclesiastics as for seculars. Still, if those who deliberated upon matters submitted to their examination manifested a desire therefor, the king repaired to them; remained with them as long as they wished; and they reported to him with com-

plete familiarity what they thought of everything, and what were the friendly discussions which had been raised among them. I must not forget to mention that, if the weather was fine, all this passed in the open air; if not, in distinct buildings, where those who had to deliberate upon the propositions of the kings were separated from the multitude of persons who came to the assembly, and then the less considerable men could not enter. The places destined for the meeting of the lords were divided into two parts, so that the bishops, abbots, and priests, high in dignity, could be united without any mixture of the laity. In the same way the counts and other principal men of the state were separated, in the morning, from the rest of the multitude, until, the king present or absent, they were all met together; and the above-mentioned lords, the priests on their side, and the laity on theirs, repaired to the hall assigned to them, and where they had honorably prepared their seats. When the lay and ecclesiastical lords were thus separated from the multitude, it remained in their option to sit together, or separately, according to the affairs of which they had to treat—ecclesiastical, secular, or both. So if they wished any one to come, whether to demand nourishment, or to ask a question, and again to dismiss him, after having received what they wanted, they could do so. Thus passed the examination of the affairs which the king proposed to their deliberations.

"The second occupation of the king was to demand of every one what he had to report to him, or to teach him concerning the part of the kingdom whence he came. Not only was this permitted to every one, but they were strictly recommended to inquire, in the intervals of the assemblies, what passed within or without the kingdom; and that they should seek to know this from foreigners as well as countrymen, enemies as well as friends, sometimes by employing envoys, and without taking much care as to how the intelligence was acquired. The king wished to know whether, in any part, any corner of the kingdom, the people murmured and were agitated, and what was the cause of its agitation, and whether it had come to a disturbance upon which it was necessary that a general council should be employed, and other similar details. He also wished to know if any of the subdued nations thought of revolting; if any of those who had revolted seemed disposed to submit; if those who were still independent menaced the kingdom with any attack, &c. Upon all these matters

wherever a disturbance or a danger became manifest, he principally asked what were its motives or occasion."[1]

I shall have no need of long reflections in order to make you recognize the true character of these assemblies; it is clearly shown in the picture which has been traced by Hincmar. Charlemagne alone fills it; he is the centre and soul of all things; it is he who says that the assemblies shall meet, that they shall deliberate; it is he who occupies himself about the state of the country, who proposes and sanctions laws; in him reside the will and impulsion; it is from him that all emanated, in order to return to him. There was there no great national liberty, no true public activity; but there was a vast means of government.[2]

This means was by no means sterile. Independently of he force which Charlemagne drew from it for current affairs, you have seen that it was there that the *capitularies* were generally drawn up and decreed. In our next lecture I shall occupy you more especially with this celebrated legislation. I desire at present merely to give you an idea of it.

While waiting for more details, here is a table of the capitularies of Charlemagne, with their number, their extent, and their object:

Table of the Capitularies of Charlemagne.

	Date.	Place.	Articles.	Civil Legislation.	Religious Legislation.
1	769	.....	18	1	17
2	779	Duren	23	15	8
3	788	Ratisbon	8	7	1
4	789	Aix-la-Chapelle..	80	19	61
5	Id.	.....	16	..	16
6	Id.	.....	23	14	9
7	Id.	.....	34	20	14
8	793	.....	17	15	2
9	794	Frankfort.....	54	18	36
10	797	Aix-la-Chapelle..	11	11	
11	799	.....	5	..	5

[1] Hincm. *App. de Ordine Palatii*, vol. ii., pp. 201—215.
[2] See my *Essais sur l'Histoire de France*, pp. 315—344.

Table of the Capitularies of Charlemagne—continued.

	Date.	Place.	Articles.	Civil Legislation.	Religious Legislation.
	Before.				
12	800	.....	70		
13	800	.....	5	5	
14	801	.....	8	8	
15	Id.	.....	1	..	1
16	Id.	.....	22	..	22
17	802	.....	41	27	14
18	Id.	.....	23	18	5
19	803	Aix-la-Chapelle .	7	..	7
20	Id.	Idem	1[1]	..	1
21	Id.	Idem	1	..	1
22	Id.	.....	11	11	
23	Id.	.....	29	27	2
24	Id.	.....	12	12	
25	Id.	.....	22	20	2
26	Id.	.....	8	8	
27	Id.	.....	13	11	2
28	Id.	Worms.....	3		3
29	804	Seltz.....	8		8
	Id.	Idem.....	12		12
30	805	Thionville.....	16		16
31	Id.	Idem.....	25	23	2
32	Id.	Idem	16	14	2
33	Id.	Idem.....	1		1
34	806	.....	20[2]		
35	Id.	.....	8	7	1
36	Id.	.....	6	6	
37	Id.	.....	8	7	1
38	Id.	Nimeguen.....	19	18	1
39	Id.	.....	23		23
40	807	....	7	7	
41	808	.....	30	28	2
42	809	Aix-la-Chapelle..	37	36	1
43	Id.	Idem.....	16	15	1
44	810	Idem.....	18	14	4
45	Id.	.....	16	13	3
46	Id.	.....	5	5	
47	811	.....	12	7	5
48	Id.	.....	13		13
49	Id.	.....	9	9	

[1] Domestic and Rural Legislation. This is the capitulary *De Villis*.
[2] Political Legislation. Division of States.

Table of the Capitularies of Charlemagne—continued.

	Date.	Place.	Articles.	Civil Legislation.	Religious Legislation.
50	812	.....	9	9	
51	Id.	Boulogne.....	11	11	
52	Id.	.....	13	13	
53	813	.....	28	9	19
54	Id.	Aix-la-Chapelle..	20	19	1
55	Id.	Idem.....	46	46	
56	Date uncertain.	.....	59	26	33
57	Id.	.....	14		14
58	Id.	.....	13		13
59	Id.	.....	13	12	1
60	Id.	.....	9		9
		Total.....	1126	621	415

Surely such a table gives evidence of great legislative activity; and yet it says nothing of the revision which Charlemagne caused to be made of the ancient barbarous laws, especially the Salic and Lombard laws. In fact, activity, an universal indefatigable activity, the desire to think of everything, of introducing everywhere at once animation and rule, is the true, the great characteristic of the government of Charlemagne—the character which he himself, and he alone, impressed on his times. I am about to place before you a new proof of this. This was not a time (allow me the expression) for much writing and scribbling; of a surety, the multitude of official acts drawn up under a reign would not prove any great things in favor of the genius of a monarch in the present day. It was different with those of Charlemagne. There can be no doubt but that the large number of public acts of all kinds which have come down to us from it, is an incontestible testimony of the immense and contagious activity, which was, perhaps, his greatest superiority and his surest power. The following is a table and classification of those acts—of those, at least, which have been printed in learned collections. Many others are doubtless lost; others, perhaps, remain in manuscript, and unknown.

Table of the Principal Diplomas, Documents, Letters, and Various Acts emanated from Charlemagne or other great men, Lay or Ecclesiastical, under his Reign.

Date.	Number.	Of Charlemagne.	Of Others.	Acts of Civil Government.	Acts of Religious Government.	Donations and Concessions to Churches.	Donations and Concessions to Monasteries.	Letters.	Various Acts.
769	23	6	17	..	3	4	14	2	
770	16	3	13	..	..	5	8	3	
771	9	1	8	..	2	..	7		
772	33	7	26	1	2	12	16	1	1
773	18	2	16	..	2	9	6	..	1
774	21	7	14	2	1	3	7	6	2
775	19	8	11	..	2	6	7	4	
776	20	4	16	..	1	3	10	4	2
777	18	4	14	1	..	5	11	1	
778	16	5	11	..	..	6	8	2	
779	19	6	13	1	2	8	8		
780	10	3	7	2	..	2	5	1	
781	12	6	6	2	2	1	5	..	2
782	21	6	15	..	..	6	4	9	2
783	11	1	10	..	..	..	4	5	2
784	6	1	5	..	..	2	2	..	2
785	15	..	15	..	1	..	7	6	1
786	15	4	11	2	4	..	6	2	1
787	26	10	16	2	6	3	5	9	1
788	27	3	24	3	2	2	12	7	1
789	16	7	9	3	2	1	6	1	3
790	22	11	11	2	3	2	14	1	
791	20	1	19	..	1	4	12	2	1
792	7	1	6	..	1	1	5		
793	28	3	25	4	1	1	7	12	3
794	20	8	12	..	7	4	4	3	2
795	14	3	11	..	1	3	5	3	2
796	32	4	28	..	2	3	15	11	1
797	15	8	7	4	1	3	5	2	
798	21	2	19	1	2	2	10	5	1
799	27	3	24	1	4	4	6	6	6
800	23	6	17	3	..	3	12	1	4
801	23	5	18	1	3	4	13	2	
802	30	13	17	4	8	3	9	5	1
803	26	15	11	7	3	7	7	..	2
804	38	5	33	2	2	9	24	..	1
805	15	6	9	2	2	4	7		
806	25	8	17	5	2	3	13	1	1
807	33	3	30	1	1	11	10	2	8
808	29	3	26	1	..	17	7	3	1

Table of the Principal Diplomas, &c.—continued.

Date.	Number	Of Charlemagne.	Of Others.	Acts of Civil Government.	Acts of Religious Government.	Donations and Concessions to Churches.	Donations and Concessions to Monasteries.	Letters	Various Acts.
809	15	5	10	3	2	5	1	4	
810	19	6	13	3	..	1	3	8	1
811	27	5	22	4	1	7	14	..	1
812	19	7	12	5	..	1	10	..	3
813	42	3	29	4	6	6	26		
814	10	..	..	..	..	7	1	..	2
Year uncertain.	194	19	175	4	2	129	27	21	11
	745	257	878	80	87	322	428	155	73

NOTE.—The elements of this table are taken from the "History of the Germanic Empire" of Count Bünau, vol. ii., pp. 872—930; Leipzick, 1732.

Such are the facts—at least, such are the frames in which they are placed. Now, I here reproduce the question which I raised just now concerning the wars of Charlemagne. Is it true, is it possible, that of this government, so active and vigorous, nothing remained—that all disappeared with Charlemagne—that he founded nothing for the internal consolidation of society?

What fell with Charlemagne, what rested upon him alone, and could not survive him, was the central government. After continuing some time under Louis le Debonnaire and Charles le Chauve, but with less and less energy and influence, the general assemblies, the *missi dominici*, the whole machinery of the central and sovereign administration, disappeared. Not so the local government, the dukes, counts, vicaires, centeniers, beneficiaries, vassals, who held authority in their several neighborhoods under the rule of Charlemagne. Before his time, the disorder had been as great in each locality as in the commonwealth generally; landed properties, magistracies were incessantly changing hands; no

local positions or influences possessed any steadiness or permanence. During the forty-six years of his government these influences had time to become rooted in the same soil, in the same families; they had acquired stability, the first condition of the progress which was destined to render them independent and hereditary, and make them the elements of the feudal regime. Nothing, certainly, less resembles feudalism than the sovereign unity which Charlemagne aspired to establish; yet he is the true founder of feudal society! it was he who, by arresting the external invasions, and repressing, to a certain extent, the intestine disorders, gave to local situations, fortunes, influences, sufficient time to take real possession of the country. After him, his general government perished like his conquests; his unity of authority like his extended empire; but as the empire was broken into separate states, which acquired a vigorous and durable life, so the central sovereignty of Charlemagne resolved itself into a multitude of local sovereignties, to which a portion of the strength of his government had been imparted, and which had acquired under its shelter the conditions requisite for reality and durability; so that in this second point of view, in his civil as well as military capacity, if we look beyond first appearances, he accomplished and founded much.

I might show him to you accomplishing and leaving analogous results in the church; there also he arrested dissolution, until his time always increasing: there also he gave society time to rest, to acquire some consistency and to enter upon new paths. But time presses: I have yet at present to speak o the influence of Charlemagne in the intellectual order, and of the place occupied by his reign in the history of the human mind; scarcely shall I be able to point out the principal features.

It is more difficult here than anywhere else to sum up facts and present them in a table. The acts of Charlemagne in favor of moral civilization form no entirety, manifest no systematic form; they are isolated, scattered acts; at times the foundation of certain schools, at times measures taken for the improvement of ecclesiastical offices, and the progress of the knowledge which depends on them; also general recommendations for the instruction of priests and laymen; but most frequently an eager protection of distinguished men, and a particular care to surround himself with them.

Table of the celebrated men born, or who died under the reign of Charlemagne.

Names.	Country.	Birth.	Death.	Condition.	Works.
1. Alcuin (he took the name of Albinus, and the surname of Flaccus).	England (co. York).	About 735	804	Chief of the school of the palace of Charlemagne, abbot of Saint Martin of Tours.	More than 30 works—viz: 1. Commentaries on the Scriptures; 2. Polemical, moral, and literary writings; 3. Historical writings, letters, and poetry.
2. Angilbert (surnamed Homer).	Neustria.	... ...	814	Prime minister of Pepin, king of Italy, duke of maritime France, from the Scheldt to the Seine, secretary of Charlemagne, abbot of Saint Riquieri.	1. Poems; 2. An account of what he had done for his monastery while abbot.
3. Leidrade.	Norica.	... ...	About 816	Archbishop of Lyons, one of the principal *missi dominici* of Charlemagne.	1. Letters; 2. Theological writings.
4. Smaragde.	... ...	... ...	About 820	Abbot of Saint Mihiel, employed by Charlemagne in many negotiations.	1. Treatises of morality; 2. Commentaries on the New Testament; 3. A large grammar.
5. Saint Benedict d'Aniane.	Septimaine.	751	821	Abbot of Aniane and of Inde; reformer of monasteries.	1. Code of monastic rules; 2. Concord of rules; 3. Theological writings.
6. Theodulph.	Italy (Goth.)	... ...	821	Bishop of Orleans; *missus* of Charlemagne.	1. Instructions concerning schools; 2. Theological writings; 3. Poems.

Table of the celebrated men born, or who died under the reign of Charlemagne—continued.

Names.	Country.	Birth.	Death.	Condition.	Works.
7. Adalhard.	Austrasia.	753	826	Counsellor of Pepin, king of Italy, and of Charlemagne; abbot of Corbie.	1. Statutes for the Abbey of Corbie: 2. Letters; 3. A treatise *De Ordine Palatii*, reproduced by Hincmar.
8. Ansegise.	Burgundy.	... ...	833	Overseer of the buildings of Charlemagne, employed in various missions; abbot of Fontenelle.	The first collection of the capitularies of Charlemagne, and of Louis le Debonnaire, in four books.
9. Wala (surnamed Arsène and Jérémiah).	Austrasia.	... ...	836	Counsellor of Louis le Debonnaire, and abbot of Corbie.	He took a great part in the revolutions of the reign of Louis le Debonnaire.
10. Amalaire, surnamed Symphosius.	Austrasia.	... ...	837	Chief of the school of the palace, and priest at Metz.	1. The rule of the canons; 2. A large treatise of ecclesiastical offices; 3. Letters.
11. Eginhard.	Austrasia.	... ...	839	Secretary of Charlemagne, and abbot of Seliegenstadt.	1. The Life of Charlemagne; 2. Annals; 3. Letters.
12. Agobard	Spain.	779	840	Archbishop of Lyons.	1. Theological writings, stamped with a reforming spirit; 2. Letters; 3. Some Poems.

13. Thegan.	Austrasia	.. ...	About 846	Chorepiscopus of Tréves.	The Life of Louis le Debonnaire.
14. Raban Maur.	Austrasia.	776	856	Abbot of Fulda, archbishop of Mayence.	Fifty-one theological, moral, philosophical, philological, chronological works, letters, &c.
15. Walfrid (Strabo).	Germany.	807	849	Abbot of Reichenau, near Constance.	1. A Commentary on the whole Bible; 2. A Life of Saint Gall; 3. Many other theological works; 4. Poems; among others a descriptive poem, *Hortulus*.
16. Nithard.	Austrasia.	Before 790	About 859	Duke of Maritime France, monk of Saint Riquieri.	History of the dissensions of the sons of Louis le Debonnaire.
17. Florus.	Burgundy.	... ...	About 860	Deacon and priest at Lyons.	Many theological writings, having for the most part a polemical character. The principal is a refutation of John Erigena. Poems; among others a Lament on the dismemberment of the empire, after Louis le Debonnaire.
18. Saint Prudentius (family name, Galindo)	Spain.	. ...	861	Bishop of Troyes.	Theological writings, among others, upon predestination, and against John Erigena.

Table of the celebrated men born, or who died under the reign of Charlemagne.—continued.

Names.	Country.	Birth.	Death.	Condition.	Works.
19. Servat-Loup.	Diocese of Sens.	... ...	862	Abbot of Ferrieres, in Gatinois.	1. Theological writings; among others, upon predestination: 2. Letters; 3. A history of the emperors (lost).
20. Radbirt (Paschase).	Diocese of Soissons.	... ...	865	Abbot of Corbie.	Theological writings, among others, his work on the sacrament of the altar, or the body and blood of Jesus Christ.
21. Ratramne.	... ...	... ...	868	Monk at Corbie.	Theological writings, among others on transubstantiation and predestination.
22. Gottschalk.	Saxony.	... ...	869	Monk at Obais.	His writings in support of predestination.
23. John, called Scot, or Erigena.	Ireland.	... ...	Between 872 and 879	... ...	Many philosophical works; among others, 1. Of Divine Predestination; 2. Of the division of nature.

There is nothing systematic, nothing that can be estimated by the mere juxtaposition of figures and words. I wish, however, with a touch, and without entering into details, to place before you some facts which may give you an idea of that kind of action of Charlemagne, of which more is said than is known. It appears to me that a table of the celebrated men who were born and died under his reign—that is, of the celebrated men whom he employed, and those whom he made—would tend efficiently towards this end; this body of names and of works may be taken as a decided proof, and even as a correct estimate of the influence of Charlemagne over minds.

Surely such a table is sufficient to prove that at this epoch, and under the star of Charlemagne, intellectual activity was great. Recall to your minds the times from whence we set out; call to mind that from the sixth to the eighth century, we had great difficulty in finding any names, any works; that sermons and legends were almost the only monuments which we encountered. Here, on the contrary, you see reappear, and that almost at once, philosophical, historical, philological, and critical writings; you find yourself in the presence of study and science—that is to say, of pure and disinterested intellectual activity, of the real movement of mind. I shall soon discuss with you, in a more detailed manner, the men and the works I have just named, and you will see that they truly commence a new epoch, and merit the most serious attention.

Now, I ask, have we a right to say that Charlemagne has founded nothing, that nothing remains of his works? I have merely given you a glimpse, as in a transient panorama, of their principal results; and yet their permanence is thus shown therein as clearly as their grandeur. It is evident that, by his wars, by his government, and by his action upon minds, Charlemagne has left the most profound traces; that if many of the things he did perished with him, many others have survived him; that western Europe, in a word, left his hands entirely different from what it was when he received it.

What is the general dominant character of this change, of the crisis over which Charlemagne presided?

Take in at one view, that history of the civilization in France under the Merovingian kings which we have just studied; it is the history of a constant, universal decline. In individual man as in society, in the religious society as in

civil society, everywhere we have seen anarchy and weakness extending itself more and more; we have seen everything become enervated and dissolved, both institutions and ideas, what remained of the Roman world and what the Germans had introduced. Up to the eighth century, nothing of what had formerly been could continue to exist; nothing which seemed to dawn could succeed in fixing itself.

Dating from Charlemagne, the face of things changes; decay is arrested, progress recommences. Yet for a long period the disord' r will be enormous, the progress partial, but little visible, or often suspended. This matters not: we shall no more encounter those long ages of disorganization, of always increasing intellectual sterility: through a thousand sufferings, a thousand interruptions, we shall see power and life revive in man and in society. Charlemagne marks the limit at which the dissolution of the ancient Roman and barbarian world is consummated, and where really begins the formation of modern Europe, of the new world. It was under his reign, and as it were under his hand, that the shock took place by which European society, turning right round, left the paths of destruction to enter those of creation.

If you would know truly what perished with him, and what, independently of the changes of form and appearance, is the portion of his works which did not survive him, if I mistake not, it is this:

In opening this course, the first fact which presented itself to your eyes, the first spectacle at which we were present, was that of the old Roman empire struggling with the barbarians. The latter triumphed; they destroyed the Empire. In combating it, they respected it; no sooner had they destroyed it, than they aspired to reproduce it. All the great barbaric chiefs, Ataulphe, Theodoric, Euric, Clovis, showed themselves full of the desire of succeeding to the Roman emperors, of adapting their tribes to the frame of that society which they had conquered. None of them succeeded therein; none of them contrived to resuscitate the name and forms of the empire, even for a moment; they were overcome by that torrent of invasion, by that general course of dissolution which carried all things before it; barbarism incessantly extended and renewed itself, but the Roman empire was still present to all imagination; it was between barbarism and Roman civilization that, in all minds of any compass at all, the question lay.

It was still in this position when Charlemagne appeared; he also, he especially nursed the hope of resolving it, as all the great barbarians who went before him had wished to resolve it,—that is to say by reconstituting the empire. What Diocletian, Constantine, Julian, had attempted to maintain with the old wrecks of the Roman legions, that is, the struggle against the invasion, Charlemagne undertook to do with Franks, Goths, and Lombards: he occupied the same territory; he proposed to himself the same design. Without, and almost always on the same frontiers, he maintained the same struggle; within, he restored its name to the empire, he attempted to bring back the unity of its administration; he placed the imperial crown upon his head. Strange contrast! He dwelt in Germany; in war, in national assemblies, in the interior of his family, he acted as a German; his personal nature, his language, his manners, his external form, his way of living, were German; and not only were they German, but he did not desire to change them. "He always wore," says Eginhard, "the habit of his fathers, the habit of the Franks. . . . Foreign costumes, however rich, he scorned, and suffered no one to be clothed with them. Twice only during the stay which he made at Rome, first at the request of pope Adrian, and then at the solicitation of Leo, the successor of that pontiff, he consented to wear the long tunic, the chlamys, and the Roman sandal." He was, in fact, completely German, with the exception of the ambition of his thought; it was towards the Roman empire, towards Roman civilization that it tended; that was what he desired to establish, with barbarians as his instruments.

This was, in him, the portion of egoism and illusion; and in this it was that he failed. The Roman empire, and its unity, were invincibly repugnant to the new distribution of the population, the new relations, the new moral condition of mankind; Roman civilization could only enter as a transformed element into the new world which was preparing. This idea, the aspiration of Charlemagne, was not a public idea, nor a public want; all that he did for its accomplishment perished with him. Yet even of this vain endeavor something remained. The name of the western empire, revived by him, and the rights which were thought to be attached to the title of emperor, resumed their place among the elements of history, and were for several centuries longer an object of ambition, an influencing principle of events.

Even, therefore, in the purely egoistical and ephemera portion of his operations, it cannot be said that the ideas of Charlemagne were absolutely sterile, nor totally devoid of duration.

Here we must stop; the way is long, and I have proceeded so quickly that I have hardly had time to describe the principal events of the journey. It is difficult, it is fatiguing to have to compress within a few pages what filled the life of a great man. I have as yet only been able to give you a general idea of the reign of Charlemagne, and of his place in the history of our civilization. I shall probably employ many of the following lectures in making you acquainted with him under certain special relations; though I shall be very far from doing justice to the subject.

END OF VOL. II.

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